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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Josiah B. Simon 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of German and Scandinavian  
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Franz Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State: Biography, History and Tragedy 
 
 
 Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) is known today as one of the most influential 
German Jewish intellectuals of the twentieth century.  His most celebrated work, The Star 
of Redemption, has earned him a reputation as a challenging religious thinker with 
increasing relevance for contemporary religious, philosophical and historical debates.  
However, this legacy has largely ignored his first published book, Hegel and the State 
(1920).  My dissertation is the first English-language monograph to fully explore 
Rosenzweig's intellectual biography of Hegel, making a contribution to contemporary 
Hegel and Rosenzweig scholarship alike.  I offer an analysis that draws on the formal 
characteristics of the work—such as the epigraph, the narrative and biographical 
structure, as well as the historical presuppositions of the foreword and the conclusion—to 
show how Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's key texts, culminating in the 
Philosophy of Right, is informed by his own biographical development and the influence 
of thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Meinecke.  By recasting his critique of 
Hegel’s political thinking into biographical and historical terms, I ultimately argue that 
Rosenzweig's narrative in Hegel and the State is a tragic foil for his own development as 
a German historian. In Rosenzweig's interpretation, the relationship between the 
individual and the state championed by Hegel ends in the tragic separation of the 
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individual from the reconciliatory promise of Idealist thought.  By unearthing 
Rosenzweig's latent theory of tragedy in Hegel and the State—evidenced most clearly in 
how he situates the figures of Friedrich Hölderlin and Napoleon—I argue that the 
historical and philosophical crisis that marked the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
particularly Rosenzweig's own biographical crisis, shapes his work as the author of Hegel 
and the State.  In addition to providing a critical commentary on the cultural, 
philosophical and literary history of the German nation, as well as providing the first 
English translation of many passages from Hegel and the State, my dissertation lays the 
necessary groundwork for a reinterpretation of Rosenzweig's critique of German Idealism 
in The Star of Redemption.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCING HEGEL AND THE STATE 
 
 
Preface: A Letter to Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik1 
 
Dear Wolfdietrich, 
 You once wrote that to approach Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State with other 
than philological eyes would be a high task.2  Indeed, especially for those already 
familiar with Rosenzweig's later work—above all The Star of Redemption—the Hegel 
book seems not only to be written by another author entirely, but also to stem from a 
vastly different age.  Rather than providing an end to this dialogue, your concern serves 
as the starting point for a now pressing renewed historical question: Why and how 
should one read Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State?   
 The most obvious answer, and the one given most recently by Axel Honneth in his 
afterword to the first Suhrkamp edition, is that this book is still highly relevant to 
contemporary Hegel scholarship.3   Indeed, this aspect cannot be overlooked and the 
present work, to which this letter serves as a preface, preserves this perspective by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Professor Schmied-Kowarzik is the founding president of the International Rosenzweig Society (2004).  I 
first met him on a research trip to Kassel in 2007.  Although our project to digitalize the Rosenzweig 
archive and help better network Rosenzweig scholars was not funded, he provided me with immeasurable 
guidance and support.  His friendship is an example of how the greatest joys in life sometimes grow from 
great struggles.  He remains an inspiration for me, in this work and beyond. 
 
2 See Schmied-Kowarzik, Franz Rosenzweig. 
 
3 Rosenzweig, Franz. Hegel und der Staat. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010. 556-82. Hereafter, HS. First 
edition published in 1920. All English quotations from HS by Josiah B. Simon.  
 2 
reconstructing and translating—into English for the first time—a large selection of 
Rosenzweig's Hegel interpretations.   
 However, there is a larger question at play, one which transcends both the 
particular interest in Hegel and Rosenzweig alike, and points to a more universal 
concern: how and why should we write about the lives of others? Or to ask the same 
question differently: what is the relation between biography and history? 
 Given the countless number of biographies, autobiographies and memoirs that 
appear each year, it may seem like the perspective of biography may lead to the trivial 
examples we see on display in today's mass-market bookstores, far away from the more 
dignified paths set in motion by the lives of Augustine, Rousseau and Goethe.  However, I 
am rather uninterested in such reproducible memoirs, which distract from the 
philosophical implications of biography for our understanding as historical beings. 
 This leads me to the figure of Franz Rosenzweig.  Wolfdietrich, you more than any 
other should understand the frustrations (and joys!) of writing about an author and a 
book only very few in your audience can recognize.  Indeed, it was first through your 
work that Rosenzweig became a common name in wider academic circles.  My 
perspective is as follows: Rosenzweig is an exemplary figure for exploring the 
intersections of biography and history, of life and thought, a lens through which we can 
better observe these questions.  And moreover, his book Hegel and the State, which is 
itself a biography of Hegel, represents a particular stage in Rosenzweig's own biography.  
Thus, my project has three levels of abstraction: 1) the life of Hegel, as told by 
Rosenzweig, 2) the life of Rosenzweig himself, especially the early Rosenzweig, and 
finally, 3) the significance of biographical history as it is reflected into philosophical 
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production.  This final point is manifested in the work and letters both Rosenzweig and 
Hegel left behind as contributions to world history.   
 You wrote in passing in the introduction to your Kassel book, that in Hegel and 
the State, Hegel serves as a "Folie" (foil) for Rosenzweig.4  This phrase has remained 
with me since.  Following upon your theatrical implication, I first began to think of Hegel 
as a "tragic" foil for Rosenzweig.  It is clear from the "Frankfurt" and the "Napoleon" 
sections that our young historian had tragedy on his mind when writing this book.  You 
may recall that while working on the Frankfurt chapter in particular, Rosenzweig 
composed a draft for a book entitled: "The Hero: A History of Tragic Individuality in 
Germany since Lessing".  Like so many of his age, Rosenzweig was also caught up in the 
spirit of tragedy introduced by Nietzsche.  The entire second volume of Hegel and the 
State is framed by Napoleon's historical, and according to Rosenzweig, tragic character.  
He even titles one of his sections "The Hero of the Trauerspiel."  Because Rosenzweig 
does not offer a theory of tragedy until Part I of The Star of Redemption, in Hegel and 
the State he remains caught between the poles of tragedy and "Trauer" (mourning), 
painting a complex picture of Hegel that lacks the clear contours he gives tragedy in The 
Star.  Hegel and the State proceeds by way of form and language, thus it is not through 
an external theory of tragedy, but only by means of these conceptual tools—language and 
form—that we can begin to understand Rosenzweig's own position as the author of the 
book.  Thus, in the following work, I allow Rosenzweig's language and the form of his 
book to guide my own interpretation.  This method also mirrors the method of biography 
implicit in Hegel and the State, namely that only by first looking at the work and 
production of individuals may we come to understand their personalities.  By following !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Schmied-Kowarzik, Franz Rosenzweig. Religionsphilosoph aus Kassel. 8-9. 
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Rosenzweig's language, not only do I offer a Hegel interpretation relevant to 
contemporary debates, but what emerges from this language is the complexity of 
Rosenzweig's own "lived-experience"—to borrow a term from Dilthey—as the author of 
Hegel and the State.  It is nothing less than Rosenzweig's "lived-experience" as the author 
of Hegel and the State that fuels the heartbeat of my interpretation.      
And finally a short note on method: by allowing the form and content of 
Rosenzweig's language to guide my interpretation, I understand my procedure as a type 
of phenomenological Epoché, which I briefly introduce in Chapter I.  This is an attempt 
on my behalf to allow Rosenzweig's work to provide us with the content to understand his 
personality.  I proceed towards this task by focusing on the form of the book as work of 
biography.  It is my hope that this approach lends my work significance beyond the mere 
scope of the book, and helps point us towards questions of the art of biography for 
historical understanding.  This is an approach not only inspired by Husserl's 
phenomenological attitude, but by my own first philosophical inspiration, Walter 
Benjamin.   
In the “Erkenntniskritische Vorrede”, under the section “Mißachtung und 
Mißdeutung der Barocktragödie," Benjamin writes that "[d]as Trauerspiel des deutschen 
Barock" appeared as the "Zerrbild der antiken Tragödie."5  According to Benjamin, this 
occurred because previous scholars had overlooked the importance of  “Formanalysis 
und Formgeschichte:”6 
   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Benjamin, Walter. Gesammelte Schriften. Erster Band, I. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980 
(1974). 230. 
 
6 Benjamin, 230.!
 5 
Die Idee einer Form ist nichts weniger Lebendiges als irgendeine konkrete 
Dichtung [...] Und so wie jede, auch die ungebräuchliche, die vereinzelte 
Sprachform gefaßt zu werden vermag nicht nur als Zeugnis dessen, der sie prägte, 
sondern als Dokument des Sprachlebens und seiner jeweiligen Möglichkeiten, 
enthält auch—und weit eigentlicher als jedes Einzelwerk—jedwede Kunstform 
den Index einer bestimmten objektiv notwendigen Gestaltung der Kunst.7            
 
Within Rosenzweig scholarship, looking back one could certainly understand how Hegel 
and the State—as an "Einzelwerk"—was seen as the "Zerrbild" of The Star of 
Redemption, how it was "mißachtet und mißdeutet."  Hegel and the State is often 
misrepresented as a work devoid of living force and as superseded by history.  All too 
often it is put prematurely back into the bookshelf as a "testimony" to the "old thinking."  
But could we not, as Benjamin does with various texts from the Baroque, understand it 
rather as a “Dokument des Sprachlebens”?  Is there not hidden in the form of the book 
as biography a “notwendige Gestaltung der Kunst,” which makes the book into 
something lasting and living?  
 These are my preliminary answers to the question, why and how to read Hegel 
and the State.  The language of the work itself will serve as the guide to its significance.  
Not only will the reader accompany me on a journey through Hegel's life, but this 
journey will also be a particular contribution to Rosenzweig's own understanding of 
history.  What will be seen—however, only once the journey is complete—is that in 
writing Hegel and the State Rosenzweig saw in Hegel's life-course the tragic foil for his 
own personality as a German historian.  Only by overcoming this moment in his 
biography, only by living through the tragic fate of the German people leading up to and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Benjamin, 230. 
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following the first World War, could Rosenzweig find the courage to follow his own life-
path towards the significance of religious thinking for our contemporary age.   
 Hegel and the State represents the pre-history of Rosenzweig's legacy known to 
the world today.  My work does not aim to undermine this legacy, but rather to show how 
deeply indebted Rosenzweig remained to the German people and their history throughout 
his life.  Thus, Wolfdietrich, I offer you these words as a way of thanking you for helping 
to bring Rosenzweig into the wider academic and public consciousness of the world.  
What follows is my own contribution to our continued struggle to grasp the significance 
and force of history for understanding our own lives and the lives of others around us.  
 
Sincerely Yours, 
Josiah Simon    
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 Hegel and the State, most briefly, is an intellectual biography of the philosopher 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831).  The book's author, Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), uses the 
form of biographical narrative in order to develop a critical perspective on Hegel's 
conception of the state.  The book grew out of Rosenzweig’s dissertation, written from 
1910-1912 under the German historian Friedrich Meinecke, and thus has a decidedly 
historicist tone and in this regard belongs to the tradition of German historiography 
beginning in the 19th century.  In its finished form, however, it was not published until 
1920, after the War and one year before The Star of Redemption—Rosenzweig's 
 7 
religious-philosophical magnum opus.  In the eight-year span leading up to these two 
publications, not only would the German nation undergo the shift from an empire to a 
democratic republic, but Rosenzweig's own personal life would so drastically change that 
he could write to Meinecke in a letter dated August 30, 1920: “The man who wrote The 
Star of Redemption to be published shortly by Kauffmann in Frankfurt—is of a very 
different caliber from the author of Hegel and the State.”8  This letter, which, in the 
words of Stefan Moses, first introduced a dark abyss between Rosenzweig's two major 
works, was written in response to an offer by Meinecke to appoint Rosenzweig to the 
then prestigious position of a university lecturer.  However, choosing rather to follow his 
awakening belief in Judaism, Rosenzweig rejected Meinecke's offer in favor of founding 
and directing the Freie Jüdische Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main.9  Like his cousin Hans 
Ehrenberg (1893-1958), his first philosophical teacher and friend,10 Rosenzweig's 
intellectual development led from German academic circles steeped in the traditions of 
the 19th and early 20th century to a life full of spiritual and religious practice.   
 Based on the account of this change, documented in numerous letters written by 
Rosenzweig during the War, many have come to hold the belief that in rejecting an 
academic future Rosenzweig also tore himself completely free from his academic past.  
But perhaps more importantly, it is on the basis of this belief that the majority of scholars 
have ignored or rejected Hegel and the State as the work of a mere student, in no way 
comparable to the more original and stunningly complex The Star of Redemption, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Glatzer, Nahum N. Franz Rosenzweig. New York: Schocken Books, 1970, 96. Hereafter, (Glatzer, Franz 
Rosenzweig). 
 
9 See here Meir, Ephraim. "Das Freie Jüdische Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main" in Franz Rosenzweig: 
Religionsphilosoph aus Kassel. Kassel: Euregioverlag, 2011. 76-85. 
 
10 Schmied-Kowarzik, Wolfdietrich. Rosenzweig im Gespräch mit Ehrenberg, Cohen und Buber. 
Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2006. 62.!
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effectively placing Rosenzweig's work on Hegel deep into the shadows of his past.  The 
above episode—the decision to reject an academic career in favor of a religious life—has 
since been used as a central argument to help navigate Rosenzweig's intellectual 
development.  This has led to an unmistakable fact of Rosenzweig scholarship: common 
to almost all accounts of his thought, at least in some regard, is an interpretation of 
Rosenzweig's life.  As will become clear over the course of this work, it is precisely this 
tension between life and thought that lies at the foundation of Rosenzweig's own 
interpretations in Hegel and the State.  
 In an essay by Reinhold Mayer and Inken Rühle dealing with the future of 
Rosenzweig studies, the authors state: “It is time to work out a biography for 
Rosenzweig, in order to fundamentally present the man and his work.”11  This demand 
for a comprehensive biography hints towards the complexity of Rosenzweig's intellectual 
development, even more so seeing that it is still unmet almost a century after 
Rosenzweig's death.  One may ask: why is there still no standard biography for a thinker 
such as Rosenzweig, who, although certainly no household name, has indeed become 
recognized as one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century?  The present work 
aims to help answer this question.   By providing the first English language exposition of 
Hegel and the State as a whole, I argue that by closely examining Rosenzweig's first 
book we will be able to more fully understand his own intellectual biography.    
 My investigation into Rosenzweig's intellectual development begins with a 
curious problem owing to scholarly reception.  Rosenzweig’s collected works were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 "Es gilt, eine Biographie Rosenzweigs zu erarbeiten, um den Menschen und sein Werk grundlegend 
vorzustellen." “Schwerpunkte zukünftiger Beschäftigung mit Franz Rosenzweig” in: Anckaert, L., and M. 
Brasser, and N. Samuelson, eds. The Legacy of Franz Rosenzweig. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004, 
81. Hereafter, (Anckaert, The Legacy). 
  
 9 
published in four volumes between 1976 and 1984 under the title Franz Rosenzweig, Der 
Mensch und sein Werk: Gesammelte Schriften.12  They stand today as the primary source 
on Rosenzweig’s life and thought.  But if one of the primary concerns of future 
scholarship on Rosenzweig is, as Mayer and Rühle state, to write a biography and 
accordingly to make Rosenzweig known to “a broader public,"13 then their essay must be 
accused of forgetting an important fact: Hegel and the State appears only marginally in 
Rosenzweig’s collected works—all that is included is the foreword to the work.  And yet, 
not only does this work stand on its own as an important contribution to German 
intellectual history, but it is also Rosenzweig’s first venture into the world of authorship.  
Accordingly, if in the future Hegel and the State remains neglected within Rosenzweig 
scholarship, then the demand to reach a broader public and to provide a comprehensive 
biography of Rosenzweig’s life will never reach its full fruition.   
 The clearest demand for reevaluating the role of Hegel and the State in the life of 
Rosenzweig comes from Otto Pöggler in his essay “Between Enlightenment and 
Romanticism: Rosenzweig and Hegel.”  To quote him at length: 
 
 If we separate Rosenzweig’s book on Hegel from his essential work, we render 
 the Hegel book a mere academic exercise; the questions Rosenzweig has to ask 
 about Hegel do not come into play.  Or to put it the other way around: if we do 
 not integrate the book on Hegel into Rosenzweig’s collected works, we cannot see 
 how important the confrontation with Hegel was for Rosenzweig’s own 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften. Bde I-IV. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976-1984. 
 
13 "einem breiteren Publikum bekannt zu machen." Anckaert, The Legacy, 79. 
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 development.  For clearly Rosenzweig’s “philosophy” was developed in the wake 
 of Hegel.14  
 
Pöggler’s thesis that Hegel and the State should not be understood as a “mere academic 
exercise,” but rather as the stage for his confrontation with Hegel, is further underscored 
when he refers to Hegel and the State in another essay on the same theme as a “Quelle” 
(source).15  If we pause for a moment on this German word, then the depth of this 
statement comes into better focus.  For a "Quelle" is not a mere textual source, as the 
word may imply, but rather, in regard to intellectual development, the source from which 
a life springs forth—even provoking the natural imagery of life-giving water.  While this 
in no way implies that Hegel and the State is the only "Quelle" of Rosenzweig's 
development—for certainly it is not—it does imply that if we ignore this originating 
source, we are ignoring an essential component in understanding Rosenzweig's life and 
thought.     
What is remarkable in such a line of interpretation is that it stands in direct 
contradiction to Rosenzweig own self-understanding—as it has been interpreted thus far.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Pöggeler, Otto. “Between Enlightenment and Romanticism: Rosenzweig and Hegel.” In The Philosophy 
of Franz Rosenzweig. Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. Hannover: University Press of New England, 1988, 108. 
Hereafter: (Pöggeler, The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig). It is on the basis of this argument that one of 
the first interpretations of Hegel and the State in the English language was written: the second chapter of 
Peter Gordon’s Rosenzweig and Heidegger (London: University of!California Press, 2003) entitled 
“Hegel’s Fate.”  In this chapter, Gordon argues that “Hegel and the State represents [Rosenzweig’s] earliest 
sustained reflection on the philosophical themes that would predominate in his later work” (84). Gordon 
argues that Rosenzweig’s emphasis on Hegel’s concept of fate in Hegel and the State “would later inform 
Rosenzweig’s reflections upon the nature of Jewish existence” (85).  Yet while Gordon's chapter serves as 
an adequate introduction to Hegel and the State in terms of intellectual history, he unfortunately does not 
carry his thesis on this book's influence throughout the entirety of the book, in effect passing over far too 
much of Hegel and the State to serve as an authoritative statement on the book.  Where the book does 
excel, however, is in pointing towards the central importance of Rosenzweig's chapter on Hegel's Frankfurt 
period.  In this regard alone can my own work said to be a continuation of his.         
 
15 Pöggeler, Otto. “Rosenzweig und Hegel.” In Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig, Bd. II. München: Verlag 
Karl Alber, 1988, 842. 
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In a letter to his parents dated May 1, 1917, three years before the publication of Hegel 
and the State, Rosenzweig, almost comically, sums up his opinion of his earliest work: “I 
have always deplored the idea of losing my literary virginity with the fat Hegel book.”16  
Already in 1913, Rosenzweig saw himself as a changed man.  This now legendary year 
marks a great turning point in Rosenzweig’s life.  To quote the Jewish philosopher and 
historian Norbert Samuelson: “Some scholars claim that Rosenzweig attended a Yom 
Kippur service in Berlin on October 11, 1913, and there had a religious experience that 
convinced him that he must become Jewish and not Christian.”17  This decision of 
Rosenzweig’s to “remain a Jew”18 has since been understood, by scholars and 
Rosenzweig alike, as the definitive move away from German Idealism towards Jewish 
Philosophy—and as interpreted within Rosenzweig's own intellectual development, as 
the move away from Hegel and the State towards The Star of Redemption.   
This, however, is a rather superficial interpretation of Rosenzweig's development, 
one that only uses Hegel and the State negatively to underscore Rosenzweig’s critique of 
German Idealism in The Star of Redemption.19  In fact, as I will clearly show, 
Rosenzweig already distanced himself quite distinctly from German Idealism with his 
early critique of Hegel.  In this sense, it is not towards Rosenzweig's religious thinking 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. 55. !
17 Samuelson, Norbert. Jewish Philosophy: An Historical Introduction. New York: Continuum, 2003, 298. 
 
18 Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. 28. 
 
19 This is not the case, however, with Myriam Bienenstock’s short article, “Rosenzweig’s Hegel” (1992).  
In this article Bienenstock, a renowned Hegel scholar, focuses on Rosenzweig’s reading of Hegel in light of 
Meinecke’s understanding of the Machtstaat, or power-state.  She is critical of Rosenzweig’s Hegel 
interpretation and makes the claim that Rosenzweig’s failure to adequately work through Hegel’s 
philosophy in his early years inhibited him from completely discarding Hegel later in his life. I touch upon 
this claim later. See Bienenstock, 177-82. !
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that we should turn as the "Quelle" of his move away from Idealism, but rather look 
within the "brilliant galaxy of German philosophy."  This will lead us deep into heart of 
Rosenzweig's thinking: deep into the labyrinths of Hegel and the State itself.  
 
 
Personality and Work   
In a journal entry from 1906, Rosenzweig writes: “Why does one philosophize? 
For the same reason that one makes music or literature or art.  Here too, in the last 
analysis, all that matters is the discovery of one’s own personality.”20  The concept of 
"personality" would occupy Rosenzweig frequently throughout his life and work.  
Already in his "Notes on the Baroque," written in 1908 but published posthumously, in 
which Rosenzweig works out a typology of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, the concept 
of "personality" plays a crucial role.  In discussing the young Goethe, for example, he 
argues that the 18th century was exemplified by a central problem in the life of the young 
writer: "the division between personality and life."21  "[A]ll his restless searching," he 
declares of Goethe, "was no searching at all [...] but rather an unceasing discovery; what 
must have appeared to him as failed attempts to harmonize the I and the world, were 
moreover positive stages upon the infinite path towards the realization of these two."22  
Rosenzweig, who was already familiar with Goethe's writings as a young man, sees this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. 9. 
 
21 "diese Getrenntheit von Persönlichkeit und Leben ist als Grundform des Rokokobewusstseins zugleich 
Wurzel seiner Problematik." "Notizen zum Barock". Rosenzweig Jahrbuch 4, (2009): 295. 
 
22 "all sein rastloses Suchen war nicht, wofür er es hielt [...] sondern ein unaufhörliches Finden; was ihm 
fehlgeschlagene Versuche scheinen musste, Ich und Welt zu harmonisieren, waren vielmehr positive 
Etappen aud dem unendlichen Wege zur Realisierung dieser beiden." Ibid. 297. 
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division between "the I and the world" reflected in the "dual life-consciousness"23 of the 
20th century.  This is a perspective developed in more detail by his older cousin Hans 
Ehrenberg in a pamphlet entitled "Die Geschichte des Menschen unserer Zeit."24  
Ehrenberg's task in this short piece, which Rosenzweig read while preparing to write his 
dissertation, was to show how the split between subjectivity and objectivity—an 
objectivity, or "Sachlichkeit", inherited from an overly historical 19th century and a 
subjectivity in search of a new spiritual home in the wake of Nietzsche's philosophy—
became the defining tension in the lives of his generation.  It was from out of this tension 
that Rosenzweig, much like Goethe before him, would soon embark on a journey of 
"unceasing discovery" to unite his emerging personality with the world.   
 But how are we to understand the concept of "personality"?  And how does this 
concept relate to the "world" as such?  As Theodor Adorno writes in his short essay, 
"Gloss on Personality": "If there existed a philosophical history of words, then it would 
have a worthy object in the expression 'personality' and in the changes its meaning has 
undergone."25  Adorno locates the beginnings of the modern usage of this word in Kant's 
Second Critique: personality is  
 
 "the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature regarded 
 nevertheless as also a capacity of a being subject to special laws–namely pure 
 practical laws given by his own reason, so that a persona as belonging to the 
 sensible world is subject to his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 "dualistisches Lebensbewusstsein." Ibid. 298 
 
24 Hans Ehrenberg, "Die Geschichte des Menschen unserer Zeit". Heidelberg: A-Ω Verlag, 1911. 
 
25 Theodor Adorno, "Gloss on Personality," in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 161-62.  
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 intelligible world; for it is then not to be wondered at that a human being, as 
 belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to his second 
 and highest vocation only with reverence, and its laws with the highest respect."26 
  
Defined in this manner, personality is understood as a component of our "intelligible 
character" in opposition to our sensible or "empirical character"; in other words, in its 
most abstract sense, it is the freedom we have as individuals to distinguish ourselves from 
the worldly laws of nature.  Personality and world will always stand distinct from each 
other—they represent the "two worlds" Kant so often sees us trapped between— yet 
neither one could exist without the other. 
 In The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig distinguishes this concept of personality 
as "freedom" from the world by opposing to it a concept of the self he terms 
"metaethics": "The self is solitary man in the hardest sense of the word: the personality is 
the "political animal."27 By "metaethics,"Rosenzweig means a tragically isolated 
individual who stands outside all relations to other selves.  Personality, in contrast, is a 
concept more in line with Hegel's own understanding of the term in his Phenomemologie 
des Geistes.  There, the concept of personality first appears when consciousness enters 
into the "actual world" (wirkliche Welt).28  Not to be confused with the self as such, 
personality is rather the "reality of the self" (Wirklichkeit des Selbst).29  In this sense, 
personality is always bound to the actual world, whereas for the "metaethical" self there 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. 5:87. 
!
27 Rosenzweig, Stern 71.  
 
28 Hegel, G.W.F. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977. 356. 
 
29 Ibid. 359 
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is no world at all.  But as personalities, we stand in direct relation to the "political" world 
around us, or as Rosenzweig expresses it in The Star of Redemption: "personality is man 
playing the role assigned to him by fate, one role among many in the polyphonic 
symphony of mankind."30  As a young doctoral student, Rosenzweig struggled to identify 
himself as the author of Hegel and the State; it was not until he wrote The Star of 
Redemption that he felt his personality and his world could unite.  Yet to understand 
Rosenzweig's role in the "symphony of mankind," to understand his fate as an individual, 
we must take more than just his magnum opus into account.  
 In his book Werk und Persönlichkeit, published in 1906—the same year 
Rosenzweig wrote so passionately of personality—Eduard Platzhoff-Lejeune argues that 
only in "the totality of works" may we find a "complete expression of a personality."31  
Indeed, and especially when dealing with writers and intellectuals as we are here, it is 
first through a subject's work that their personality becomes known to the world.32  It 
cannot be overstated that we depend upon written documents left behind—books, 
manuscripts, letters, etc.—to tell the story of a person's life.  But as Platzhoff-Lejeune 
argues, the goal is still to "penetrate behind the work, whose appearance gave notice to 
the personality."33  And yet, before there can be any hope of going behind the work, we 
must use this very work to reveal the personality in question—in other words, the work is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The Star of Redemption. 68 (Herafter, Star). !
31 "das Werk, oder die Gesamtheit der Werke, [ist] der völlige Ausdruck einer Persönlichkeit." Platzhoff-
Lejeune, Eduard. Werk und Persönlichkeit: Zu einer Theorie der Biographie. Minden in Westf.: J.C.C. 
Bruns' Verlag, 1906. 7. 
 
32 This approach to personality differentiates Rosenzweig from his predecessors in the 19th century.  Again 
in the "Notizen zum Barock" he writes: "to understand personality in the 19th century means to study it 
directly, it is ungraspable in the work.  But how Bismarck would have been misunderstood, if one could 
merely know him through his actions." ("Notizen zum Barock," 299) 
 
33 "hinter das Werk zu dringen, dessen Erscheinen auf die Persönlichkeit aufmerksam gemacht hat." Ibid. 9.  
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still necessary, even if it is merely a mediating factor between a personality and their 
world.  With the above thoughts in mind, how are we to approach Rosenzweig's Hegel 
and the State and what does this work tell us about his personality?   
 
 
On Historicism 
 In 1906, Rosenzweig began studying philosophy at Freiburg University with 
Professor Jonas Cohn.  These early studies would lead Rosenzweig away from his 
interest in medicine towards a deeper appreciation of history.  When in 1910 he began 
researching Hegel’s manuscripts for his dissertation, Rosenzweig was already deep into 
the discovery of his own “personality.”  However, as expressed in the now famous letter 
to Meinecke from 1920, Rosenzweig had great trouble recognizing this same personality 
only a decade later.  In that letter, in which, to remind, he rejected an offer for a 
university lectureship, Rosenzweig looks back upon the days of his youth: 
 
I felt a horror of myself, quite similar to the horror [Siegfried] Kähler34 felt in my 
 company when we were studying in Freiburg: I remember how sinister my !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Siegfried Kähler (1885-1963) was a German historian who studied with Rosenzweig under Meinecke.  
Together with a small group of Meinecke's other students, they identified themselves as the "Freiburg 
Circle" (Freiburger Kreis).  Kähler himself would go on to publish a book entitled Wilhelm von Humboldt 
und der Staat, a title unmistakably akin to Rosenzweig's own.  However, their approach to the personalities 
treated in their works—Kähler to von Humboldt and Rosenzweig to Hegel—was less similar than one may 
assume.  With Rosenzweig, only rarely do the personal details of Hegel's "life" arise in Hegel and the State: 
love relationships, emotional turmoil, and family relations are kept at a minimum.  Rather, as I described 
above, it is through the work as a form of historical truth that Rosenzweig seeks to gain access to Hegel's 
life.  Kähler procedes in a similar manner, and yet it was not only the "forms" of history that were of 
interest to him, but the personal feelings of his subject, especially as expressed though letters: "Nicht was er 
tat und leistete, vielmehr wie er es anlegte, um zu seiner Leistung zu gelangen [...] eine Anschauung zu 
gewinnen von der inneren Stellung dieses außerordentlichen Menschen zu seiner Zeit und Umwelt."(Kähler 
4)  Rosenzweig himself would not give his readers even that much insight into his method as a biographer.  
Rather, the method itself is hidden within the form of the book—so obsessed was Rosenzweig with the 
formal presentation of his work.  The difference between these two historians, between Kähler and 
Rosenzweig, can be gleaned from a letter Meinecke wrote to Kähler, which Kähler then ironically includes 
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 insatiable hunger for “forms” [Gestalten]—a hunger without goal or meaning, 
 driven  on solely by its own momentum—then appeared to him.  The study of 
 history would  only have served to feed my hunger for forms, my insatiable 
 receptivity; history to  me was a purveyor of forms, no more.35 
 
When Rosenzweig writes that "[t]he study of history" would only have fed his "insatiable 
hunger for "forms"," he is justifying to Meinecke why he chose not to accept his offer for 
a university position.  But read closely, Rosenzweig does not reject his own hunger for 
forms outright, but rather the study of history for its own sake—a clear response to the 
"crisis of historicism" his generation was experiencing.  This "crisis," as Georg Iggers 
expresses it in his authoritative book The German Conception of History,36 was based on 
the growing concern for "the limitations of human knowledge and the subjective 
character of all cognition in regard to human behavior and social processes."37  The 
ultimate result of this concern, within the context of a German historicism that "assumes 
that all values and all cognitions are historic and individual,"38 leads to a "radically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
in the preface to his book.  Meinecke is critical of Kähler's approach to!historical!scholarship:!"Aber!Sie!
handeln!wie!jemand,!der!unzufrieden!mit!dem!magischen!Oberlicht,!das!ihn![von!Humboldt]!bisher!
beleuchtete, die Lampe—nicht etwa auf den Tisch, wo man Ober- und Unterkörper gleichmäßig übersehen 
kann—sondern gleich auf den Fußboden setzt und von da aus denn auch die Unterhose Humboldts 
entdeckt"(Kähler V).  What horrified Rosenzweig years later as he reflected on his Hegel book, was not the 
content of the book itself, but the manner in which his own personal position was subsumed into the form 
of Hegel's works themselves.  This is immediately apparent in the opening pages of The Star of 
Redemption, where the personal position of the author is reflected in the language of the text itself.  But as 
for Hegel and the State, nowhere do we get a glimpse of Hegel's "Unterhose."   
 
35 Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. 95. 
 
36 Iggers, Georg. The German Conception of History. The National Tradition of Historical Thought from 
Herder to the Present. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1968 (1983). 
 
37 Iggers, 124. 
 
38 Ibid. 35. 
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relativistic position in regard to knowledge."39  Rosenzweig was aware of this danger, 
distancing himself from history as a mere "purveyor of forms" and as a discipline that 
was unable to provide a sustainable foundation for his newly awakening Jewish belief.  
However, like his teacher Meinecke, throughout his development he still held to a "faith 
in the meaningfulness of history."40  Thus, in the words of Paul Mendes-Flohr, it would 
"be erroneous to interpret Roesenzweig's moving letter to Meinecke as a rejection of 
history per se: rather he is passionately rejecting the then-prevailing modes of historical 
scholarship."41     
 Before turning to the question of "form," for it is Rosenzweig's "insatiable 
hunger" that we are still pursuing, I would like to briefly mention one mode of 
historicism that Rosenzweig was particularly sensitive to as the author of Hegel and the 
State: the historicist presupposition that Iggers identifies as "the state as an end in 
itself."42  From Meinecke's letter above, it could be falsely assumed that in rejecting the 
modes of historical scholarship Rosenzweig was also rejecting his work as the author of 
Hegel and the State.  The subject matter of that book, no less than the intellectual 
development leading up to the Hegelian version of "the state as an end in itself," certainly 
aligns Rosenzweig with the historicist tradition.  Within this tradition, "[s]tates have more 
than merely empirical existence [...] they each represent a higher spiritual principle."43  
And accordingly, "[f]or Meinecke, as for his teachers, belief in the central role of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Ibid. 125. !!
40 Ibid. 127. 
 
41 Mendes-Flohr, "Franz Rosenzweig and the Crisis of Historicism." 157. 
 
42 Iggers, 7. 
 
43 Iggers, 8. 
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state in human culture and in the spiritual character of political power was not merely a 
question of scholarly approach, but a matter of profound religious conviction."44  The 
same cannot be said of Rosenzweig.  While Hegel and the State indeed follows and 
culminates in Hegel's ideal of the state, there is an unmistakably critical tone that 
accompanies Rosenzweig's narrative (to say nothing of his personal religious 
convictions).  And although he is a historicist in the sense that his work assigns a central 
role to the state and to political history, in undermining these traditions he is also subtly 
undermining the tradition of historicism itself.  Following this line of argument, it can be 
assumed that Rosenzweig was further along in his response to the "crisis of historicism" 
when he was working on Hegel and the State than some critics may have believed.  And 
although he stuck to the central historicist principle that "[n]o individual, no institution, 
no historical deed can be judged by standards external to the situation in which it rises, 
but rather must be judged in terms of its own inherent values,"45 it was the manner in 
which he chose to follows this principle, precisely his "insatiable hunger for 'forms'," that 
distinguished him as an historian.       
 
 
Biography as Form 
 As a literary form, biography has not received the sort of attention that poetry, the 
novel or even the essay, have been given.  This is due in part to the very nature of the 
form itself; in the words of Helmut Koopmann: "die Biographie [ist] keine eigenständige 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Iggers, 198. !
45 Iggers, 8. 
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literarische Form [...] sondern angesiedelt zwischen Geschichtsschreibung und schöner 
Literatur, zwischen Wissenschaftlichkeit und Dichtung."46  Although this character as a 
"Zwischenbereich"47 prevents the form from being simply defined, the great 
"Spielraum"48 of biography makes it a rich form nonetheless, capable of capturing the 
most complex and intriguing of lives in the written word.  Indeed, the experience of life 
and the attempt at a "literarische Wiederauferstehung"49 of the same, are what make the 
form of biography a necessary form when retelling the events of the past. 
 Biographical elements appear in almost all historical writing.  Using the objective 
poles of birth and death—"[d]ie Biographie kann objektiv nur dort sein, wo sie sich auf 
Daten beschränkt"50—biography functions under the assumption "daß die Wirklichkeit in 
der Literatur restituierbar sei."51  However, once biography strays from its objective 
orientation towards an interpretation of reality, the form splinters off into fragmentary 
forms at best.  There are popular biographies, bordering on memoirs, which appear by the 
dozens every year—and these are perhaps the furthest from what I have in mind here.  
Rather, we are in pursuit of what Koopmann calls the "geistige Biographie:" "in der die 
Triebkräfte des Denkens und der Lebensansichten wichtiger sind als die tatsächlichen 
Handlungen."52  Here, biography may appear in the extremes of honoring the subject or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Koopman, Helmut. "Die Biographie", in Prosakunst ohne Erzählen. Die Gattung der nicht-fiktionalen 
Kunstprosa. Hg. Klaus Weissenberger. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1985. (45-65). 45. 
 
47 Ibid. 59. 
 
48 Ibid. 47. 
 
49 Ibid. 49. 
 
50 Ibid. 51. 
 
51 Ibid. 46. 
 
52 Ibid. 55.!
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of offering a devastating critique, or even warning.  What lies at the foundation of all 
biography, however, is not only that it qualifies as "Lebensdeutung," but ultimately that it 
is "eine interpretierende Darstellung."53  Thus, our question is something more than the 
form of biography as such.  What drives this investigation into Hegel and the State is first 
and foremost the position of the author, Rosenzweig, with regard to his biographical 
subject, Hegel's life and thought.       
 In a short chapter on Hegel and the State, Wayne Cristaudo writes that 
Rosenzweig's Hegel book "is as revealing about its author as it is about its subject."54   
Koopmann agrees in principle on this point, defining biography as the form "wo die 
Beschreibung eines anderen zur Selbstdarstellung geraten kann."55  This self-revealing 
character of biography—what Koopmann calls its "Pygmalion-Aura"56—pushes the form 
towards its close cousin, the autobiography.  Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit serves as 
an extreme example of a biography that is simultaneously autobiographical.  Of course, 
Hegel and the State cannot be said to be autobiographical to that degree—the degree to 
which it collapses into one with biography.  Rather, as the author of Hegel and the State, 
Rosenzweig's presentation is autobiographical on a more subtle level.   
 Ulrich Bieberich—the only scholar to offer a full account of Rosenzweig's 
relation to Hegel in both Hegel and the State and The Star of Redemption57—sees a clue 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Ibid. 50. 
 
54 Cristaudo, Wayne. Religion, Redemption, and Revolution. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. 
296.  
 
55 Koopmann, 48. 
 
56 Koopmann, 46. 
 
57 Bieberich, Ulrich. Wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre. Rosenzweigs Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel. 
Erzabtei St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1990.!
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to Rosenzweig's autobiographical moment in the letter to Meinecke from 1920.  There, as 
we have already discussed, Rosenzweig spoke of his "hunger for forms" as the driving 
force behind his interest in history.  Bieberich reads this statement as    
Rosenzweig's desire to satisfy this hunger "objectively": "Noch versteckt sich Rosenzweig 
so hinter dem Objektiven, daß er Angst vor dem eigensten Selbst bekommt."58  Without 
getting ahead of ourselves, if for the young Rosenzweig history was a "purveyor of 
forms, no more"—as he states in his letter to Meinecke—then it is to the form of Hegel 
and the State that we must turn in order to find the personality of the young Rosenzweig.   
 As Wayne Cristaudo correctly notes, it was first in the foreword to Hegel and the 
State that Rosenzweig "subtly alerted his readers"59 to the self-revealing character of his 
book.  Thus, providing a close reading of the foreword is the first step in revealing 
Rosenzweig's character as the author of his Hegel biography.  Moreover, it will help us 
establish the theoretical foundations needed in order to illuminate Rosenzweig's 
interpretation of Hegel.  The form of the work serves to mediate the personality of its 
author—and in the case of Rosenzweig, to uncover a remarkable personality beneath the 
"sinister" objectivity of his text.     
 
 
Rosenzweig's "Vorwort" 
 Throughout my interpretation of Hegel and the State, I will be following the 
historicist precept of only allowing the material to "be judged in terms of its own inherent 
values."  However, given the philosophical context I am working within, I prefer to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Bieberich, 26. 
 
59 Cristaudo, 296.!
 23 
understand this method as performing a playful literary variation on what Edmund 
Husserl called a philosophical Epoché.  Instead of focusing on "consciousness" as 
Husserl does, I will be focusing on a textual object—the book Hegel and the State.  Thus, 
while Husserl's Epoché calls for suspending all judgment of the "natural world" in order 
to bring the phenomena of consciousness into conceptual focus, I replace consciousness 
with the "spirit" of Hegel and the State—if books can be said to have a "spirit" at all—
and for my part suspend all judgment that does not issue directly from this work as an 
historical and literary object.  In this manner, a philosophical Epoché—when applied to a 
text—privileges the form of the object, which then functions to circumscribes the content 
from the outset.  This is similar to the methodological procedure that Hegel calls for in 
the Preface to the Phenomenology, which produces a "self-originating, self-differentiating 
wealth of shapes."60  Without such a critical approach—albeit a stretch from a Husserlian 
perspective—one could, for example, easily overlook the foreword to Hegel and the State 
as a mere gloss on Rosenzweig's predecessors, fulfilling more of what a standard 
historical introduction may require and lacking any rigorous methodological explanation.  
However, the foreword, when taken as a "self-originating" object, provides us with a 
methodological constellation, which, if deciphered correctly, reveals the theoretical 
underpinnings of the book (or what Husserl would call the "essence").  As the first 
"gesture"61 to give rise to the form of the book as whole, it serves as the initial key to 
Rosenzweig's Hegel interpretation.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Hegel, Phenomenologie. 9: "der aus sich entspringende Reichtum und sich selbst bestimmende 
Unterschied der Gestalten." 
 
61 See here: Mosès, "Hegel beim Wort genommen".!
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 The foreword, now that I have made my case for it, is an introductory narrative 
that places the authors of three 'classic' Hegel biographies into an historical 
constellation.62  These authors—Karl Rosenkranz, Rudolf Haym and Wilhelm Dilthey—
all made material contributions to the study of Hegel’s life and thereby had a lasting 
impact upon Rosenzweig's generation.  By introducing his book with the personalities 
who wrote Hegel’s life, Rosenzweig shows that to understand the works of history we 
must take into account the historical lives of their authors.  Moreover, by focusing on the 
respective distance or nearness of the biographers to the historical Hegel, Rosenzweig’s 
foreword implicitly assumes that history is written from a relative standpoint and that the 
author's interpretations stem from the particular problems of their time.  Without saying 
it, Rosenzweig subtly implies that the works of Rosenkranz, Haym and Dilthey reveal as 
much about their personalities as they do about Hegel.  Of course, the same can be said of 
Rosenzweig. 
 Rosenzweig opens his book quite plainly: “The first to have written the life of 
Hegel was the Königsberg professor Karl Rosenkranz.”63  Still today, Rosenkranz’ book 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben (1844) is respected as a definitive source of 
information on Hegel’s life.  But it remains little more than that—a book of information.  
Rosenkranz was Hegel’s student, and after Hegel’s death he had the advantage of being 
able to consult many of Hegel’s manuscripts that are no longer available today.  In 
addition, Rosenkranz could talk to Hegel’s friends and relatives to gain insight into 
Hegel’s life.  This alone makes his work one of lasting importance.  However, 
Rosenzweig is quick to point towards the limitations of his predecessors work:    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 HS 11-19. 
 
63 "Der erste, der das Leben Hegels schrieb, war der Königsberg Professor Karl Rosenkranz. HS 11.!!
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It could be the case that, in order to formulate a comprehensive and universal  
intellectual history, [Rosenkranz’] external and especially internal distance was 
still not great enough.  He only knew how to situate his hero in terms of a history 
of philosophy; but here his hero had already done the decisive work—the pupil 
merely followed the master’s lead.64     
 
For Rosenkranz, Hegel remained the master of his own story.  It was especially the lack 
of "internal distance" that prevented Rosenkranz from breaking free from his master.  In 
Rosenzweig’s estimate, “Hegel’s life story was made public as a supplementary-volume 
to his works.”65  Here it is implied that in order to "formulate a comprehensive and 
universal intellectual history" a critical perspective is necessary as well.  Ultimately, it 
was the personality of Rosenkranz that was missing from his interpretation: "It would 
almost be possible to separate the author’s independent remarks cleanly from the book; 
one would then be left with a collection of materials, which would indeed count as a 
biography for that time."66  Rosenzweig's words, which impart as sense of irony as well, 
point towards what Herbert Schnädelbach, in his book Philosophy in Germany 1831-
1933, calls positive historicism: “the value-free accumulation of material and facts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 "Für eine umfassendere, allgemein geistesgeschichtliche Fragestellung mag sein äußererund vor allem 
sein innerer Abstand noch nicht weit genug gewesen sein; nur philosophiegeschichtlich weiß er seinen 
Helden bestimmt einzuordnen; hier aber hatte dieser selbst ihm schon kräftig vorgearbeitet; der Lehrling 
folgte nur des Meisters Spur." HS 12.  
 
65 "die Lebensgeschichte trat an die Öffentlichkeit als Ergänzungsband zu den Werken." HS 11. 
 
66 "Es wäre beinahe möglich, die selbstständigen Anmerkungen des Verfassers sauber aus dem Buche 
herauszutrennen; man behielte dann eine der Stoffsammlung übrig, die jene Zeit als Biographien wohl 
gelten ließ." HS 12. 
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without distinction between what is and what is not important.”67  But it is not for the 
sake of distinguishing himself from Rosenkranz alone that Rosenzweig opens his book 
with Hegel's first biographer.   
 In a short section of the book entitled “Hegel’s Eigenheit” Rosenkranz writes: 
“Die Geschichte eines Philosophen ist die Geschichte seines Denkens, die Geschichte der 
Bildung seines Systems.”68  Like Rosenkranz, Rosenzweig follows the "history of 
[Hegel's] thought."  In line with the still present trend of philosophical biography, 
Rosenzweig agrees that it is primarily through Hegel's thought—which is to say his 
work—that we may come to know his life; however, this does not exclude some instances 
where it is the life that informs the thought.  For Rosenzweig, and this will be underlined 
again and again throughout this work, the development of Hegel's thought does not 
culminate in his philosophical system, but rather in his ideal of the state—as he claims ex 
negativo about Rosenkranz: "all in all, the state rarely appears.”69  Rather than abstracting 
Hegel's thought to the degree that his life can be judged to be “ohne allen pikanten 
Schimmer von Intriguen und Geheimnissen,”70 Rosenzweig rather shows how Hegel's 
thought is bound to the political and social problems of his age.   In stark contrast to 
Rosenkranz, he draws prominently on the "Intriguen und  Geheimnissen" of Hegel's life 
in order show the development of his thought.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Schnädelbach, Herbert. Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984, 35. !
68 Rosenkranz, Karl. G.W.F Hegels Leben. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlich Buchgesellschaft,  
1998, 21. Hereafter (Rosenzkranz, Hegels Leben).  
 
69 "im ganzen tritt der Staat doch wenig hervor." HS 12. 
 
70 Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben. XV.!!
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 Rosenkranz is introduced to show both the connection and the distance 
Rosenzweig's own work will take to the official Hegel reception.  In some ways, he is 
certainly continuing the work Rosenkranz began.  But it is first with the introduction of 
the second biographer, Rudolf Haym that Rosenzweig's own position begins to emerge 
more clearly.  There is a clear shift in tone leading from Rosenkranz to Haym.  Where 
Rosenzweig spoke with irony, but respect, of the former, there is a sense of genuine 
admiration present for the latter.  In the end, it was Rudolf Haym's unique personality and 
how this personality was reflected in his work that proved a major inspiration for 
Rosenzweig's book. 
 
 
Rudolf Haym and the Historical Hegel 
 Haym’s biography, Hegel und seine Zeit, was written in 1857, twenty-six years 
after Hegel’s death.  With Haym, we witness the life of Hegel being lifted into the 
historical debate of the time.  In opposition to Rosenkranz, Haym wished “von 
Systemfesseln losgebunden zu sein.”71  His task was to oppose the orthodoxy of Hegel's 
system with a historical critique while still providing "eine objektive Geschichte der 
Philosophie.  Wohl beabsichtige ich, sie darzustellen, wohl, sie zu kritisieren: —aber den 
Boden zu Beidem will ich auf historischem Wege, durch eine Auseinandersetzung ihrer 
Entstehung und ihrer Entwickelung gewinnen."72  Critical of his contemporaries, Haym 
writes: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Haym, Rudolf. Hegel und seine Zeit. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962, 15. 
Hereafter (Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit).  
 
72 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 2. 
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Sie irren, wenn sie ein neues Uebel mit alten Mitteln heilen zu können meinen, 
wenn sie die Waffen zu Bekämpfung des Gegners einzig aus dem Arsenal einer 
Weltansicht und einer Dialektik entnehemen, die, wie geschlossen in sich, wie 
durchgearbeitet auch immer, in einem anderen als in dem Boden unsrer heutigen 
sittlichen und geistigen Zustände ihre Wurzeln hat.”73         
 
It is precisely the conditions of Haym’s historical present that Rosenzweig draws out in 
his foreword.  And here it becomes readily apparent that Hegel und seine Zeit is a mirror 
of Haym’s own life.  It is what is at stake for Haym personally and the personal 
undertone of the text that makes the book so intriguing to Rosenzweig—in Haym's own 
words: “An die Stelle der Vernunft tritt uns der ganze Mensch, an die Stelle des 
allgemeinen der geschichtlich bestimmte Mensch.”74      
 There is a sense of urgency with Haym that is lacking in Rosenkranz.  Haym’s 
work is no mere “value-free accumulation of material and facts,” but rather the personal 
struggle of an author to come to terms with his past.  As Rosenzweig recognizes, "[o]nly 
rarely does the biography of a philosopher become such a work of political passion."75  It 
was Haym’s concern to establish “a conscious will towards actuality,” and as such help 
place his generation “under the rule of the great goals of the state and a people.”76  In 
providing "as much a philosophical as a political polemic,”77 Haym shows how Hegel’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 12. 
 
74 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 14. 
 
75 "Selten wohl ist die Biographie eines Philosophen so sehr das Werk politischer Leidenschaft gewesen." 
HS 13. 
 
76 HS 15. 
 
77 HS 14. 
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ideal of the state was merely carried on dogmatically after his death in the form of his 
system.  Following Rosenkranz' lead, Haym attempts to give “eine historische Analyse 
dieses Systems.”78  And like Rosenkranz, Haym sees the culmination of Hegel's thinking 
in his system.  However, unlike Rosenkranz, Haym recognized that in the end Hegel 
"only appeared to exhaust the depth of life in order to sacrifice the elicited good upon the 
altar of the concept."79  Thus, focusing on the “remarkable opening and ending of 
Haym’s book,”80 Rosenzweig was not only inspired by Haym's intention to establish a 
new historical understanding of Hegel’s thought for the sake of the present, but moreover 
mimics Haym's critical outlook on Hegel's thinking as a whole. 
 It is remarkable how closely Rosenzweig follows Haym's lead on this account.  
Not only does Haym call for “eine vernunftsgemäßere und sittlichere Gestaltung unseres 
Staatslebens,”81 but he is critical of Hegel's entire metaphysical project: 
 
 "Sie [die Hegelsche Philosophie] ist, um Alles zu sagen, der mit List und 
 Geschick zum Frieden formulierte Krieg von Allem wider Alles.  Sie will sein
 eine absolute Versöhnung von Denken und Wirklichkeit: sie ist in Wahrheit eine 
 spiritualistische Verflüchtung des Wirklichen und eine methodische Corruption 
 des reinen Denkens. [...] sie treibt in Wahrheit nur ein betrügliches Spiel mit den 
 Mächten der Freiheit und des Verstandes und des Subjektiven. [...] sie ist in 
 Wahrheit nur die schlechthinige Zweideutigkeit, sich weder zu der einen noch zu 
 der andern, sich sowohl zu jener wie zu dieser zu bekennen. [...] Im Ganzen wie !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 464. 
 
79 "die Tiefe des Lebens doch nur auszuschöpfen schien, um das heraufgeförderte Gut auf dem Altare des 
Begriffs zu opfern." HS 14. 
 
80 HS 15. 
 
81 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 465. 
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 im Einzelnen ist ihr methodisches Vermitteln eine ästhetisch-formalistische 
 Illusion.82 
 
Rosenzweig directly takes up Haym's formulation that Hegel attempts "eine absolute 
Versöhnung von Denken und Wirklichkeit."  And it is precisely the "Illusion" of this wish 
for reconciliation that Haym emphasizes and which Rosenzweig uses as the basis for his 
own interpretation.  Haym sees the task of his generation as the “Auflösung”83 of this 
illusion into "eine historische Analyse dieses Systems.”84  “Was uns zu Gebote steht” 
writes Haym, “sind die wiederbefreiten Elemente, und ist der seiner vergänglichen Form 
entkleidete Geist jenes Systems.”85  In order to reach the “entkleidete Geist” of Hegel’s 
system, Haym insists on a renewed “Mitarbeit an der Geschichtsforschung.”86  While 
giving much less weight to Hegel's system as such, it is on the basis of this desire to work 
with and for history—and to uncover the illusion that reconciles thought with reality in 
Hegel's work—that Rosenzweig finds in Haym a lasting inspiration for his own work on 
Hegel.   
 This is alluded to nowhere more clearly than when Rosenzweig praises Haym’s 
book as “a great biographical work of art.”87  What makes Haym's book more than a mere 
collection of materials stems in part from its character as a “testimony to his personal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Ibid. 461-62. 
!
83 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 462. 
 
84 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 464. 
 
85 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 465. 
 
86 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. 469. 
 
87 "ein großes biographisches Kunstwerk." HS 13. 
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becoming and the passage of time.”88  Hereby Rosenzweig implies that to understand and 
appreciate a biographical work of art we must take the personality of the author and his 
age to be as important as the subject of the biography itself.  By drawing out Haym’s 
personality in his foreword, and in showing how Hegel und seine Zeit is a product of 
Haym’s engagement with the present, Rosenzweig thus makes an indirect and subtle 
reference to his own method of biographical analysis in Hegel and the State.  Like Haym 
and Rosenkranz before him, Rosenzweig was certainly influenced by the historical 
conditions of his age.  From the solemn respect of Karl Rosenkranz, to the impassioned 
polemic of Rudolf Haym, we now turn to these conditions.  Wilhelm Dilthey, the last in 
the line of biographers and closest influence on Rosenzweig's own age, provided a new 
gateway through which Rosenzweig's generation learned to look upon the lives and 
events of the past.  
 
 
The Hegel Renaissance of the Early 20th Century 
 Before lingering on Dilthey's influence upon Rosenzweig, any discussion of 
Hegel in the early 20th century must make at least brief mention of a speech delivered in 
1910 by the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband entitled "Die Erneuerung des 
Hegelianismus."89  Critical of what he saw as the renewed appropriation of Hegel's 
thought, Windelband observed around him a "Hunger nach Weltanschauung, der unsere 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 "ein Zeugnis seines persönlichen Werdens und des Ganges der Zeit." HS 13. !
89 Wilhelm Windelband, Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte. Tübingen: 
Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1921. 
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junge Generation ergriffen hat und der bei Hegel Sättigung sucht."90  The young 
generation searching for a new "Weltanschauung" latched onto a few key components of 
Hegel's thinking: "Gesamtsinn aller Wirklichkeit"; "ästhetische[r] Sinn"; "das Vertrauen 
in die Macht der Vernunft."91  With his speech, Windelband, who ultimately calls for a 
return to Kant's philosophical position, managed to capture the new spirit influencing 
Rosenzweig's age.  This "Hegel renaissance," as it has since come to be known—and 
indirectly the "Hunger nach Weltanschauung" as well—was to no small degree 
influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey and his biography History of the Young Hegel, published 
in 1905.92   
 It was Dilthey, writes Rosenzweig, who “placed research into Hegel’s life on a 
new foundation.”93  Rosenzweig’s generation had become “fed up and scornful with the 
sense of reality of the last half century,” and “so it came about that in the midst of a 
generation which sought the way back to the old Idealism through a newly fashioned 
longing, Dilthey was called to renew the historical remembrance of Hegel.”94  The "sense 
of reality" (Wirklichkeitssinn) Rosenzweig speaks of, is akin to the "Sachlichkeit" Hans 
Ehrenberg saw as the task of his generation to overcome.  This is a position indirectly 
drawn out by Norbert Waszek, who notes that Dilthey followed the "methodische 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 "a hunger for world-views, which has seized our younger generation and which finds satisfaction in 
Hegel." Windelband, 278. !
91 Ibid. 278. 
 
92 Wilhelm Dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. 
 
93 "die Erforschung des Hegelschen Lebens auf eine neue Grundlage gestellt hat." HS 15.  See also, 
Norbert Waszek, "Die Hegelforschung mit Wilhelm Dilthey beginnen?" in Anfänge bei Hegel. Schmied-
Kowarzik and Eidam, ed., Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2008. 
 
94 HS 16. 
 
 33 
Prämisse, möglichst kein Dokument, keine Quelle zu übergehen, die Hegels Entwicklung 
erhellen könnte."95  In Rosenzweig's words, this commitment to "Sachlichkeit" placed 
Dilthey within "the true products of the new spirit, "positivism" and "empiricism"."96  
Although Rosenzweig veils his own indebtedness to these new "deformities" with his 
critique of Dilthey, there was something akin to his own spirit that he found in his 
predecessor: “a deeply personal impulse within him to fix his vision on the image of the 
peak of 1800.”97  This historical moment, which Rosenzweig will later describe as a 
moment "der sich ja ebenfalls um den Philosophen im Gegensatz zur Philosophie 
dreht"98—thereby showing his prolonged interest in philosophical personalities—is 
reconfigured in the work of both historians in order to show its influence upon their own 
generation.  Not only did this task require a renewed engagement with German Idealism, 
Romanticism and the political conditions that led to the end of the Holy Roman Empire, 
but it also demanded, as Windelband's speech showed, rescuing Hegel from the neo-
Kantian critique of the 19th century.  
  Dilthey's History of the Young Hegel was the first biography to focus exclusively 
on Hegel’s formative years, and accordingly “it was now a totally new Hegel"99 that 
confronted Rosenzweig's age.  The last lines of Rosenzweig’s foreword capture the debt 
Rosenzweig paid to his predecessor:  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Waszek, 20. 
 
96 "die echten Ausgeburten des neuen Geistes, "Positivismus" und "Empirismus"." HS 15. !
97 "ein tief persönlicher Drang, das Bild des Gipfels von 1800 [...] im Auge festzuhalten." HS 15. 
 
98 Rosenzweig, "Urzelle", Kleinere Schriften. 370.  
 
99 "Überhaupt aber war es nun ein ganz neuer Hegel, den Diltheys Buch hinstellte." HS 17. 
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It was [Dilthey] who first, with gentle hand, raised the veil and showed, how from 
the great rigid pictures of the historical Hegel, which remained just as soulless and 
untransparent in Rosenkranz’s panegyric as in Haym’s pamphlet, there poured 
forth a stream of hidden sorrows and hidden passions from those days of his 
youth.”100        
 
For the first time, it was the “hidden sorrows and hidden passions”—previously 
undiscovered—that gave context to Hegel's life and thought.  In the afterword to the 
second edition of Haym's biography, published in 1927, the editor Hans Rosenberg writes 
that is was thus Dilthey who first discovered the "irrational" Hegel.101  By focusing on the 
beginnings of Hegel's intellectual development, Dilthey aimed to uncover Hegel’s living 
personality from the scattered writings of his oft-neglected student years:     
 
It is not as if those beginnings, which show Hegel sharing paths with Hölderlin 
and the early Romantics, remained unnoticed by the older biographers [...] But 
Dilthey, a contemporary of Nietzsche, opposed the crude method of presentation 
of these two—for Rosenkranz, essentially a naïve wondering about the 
conceptuality of such historical detours, for Haym, a rashly judged insertion 
within the much too linear path of Hegel’s biographical evolution—with a highly 
perceptive sense for soulful reality as such.102 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 "er zuerst hob mit zarter Hand die Schleier und zeigte, wie in dem starren Riesenbilde des historischen 
Hegel, das in Rosenkranzens Panegyrikus wie in Hayms Pamphlet gleich seelenlos und undurchsichtig 
blieb, von jenen Jugendtagen her ein Strom geheimen Leidens und geheimer Leidenschaft rauschte." HS 
17. 
 
101 Haym, 550. !
102 "Nicht als ob jene Anfänge, die Hegel auf verwandten Wegen mit Hölderlin und den Frühromantikern 
zeigen, von den älteren Biographen unbeachtet geblieben wären [...] Aber den primitiven 
Darstellungsmitteln jener beiden—bei Rosenkranz hier wesentlich eine naive Verwunderung über solche 
begriffsgeschichtlichen Umwege, bei Haym ein vorschnell wertendes Einfügen in den eben doch sehr 
gradlinigen Gang der biographischen Eintwickelung—diesen Mitteln setzte nun der Zeitgenosse Nietzsches 
entgegen den positivistisch geschulten, höchst empfindlichen Sinn für seelische Wirklichkeit rein als 
solche." HS 17. 
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In Dilthey’s Hegel biography, the years leading up to the “peak of 1800” would come to 
represent the young Hegel as such—that is to say, Hegel’s pre-systematic years.  Just as 
Dilthey was above all concerned with the “beginnings” of Hegel’s life, Rosenzweig 
would follow the same path into the "soulful reality" of the young Hegel.  However, 
Rosenzweig's position within the "Hegel renaissance" of his age was already much 
different than Dilthey's.  Concerning Dilthey’s historical position as a Hegel biographer 
Rosenzweig writes: 
 
Already in 1887, when the collection of Hegel’s letters appeared, Dilthey had 
stated that the time for fighting with Hegel was over and that that of his historical 
recognition had come.  Although it still sounded similar to Haym, it was already 
something quite different.  For Haym, the historical recognition itself was to end 
the fight, Dilthey pulled it out of the fight altogether.103                               
 
When Rosenzweig writes that Dilthey pulled the "historical recognition" of Hegel "out of 
the fight altogether," he is offering his readers an important clue as to why he chose to 
publish his own biography of Hegel after Dilthey.  For while Rosenzweig was certainly 
influenced by Dilthey's biographical method, as I show below, for the two historians 
something entirely different was at stake:   
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 "Schon 1887, als die Sammlung der Hegelschen Briefe erschien, hatte Dilthey ausgesprochen, daß nun 
die Zeit des Kampfs mit Hegel vorüber sei und die seiner historischen Erkenntnis gekommen. Das klang 
noch ähnlich wie bei Haym, war aber doch schon etwas ganz anderes: für Haym hatte die historische 
Erkenntnis selber den Kampf erst vollenden sollen, Dilthey hob sie aus dem Kampf heraus." HS 16. 
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It is characteristic of Dilthey’s historical and personal context, that his book 
traced the development of the metaphysician in the first place, and only then the 
philosopher of history.  For Rosenkranz, in accordance with the direction of that 
decade, it was the philosopher of religion, for Haym, the politician.  That peculiar 
inner departure of German Bildung from the State, which occurred as a reaction to 
the close relationship of the two during the founding years of the empire, found its 
expression in Dilthey.  For him, the political in Hegel was more of a piece than a 
founding force in his development.104  
                                                                               
For Dilthey, the political dimension of Hegel's thinking was not the "founding force" of 
his development, but merely a "piece."  Dilthey's investigation into Hegel's youth aimed 
to uncover the overreaching metaphysical concern of his thought.  In contrast, 
Rosenzweig situates Hegel's political thought—and not his metaphysics—as the 
"founding force" of his development.  Thus, Rosenzweig's contribution to the "Hegel 
renaissance" of his age was to resist the allure of Hegel's metaphysics—in the words of 
Windelband, to resist the "Gesamtsinn aller Wirklichkeit" as the "Vertrauen in der Macht 
der Vernunft"—and place Hegel, following here more closely in the footsteps of Haym, 
back into the fight for historical recognition.  Rosenzweig's rejection of Hegel's 
metaphysics should be kept close to mind, and I will return to it later in this work, as it 
offers one of the main reasons why Rosenweig chose to write a new biography of Hegel.    
 Although Rosenzweig and Dilthey differ on this important point, the foreword to 
Hegel and the State is written in clear crescendo towards Dilthey—a gesture that should !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 "Es bezeichnet Diltheys zeitgeschichtliche und persönliche Stellung, daß sein Buch in erster Linie dem 
Werden des Metaphysikers und in zweiter dem des Geschichtsphilosophen nachspürte; bei Rosenkranz war 
es, der Richtung des Jahrzehnts gemäß, der Religionsphilosoph gewesen, bei Haym der Politiker. Jene 
eigentümliche innere Abkehr der deutschen Bildung von Staat, die im Gegeschlag zu dem engen Verhältnis 
der beiden in den Reichsgründungsjahren die letzten Jahrzehnte gebracht hatten, fand bei Dilthey ihren 
Ausdruck. Das Politische in Hegel war ihm mehr ein Teil als eine Grundkraft seiner Entwickelung." HS 16-
17.  
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not be ignored.  Thus, in order to help set the theoretical foundations of our critical 
exposition of Hegel and the State, we must still linger with Dilthey's thought.  For above 
all, it was his work that guided Rosenzweig into the "Hegel renaissance" of his age.  This 
leads us to return to what I termed "biography as form" above.  And in the case of 
Dilthey, towards a thinker who understood this form above all as a "work of art."  
 
 
Wilhelm Dilthey and the Art of Biography 
Dilthey’s life's work revolves around the question of the “theoretical possibility of 
justifying historical knowledge.”105  His writing reflects how human beings are to come 
to terms with the essential fact that we are historical beings and how our productions 
stem from an understanding of our own historical consciousness and that of others as 
well.  In the year 1910, the same year Rosenzweig began working on his dissertation, 
Dilthey published parts of The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, 
his uncompleted masterpiece, which attempts to lay a theoretical foundation for historical 
understanding within the human sciences.  In the introduction to this work he writes:   
 
 The development of the human sciences must be accompanied by a logical-
 epistemological self-reflection, that is, by the philosophical consciousness of the 
 way in which the intuitive-conceptual system of the human-socio-historical world 
 is formed on the basis of the lived experience of what has happened.106    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Makkreel, Rudolf A. Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1975, 3. 
 
106 Dilthey, Wilhelm. The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002, 24. Hereafter (Dilthey, Formation of the Historical World ). 
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The category of "lived experience" (Erlebnis) represents Dilthey's starting point and 
primary conceptual tool for all investigation into our historical understanding.  As he 
defines it, lived experience is "the structural unity of attitudes and contents" by way of 
which I become aware of objects of perception as "conscious and there for me."107  
However, any reflection upon our own lived experience simultaneously represents "a 
transcendence for the experiencing consciousness."108  This "transcendence" of 
consciousness leads towards a reflection upon past lived-experiences, unified under the 
idea of the totality of the self.  This unified idea of the self holds the possibility of 
becoming a "productive force" in history only through the creation of work—"a 
directedness at a goal, or the emergence of an intention to actualize something that was 
not already part of reality."109  Thus, if historical understanding is based upon lived 
experience, then it is only by examining the work of individuals—in our context, the 
written manuscripts, letters and texts left behind—that an understanding of history may 
be gained.  This leads above all towards the relation between the literary forms of 
autobiography and biography.  
 Dilthey introduces his reflections upon the form of biography with the 
provocative question: “Is biography possible?”110  If we understand biography, perhaps as 
Rosenkranz did, as a mere copy of the life in question, with only minimal personal 
inflection, then it seems impossible indeed—even if it remains unacknowledged, an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Dilthey, Formation of the Historical World. 46-47. !
108 Dilthey, Formation of the Historical World. 50. 
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insurmountable personal and temporal distance between the biographer and his object 
will always exist.  However, at least at first glance, this distance seems bridged with the 
form of autobiography.  Within the autobiographical form, understood as "the literary 
expression of the self-reflection of human beings on their life course,"111 the author is 
reflecting on their own lived experience, to which they have the most immediate access.  
In this sense, we find that "[t]he work of historical narrative is already half done by 
itself."112  The great historical examples of autobiography—represented by the writings 
of Augustine, Rousseau and Goethe—provide us with "the highest and most instructive 
form of the understanding of life."113  And yet in reflecting upon their own lives, the 
authors of autobiographies are always following their own plans or intentions with regard 
to the future.  “Here,” writes Dilthey, “lies the advantage of biography over 
autobiography.”114  Whereas autobiography has the clear advantage of understanding the 
connectedness of internal events, a biography can show how these events intersect with 
an external historical reality.  It can lend meaning to the plans and intentions of an author, 
whereas the author was merely swept along by the stream of their own life.  Biography, 
as “the literary form of understanding other lives,”115 provides the critical distance 
needed for historical understanding.  But as a literary form, biography is faced with its 
own set of limitations:   
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For biography to be a work of art, one has to locate the perspective from which 
the horizon of history in general opens up but for which the individual still 
remains the center of a productive or meaning system; no biography can perform 
this task with more than partial success.116                                              
 
Whereas with autobiography the distance between the horizon of history and the life of 
the individual is collapsed into the internal consciousness of the individual, biography as 
a form of historical understanding is faced with the task of producing a narrative that 
allows these two extremes to coincide—in this sense it can be termed "a work of art."  
The artistic task of the biographer is thus to mediate the lived experience of the 
individual with the forces of history from and towards which this individual life emerges.  
 By designating biography as a "work of art," Dilthey shows not only the great 
potential of this historical form, but once again draws out its limitations:  
 
 The limit of biography lies in the fact that general movements find their point of 
 transition in individuals.  In order to understand individuals, we must investigate 
 new foundations for understanding that are outside the individual.  As such, 
 biography does not have the potential of defining itself as a scientific work of art.  
 We must turn to new categories, configurations, and forms of life that do not 
 appear in individual life.117   
 
As Dilthey states above, biography cannot be understood as a "scientific" work of art.  
Rather, biography is limited as a "literary" form, thereby implying its subjective 
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character.  However, what separates biography as the “intersection”118 of life and history 
from other literary forms—the novel, for example—is that “the art form of biography can 
be applied only to historical figures.  For they alone have the productive force to become 
such a central point of intersection.”119   Thus, as a work of art, biography is always 
bound the historical conditions of its object and to history itself.   
 As Rosenzweig's foreword to Hegel and the State shows, to return to our own 
investigation, when Hegel's life is taken as a "productive force" of history, this force is by 
necessity interpreted anew from the standpoint of the present.  The respective biographies 
of Rosenkranz, Haym and Dilthey each balance the life and thought of Hegel with the 
forces of history by which they find themselves shaped.  In this manner, by attempting to 
renew the life in question for the sake of the present, these biographers and biographers 
more generally necessarily betray their own lived experience within the very form of the 
biography itself.  Following upon this necessity, it can be said that the form of biography 
reveals as much about its author as it does about the life in question.  Or to put it slightly 
differently, we can begin to imagine how biography, as a literary work of art, reveals the 
personality of its author.   
 This is certainly the case with Dilthey himself and his book History of the Young 
Hegel (1906).  As I showed above, Rosenzweig points to Dilthey's interest in Hegel's 
metaphysics in order to differentiate his own approach to Hegel's life.  However, 
compared with Rosenkranz and Haym, even given his distaste for Hegel's metaphysics, 
Rosenzweig takes a similar biographical approach to Dilthey. In the introductory 
paragraphs to History of the Young Hegel, Dilthey presents the need for writing a new !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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biography on Hegel—a need Rosenzweig will soon turn to with his dissertation.  Dilthey 
states that “in der Beschäftigung mit [Hegel] hat sich mir ergeben, daß auch nach den 
Werken von Rosenkranz und Haym ohne eine erneute Durchforschung der Handschriften 
Hegels ein historisches Verständnis desselben nicht gewonnen werden kann.”120  The 
“Handschriften” that Dilthey focued on were those “von Hegels frühesten 
Aufzeichnungen bis zu dem Beginn der uns erhaltenen ersten Darstellung seines Systems 
und zu seinen ersten Veröffentlichung im Philosophischen Journal.”121  By focusing on 
the beginnings of Hegel's development, Dilthey hoped to better understand his later 
philosophy.122  This progression from early to later development through the use of 
unpublished manuscripts is the same approach Rosenzweig will take, albeit focusing on 
the political Hegel.  However, the manner of this research is revealing for Dilthey and 
Rosenzweig alike.   
 In the introduction to Dilthey's biography on Hegel, Dilthey’s colleague and 
friend Herman Nohl writes: “Was Dilthey an Hegel rühmt, dieses gegenständliche 
Sichversenken in die Sache unter völliger Abstraktion von der eigenen Person, das war 
doch sein allereigenstes Wesen!”123  What Nohl claims of Dilthey, is that despite his 
objective fixation upon the matter at hand, he saw in Hegel's life an intellectual 
predecessor with that same personal impulse to justify historical knowledge.  Thus, as 
Rosenzweig’s foreword clearly showed for Rosenkranz and Haym as well, Dilthey’s 
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“renewal” of the life of Hegel cannot be understood apart from his own personality as a 
historian.  What Rosenzweig leaves unmentioned, is that this same law of biography 
applies to his own work as well.   
 Following Dilthey’s own insistence to work with the manuscripts themselves, 
Rosenzweig spent many months poring over Hegel’s own handwritings.  In a letter to his 
friend Hans Ehrenberg he writes:   
 
You can imagine that my days are filled to the brim.  I seem to have turned into a 
day laborer: I start theoretically at ten (actually a little later)—I hope in the future 
to make my theoretical start at nine.  I work straight through in the manuscript 
room until three when it closes.  I remain in the reading room until seven, 
spending quite a lot of time in the catalogue room; by that time I feel tired and 
stupid, go to the theater indiscriminately, with the single reservation: no music.  
Here you have the frame; the picture within, you will scarcely recognize.  I’ve 
joined the philologists.124 
 
The above self-portrait of Rosenzweig should be kept in mind while reading Hegel and 
the State.  The curious dictum "no music," can be read as a testament to the selfless 
commitment Rosenzweig displayed in dedicating himself to his work as an historian.  In 
joining the "philologists," Rosenzweig—who was proficient at the violin at a young age 
and even considered a life of music—was not only aligning himself with Dilthey, and 
Rosenkranz and Haym as well, but above all with his teacher Friedrich Meinecke and the 
discipline of historiography.  Like Dilthey, Meinecke was a great historian.  But whereas 
in his quest for historical knowledge Dilthey often wrote using the biographical form, 
Meinecke, in line with the school of historicism, was more clearly committed to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. 20. 
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interpreting history as a political phenomenon—"the state as an end in itself."  Thus, by 
committing himself, at least temporarily, to a life of "no music," this moment in 
Rosenzweig's own biography, his turn towards the authorship of Hegel and the State, 
marks the beginning of a fate that cannot be separated from Meinecke’s guidance and 
inspiration.  It is to the influence of this personality upon Rosenzweig that we now turn. 
 
 
 
Rosenzweig's "Anstoß": Meinecke and the Personality of the State 
 What I have deliberately left unmentioned in my discussion until now, is the now 
famous note Rosenzweig appended to this foreword before its publication in 1920.125  As 
far as Rosenzweig scholarship is concerned, this note has contributed more to the 
interpretation of Hegel and the State than the main text itself.  A single line from this 
addendum has served to encompass Rosenzweig's own judgment of his book: “in the year 
1919 the book could only be brought to an end; I would have never begun it today.”126  
This line has unfortunately scared off most readers before they even begin the book.  
Why read Hegel and the State, when clearly the book that Rosenzweig did begin in 1919, 
namely, The Star of Redemption, was not subject to the now outdated pre-War conditions 
in Germany?  Rosenzweig turned away from Hegel and the State for personal, historical 
and philosophical reasons.  For one, he saw the hope of restoring a monarchical German 
state after the World War as a lost cause.  But he had also begun to find a renewed faith 
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in a personal understanding of Judaism—a faith that was lacking from his task as an 
historian.  However, recalling Dilthey's theory of biography, while perhaps doing justice 
to an autobiographical understanding of Rosenzweig's life, taking his above comment as 
the only explanation of his life-course leaves behind the benefits of an external, or 
biographical understanding of his life.  Just as Haym resisted Hegel's own self-
interpretation of his work as absolute spirit, so too must we remain at a critical distance to 
Rosenzweig's own autobiographical understanding of his development. 
 The appended note to the foreword is also famous for another line, which at first 
glance seems to point directly to Rosenzweig’s inspiration for writing Hegel and the 
State.  He writes: “I received the first impetus [Anstoß] to write [Hegel and the State] 
from the eleventh chapter of the first book of [Meinecke’s] Cosmopolitanism and the 
National State.”127  Indeed, Rosenzweig was so inspired by Meinecke’s work that he 
could write to his mother in a letter from 1908: “I would give ten years of my life to write 
such a book [as Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat].”128  Unbeknownst to him at the time, 
it would take Rosenzweig over ten years before the publication of Hegel and the State in 
1920.  However, years after the letter to his mother he could write to Eugen Rosenstock-
Huessy: "You must have noticed in the Hegel that its real reason for being was not an 
interest in Hegel, but my wish to make a book."129  Thus, while it is clear that Meinecke's 
book—qua book—remained the model for Rosenzweig throughout, we must keep his 
distance to Meinecke in mind and his own original contribution close to heart.  While !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Dilthey would prove the lasting inspiration for the form of the book as biography, it was 
indeed the inspiration he gained from Meinecke that led him to couple “Hegel” with “the 
state,” to couple biography with the political thinking of the historicist school.  This path 
leads Rosenzweig away from Dilthey and towards the inspiration he gained from his 
living mentor.  However, this path is not as direct as it may seem. 
 Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, Meinecke’s first major work, was published in 
1907.  Shortly thereafter Rosenzweig began his studies with Meinecke at Freiburg 
University.  In his book, Meinecke introduced a new type of historiography known today 
as Ideengeschichte, or “history of ideas.”  In general, this method of interpreting history 
understands the individuals of the past and their ideas as the formative elements of the 
present.  In the particular context of Meinecke’s book, this would come to mean that the 
German nation-state under Bismarck must be understood through the ideas of the 
historical individuals who helped guide Germany to up until this point.  That Germany 
was not an official nation-state until 1871, and yet still understood itself as a united 
people, led to Meinecke’s famous distinction between a cultural and a political nation.  
The struggle of Germany as a cultural nation before 1871 characterizes the unique 
tension of Meinecke’s book, that is, the tension between the idea of the nation held by 
individuals and the actualization of this nation as a state.                                          
 Although distinct, Meinecke’s method of writing history overlaps with Dilthey’s 
theory of biography.  For both historians, it is the living personality of individuals that 
form the basis of historical interpretation.  Meinecke writes: “It is of particular 
importance that we trace thoughts and concepts back to what is more important than 
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thoughts and concepts, that is, to life and personality.”130  However, the difference 
between the two historians is even more striking.  Although the personality of the 
historical individual takes center stage for both thinkers, for Meinecke there is a greater 
personality in play, which becomes the focus of his life's work—the personality of the 
state.  On this point Meinecke writes:  
 
The lofty insight that the state is an ideal supra-individual personality—this 
insight that sustains and justifies all our thought and concern about the state—
could only come to life when the political feelings and energies of individual 
citizens permeated the state and transformed it into a national state.131    
 
In his book, Meinecke shows how political thinkers such as Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
Fichte and Hegel contributed in their own unique way to the formation of the German 
nation-state.  “The nation,” he writes, “drank the blood of free personalities, as it were, to 
attain personality itself.”132 
It is important to keep Meinecke and Rosenzweig's understanding of personality 
distinct here.  While Rosenzweig clearly follows from the inspiration of his teacher, he 
resists understanding the state as a personality itself.  Rather, it is precisely by following 
Hegel as a historical personality that Rosenzweig shows that the state, and any ideal 
attached to it, can never fully transcend the particular lives of individuals.  Thus, what 
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remains important for Rosenzweig is less the “supra-individual personality” of the state 
than Meinecke's emphasis on the nation as such.  On this point Meinecke writes: 
 
of all the great spheres of life that a man can enter, there is probably none that 
speaks so directly to the whole man as the nation, none that carries him so 
strongly, none that renders so faithfully his entire natural and intellectual being, 
none that can so readily be or become both macroanthropos and fully realized 
individual.133   
 
It was thus questions of the German nation—not the state as personality—that would help 
shape the underlying interests in Rosenzweig’s book.  Accordingly, as he states in the 
addendum to his foreword, when Rosenzweig began his book, his hope was that “the 
internal as well as external, breath-robbing narrowness of the Bismarckian state would 
expand itself outward to a free empire, breathing the air of the world.”134  To gain this 
perspective, Rosenzweig had to distance himself from Dilthey’s metaphysical biography 
of Hegel and focus on Meinecke’s statement that “the ideal image of the nation is always 
the mirror of what stirs in individual souls.”135  By focusing on the concept of the nation 
as it developed in historical individuals, Rosenzweig found in Meinecke’s 
Ideengeschichte a method for excavating the concept of the state in Hegel’s life.  Yet, 
while Meinecke’s broad investigation of the state gave Rosenzweig his contextual 
starting-point, Rosenzweig’s central focus still remained on the life and personality of 
Hegel as an individual, not the personality of the state.  Thus, although Meinecke’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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influence cannot be overstated, the inspiration Rosenzweig gained from his teacher was 
rather limited.  Indeed, it is more or less confined to one chapter in the history of the 
German nation.   
 As stated in the addendum, Rosenzweig received his "Anstoß," or first impetus, to 
write Hegel and the State from the eleventh chapter of the first book of Cosmopolitanism 
and the national State.  This chapter is quaintly entitled “Hegel.”  In this chapter, 
Meinecke ranks Hegel, alongside Ranke and Bismarck, as one of the three “great 
liberators of the state.”136  While today Hegel’s philosophy is often used as a scapegoat 
for the failure of German idealism to capture the truth of reality—a view that the later 
Rosenzweig adopts in the introduction to The Star of Redemption—Meinecke understood 
Hegel’s philosophy as the first move “from ideal and speculative to realistic thinking.”137  
According to Meinecke, Hegel’s “theory of the state in particular was able to reach out in 
the most contradictory directions and distribute everywhere some of the permanently 
valid truths that it contained.”138  It was certainly Meinecke’s insistence on the relevance 
of Hegel’s theory of the state that led Rosenzweig towards an in-depth examination of the 
development of this theory in Hegel’s life.  Meinecke’s chapter on Hegel is, as he states, 
merely a sketch of Hegel’s influence on the German nation.  It leaves so many open 
doors that it comes as no surprise that Rosenzweig found the impetus for his own book in 
these pages.  A telling statement from Meinecke’s chapter on Hegel justifies 
Rosenzweig’s choice to excavate the concept of the state from Hegel’s life: 
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 the fact that the most varied elements were brought together under one roof in 
 [Hegel’s] thinking and that they were obliged to get along with each other there 
 had, we might say, important pedagogical consequences for the future.  
 Conservatives, liberals, and radicals, historical and doctrinaire thinkers, national 
 and cosmopolitan thinkers could all learn from his system, exploit it for their own 
 purposes, and yet still retain tenuous links with those elements of it that they had 
 rejected in this process.139        
 
Well into the first volume of his work, Rosenzweig makes explicit his acceptance of 
Meinecke’s understanding of Hegel.  In a rare sentence pertaining to the aim of his book, 
Rosenzweig remarks: “an underground line of development runs from the picture of the 
state of [Hegel's] system through the Paulskirche to the 18th of January, 1871."140  The 
concluding remarks of Rosenzweig’s book are dedicated in part to a sketch of this 
development.  In these pages he shows how Hegel’s theory of the state led through 
Dahlmann, Stahl and Treitschke—all state-thinkers of the 19th century —to the idea of 
the present German nation-state.  The aim of these remarks, and the greater aim of 
Rosenzweig’s book, is to prove Meinecke’s claim that “Hegel’s ideas continued to bear 
fruit no matter what soil they fell on.”141    
 The backdrop of Rosenzweig’s Hegel biography was the German political state.  
He began his work in 1908 and was largely finished by 1913—that is, before the start of 
World War I.  The peculiar fate of Hegel and the State is its publication in 1920.  As 
Rosenzweig states in his addendum, it was his hope that his book would contribute to a 
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renewal of the German state.  After 1918, for Rosenzweig, this was no longer possible.  
The last lines of his book, edited after the War, give a glimpse into Rosenzweig’s lost 
hope: “When the structure of a world crashes down, the thoughts that thought it as well as 
the dreams which are woven through it are buried under the collapse” (HS, 246).  While 
the world-historical path that Dilthey took in his book could outlive the War, and did so, 
Rosenzweig’s book has been criticized from the date of its publication.  Georg Lukács, 
albeit years later, criticized Rosenzweig for interpreting Hegel as “a precursor to 
Bismarckian politics.”142  He even went so far as to call Rosenzweig’s method “anti-
historical.”143  However, this rash criticism merely identifies Rosenzweig’s understanding 
of Hegel with that of Meinecke.  In support of Rosenzweig, I would claim that although 
questions of the German state gave Rosenzweig the initial impulse for his book, these 
questions were coupled with the inspiration he gained from Dilthey, namely, to 
understand history through the form of biography.  It was precisely the understanding of 
the state as a personality itself that led Rosenzweig to write such a sharp criticism of 
Hegel's political thought.  By showing how Hegel's own biography was limited to the 
conditions of his particular life, Rosenzweig distanced himself from the work of his 
teacher and provided a critique of Hegel's development that is unique in itself.  Not the 
state as personality, but the very personality of Hegel himself became the driving force of 
his interpretation. 
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The Early Rosenzweig 
 I can now finally return to Rosenzweig’s own assessment of Hegel and the State 
as a testament to his "insatiable hunger for "forms"."  When Rosenzweig goes on to say 
that “history to me was a purveyor of forms, no more,” he is addressing the failure of his 
book to contribute in a substantive way to the political drama of his time.  What is left 
unaddressed, however, is the form of Rosenzweig’s book itself.  The trend in Rosenzweig 
scholarship to identify Hegel and the State as the work of a mere student leaves 
Rosenzweig’s own creativity and artistic drive unspoken for.  I must disagree with 
Rosenzweig’s autobiographical claim—taken by Rosenzweig scholars as the final word 
on the matter—that Hegel and the State can now only be understood as "a testimony to 
the spirit of the pre-War years, not the spirit of 1919."144  While it is certainly true that 
Rosenzweig's hope for the book was buried under the rubble of World War I, the book 
itself survived and moreover, the author of the book continued to struggle with the 
problems of representation.  The book is thus no mere testament to “the spirit of the pre-
War years,” but a testament to the spirit of the early Rosenzweig.  As a work of art, 
Rosenzweig's biographical narrative remains an expression of his own personality. 
 Two difficult questions come to mind here.  First, why did Rosenzweig choose to 
write in the form of a biography, and second, why did he choose to publish Hegel and the 
State at all?  Rosenzweig gives a clue to the second question when in the addendum he 
states that with the publication of Hegel and the State “a certain service would be done, if 
no longer to German life, then surely to science, which outlasts the destroyed life.”145  
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And indeed, even the most recent of publications on Hegel pay their respect to Hegel and 
the State.146  But perhaps a deeper reason why Rosenzweig chose to publish Hegel and 
the State lies in the form of the book itself.  While historical science lays claim to an 
objective account of the past, Rosenzweig chose a form of writing that can be at best, as 
Dilthey states, only a “partial success.”  Dilthey’s understanding of biography as a 
literary work of art places the author of a given biography in an artistic dilemma.  How 
can a life be represented faithfully from the historical perspective of the other?  This 
question stays in the biographer’s mind throughout the entire process of writing.  And 
even when the author reaches the end of the book, his task is again always only a “partial 
success.”  Thus, the form of biography presupposes a personal involvement on behalf of 
the author, an awareness of his own limitations.  In writing a biography the author must 
constantly take into account these limits of interpretation and write their work 
accordingly.  If we remember Rosenzweig’s question, “[w]hy does one philosophize?”, 
and his answer to that question, “[f]or the same reason that one makes music or literature 
or art [...] in the last analysis, all that matters is the discovery of one’s own personality,” 
then we can begin to understand why Rosenzweig chose the form of biography as the 
form of his book.  Hegel and the State was not a mere academic exercise, but 
Rosenzweig's struggle as an author to come to terms with his own personality.  He 
remarks in the addendum to the foreword that although he left the book largely 
unchanged, it was necessary "to mark the tragic moment of its appearance."  This is a 
point I will return at the end of my work.  For now, leaving the questions of tragedy 
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untouched, I show how Rosenzweig's interpretation leads up to this point by drawing out 
his own "lived-experience" as the author of Hegel and the State. 
 Although Rosenzweig openly rejects Hegel and the State the time has come to 
reconcile his life with history, that is, the time of his biography has arrived.  Over one 
hundred years after he began working on Hegel and the State, history now demands 
taking a closer look at the development of this work.  For the purpose of better 
understanding Rosenzweig’s life, Hegel and the State must be taken from Rosenzweig’s 
grasp and released into the ocean of history.  Rosenzweig’s life is a contradiction he was 
brave enough to resolve.  He saw his own shortcomings in Hegel and the State and the 
shortcomings of German Idealism in general as a path he could no longer follow.  But the 
story of this contradiction should not discount that Hegel and the State is still a great gift 
he gave to the world.  Furthermore, this gift must not remain in the shadow of The Star of 
Redemption.  Rather, these works should be understood as two qualitatively different 
books.  While The Star is a philosophical work of utmost originality and importance, 
Hegel and the State stands on its own as an original contribution to the history of the 
German Geisteswissenschaften.  It is for this reason that I leave The Star relatively 
untouched in this work.  Rosenzweig’s Hegel biography should no longer be compared to 
The Star in terms of a failed metaphysics, but must now stand on its own as a 
biographical history of thought.147       
 The foreword to Hegel and the State, as I have shown, holds the key to 
understanding Rosenzweig’s intentions as an historian.  If we merely identify !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 I gained the inspiration for following this path from Julius Simon’s understanding of Rosenzweig’s life.  
In an encyclopedia article on Rosenzweig, Simon splits Rosenzweig’s work into two distinct categories: a 
philosophy of history [Hegel and the State] and a philosophy of religion [The Star of Redemption] (Simon, 
“Rosenzweig”). Following this lead, my task has been to explore Rosenzweig’s philosophy of history 
through the form of Hegel and the State and prove its worth in its own right. 
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Rosenzweig with the ideas of his teacher Meinecke—as the addendum would have us 
do—then not only will Hegel and the State be read as a failed political project, but the 
creative fruits of Rosenzweig as the author of Hegel and the State will never come to 
light.  Thus the foreword, and not Rosenzweig’s rejection of the book in the addendum, 
must serve as the starting point for understanding its lasting worth.   
 Rosenzweig’s explicit choice to situate himself within a constellation of Hegel 
biographers implicitly shows his own position with regard to these writers.  His 
philosophy of history proceeds from a philosophy of personal life.  This is his undeniable 
link to Dilthey.  His choice to write about the Hegel biographers who preceded him 
shows that he understands the personality of the authors as determining the historical 
value of their work.  The foreword, the true introduction to Hegel and the State, shows 
that history can only be understood through the historical-standpoint of the author.  To 
more fully understand Rosenzweig’s own life and thought would then imply grasping his 
personality as it is expressed in Hegel and the State.  But alas, there is hardly any talk of 
an early Rosenzweig at all. 
 The above introduction attempts to provide a framework for reading Hegel and 
the State as a whole.  By outlining the theoretical underpinnings of Hegel and the State, a 
window has been opened to work out of this book, and not merely back towards it.  
Indeed, if we can understand in what manner Rosenzweig wrote this book, perhaps it will 
help in understanding the questions of a philosophy of history more generally, and 
Rosenzweig’s own thought in particular.  Hegel and the State was received as a testament 
to Hegelian philosophy and German history.  In fact, this is the clear strength of the book.  
However, left out of this picture is Rosenzweig himself.  Although Rosenzweig’s project 
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was inspired by Meinecke’s focus on the German nation-state, he chose a more personal 
form of writing than Meinecke’s Ideengeschichte.  Rosenzweig’s decision to write a 
biography of Hegel overlaps with his own impulse to develop his personality as an 
intellectual.  By walking the artistic line that a biography demands, Rosenzweig proved 
himself a free personality.  Working from within Hegel and the State itself, as I do in the 
following chapters, not only helps us understand the merits of the book, but also provides 
a perspective through which our struggles as humans to come to terms with history can 
be better understood.  The early Rosenzweig should not be remembered as a mere 
student, but rather as that great author who dared to struggle against the tides of history.  
This legacy can then take root as a lasting source of inspiration for biographers, thinkers 
and readers alike.   
 
 
A Letter to the Author 
 In the spirit of the letter, which helps so many of the interpretations found in the 
following pages and to which the form of biography is indebted, I would like to end this 
introduction with a hypothetical letter to Franz Rosenzweig himself.  While this intention 
may come as a surprise, it seems necessary for me as a biographer of Rosenzweig and 
after reading so many of his countless letters, to put into external form one of the many 
conversations I have held with Rosenzweig over the years of laboring on this work.  In 
doing so, I hope not only to reveal my own personal entanglement with the subject matter 
at hand, but to display in a playful manner the importance of letters for our biographical 
and historical understanding.  As Dilthey writes: "Letters disclose momentary states of 
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mind, but they are also influenced by being directed to a recipient.  They manifest life-
relationships, but each life-relationship is only seen from one side."148  The following 
letter is my brief attempt to offer readers a first glimpse into my own relationship with 
Rosenzweig's life and thought: 
 
 
Dear Franz, 
 In 1925, four years after the publication of The Star of Redemption, you published 
an essay entitled “The New Thinking,” in which you offer valuable insight into your 
presuppositions for writing The Star of Redemption as a way of replying to your then 
small group of readers.  Since its publication, your essay has served as a reference point 
not only for explaining the philosophical method of The Star of Redemption—the "new 
thinking" as you coined it there—but also as a primary source on your position regarding 
reading and authorship.  Towards the end of the essay you write:  
 
I have experienced that it is difficult as an author to speak about one’s own book.  
The author may hardly presume to say something authentic.  For he himself 
stands no differently than anyone else with regard to that which is spirit in his 
work and hence transplantable into other spirits.  The other, because he is an 
other, and precisely because he is an other, will be permitted to attempt time and 
time again—in Kant’s bold assertion that really is not quite so bold—“to 
understand Plato better than he understood himself.149  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 Dilthey, Formation of the Historical World. 268. 
 
149 Udoff, The New Thinking. 100-01.!
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Of course, when you speak on the difficulty of judging one's own book, you are referring 
to The Star of Redemption.  What if I were to be so bold and take your words as they 
apply to Hegel and the State?  The ethical impulse behind the above quote—"precisely 
because he is an other"—must be taken in the extreme sense of your intention.  You would 
certainly agree that once a work has been completed, the author then stands side by side 
with his readers, perhaps looking upon the work as a part of their selves, but looking 
upon the book nevertheless—do you see your personality in the pages of Hegel and the 
State?  The reader, as "an other," holds the possibility of giving new life to a forgotten 
work.  In my interpretation of your early work on Hegel, you may be surprised at how 
brightly your own personality looks back at you.  This is merely a testament to your life, 
as well as your thought. There has been enough delay—the spirit of your book beckons 
still! 
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     CHAPTER II  
 
THE STREAM OF PERSONAL LIFE 
 
 
 
"die Quelle kann nur gedacht werden, 
 insofern sie fließt." 
   
     Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit  
 
 
"Mein Freund, die Zeiten der Vergangenheit  
Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln.  
Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heißt,  
Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist,  
In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln." 
 
   Goethe, Faust I  
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks: On Method 
 
 Hegel and the State was originally published as two separate volumes: "Stations 
of Life" (Lebensstationen) and "Epochs of the World" (Weltepochen).  In the newer 
German editions, these two volumes were combined into one.  While this editorial 
decision aids the reader and may please the publisher, it also subtly masks one of 
Rosenzweig's original intentions, namely that these two separate volumes clearly 
represent two distinct halves of Hegel's life: Lebensstationen displays the development of 
Hegel's unique personality and his struggle to unite this personality with the age, while 
Weltepochen shows how later in life and in the realm of philosophy this same personality 
plays out on the stage of world history.  I point out this division here to underscore one of 
the main assumptions of my own argument: namely that the content of Rosenzweig's 
Hegel interpretation is first and foremost hidden within the form of the book itself.  
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Accordingly, the following questions serve as touchpoints throughout: How does 
Rosenzweig conceptually organize Hegel and the State and what does this organization 
tell us about his understanding of Hegel's life and thought? What effect does the language 
of biography have on his overall argument?      
 As I will show, the biographical form exposes an internal division between 
Hegel's life and thought.  This is the premise of Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State.  
However, this premise is presented in the form of a positive and external unity given 
shape through the content of Rosenzweig's interpretation as a biographer.  It serves as my 
task to present this unspoken unity, which can only be found in the book as a whole, and 
show how this unity is based on the disjunction of Hegel's life and thought.  Thus, two 
accounts run throughout my entire presentation: on the one hand, Hegel's life and thought 
as critically presented by Rosenzweig, and on the other, my own interpretation of the 
narrative and how this reveals a crucial stage in Rosenzweig's own biographical 
development.   
 The first and most obvious feature of Rosenzweig's narrative is a meticulous 
focus on the development of Hegel's concept of the state.  This focus leads from Hegel's 
early writings on politics and religion, through the Phänomenologie des Geistes, and 
finally culminates in a prolonged analysis of the Rechtsphilosophie, his last published 
work.  Yet while navigating the content of this life-long development, Rosenzweig 
repeatedly explores one central tension in Hegel's thought: the relationship of the 
individual to the state.  It can be argued that this is the central theme of the book.  
Accordingly, I ask how this relationship plays out throughout the various stages of 
Hegel's development and, more marginally, how this central theme foreshadows 
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Rosenzweig's own treatment of individuality in The Star of Redemption.  In more 
philosophical terms, the relation between the individual and the state translates into the 
tensions between particular and universal, part and whole.  The entirety of Hegel und der 
Staat is permeated by the possibility of unifying these tensions.  It is thus telling that 
Rosenzweig gives both an undialectical account of Hegel's development and focuses little 
if at all on the method of "dialectics".150  This shows that for Rosenzweig the progression 
of Hegel's biography does not culminate in a harmonious and unifying element, but rather 
reveals the ultimate impossibility of unifying opposing tensions within an Idealistic 
framework.  Despite this central claim to my investigation, it proves quite difficult to 
discern Rosenzweig's position within Hegel und der Staat.  This too is based on the form 
of the book, yet on the material as well.   
 Following the script of a philosophy of history inherited from his teacher 
Friedrich Meinecke, Rosenzweig plays the role of an observing historian.  While 
composing Lebensstationen, the first volume of his book—and I will have more to say on 
the second volume later on—Rosenzweig was often working with manuscripts and notes 
and did not have the same overview that more modern editions of Hegel's work provide.  
In other words, he had to reconstruct the historical and philosophical perspective as he 
went along, often withholding his own position in favor of providing an accurate picture 
of both the content and chronology of Hegel's writings.  Thus, the critical tone 
Rosenzweig will assign to Hegel's thought in The Star of Redemption—already in its 
introduction—is often so difficult to discern here that one may think one is reading two 
entirely separate authors.  It was not only to the nature of archival work—where the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 Only in the final sections do we see the word "dialectic" creeping up, but much more often Rosenzweig 
simply uses "method" or later "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit) to describe Hegel's philosophical procedure. 
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researcher is often little more than the conduit through which the material flows—that 
Rosenzweig's rather reserved stance should be attributed, but also to the manifold 
interests of the young Hegel.  Indeed, very often these interests stood in contradiction to 
each other, making it near impossible, even today, to unify them into one coherent view.  
In throwing himself wholeheartedly into this difficult work, it is apparent that 
Rosenzweig often struggled to free himself from the complexity of the materials at hand.  
The reader is left to tarry with Rosenzweig's language, searching, often with great 
struggle, to find the biographer's voice in a labyrinth of words and interpretations.   
 In his afterword to the Suhrkamp edition, Axel Honneth captures the above 
difficulties quite succinctly: "for the contemporary reader, engaging the study at hand 
first requires that one work through the crust of antiquated viewpoints and interpretive 
perspectives, before one can reach the actually productive, living kernel."151  But how 
exactly does one work through the "antiquated viewpoints and interpretive perspectives" 
of the book? And perhaps more importantly, what is the "living kernel" of the book that 
Honneth speaks of?  On the surface, there are at least two ways of reading Rosenzweig's 
Hegel und der Staat: First, to read it in the context of its contribution to Hegel 
scholarship152—however, this method treats Rosenzweig as an anonymous historian, who 
happened to write an important book on Hegel because of his emergence within the 
Hegel renaissance of the early 20th century in Germany and his access to some of Hegel's 
unpublished manuscripts, especially those from his youth.  Second, to read it in the 
context of its contribution to Rosenzweig scholarship—and yet this method overlooks the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 HS "Nachwort," 557. 
 
152 This is more or less the perspective taken by Axel Honneth in his "Nachwort" to the Suhrkamp edition 
(2010) of Hegel und der Staat. See HS 556-82.!
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form of the book as a historiographical document and values the work for what it 
illuminates about Rosenzweig's later works—especially The Star of Redemption—
thereby minimizing the importance of the Hegel interpretation.  Both of these methods 
fall short. 
 Accordingly, my work proposes a third method: to combine these two approaches 
and find the importance of the book for Rosenzweig's spiritual biography in the 
substantive content and stylistic form of the whole of its Hegel interpretation.  This 
requires treating the book itself as an historical object, which in the form of its Hegel 
interpretation is revelatory for Rosenzweig's own biography.  This differs from the 
second method above, for instead of using Rosenzweig's later work as the locus of 
orientation, Hegel und der Staat itself serves as the point around which my own 
observations are organized.  This method lends a particularly Hegelian tone to my 
work—and shows the depth at which Rosenzweig engaged Hegel's thought—as I never 
stray far from the trajectory of Hegel's development.  However, as I claim above, Hegel 
und der Staat is a work filled with the tensions of divisions and unity.  By providing an 
immanent critique of Hegel und der Staat, I show how the "living kernel" of the book 
emerges from the form and content of the work as a reflection of Rosenzweig's own 
struggle to unite his personal life and thought. 
  Lebensstationen, the volume where the "living kernel" of Rosenzweig's Hegel 
interpretation germinates, presents a series of problems particular to the biographical 
presentation of Hegel's early life and thought.  As Otto Pöggeler points out, even in 
recent times Hegel's early development is still cause for much debate: "The young 
Hegel—each year brings us a range of works about him, yet he still remains largely 
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unknown: his work is overlaid with the various kinds of concealments that discoveries 
always bring in their train."153  Rosenzweig is rightly credited as being one of the first 
explorers of the early Hegel, and his discoveries, as recorded in the first volume of Hegel 
und der Staat, are still praised as "indispensible" for scholarship.154  However, although 
one must never lose sight of the fact that Rosenzweig is writing within the Hegelian 
tradition, as I have argued above, the first volume of his Hegel biography presents many 
difficulties, which at first may conceal, as Pöggeler's comment above implies, a clear 
view of the early Hegel.    
 Thus, in what follows, I attempt to show both what the first volume of Hegel und 
der Staat reveals about Hegel's life and thought, and also how the manner in which it is 
revealed reflects Rosenzweig's own particular position as a biographer and historian.  As 
will be seen, I trace Rosenzweig's argument regarding Hegel's youth as it issues from 
Hegel's entanglement within an intellectual community and the historical events of the 
age towards his later thought and ultimate philosophical system.  It can be seen from this 
sustained interest in Hegel's early development how Rosenzweig himself, who was a 
young doctoral student at the time he began the project, is working out his own ideas 
towards history and life.  Without yet knowing his own future, Rosenzweig attempts to 
trace the formative experiences of Hegel's youth as they become determining forces in 
Hegel's life and thought.  From these youthful experiences, and especially the French 
Revolution in 1789—when Hegel was an impressionable nineteen years old—
Rosenzweig draws a striking contrast between Hegel's youth and his later thought.  This 
contrast, which culminates in Frankfurt in proximity to Hölderlin, forms the basis of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 Quoted from David Farrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute. 21-22.  
 
154 See, for example, Joachim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution. 109.!
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Rosenzweig's argument and the contours of Hegel's early development—he will return 
again and again to this decisive phase.  Ultimately, Hegel's path is inspired by what 
Rosenzweig calls the "riddles of personal life": it leads from a fascination with religion 
and Greek antiquity towards a growing interest in the defense of the rights of the 
individual—inspired by the neighboring revolution—to the riddles of personal life in 
Frankfurt and the emergence of the state as "fate," and finally culminates in a turn 
towards the state as "power" in Jena, the first full expression of Hegel's philosophy of 
history and his philosophical system.  With Rosenzweig as our guide, we now turn to 
these first phases of Hegel's life.  It will be our task to hold patiently, behind the formal 
and material shapes of Hegel's development, to the question of significance for 
Rosenzweig's own biography. 
 
 
The Stream of Personal Life 
  To begin our investigation into the heart of Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State, a 
simple metaphor may be of use.  Imagine one way of reading through a relatively 
unexplored and disregarded work like Hegel and the State to be similar to panning for 
gold in a stream: one aims to sift through all the sediment—the historical and 
philosophical details common to the age or what Rosenzweig calls "the pre-war 
spirit"155—until all that remains are those valuable pieces for the future, approaching in 
our context the brightness of the ideas from The Star of Redemption, which they will one 
day help compose.  However, this manner of approaching the text proves inadequate.  For !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 "Geist der Vorkriegsjahre." HS 18. 
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the sediment itself, this earth-like structure within the stream that supports the objects of 
value, has a story of its own to tell.  By taking only what is of value from the flowing 
stream, one loses the story—the biographical drama—that gave these objects their 
original importance.  And by doing away with the sediment and stream alike, one also 
risks doing away with the very source from which Rosenzweig's future thought, at least 
in part, springs forth. 
 Rosenzweig employs a similar metaphor when dealing with the context of Hegel's 
life and thought.  Very early on in the book, while introducing the crux-point of Hegel's 
early development—the transition from the political philosophy of the eighteenth to the 
nineteenth century—Rosenzweig writes that this transition "did not play itself out in 
thinking as a dry, conceptual process, but was rather deeply embedded in the stream of 
personal life. In order to understand this development, one should not wish to pull it from 
the stream onto a dry embankment."156  It is with this metaphor of a "stream of personal 
life" that Rosenzweig begins his narrative on Hegel's life and thought.  In the words of 
Goethe: "die Quelle kann nur gedacht werden, insofern sie fließt."157 
 Rosenzweig's language often emerges from the work of his teacher, Friedrich 
Meinecke, in strikingly "Romantic"158 terms.  This is first expressed metaphorically in 
Rosenzweig's sustained use of the word "stream" in order to conceptualize time, yet also 
conceptually with through an emphasis on the central role of the "individual" in political 
philosophy.  On this latter point, what Meinecke argues for as the central idea of Novalis' !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 "Das Werden der neuen Anschauung vollzog sich zumeist nicht im Denken als ein trocken-begriffliches 
Geschehen, sondern es war tief eingebettet in den Strom des persönlichen Lebens; um dies Werden zu 
verstehen, darf man es nicht aus dem Strom heraus ans trockene Ufer tragen wollen." HS 25. 
 
157 Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit II. 17. 
 
158 See Ernest Rubenstein, An Episode in Jewish Romanticism. 
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political thought also remains crucial in Rosenzweig's investigation of Hegel: "Alle 
Kultur entspringt aus den Verhältnissen eines Menschen mit dem Staate."159  
Rosenzweig, who was certainly familiar with the writings and life of Novalis from 
Dilthey's Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, can be brought even closer to Novalis if we 
consider the following passage from "Die Lehrlinge zu Sais": 
 
 "Wie wenige haben sich noch in die Geheimnisse des Flüssigen vertieft und 
 manchem ist diese Ahnung des höchsten Genusses und Lebens wohl nie in der 
 trunkenen Seele aufgegangen.  Im Durste offenbaret sich diese Weltseele,  diese 
 gewaltige Sehnsucht nach dem Zerfließen.  Die Berauschten fühlen nur zu gut 
 diese überirdische Wonne des Flüssigen, und am Ende sind alle angenehme 
 Empfindungen in uns mannigfache Zerfließungen, Regungen jener Urgewässer in 
 uns."160  
 
The importance of this "Urgewässer in uns" as it appears within Hegel and the State as a 
metaphor of time informing Rosenzweig's philosophy of history, remains central to his 
later thought as well.  In The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig will take a position in 
contrast to this Romantically inspired idea of the "stream" in Hegel and the State; 
however, the language remains the same.  In The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig writes, 
commenting on his method of breaking apart the "elements" of God, World and Man 
from the unity of the "all": "We know of a living movement, a circuit in which these 
elements swim; now they have been torn from the current."161  Whether consciously or 
not, Rosenzweig is taking a position here against his own earlier work.  Thus, in the sense !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
159 Meinecke, 63. 
 
160 Novalis, "Die Lehrlinge zu Sais." 93. !
161 Star 83. 
 68 
of this metaphorical language alone, his later work may be understood as a continuation 
of the first.    
 In order to understand Hegel's thought, Rosenzweig argues in Hegel and the State 
that one cannot do away with the personal life, the "stream" that gives this thought its 
context.  This, of course, was already apparent in the foreword, where Rosenzweig 
credits Dilthey with first unveiling from Hegel's life "a stream of hidden sorrows and 
hidden passions" for Rosenzweig's age.  In approaching the first volume of Hegel and the 
State, one does well to keep these words in mind.  For central to Rosenzweig's 
exploration of the "relationship of the individual to the state" within Hegel's early 
thought, is not only the role of Hegel's personal life in general, but indeed these "hidden 
sorrows and hidden passions" of Hegel's youth.  Already the tone of tragedy can be heard 
within Rosenzweig's voice, anticipating its first crescendo in Hegel's Frankfurt period.  
But before turning to this all-important chapter in Hegel's life, Rosenzweig proceeds 
quite conventionally, staying within the character of the dramatic historian and utilizing a 
chronological narrative.  Beginning first with the historical context, Rosenzweig then 
moves on to Hegel's youth in Stuttgart, followed by his formative years in Tübingen and 
finally his first years of independence in Bern. 
 
 
Janus-Face  
 Rosenzweig situates the beginnings of Hegel's life within the general context of 
the European reaction to the Reformation and Enlightenment as they played out in the 
eighteenth century, especially in Germany, England and France.  Rosenzweig follows 
 69 
quite closely the same historical context his teacher Meinecke introduces in the second 
chapter of his Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat.162  In that work, Meinecke's guiding 
thought revolves around the particular relationship between "national" and "universal" 
drives in the thoughts of individual thinkers.  Following this approach, Rosenzweig's own 
introduction to Hegel's life places the "universal" tendencies of the eighteenth century—
especially in France, England and Germany—against the backdrop of the emerging 
"national" sensibilities. In leading up to the nineteenth century, whose beginnings were to 
be largely mirrored in the emergence of Hegel's philosophy, Rosenzweig juxtaposes what 
he sees as the two dominating "universal" forces of the eighteenth century that would 
influence Hegel's life and thought: "concept" (Begriff) and "experience" (Erfahrung).  
Again using the metaphor of a stream to guide his readers, Rosenzweig writes that these 
two aspects of the eighteenth century were "two streams, which ran along side each other 
in this river.”163  Still far removed from associating this image of two streams with his 
own German and Jewish roots as he does in Zweistromland164—his first collection of 
essays published in 1926—Rosenzweig introduces the "conceptual" stream leading up to 
the nineteenth century with Rousseau and warns of merely following this single path of 
“inspired rationality.”165  In contrast to Rousseau, we are reminded of the stream of 
Montesquieu; next to the “passionately fulfilled and coldly calculated” ideal of the state, 
we are reminded of the “the political museum of the other, a treasury of immeasurable 
materials of experience brought together with a true joy in collecting the multifarious, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. 27-39. 
 
163 "zwei Strömungen, die in diesem Flüsse nebeneinander herliefen." HS 23. 
 
164 Rosenzweig, Zweistromland (1926). 
 
165  "vernunftsfreudigen." HS 23!!!
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colorful, even the bizarre.”166  Rosenzweig calls this the “double countenance” 
(Doppelantlitz) of the eighteenth century and likens it to a Janus-face that never sees the 
same object: 
 
The one, which looks out to the state for how it should act for the sake of 
rationality, prefers to see, or oversee, all reality of political life in the state with 
the eyes of a revolutionary; the other, in that its glance of this reality strays from 
here to there in curiosity, would rather not feel the historical rationality within this 
manifold life; rather, it only finds a confusion of strange things which long for 
that richly spiritual, enlightening inscription.167 
 
 
This image of two conflicting, yet complementary historical personalities—Rousseau and 
Montesquieu—introduces readers to Rosenzweig's central claim concerning Hegel's 
generation: “To unite this double countenance, to change the breaking apart of the two 
viewpoints into a joining together, became the project of the 19th century.”168  Thus, in 
Rosenzweig view, Hegel's future task is ultimately the unification of "concept" and 
"experience."  Indeed, in terms of the biographical form and anticipatory tone of the 
book, the entirety of Hegel and the State is built around the dynamics of this division and 
the possibility of its reconciliation in Hegel's life and thought.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 "leidenschaftlich erfühlten, bald kalt errechneten"; "das politische Museum des andren, Schatzkammer 
eines unermeßlichen Erfahrungsstoffs, mit echter Sammlerfreude am Vielfältigen, Bunten, selbst 
Absonderlichen." HS 24. 
 
167 "Das eine, das nach dem Staat ausschaut, wie er von Vernunft wegen sein soll, mag die Wirklichkeit 
staatlichen Lebens ringsum nur mit den Augen des Revolutionärs sehen oder übersehen; das andere, das 
seinen Blick durch diese Wirklichkeit neugierig hin und her schweifen läßt, vermag doch die innere 
geschichtliche Vernunft dieses mannigfaltigen Lebens nicht zu fühlen, es findet darin nur ein 
Durcheinander von Merkwürdigkeiten, die nach der geistreich erklärenden Aufschrift verlangen." HS 24.  
  
168 "Das Doppelantlitz zu vereinigen, das Auseinanderlaufen der beiden Blickrichtungen in ein Miteinander 
zu verwandeln, wurde das Werk des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts." HS 24. 
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 The importance of biographical form for Rosenzweig's argument is already 
evident in the epigraph to the “Preliminary Remarks.”  Here he quotes the famous line 
from the preface to the Philosophy of Right—“What is rational is actual; and what is 
actual is rational”169—but intentionally changes this statement by separating the two lines 
and inserting ellipses: 
 
   “What is rational… 
   “and what is actual… 
 
This gesture is decisive and not to be overlooked.  In writing that the task of the 
nineteenth century would be to unite "concept" and "experience," Rosenzweig sees in 
Hegel’s statement from the Philosophy of Right the “guiding saying” (Leitspruch) of the 
political thinkers of the nineteenth century—including those who opposed Hegel 
himself.170  Thus, if Hegel's philosophical path was to be the conjoining of the rational—
the “concept” of Rousseau—and the actual—the “experience” of Montesquieu—then the 
above gesture by Rosenzweig, placed on the first pages of his book, is made in order to 
question the possibility of reconciling these opposites.  This gesture thus slyly veils the 
critical tone with which Rosenzweig responds to Hegel's philosophy throughout. 
 In terms of Rosenzweig's biographical narrative, the two separate volumes 
represent a position suggesting an insurmountable division between life and thought.  
Hegel’s struggle with personal life is transformed in the second volume into the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 Hegel, G.W.F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. 20 (Hereafter: PR). 
 
170 HS 24. 
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philosophical struggle for the “unification with the age.”171  On the one hand, the division 
between the "rational" and the "actual" shows the personal struggle for unification, which 
at the height of the first volume reflects itself into the language of tragedy, as I argue in 
Chapter III.  On the other hand, this division shows how Hegel's personal life is a 
"mirror"172 (Spiegel) to his age; how the life of this historical personality helps to reflect 
the historical epoch—rife with philosophical and political divisions—into which he was 
born.   
 
 
The Hero and His Age: The Individual and the State in the Context of Hegel's  
Early Political Thought 
 
 When in 1908 Rosenzweig claimed that he would give "ten years"173 of his life to 
write a book like his teacher Friedrich Meinecke's Cosmopolitanism and Nation-state he 
would in effect give future researchers one of the biggest clues for discerning the nature 
of his own book on Hegel.  In a letter to Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy he wrote: "You must 
have noticed in the Hegel that its real reason for being was not an interest in Hegel, but 
my wish to make a book."174  Despite the fact that Rosenzweig's Hegel book, in contrast 
to his own assessment, exposes a clear and lasting interest in Hegel's life and thought, 
Meinecke's book—qua book—remained the model for Rosenzweig throughout.  Not only 
would Meinecke's short chapter on Hegel give Rosenzweig the first impulse to interpret !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 "Vereinigung mit der Zeit." HS 521. 
 
172 HS 145. 
 
173 "Um so ein Buch geschrieben zu haben, würde ich wohl zehn Jahre meines Lebens geben." Rosenzweig, 
Briefe, (13.11.1908). 41. 
 
174 From Judaism Despite Christianity. 86. 
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Hegel's view of the state as one developing away from the rights of individuals towards a 
"power-state" (Machtstaat), but Rosenzweig would adopt his teacher's method of 
exploring the political history of Germany through the lives of its greatest individuals.  
To quote Meinecke: "Die Untersuchung politischer Gedanken darf niemals losgelöst 
werden von den großen Persönlichkeiten, den schöpferischen Denkern."175  But the 
inspiration Rosenzweig gained from Meinecke would also help set him free.  In the 
foreword to the second edition of Cosmopolitanism and Nation-state of 1911, Meinecke 
writes: 
 
 Mein Buch beruht auf der Meinung, daß die deutsche Geschichtsforschung, 
 ohne auf die wertvolle Überlieferung ihres methodischen Betriebes zu 
 verzichten, doch wiederum zu freier Regung und Fühlung mit den großen 
 Mächten des Staats- und Kulturlebens sich erheben müsse [...] daß sie erst ihr 
 eigenstes Wesen entwickeln könne, universal und national zugleich zu sein.176    
 
While Meinecke's influence cannot be ignored, and I will draw upon it again and again, it 
is equally obvious that Rosenzweig took his teacher's call for "freie[] Regung und 
Fühlung" to heart.  With this in mind, I would like to suggest that although 
unacknowledged, it is Goethe who provides one of the fundamental impulses to 
Rosenzweig's treatment of Hegel's life.  In the introduction to his Dichtung und 
Wahrheit—his "half-poetical, half-historical"177 autobiography, which Rosenzweig had 
read already as a youth—Goethe writes that "the main task of biography seems to be to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Meinecke, 24. !
176 Meinecke, 1-2. 
 
177 Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit I. 7. 
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present man in his relation to time, and to show to what extent the whole resists him, to 
what extent it favors him, how he forms a view of the world and humanity from this and 
how, if he is an artist, poet, or writer, he then reflects these views outwardly."178  This 
passage captures the mood within which Rosenzweig sets the entirety of his work on 
Hegel.  Accordingly, in order to understand Hegel's biography—and his philosophy of 
the state, which for Rosenzweig is the crowning achievement of his thought—we must 
again and again understand Hegel's relationship to the age he was living in. 
 Rosenzweig situates the emergence of Hegel's philosophy of the state within the 
transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century in Europe.  As discussed above, 
common to the European eighteenth century was the division between "concept" and 
"experience."  This division, however, manifests itself differently when addressing 
political sensibilities on the one hand and the spiritual and cultural movements of science 
and art on the other.179  In opposition to France, for example, where the political ideas of 
the nineteenth century seemed to flow with little resistance from the eighteenth century 
and those of art and science had to overcome a great distance “in order to join the 
Romantic movement of the new century,”180 in Germany the  
 
general spiritual evolution since the middle of the eighteenth century actually runs 
without a visible break right into the nineteenth.  But for the state, and especially 
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for the ideas of the state, which means here for the relationship of man to the 
state, the distance between the centuries seems at first glance immeasurable.181  
 
 
In Rosenzweig's reading, the particularity of the German political sensibility at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century is its entwinement with the science and art of the age.  
Thus, in Germany the Enlightenment was a "purely spiritual movement" (rein geistigen 
Bewegung) and it was not from a body of highly trained politicians that Germany’s 
fledgling political philosophy arose, but from a “community of the educated” 
(Gemeinschaft der Gebildeten) or in other words, from within the circle of German 
Classicism.182  For Rosenzweig, Immanuel Kant characterizes this emergence of political 
consciousness within the sphere of science and art in his 1784 essay “Beantwortung der 
Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?”  Rosenzweig points out the naiveté with which Kant 
explains the relationship between the individual and the state: “argue, but obey” 
(räsonniert, aber gehorcht).  “This ‘but',” Rosenzweig continues, “this complete 
disjunction between “arguing” and “obeying,” is expressed in this essay with a most 
unselfconscious brevity.”183  In Germany in particular, this “unselfconscious” 
relationship between the individual and the state reveals a deeper divide in their political 
sensibility: "the hostility or indifference of the individual person towards the state, the 
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abyss between the personal life of morals and the public life of the state."184  In Germany, 
not only would this "abyss" between individual and state become the defining problem of 
the century to come, but this division—as witnessed by Hegel's dictum to unite 
"rationality" and "actuality"—would cast a shadow of political homelessness—reaching 
well into the age of Napoleon and the Restoration—over the richly spiritual age of 
German Classicism.  For Hegel in particular, this means that his political philosophy 
emerged as a highly personal experience mediated by the rich tradition of German 
science and art. 
 Only towards the end of Hegel and the State does Rosenzweig share his thought 
that the biographical dates of Hegel—who was born in 1770 and died in 1831—span the 
exact timeframe when Goethe began the first and finished the second volume of his tragic 
drama Faust.185  Given the central importance of this tragedy for understanding the form 
and intention of The Star of Redemption, no reference to Goethe's Faust within Hegel and 
the State should be easily overlooked.  However, whereas in The Star of Redemption 
Goethe's tragedy is used as a narrative device and primary example of the tragic figure 
within modernity, here, for Rosenzweig, Goethe's work both precedes and outlasts 
Hegel's influence and thus acts as a sort of litmus test on Hegel's historical personality.  
And yet only in the second volume of his book—"Epochs of the World"—does 
Rosenzweig begin to hint that Hegel is indeed living in the age of Goethe.  Only here has 
Hegel's thought broken the shores of personal life and begun to take on a historical life of 
its own.  During the days of his youth, however, Hegel is still so entwined in his personal 
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circles, that Rosenzweig hesitates to identify Hegel's notes and essays as a schoolboy—
the content of the "Stuttgart" section—with any of his mature thoughts.  He sees them 
rather as general influences of the age, as signs pointing towards Hegel's future thought.  
One of these signs in particular will return again and again in Hegel's thought and 
Rosenzweig's treatment of the same, which cannot be overlooked: the fascination of 
Hegel's age with ancient Greece. 
 In the first paragraph of the section "Stuttgart", Rosenzweig situates Hegel 
amongst the historical personalities—or the "community of the educated"—of his age.  In 
the first line he writes: "Hegel was born in 1770, in the same year as Friedrich Wilhelm 
III and as Hölderlin."186  These two figures—the first of which would go on to be the 
King of Prussia from 1797 until 1840, reigning while Hegel was the state-appointed 
philosopher in Berlin, the second to be Hegel's close friend as a young man and one of 
the greatest poets of the age—form the poles of Hegel's early development: his "national" 
interest in and devotion to the political fate of Germany on the one hand and his personal 
struggle with the "universal" concepts of fate and personality on the other.  But it was 
Hölderlin in particular with whom Hegel held a common interest in the problems and 
tensions of the age.  And no tension, even today, stands out more prominently than the 
obsessive fascination of Hegel's age with the culture and thought of ancient Greece.  Both 
Hegel and Hölderlin, roomates at the Tübingen seminary along with Friedrich Schelling, 
shared “the common religion of Greek rapture.”187  For Rosenzweig himself, this 
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"religion of Greek rapture" would form the cornerstone of his future interpretation of the 
influence of pagan thought upon philosophy.188  
   Already Herder and Schiller, two of the major influences upon the young Hegel, 
had seen in Greek culture the counter-model of understanding the cultural present in 
Europe.  Directly drawing upon these writers, Hegel saw in the Greeks—and later the 
Romans as well—“the path of all nations” (den Weg aller Nationen).189  In terms of his 
evolving philosophy of state, it was by comparing the political situation in Germany to 
that of antiquity, that Hegel saw the shortcomings of German political philosophy.  
Already in his youth and lasting into his maturity, the Greeks for Hegel would stand as a 
“warning voice for the German people” (Mahner zur Deutschheit).190  And although the 
image of the Greeks as the forefathers of European tradition was not entirely new to the 
late eighteenth century, “what is new is the measurement of the state of the present 
against the standard of the Polis.”191  Thus, throughout his life Hegel will again and again 
turn to the concept of the Greek "Polis" in order to measure the health of the German 
state, most notably in the preface to Philosophy of Right.192    
 Consequently, there developed in Hegel's thinking a necessary link between the 
fate of the German state and the ideal of the ancient Polis.  What drove Hegel to 
repeatedly make this comparison, however, was not a lifeless fascination with the past, 
but the very real political events turning his age on its head.  For directly or indirectly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 See here Part I of The Star of Redemption. 
 
189 HS 37. 
 
190 HS 38. 
 
191 "neu ist die Messung des Staats der Gegenwart am Maßstab der Polis." HS 28. 
 
192 I deal with this reference in Chapter IX. !
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influencing all thinking about the political future of the German state at that time were 
the events and consequences of the French Revolution.  Thus, looking to Greek antiquity 
was never a wish to return to that past for Hegel's generation, but stemmed from the 
desire to restore the ideals of humanity—albeit in a manner all their own and different 
from the French revolutionaries—into the unsure political present of the German people.          
 
 
"The Ideas of 1789" and Hegel's Early Theological Writings: Politics and Religion  
 The role of the French Revolution in Hegel's thought reaches it peak and perhaps 
most important expression in the Phenomenology of Spirit.  There, in the section entitled 
"Absolute Freedom and Terror," Hegel writes how the freedom won from the French 
Revolution as the "universal will" betrays itself when it becomes actual, ultimately 
negating the will of the individual, introducing "the sheer terror of the negative that 
contains nothing positive, nothing that fills it with content."193  For Hegel, this turning 
point in world history marks the moment when "absolute freedom" abandons "its self-
destroying reality" and passes over "into another land"194—this land was of course 
Germany itself.  But long before these considerations—written down in 1806 and which 
Rosenzweig will also use to mark Hegel's transition from the riddles of personal life to 
the "Epochs of the World"—Hegel, along with his Tübingen roommates Hölderlin and 
Schelling, experienced the Revolution at the height of the ideals of his youth.  And here, 
rather than encountering a young man obsessed with the external events of the present, 
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we find Hegel as a student, a young man driven by the "inner necessities" (innere 
Notwendigkeiten)195 of learning and knowledge.   
 It was during this time that Hegel, along with Hölderlin, was exposed to Rousseau 
and his ideas of "reason and freedom," which would form the basis of Hegel's critique of 
"absolute freedom" in the Phenomenology.   Additionally for Hegel, this interest in the 
events of his age was coupled with a deep concern for the history of religion in Europe.  
From Rosenzweig's presentation of Hegel's early development, it becomes clear that one 
of the major contributions of Hegel and the State is to show that the complexity of 
Hegel's early writings stems from the paradoxical coupling of a budding interest in 
"freedom" and the rights of the individual with a lasting fascination for world historical 
religion, especially Christianity.  Emil Fackenheim, the 20th-century Jewish philosopher, 
preserves this perspective in his book The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought when 
he claims that "without the Christian dimension of modern life [Hegel's] own philosophy 
could not have reached its all-comprehensive goals."196  Rosenzweig's treatment of the 
early Hegel shows that his earliest ideas on the relationship of the individual to the state 
emerge from an engagement with a philosophy of religion coupled with the political 
concerns of the age.   
 With these ideas in mind, we can understand the fascinated attention Rosenzweig 
pays to Hegel's early period in Tübingen and then Bern, which is marked not only by a 
passionate interest in antiquity and the Revolution in France, but also more specifically 
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by "the relationship of man to religion."197  As will become clear in Hegel's Frankfurt 
period, and later in Jena as well, the question of religion and its unfolding in history will 
play a central role in determining Hegel's early conception of the state.  In the Tübingen 
period, however, Rosenzweig concentrates on a group of fragments—cataloged by 
Hermann Nohl as "Volksreligion und Christentum"—that count as the "first flames" 
(erste Flamme)198 of Hegel's spirit.  Here, Rosenzweig offers a close reading of these 
fragments and organizes them both as foreshadowing Hegel's intellectual development 
and as his philosophical response to the "ideas of 1789."   
 From within these fragments there first emerges the sign of a grouping of ideas 
within Hegel's political thought, which will ultimately determine Hegel's understanding 
of world history and form the central piece to his argument for the unity of "reason" and 
"actuality" in the Philosophy of Right: the conceptual constellation between Greek 
antiquity, Christianity and the state.199  Looking back on this time, Hegel would later 
write to Schelling from Bern: "reason and freedom remain our slogan and our point of 
unity the invisible church."200  This notion of an "invisible church," borrowed from 
Immanuel Kant,201 refers to the growing importance Hegel will come to assign to 
religious values as the underlying structures of cultural life and ultimately use to engage 
the riddles of his own personal life.  Later, in "The Positivity of the Christian Religion," 
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 82 
he will write of those who adhere to this  "invisible church": "he adopts no duties except 
the one imposed by himself, and he gives his society no rights over him except the one 
that he himself concedes."202  Here, Hegel is speaking in the moral language of Kant and 
Fichte and responding to the problems addressed in Mendelssohn's Jerusalem.   
 Although one cannot overlook the influence of Mendelssohn’s interpretation of 
church and state in Jerusalem when addressing Hegel's early theological writings,203 
Rosenzweig at first does little more than mention this "literary influence" (literarischer 
Einfluß).204  The same can be said of the religious debate between Kant and Fichte, which 
Hegel was closely following.205  This constellation of thinkers, however, would come to 
dominate Hegel's thinking with his first sustained work written in Bern, "The Positivity 
of the Christian Religion."  In Rosenzweig's reading, however, it is not from these 
sources that the "spirit of the whole" (der Geist des Ganzen)206 present in Hegel's 
Tübingen period is to be deduced.  Rather, through reading Schiller's poetry on Greece, 
especially his poem "Die Götter Griechenlands,"which Hölderlin knew as well, there 
arose for Hegel the concept of the "spirit of the people" (Volksgeist),207 which he defined 
in relation to Montesquieu's conception of "Espirit général" as the end "product" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 See here "The Positivity of the Christian Religion", trans. Knox, 100.  
 
203 For an excellent treatment of the relation between Mendelssohn, Hegel and Rosenzweig, see: Bruce 
Rosenstock, Philosophy and the Jewish Question, esp. 205-243. 
 
204 HS 43. !
205 This debate centered around two texts: "Versuch einer Critik aller Offenbarung" by Fichte in 1792 and 
"Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft" by Kant in 1793, wherein the term "invisible 
church" is set against the "visible church" in order to contrast rational morality with institutionalized 
religious values. !
206 HS 43. 
 
207 Bienenstock calls Rosenzweig's emphasis on Hegel's "Volksgeist" "Romantic" (see Bienenstock, 
Rosenzweig's Hegel). !
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(Ergebnis) of the several things—such as climate, religion, laws, manners etc.—which 
make up a people.208  There is no doubt that in his youth Hegel saw the ideal 
manifestation of this "product" in the "beauty" of Greek cultural life.  But drawing on the 
contemporary political and social context he found himself within, Hegel sought to unify 
this inspired concept of a "Volksgeist" under the banner of "universal reason:" "national 
culture, the spirit of the people, is measured according to the degree of universal reason it 
attains."209  It was with this concept of reason, writes Rosenzweig, "that religion gained 
its place" in Hegel's thinking: "next to the political relations, religion is the most 
important mediator between the roots of reason and the flowering of life."210   
 In bringing out the significance of religious thought in Hegel's early period, 
Rosenzweig also notes that, initially at least, this had the effect of reducing the attention 
Hegel paid to his conception of the state in his "first socio-philosophical system" (erstes 
sozialphilosophisches System).211  In the fragments that make up this ideal, Hegel's 
conception of the state was reduced to the passive role of leaving the upbringing of the 
"Volksgeist" to "nature,"212 whereas religion, as a "religion of reason," had direct 
influence upon the "whole of national life" (nationales Gesamtleben).213  Regarding the 
relationship of the individual to the state, in answering "the ideas of 1789" by focusing on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 HS 44-45. 
 
209 "je nach dem erreichten Grad der allgemeinen Vernunft bestimmt sich die nationale Kultur, der 
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the concept of "Volksgeist"—by way of man's relation to religion—for Rosenzweig "it is 
precisely the idea of the state that is undeveloped in this ideal of society."214  This, 
however, was soon to change.  From the days of "inner necessity" in Tübingen, there 
arose in Hegel a "new wave" (neue Welle) that drew his attention more closely towards 
the political events of his day.215  This "new wave" was to give rise to the first expression 
of a thought that would occupy Hegel his entire life long: "the thought of the 
incompatibility of Christianity with the state."216  With the further thought that "reason 
and freedom . . . had to establish themselves in the state for the sake of the 'invisible 
church'"217 Hegel hinted at his main concern for the following years in Bern, namely, the 
ideal of the "inviolable internal and external freedom of man."218  He would again first 
look for this ideal by turning to religion, and only later turn directly to the political events 
of his age.  If in Tübingen Hegel blended his critical voice with an "ever stronger with 
personal experience"219, then in Bern, this personal experience reached a new height in 
his demand for the "freedom of man."  It would above all be Kant, "not the historical 
Kant in Königsberg [...] but rather a Kant who himself had already been taken up into the 
stream of history,"220 and especially Kant's notion of "the dignity of man" (die Würde des 
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Menschen),221 that would now fully consume Hegel.  This would lead Hegel towards his 
highest defense of the individual against the state.  For Rosenzweig, this is the last station 
before Hegel's conception of the state would gradually take a lasting hold upon his 
thought.  
 
 
"The Dignity of Man": In Defense of the Individual 
 During the French Revolution, Hegel and his contemporaries had very selectively 
fixed their eyes upon the events in France.  As Rosenzweig claims, "none saw the world-
historical process that was taking place there behind the fog of phrases and steam of 
blood, the emergence of the new nation-state."222  They saw only their own "well-trusted 
ideals," they saw "freedom, but not the state."223  But now in Bern, four years after the 
revolution, Hegel and his contemporaries gradually turned their eyes back to their own 
social and political conditions.  What was immediately at stake for them was the 
“orthodoxy” (Orthodoxie)224 that the young philosophers saw taking over German 
academic life.  Still infused with the spirit of the recent political events in France, they 
themselves now awaited a “revolution” from the “completion of the Kantian system.”225  
Remembering here Rosenzweig's claim in the first pages of Hegel and the State that the 
German political consciousness arose from the science and art of the age, one should not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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222 "keins den welthistorischen Vorgang sah, der sich dort hinter Phrasennebel und Blutdampf vollzog, die 
Entstehung des neuen Nationalstaats." HS 48. 
 
223 "der eignen wohlvertrauten Ideale; man sah die Freiheit, aber nicht den Staat." HS 48. 
 
224 HS 58. 
225 "von der Vollendung des Kantischen Systems eine 'Revolution'." HS 58. 
 
 86 
be surprised that it was a thought from the likes of Schiller, Kant and Fichte that gave 
way to the primary focus of Hegel's new political thought: “the dignity of man.”  And 
like the Greek culture by which Hegel was presently so taken, he thought the 
“revolution” in Germany would come from the heights of philosophical speculation, 
understanding with the phrase "the dignity of man" not an empty ideal, but the politically 
charged notion of “the unconditional self-legislation of the individual.”226  This is the first 
appearance of this notion of Kantian autonomy in Hegel's thought, which was to last well 
into his work on the Phenomenology.    
 Rosenzweig marks this shift in Hegel's thinking with an observation on Hegel's 
personal life, which helps give shape to his biographical interpretation and again recalls 
the division between "concept" and "experience" with which he introduced his book.227  
While in Bern, Hegel lived and worked as a tutor with the Steiger family.  However, he 
never fit in with the family or the town in which he was living.  Accordingly, this period 
for Hegel was marked by the "feeling of opposition to his surroundings" and he fled "into 
the arms of good mother nature."228  This separation Hegel felt with the world is the first 
sign of the personal tragedy in Frankfurt, which in Rosenzweig's reading would 
permanently shift Hegel's conception of the state.  In Frankfurt, the biographical 
"separation" (Trennung) from the world around him was cause enough for Hegel to 
reflect on the "tragedy" of Jesus' separation from life in general.  This is carried out in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226 "die Lehre von der unbedingten Selbstgesetzlichkeit des Individuums." HS 60. 
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Hegel's "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate."  In Bern, however, rather than the tragic 
separation from life, Hegel's alienation from the world around him led him to write in 
defense of the individual and his rights all the more vehemently, and most importantly 
with "a sharp political turn."229 
 The major piece of writing from this period is an essay entitled "The Positivity of 
the Christian Religion."  According to Rosenzweig, Hegel received the impetus, for both 
the manner and content, from Herder, especially from his “famous 17th book of the 
Ideas.”230  Rosenzweig goes as far as saying that this is “the seed of Hegel’s concept of 
historical development.”231  In the 17th book of the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte 
der Menschheit, Herder lays out the various aspects of the teachings of Jesus and how 
they evolved over the course of Western history.  Striking in our context is his use of the 
term "revolution"232 to introduce the manner in which Christianity appeared in world 
history.  Given the contemporary events in Germany, it is no surprise that this 
revolutionary character of Christianity corresponded to the mindset of the young 
philosopher.  Commenting on the section "How a Moral or Religious Society Grows into 
a State,"233 Rosenzweig points to the influence of both Rousseau and Mendelssohn on 
Hegel's own interpretation of Christianity.  With his interpretation, Hegel is under the 
spell of Rousseau's "contractual thought" (Vertragsgedanken),234 understood as the 
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thought of a "contract of every individual with everyone else."235  With regard to the 
relationship between church and state, on the other hand, Hegel takes up Mendelssohn's 
distinction between a “free-willed society and a society of coercion.”236  In order to have 
a free society the state may not have rights itself which it upholds over an individual.237  
Resisting the mere “legality” (Legalität) of the state, Hegel calls upon religion to restore 
“morality” (Moralität) to society.238  In effect, Hegel is working out what actually 
happened with Christianity as it spread throughout history.  The ideal relationship 
between church and state for Hegel would be that while religion inspires the "morality" 
of individuals, it remains separated from the "legality" of the state—a distinction central 
to the Kant's moral philosophy.  Rosenzweig summarizes: “This is the relationship of 
church and state as it should be; but it came about differently in history; the church, the 
Protestant as well as the Catholic, became a state itself.”239   
  In terms of Hegel's conception of the state, Rosenzweig anticipates here his own 
thesis, inspired by Meinecke, that Hegel's state is ultimately a "power-state."  For in this 
discussion of church and state he sees again and again that Hegel already understands the 
relation as determined by the “absolute power of the state (Allmacht des Staats).”240  But 
at this juncture, this "power of the state" does not yet tower over the dignity of man, “but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
235 "der Gedanke des Vertrags jedes einzelnen mit allen anderen." HS 62.  
 
236 "Unterscheidung einer freiwilligen und einer Zwangsgesellschaft." HS 62. 
 
237 HS 62. 
 
238 HS 63. 
 
239 "Dies ist das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat, wie es sein sollte; in der Geschichte ist es aber anders 
gekommen; die Kirche, protestantische wie katholische, wurde selbst ein Staat." HS 63. 
240 HS 64. 
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rather it finds in the natural rights of the individuals its task and its limit.”241  With this 
interpretation, Rosenzweig is anticipating the shifting roles of the individual and the state.  
Here, Hegel is critical of both the state and the church in order to defend the rights of the 
individual. Rosenzweig thus remarks, again anticipating his own next move: “To such 
height Hegel’s belief in the autocracy of man has climbed here.”242  Indeed, to a height at 
which Hegel could not remain forever.243 
 
 
Schiller, History and the State 
 In order to summarize Hegel's conception of the state at this point in his 
development, Rosenzweig uses the occasion of Hegel's newly developed historical 
thinking to draw out a crucial connection between Hegel and Schiller in their 
understanding of history.  As is well known to readers of The Philosophy of Right, 
Schiller's famous line "world history is the world's tribunal" (Weltgeschichte ist das 
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241 "sie findet in den natürlichen Rechten des Einzelmeschen ihre Aufgabe und ihre Grenze." HS 64. 
 
242 "Zu solcher Höhe ist hier Hegels Glaube an die menschliche Selbstherrlichkeit gestiegen." HS 65. 
 
243 Although Hegel begins to realize the "power of the state" during this time, a most important element is 
still missing for him: "the ethical (Sittliche) in the relation of man to the state" (HS 66).  It is here that 
Rosenzweig draws on the “The Oldest System-program of German Idealism” (Systemprogram) which he 
discovered and first published himself: "It must have come precisely in this summer, shortly after the piece 
just discussed, that Hegel copied the Systemprogramm of his friend Schelling, wherein it is said: that there 
is no idea of the state, because the state is something mechanical—just as little as there could be an idea of 
a machine.  'Thus, we must go above and beyond the state!—for every state must treat humans as 
mechanical wheelwork; and it shouldn’t do that; so it should cease.'  It is the same passionate accusation 
against the state that broke forth for Hegel.  But for Hegel the dispute could not end here; for him, the hate 
for the state could not become the denial of the state." (HS 66).  Commenting on the—still ongoing—
debate as to the authorship of the “Systemprogram,” one can see from this quote alone why Rosenzweig, 
writing a book on the development of Hegel’s conception of the state, could not attribute the 
“Systemprogram” to Hegel himself. For how could a thinker who would continue to so adamantly 
legitimize and defend the state write that the state “should cease”! 
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Weltgericht) will form one of the most central claims in Hegel's understanding of the 
state in history.  Rosenzweig shows his readers here that this lasting influence is already 
at work in Hegel's early years.    
 As introduced above, after the revolution in France, Hegel and his contemporaries 
began to anticipate their very own historical “revolution” in Germany.  And it was with 
none other than this future-oriented thinking that Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man clearly manifested for Hegel's age.  While many relations can be 
drawn between Hegel and Schiller, for example from their aesthetic theories or from 
Schiller’s poem on the gods of Greece as I mentioned above, Rosenzweig draws out their 
relation in terms of a philosophy of history.  It was from the 6th letter of Schiller's Letters, 
Rosenzweig claims, that Hegel drew the idea of dividing "the entire course of history up 
until now into the epoch of the Greeks and the following period.”244   For Hegel, this 
underlined the thought that what was lost to his generation could only be found in the age 
of the Greeks, namely, that “beautiful fullness of the Greek people.”245  In reflecting on 
the "beautiful fullness" of the Greek age, Hegel was led to conclude that “[t]he pulse of 
the entire view of history from that time is thus, that such magnificence of Greek 
antiquity has become simply impossible in the Christian world.”246  Newly influenced 
and changed by these ideas drawn from Schiller, Hegel leaves Bern with a new ideal of 
the modern state: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
244 "Teilung des ganzen bisherigen Geschichtsverlaufs in die Epoche der Griechen und die Folgezeit." HS 
71. 
 
245 "schönen Fülle des griechischen Menschen." HS 71. 
 
246 "Der Nerv der ganzen damaligen Geschichtsanischt Hegels ist eben, daß jene Herrlichkeit des 
griechischen Altertums in der christlichen Welt schlechthin unmöglich geworden ist." HS 72.  
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 The state can no longer be something divine, as it was back then when the  Gods 
 were not yet divine for the people.  Rather it rests with the state in the 
 modern world  to protect the sacred relics of conviction, belief, human rights, 
 which lie all together outside of its precinct; but after all, it is satisfied with its 
 own unholy sphere of power.247 
 
The state is still conceived as that force designed to serve the rights and beliefs of the 
individual, but the shift towards the "power of the state" has already been made.  Whereas 
in antiquity the role of the individual in the state was “the crown of life,” “for the post-
Greek people the work in the actual state of the present is only the unconsciousness of the 
little wheel—to speak with Schelling—in the machine.”248  Anticipating this shifting role 
of the state away from the rights of the individual and towards the "power-state" taken 
from Meinecke's interpretation, Rosenzweig warns his readers of the dangers to come: 
 
 the state is powerful, but is not power: it is not the independent being 
 strolling about that could also use its right against the rights of the individual, 
 that lives its own life, unconcerned if this individual perhaps unconsciously 
 effects it as a little cog in a subordinated position of the machine or even at 
 all.  We are still far away from that Hegel who was destined to create the 
 effective formula for the political thinking of the nineteenth century.249 (HS 73)  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
247 "Der Staat kann nun nichts Heiliges mehr sein, wie damals, als die Götter es dem Menschen noch nicht 
waren. Vielmehr obliegt dem Staat in der modernen Welt, die Heiligtümer der Überzeugung, des Glaubens, 
die Meschenrechte zu schützen, die allsamt außer seinem Bezirk liegen; übrigens aber hat er sich mit 
seinem eigenen unheiligen Machtgebiet zu begnügen." HS 72. 
 
248 "Krone des Lebens [...] dem nachgriechischen Menschen aber ist die Arbeit im wirklichen Staat der 
Gegenwart nur die unbewußte des Rädchens in der—mit Schelling zu reden—Maschine." HS 73. 
 
249 "der Staat ist mächtig, aber er ist nicht Macht: er ist nicht das selbstständig hinwandelnde Wesen, das 
sein Recht auch gegen die Rechte des einzelnen wenden könnte, das sein eigenes Leben lebt, unbekümmert 
ob dieser einzelne etwa bewußtlos als Rädchen an untergeordneter Stelle der Maschine oder auch 
überhaupt nicht an ihm wirke. Wir sind noch weit ab von dem Hegel, der dem politischen Denken des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts die wirksame Formel zu schöpfen bestimmt war." HS 73.  
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In Rosenzweig's critical reading, Hegel's state has not yet reached its all-powerful 
position within his thought—it is still tipped towards the side of the individual.  This 
leads Hegel further into the political events of his age and it is this engagement with the 
present time that will ultimately lead to a "division" with the world.  This "division," 
already hinting at elements of tragedy making their way into his personal life, was the 
result of the young Hegel's longing for "justice" and the resistance of the world—and as 
would later become clear, the course of history itself—against his political ideal.  
 
 
The Transition to Frankfurt: The Division between Life and Thought      
 In dealing with Hegel's early theological manuscripts, Rosenzweig followed the 
evolution of Hegel's conception of the state as it appeared there within his discussion of 
religion.  The central political idea to emerge for Hegel during that time was the “ethical 
relation of the individual to the state.”250  Hegel used the historical development of 
Christianity to show how this relationship evolved against the interest of the individual.  
In doing so, Hegel's was following his own "invisible church" of "Greek rapture" and not 
subscribing to any institution of the present.251  Thus, it was "from the perspective of the 
classical ideal"252 that Hegel's idea of the state emerged.  Here, Rosenzweig summarizes 
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250 "Das sittliche Verhältnis des einzelnen zum Staat." HS 69. 
 
251 As Lev Shestov points out in his book Potestas Clavium, Hegel replaced the idea of God with the idea 
of "the good" from Greek antiquity. Rosenzweig hints at this position without explicitly stating it. (See here 
Shestov, Potestas Clavium, "Sancta Superbia"). 
 
252 "von Standpunkt des klassischen Ideals." HS 70. 
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Hegel early political ideal: “The idea of the state is the item (das Gut) for which the 
individual works, the ultimate purpose of his world in front of which his individuality 
disappears, that which survives him, his soul, something eternal.”253  In his early writings, 
however, Hegel is not favoring the state over the individual, but both are there to serve 
each other.  This was already expressed in Hegel's concept of "Volksgeist."  But, as stated 
above, looking to the political reality surrounding him, Hegel realized that the 
"magnificence of Greek antiquity has become simply impossible in the Christian world."  
Thus, it was not with the aim to restore the past that Hegel confronted the political events 
of his time, but with a "picture of a better, more just age" and—with words Rosenzweig's 
echoes in the foreword to Hegel and the State—the "sighing for purer, freer 
conditions."254  In clear language, with a longing for "justice."   
 The section in Hegel and the State entitled "Two Political Writings" works as an 
interlude between “the sharp political turn of the Bern years”255 and the definitive 
“turning-point (Wende)”256 of Hegel's Frankfurt period.  Rosenzweig's title for this 
section is the only one in the book to match up exactly with a chapter title from Dilthey's 
History of the Young Hegel. 257  However, the contents of the sections differ for both 
authors. While both Rosenzweig and Dilthey focus on Hegel's critique of contemporary 
politics as it is expressed in Hegel's piece on the constitution of Württemberg, along with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
253 "Die Idee des Staats ist das Gut, wofür der einzelne arbeitet, der Endzweck seiner Welt, vor dem seine 
Individualität verschwindet, das ihn überlebt, das seine Seele, ein Ewiges ist." HS 69. 
 
254 "Das Bild besserer, gerechter Zeiten"; "ein Seufzen nach einem reineren, freieren Zustande." HS 87. 
 
255 "der scharf politischen Wendung der Berner Jahre." HS 67. 
 
256 HS 97. 
 
257 See Dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels, 122-137.  
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this polemical piece Dilthey addressed Hegel's important critique of the German 
constitution, known as the Reichsverfassungsschrift.258  Through the formal arrangement 
of his book, however, Rosenzweig argues that the Reichsschrift should be addressed apart 
from Hegel's "political writings" and, while certainly through and through "political" in 
nature, treated rather as the first example of the change in Hegel's view of the state 
mediated through the profound experiences of his personal life.  In Rosenzweig's reading, 
this important piece of critique cannot be understood outside of the context of Hegel's 
relationship to Hölderlin.  In place of the aforementioned piece, Rosenzweig's includes 
Hegel’s translation of, and commentary on the Swiss politician Jean Jacques Cart’s 
political polemic against his homeland of Wadtland, which is excluded by Dilthey. 
 Rosenzweig's explicit choice to order his texts differently than Dilthey is by no 
means a critique of his fellow Hegel biographer.  Rather, what is at stake for both authors 
is the same: Hegel's political ideal.  However, whereas Dilthey only touches upon the 
components of this ideal and points towards their possible connections to Hegel's 
developing thought, Rosenzweig unfolds them systematically within a biographical 
argument.  But Hegel's ideal of the state can already to be found in Dilthey's presentation.  
It is composed, for Rosenzweig and Dilthey alike, by the influence of Greek antiquity as 
reflected through the revolutionary standards of the present as well as by a longing for 
justice and the emergence of the idea of the unity of life.  For both authors, Hegel's 
engagement with the actual political events of his age point towards an even larger theme 
in Hegel's development: the separation of life and thought. 
 As I have argued, the division between "concept" and "experience" is a central 
theme in Rosenzweig's treatment of Hegel's political philosophy.  Hegel's age is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258 "Writing on the Constitution of the Empire", hereafter Reichsschrift.!
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presented as a generation whose task it was to unite this division.  Within Hegel's own 
personal biography, this division is first broadened into the general separation between 
life and thought.  Only by acknowledging this tension as a central organizational theme in 
Hegel's life can the biographical origins of the division between "actuality" and 
"rationality" in The Philosophy of Right be understood.  By focusing on two of Hegel's 
texts that deal directly with the politics of his age, Rosenzweig shows how the ideals of 
Hegel's youth rise up one last time in defiant cries for "justice," only in the end to remain 
unheard and estranged from the world.  This is the beginning of a rift in Hegel's personal 
life, which will be the cause of the "turning-point" in his biographical development.  In 
commenting on the sentiment of his own generation, as introduced above, Hegel himself 
was not unaware of this growing tension between personal life and political ideal: "The 
picture of a better, more just age has awakened in the souls of man, and a longing, a 
sighing for purer, freer conditions has moved all minds and divided them (entzweit) with 
actuality."259  However, Hegel's cry in his commentary on the Cart translation to "Discite 
justiciam moniti"260—"learn justice from this warning"—fell upon deaf ears, if it was 
even heard at all.  As Rosenzweig concludes: "So Hegel experienced the backlash of 
external life against the ideas that determined his political thinking up until now."261     
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
259 "Das Bild besserer, gerechterer Zeiten ist lebhaft in die Seelen der Menschen gekommen, und eine 
Sehnsucht, ein Seufzen nach einem reineren, freieren Zustande hat alle Gemüter bewegt und mit der 
Wirklichkeit entzweit." HS 87. 
 
260 HS 80. 
 
261 "So erfuhr Hegel den Rückschlag des äußeren Lebens gegen die Ideen, die sein politisches Denken 
bisher bestimmt hatten." HS 92. 
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 While observing this period of Hegel's development, Dilthey was filled with 
"deep respect and a feeling of tragedy."262  One can understand how in Rosenzweig's 
reading, these two emotions—"respect" and "tragedy"—also informed his ultimate 
interpretation of Hegel's life.  That is, how through a close, thus respectful reading of his 
writings, Rosenzweig came to see the personal tragedy of Hegel's life.  For Rosenzweig, 
the "feeling of tragedy" Dilthey read into Hegel's writings of the time came from Hegel's 
own personal life—his own "division" from "reality" ("Entzweiung" mit der 
"Wirklichkeit")—reflected more specifically into his relationship with Hölderlin.  In this 
context, Rosenzweig credited Dilthey with first raising that all-important relationship 
between Hegel and Hölderlin to its proper level.  For Hölderlin also shared this personal 
and tragic "division" from the world and this longing for a better future with his friend 
Hegel.  While Hegel was writing about the political events of the age, Hölderlin had 
already begun working on his novel Hyperion.  And Rosenzweig argues that it was 
precisely the "Hyperion-poet" Hölderlin who gave the sentiment of the age its "most pure 
artistic expression."263  By turning to a language of tragedy drawn from Hölderlin's 
writings, Rosenzweig introduces the great "turning-point" in Hegel's life: a turn from the 
ideals of his youth towards the powers of history and the state, and in terms of the 
individual, towards the tragic "fate" of personal life. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
262 Dilthey, Hegel. 123 !
263 "den reinsten künstlerischen Ausdruck." HS 87. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE UNITY OF PERSONAL LIFE: 
 
HEGEL AND HÖLDERLIN IN FRANKFURT 
 
"Versöhnung ist mitten im Streit,  
und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder" 
       Hölderlin, Hyperion 
 
 
Introductory Remarks: Hegel and Hölderlin       
In a letter from 1911, Rosenzweig wrote to Gertrud Oppenheim—his cousin, 
childhood friend and lifelong intellectual confidant—that the section of his dissertation 
entitled "Frankfurt" was finished.264  He continues that of all the sections, this is the one 
that she should read, and characterizes it as the “main chapter” for which he had “long 
prepared himself.”265  In Rosenzweig's narrative, Hegel's Frankfurt period marks the 
"turning-point"266 of his views on the state.267  On the one hand, the relation between the 
individual and the state introduced in the previous chapter tips decidedly towards the 
state—a decisive change, which according to Rosenzweig would subsequently determine 
the character of Hegel's view of the state.  On the other hand, this period was also 
decisive in facilitating a profound shift in Hegel's thinking as a whole: “The idea of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 See Rosenzweig, Briefe, 28.9.11. 
 
265 Rosenzweig, Tagebücher und Briefe, In Franz Rosenzweig: Der Mensch und sein Werk. 120. 
 
266 "Wende." HS 97. 
 
267 That Frankfurt represents the true turning-point in Hegel's development is disputed by Harris in Hegel's 
Ladder. He argues that Rosenzweig's overemphasizes this period and sees the turning-point rather with 
Hegel's Phenomenologie. 
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unity of all life gained force.”268  The concept of “unity” (Einheit) plays a decisive role in 
Rosenzweig’s treatment of Hegel's Frankfurt period, especially with regard to the 
division between life and thought that permeates the entire work.  Moreover, what 
Rosenzweig critically presents as Hegel's notion of "the unity of all life" relates back to 
the division between "concept" and "experience" Hegel inherited from the eighteenth 
century.  Finally, in The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig argues that the unity of "being" 
and "thought" in Hegel's thinking is the fundamental assumption of all Idealism.269  Thus, 
when Rosenzweig writes that in Frankfurt Hegel’s ideas "entered into the constellation, 
which would rule over his later system,”270 he is not only setting the stage for his critique 
of Hegel's political thought, but also anticipating his critique of German Idealism in The 
Star of Redemption.  
This emergence of the "unity of all life" in Hegel's thought cannot be understood 
without underscoring his relation to Hölderlin in Frankfurt.  In his essay "Hegel and 
Hölderlin," Dieter Henrich emphatically declares the importance of this relationship:  
 
 Before his encounter with Hölderlin in Frankfurt, Hegel was a critic of the church 
 and a historical and political analyst with connections to the Gironde.  Only in 
 relation to Hölderlin, and by the latter’s influence on him, was he to become the 
 philosopher of the age."271 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
268 "Die Idee der Einheit alles Lebens gewann Gewalt." HS 97. 
 
269 "Die wißbare Welt wird wißbar durch das gleiche Denkgesetz, das auf der Höhe des Systems als 
oberstes Seinsgesetz widerkehrt." Stern, 7. 
 
270 "sein Gedanken traten in die Konstellation, welche sein späteres System beherrschen sollte." HS 97. 
 
271 Dieter Henrich, "Hegel and Hölderlin" in The Course of Remembrance. 139.!
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When Rosenzweig began writing his dissertation towards the beginning of the 20th 
century, such strong affiliation between Hegel and Hölderlin was virtually unheard of.  
Through the work of Norbert von Hellingrath, Hölderlin was only then gradually 
emerging as the national poet he is known as today.  However, before all others, Wilhelm 
Dilthey recognized that it was indeed Hölderlin who provided the impetus for Hegel to 
become the "philosopher of the age."  What Dilthey began, Rosenzweig carries on in his 
own work.272  This is already apparent in the foreword to Hegel and the State, where 
Rosenzweig ends this short, but critical piece of prose with a crescendo towards Dilthey's 
contribution to Hegel's legacy:   
 
And so it was he [Dilthey] who first recognized how that connection between 
 Hegel and Hölderlin was more than a biographical curiosity, and more than the 
 sign or ground of an organic deformation; it was he who first, with gentle hand, 
 raised the veil and showed, how from the great rigid pictures of the historical  
 Hegel [...] there poured forth a stream of hidden sorrows and hidden passions 
 from those days of his youth.273 
 
Rosenzweig concludes the foreword to his book by emphatically emphasizing the 
importance of Hegel's relation to Hölderlin.  And already here he introduces this relation 
in language familiar to us—as sorrow and hidden passions flowing into a "stream," the 
stream of personal life.  As Henrich points out in the previous quote, the stations of 
Hegel's life leading up to Frankfurt show him as "a critic of the church and a historical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
272 See Dilthey, Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. 40-42; 140-41. 
 
273 "So erkannte er, und er zuerst, wie jener Zusammenhang zwischen Hegel und Hölderlin mehr war als 
eine biographische Merkwürdigkeit und mehr als das Zeichen oder der Grund einer organischen 
Verbildung; er zuerst hob mit zarter Hand die Schleier und zeigte, wie in dem starren Riesenbild des 
historischen Hegel [...] von jenen Jugendtagen her ein Strom geheimen Leidens und geheimer Leidenschaft 
rauschte." HS 17.!
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and political analyst."  However, it was first in Frankfurt that the "hidden sorrows and 
hidden passions" of his youth are revealed.  It is from these revealed passions of Hegel's 
personal life that Rosenzweig sees a shift issuing from Hegel's political thinking as well.  
As Rosenzweig will again emphasize on the last pages of his book, in Frankfurt "the new 
idea of the state arose for [Hegel] in the proximity of Hölderlin."274   
 In what follows, I will show how the "main chapter" of Rosenzweig's dissertation 
gains its momentum from a philosophical interpretation of Hölderlin's Hyperion—with 
additional evidence from one of Hegel's personal letters—and how through a rather 
creative reading of the notion of "fate" (Schicksal) in this novel Rosenzweig introduces 
one of the central points of his critique of Hegel's political philosophy: how from the 
"sorrows and hidden passions" of his youth, Hegel moves towards the idea of the "unity 
of all life" through the concept of the "state as a part of fate."  
 
 
"The Riddles of Personal Life" 
 According to Rosenzweig, the philosophical questions during Hegel's Frankfurt 
period revolve around the "riddles of personal life."275  Before looking at Hölderlin's 
Hyperion, it is helpful to again immerse ourselves within the stream of Rosenzweig's 
interpretation, in order to give some context to our discussion. Rosenzweig describes the 
relationship between Hegel and Hölderlin in Frankfurt as "equal to equal" (von Gleich zu 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
274 "da ihm in Hölderlins Nähe die neue Staatsidee erwuchs." HS 531. 
 
275 "die Rätsel des persönlichen Lebens." HS 102. 
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Gleich).276  However, as Dieter Henrich points out, "[i]n all of Hegel's work Hölderlin is 
not mentioned once."277  This makes Rosenzweig's emphasis on this relationship even 
more striking, especially given his own admission that Hölderlin's "actual influence can 
often only be proved with uncertainty.”278  Nevertheless, the original arguments in 
Rosenzweig's "Frankfurt" section anticipate Henrich's future claim, namely, how from 
the "awkward Frankfurt texts" and Hegel's encounter with Hölderlin "the system emerged 
which subsequently became the world philosophy of the age."279   
 During their time in Frankfurt, both Hegel and Hölderlin were still on a very 
similar path of life.  Not only had they once lived and studied together in Tübingen, but 
now reunited they were familiar with many of the same authors and texts: Greek 
philosophy, Kant, Schiller, Fichte, among others.  For Hegel's emerging concept of 
"fate," one text in particular was of great significance: Schiller's Briefe über die 
ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen.  As mentioned in Chapter II, this text had a great 
impact on Hegel's development, especially on his budding philosophy of history and his 
idea of the "beautiful fullness" of the Greek people.  Rosenzweig again claims that it was 
from Schiller's philosophy of history that Hegel now found the origins of a new “ideal 
concept” (Idealbegriff), namely the concept of "totality" or "the unity of life, and namely 
of personal life.”280  When discussing the first republics of ancient Greece, the decisive 
trait for Schiller was “the internal unity and wholeness of humanity,” which is seen in 
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276 HS 100. 
 
277 Henrich, 119. 
 
278 "selbst abgesehen von der meist doch unsicheren Nachweisbarkeit eigentlichen Einflusses." HS 99. 
 
279 Henrich, 127. However, the two authors come to this similar claim by different means. 
 
280 "die 'Totalität,' die Einheit des Lebens, und zwar des persönlichen Lebens." HS 103. 
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contrast to “the work-dividing fragmentation in newer society.”281  For the Tübingen 
friends, including Schelling, Schiller's demand "to renew that beautiful unity" now 
became "the task of the future."282  Schelling in particular, who although the youngest, 
was the philosophically superior of the three, formulated this new battle cry in his 
"Ichschrift" as follows: "become simply one, elevate the plurality in yourself to a unity, 
that is, become a totality closed off in yourself."283  For Hegel, this idea of “unity” drawn 
from Schiller's ideal of Greek society and translated into more philosophical terms by 
Schelling became a “new power” for him during his Frankfurt period, one that now lay 
“scattered”284 throughout his writings. It is on the basis of this new concept of "unity" as 
an answer to the "riddles of personal life" that Rosenzweig presents his interpretation of 
Hölderlin's Hyperion as it relates to Hegel's emerging concept of fate. 
 
 
Hölderlin's Hyperion and Hegel's Letter 
 What is at stake for Rosenzweig in the "Frankfurt" section is ultimately how a 
new conception of the state arises from Hegel's notion of "fate."  However, over the three 
years Hegel spent in Frankfurt (1797-1800), this very notion went through considerable 
changes.  Drawing on various manuscripts, but especially "The Spirit of Christianity and 
its Fate" (Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal), Rosenzweig juxtaposes 
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281 "die innere Einheit und Ganzheit des Menschen gegenüberstellt der arbeitsteiligen Zersplitterung in der 
neueren Gesellschaft." HS 103. 
 
282 "jene schöne Einheit wieder zu erneuern"; "Aufgabe der Zukunft" HS 103. 
 
283 "werde schlechthin Eines, erhebe die Vielheit in dir zur Einheit, d.h. werde eine in dir selbst 
beschlossene Totalität." HS 103. 
 
284 "neue Kraft"; "versprengt" HS 103.!!
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Hegel's ideas from this period to the earliest versions of Hölderlin's Hyperion—and to 
some fragments from his Empedokles as well—in order to trace Hegel's notion of fate in 
relation to his view on the state.  Additionally, remaining within the "stream of personal 
life," Rosenzweig draws heavily upon a letter Hegel wrote in 1797—a "first class 
source"285—which for Rosenzweig shows the first signs of Hegel's turn away from the 
rights of the individual towards the power of the state.  Hölderlin's Hyperion and Hegel's 
letter from 1797 provide Rosenzweig with an interpretive lens used to magnify Hegel's 
biographical and philosophical transition from youth to adulthood. 
 As I argued in Chapter I, Hegel and the State is best understood through its 
biographical form.  This reading not only captures the particular manner in which 
Rosenzweig presents Hegel's philosophical development, but underscores Rosenzweig's 
struggle with the tensions of "life" and "thought" that can be traced throughout all of his 
work.  It is also indirectly through the lens of biography that the importance of Hyperion 
within Hegel and the State should be understood.  In his book Das Erlebnis und die 
Dichtung, Wilhelm Dilthey very tellingly characterizes Hyperion as a 
"Bildungsroman."286  Goethe, Jean Paul, Tieck and Novalis, along with Hölderlin, 
provided fine examples of the Bildungsroman for their time.  All these authors, writes 
Dilthey, followed a similar form: 
 
 sie stellen alle den Jüngling jener Tage dar; wie er in glücklicher Dämmerung 
 in das Leben eintritt, nach verwandten Seelen sucht, der Freundschaft begegnet  
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 und der Liebe, wie er nun aber mit den harten Realitäten der Welt im Kampf gerät 
 und so unter mannigfachen Lebenserfarhungen heranreift, sich selber findet und 
 seiner Aufgabe in der Welt gewiß wird.287 
 
From the above quote, one can easily see that the trajectory of the Bildungsroman and 
that of biography match up at many points.  However, Dilthey goes on to distinguish 
between these two forms, stating that with the Bildungsroman, we have a literary form 
that presents "das allgemein Menschliche an einem Lebenslaufe [...] bewußt und 
kunstvoll."288  Biography ultimately presents a particular life and lays claim to some 
form of objective reality.  However, as Dilthey himself has argued, the problem of 
biography is that it can never completely grasp this external reality and thus must be 
understood as a work of art itself.  Without delving further into a comparison of these two 
forms, suffice it to say that in the all-important Frankfurt chapter, Rosenzweig takes up 
some of the language and themes of Hölderlin's Hyperion, and in this manner 
momentarily combines this section of his Hegel biography with the form of the 
Bildungsroman.  As Dilthey will go on to explain, however, Hyperion differs from other 
forms in this genre through its philosophical character.  This "philosophical novel,"289 as 
Dilthey calls it, contains many of the same elements of biography and provides a useful 
tool for Rosenzweig's Hegel interpretation.  While Hegel and the State is first and 
foremost an historical biography, overlooking Rosenzweig's philosophical—and at times 
poetic—gestures woven into the text, ignores the clues and the layer of complexity 
necessary for further integrating this work into Rosenzweig's life and thought.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rosenzweig's use of a philosophical Bildungsroman to help shape the form of his Hegel 
biography is one of the most important gestures of his book.    
 Hyperion is the story of a young poet living in 18th century Greece, who writes a 
series of letters to a friend recollecting the struggle between his internal passions and 
desire to act in the world.  It is difficult to separate the character Hyperion from 
Hölderlin's personal life—Rosenzweig even goes so far as referring to the pair as 
“Hölderlin-Hyperion”290 and Dilthey claims "Hyperion ist Hölderlin selbst."291  The 
character Hyperion's ultimate hope is for the unity of all life: "Es wird nur Eine Schönheit 
sein; und Menschheit und Natur wird sich vereinen in Eine allumfassende Gottheit."292  
This hope,293 however, is manifested in the poet's own personal dilemma: how to 
reconcile the internal world of beauty (Schönheit) with the external world of action (Tat).  
This tension provides the content for Hyperion's "fate" (Schicksal).  Torn between the 
poles of beauty and action, Hyperion must choose (or is it chosen for him?) between 
Diotima—his lover, muse and the epitome of beauty—and Alabanda—his friend who 
represents the epitome of action.  Thus, in Hyperion, the concept of "fate" stands in 
tension between the internal pole of Hyperion's love for Diotima's beauty and the external 
pole of his love for Alabanda's friendship.  At the turning point of the novel, Hyperion 
chooses to act in the world, and the same tension between internal and external becomes 
deeply rooted in the friendship between Hyperion and Alabanda. Hyperion represents the 
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internal poetical ideal, hoping to actualize that within him, and Alabanda represents the 
external consciousness, trapped within reality.294  For both these friends, this division 
between internal and external becomes a struggle with fate: "So stehn wir da und ringen, 
das wandelnde Schicksal anzuhalten."295  And the only way to overcome this fate is 
through "love": "Was ist alles, was in Jahrtausenden die Menschen taten und dachten, 
gegen Einen Augenblick der Liebe!"296  Rosenzweig uses these characters and themes of 
the story as metaphors for the tension at play within Hegel's own thinking.  He very 
cleverly juxtaposes the tension between the two friends in the novel to the developing life 
philosophies of the two friends in Frankfurt.  For Hegel—Rosenzweig's "hero"297 at this 
juncture in the book—an emerging concept of "fate" is set within the terms of "internal" 
and "external," and the possibility of their ultimate "unity."  It is through tarrying with 
these concepts inspired by Hölderlin that Hegel confronts the "totality" of "the riddles of 
personal life."  This is the first peak of Rosenzweig's dramatic presentation of Hegel's life 
and thought.  And at this peak, prior to seeing Hegel's great system take shape in the 
distance, Rosenzweig pauses to examine a document from Hegel's life containing an 
important hint on his earliest conception of fate: an unassuming personal letter from 
1797.   
 In this letter, written to Nanette Endel on July 2nd, Hegel makes reference to his 
country life in Bern while describing his first days in Frankfurt:  
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 from Frankfurt I am now always driven by the memory of those days   
 lived in the country and how there, in the arms of nature, I always   
 found peace with myself and with humanity, and so I often flee here  
 to this  faithful mother, so that I can again separate myself from the  
 people with whom I live in peace and protect myself from their   
 influence and counteract a union with them under her aegis.”298 
 
It is difficult to overlook the similarity between this letter and the concluding lines from 
the first letter of Hölderlin's Hyperion: "Ja, vergiß nur, daß es Menschen gibt, darbendes, 
angefochtenes, tausendfach geärgertes Herz! und kehre wieder dahin, wo du ausgingst, 
in die Arme der Natur, der wandellosen, stillen und schönen."299  Hegel's letter seems to 
be echoing Hyperion's cry to flee away from the people surrounding him into "the arms 
of nature" (in die Arme der Natur).  For Rosenzweig, what is decisive here is the 
“separation” (Entzweiung) that remains between the self and the world.  Dilthey puts this 
quite precisely when he claims: "Die Einheit mit der Natur hat hinter sich die Trennung 
von den Menschen."300 This separation is from people and unity with nature is again the 
theme of the very last pages of Hyperion, where in Dilthey's words the poet's principle 
has become "Flucht vor dem Leben und seinem Leiden."301  At the beginning of his time 
in Frankfurt—based on this letter from 1797—Hegel seems to be in accord with the 
sentiments of Hölderlin's hero, with the notion of "separation" at the center of his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
298 "aus Frankfurt treibt mich izt immer das Andenken an jene auf dem Lande verlebte Tage und sowie ich 
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zu entzweyen, und mich unter ihrer Ägide von ihrem Einfluß zu bewahren, und einen Bund mit ihnen zu 
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thoughts.  While in Bern, where this division between the self and the world—the 
division between life and thought—was first introduced owing to Hegel's ideals for 
justice and the dignity of man, it was the "world" itself that was guilty of this 
separation.302  But now for the first time in Frankfurt, this division between the self and 
the world is no longer something external; rather, much like Hölderlin's Hyperion, “the 
feeling of the self had been internalized.”303  Rosenzweig introduces this internalization 
using language very telling for our overall discussion: namely, as the "tragic knowledge" 
of the “necessary isolation of the inner person.”304  Using Hegel's own formulation, 
Rosenzweig characterizes this tragic separation as "the highest subjectivity" (die höchste 
Subjektivität).305  At this juncture, there arises an unmistakable connection to 
Rosenzweig's own personal thoughts on tragedy.  
 
 
On Rosenzweig's Language of Tragedy  
 In the same letter from 1911 to his cousin Gertrud Oppenheim quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, Rosenzweig writes that while he was finishing the Frankfurt 
section he experienced one or two weeks of "condensed inspiration," wherein he outlined 
the conception of a new book project: The Hero:  A History of Tragic Individuality in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
302 HS 106. 
 
303 HS 107. 
 
304 "zum tragischen Wissen um die über alle Zufälligkeit einer Umgebung hinaus notwendige Vereinsamung 
des inneren Menschen." HS 107. 
 
305 HS 107. 
 109 
Germany since Lessing.306  This is the only reference to this uncompleted work on 
tragedy in Rosenzweig's correspondence, but finding it together with Rosenzweig's 
description of his Frankfurt section is indeed significant.  What was more loosely called 
"division" or "separation" between the individual and the state in earlier sections of the 
book, takes on a curious tone of tragedy in the Frankfurt section.  It is curious, because 
Rosenzweig alludes to, but never explicitly spells out, the significance of tragedy for his 
Hegel interpretation.  This is the case in the first pages of the Frankfurt section, where 
Rosenzweig summarizes the ethical views contained within "The Spirit of Christianity 
and Its Fate:"  
 
 Guilt and fate—so an ethic that summarizes personal life under the same concepts 
 that art history tries to illuminate the essence of tragedy.  Then still above guilt 
 and fate, prevailing from them, dissolved and restored in them and through them, 
 the unity of life.307   
 
Although the categories of "guilt" (Schuld) and "fate" (Schicksal) fall broadly under the 
concept of tragedy, they are further subjugated under the idea of the unity of all life: 
"guilt" as the "separation of man from this unity,"308 and "fate" as the suffering under this 
separation and desire for reconciliation.  Thus, in terms of our own discussion, tragedy 
and tragic thinking as they appear in the Frankfurt section are themselves contained 
within the form of biography.  It is one of my central tasks to show to what degree and in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Lebens." HS 97. 
 
308 "Trennung des Menschen von dieser Einheit." HS 97.!
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what manner Rosenzweig's biographical interpretation is rooted in a tragic understanding 
of Hegel's personality and then point to possible ways this understanding is reflected in 
Rosenzweig's own biography.  For example, if we read parts of Hegel and the State 
through the language of tragedy—as will be seen most clearly in the "Napoleon" section 
that begins the second volume—a light is shed upon Hegel's life and thought that helps to 
clarify Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel's failure to unite "concept" and "experience."  
Moreover, with Rosenzweig's language of tragedy in mind, the beginnings of a pathway 
are illuminated that leads from Hegel and the State to Rosenzweig's own conception of 
the self in The Star of Redemption as "metaethics."  
 A brief note on this relation between Rosenzweig's two main works proves useful 
here.  When Rosenzweig claims, as we described above, that Hegel's first conception of 
"fate" led him to the "tragic knowledge" of the “necessary isolation of the inner person," 
designating it with Hegel as "the highest subjectivity," then it is apparent that a similar 
formulation is at the basis of his notion of "metaethics" in The Star of Redemption.  There 
he writes that the "metaethical" man "has only himself, knows only himself, is known to 
no one, for no one exists but he."309  This is a strikingly similar moment of tragic 
isolation to the moment Rosenzweig observes in Hegel's letter at the beginning of his 
Frankfurt period.  However, and without pursuing this juxtaposition much further here, 
compared to The Star of Redemption, where a theory of tragedy is worked out in some 
detail, it is clear that there are only references to drama and tragedy in Hegel and the 
State, but nowhere an explicit theory of dramatic or tragic form.  Where the language of 
tragedy does appear it functions more along the lines of what Hayden White, in his book 
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Metahistory, calls "emplotment": "the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into 
a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind."310   
 White's concept is useful to keep in mind when dealing with Rosenzweig's 
language of tragedy in Hegel and the State.  This tragic "emplotment" first surfaces 
within the Frankfurt section and reaches a point of emphasis with the notion of "the 
highest subjectivity."311  In terms of Rosenzweig's biographical narrative, this moment of 
tragic isolation is the pivotal "turning-point" in Hegel's understanding of the individual's 
relation to the world, and by extension, the state: “[i]n Hegel’s development this feeling 
of life is only a moment, but if I am not mistaken, the decisive one, from whose 
overcoming he emerged a matured person."312  This concept of "the highest subjectivity" 
not only anticipates Rosenzweig's own notion of "metaethics," but with regard to Hegel's 
understanding of the state is the pivotal and "decisive" notion by way of which his view 
of the state is permanently transformed.  By following Rosenzweig and reading this 
transformation through the language of tragedy, we may come to a better understanding 
of why Hegel once again takes up an analysis of Christianity and the life of Jesus and 
how through this interpretation, as I show below, he develops his notion of "fate" as 
history itself.  Turning for now from Hölderlin's Hyperion and Rosenzweig's language of 
tragedy, we can take a closer look at Hegel's own writings from this period, and how they 
helped determine his development.  
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"The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate": Hegel's Turn from Personal Life  
 Dilthey summarizes Hegel’s general development during his Frankfurt period 
quite nicely in the following long, but important quote, which I repeat in the original 
German: 
 
 Es war die Zeit, in welcher, in theologischen Verkleidungen, Hegels neue 
 Philosophie sich entwickelte.  Er trennte sich nun endgültig von der Denkweise 
 Kants, Fichtes und Schillers.  Deren Grundgedanke war die schöpferische Kraft 
 der Persönlichkeit gewesen: sie bringt in unserem anschauenden und denkenden 
 Verhalten die Welt hervor, die wir als von außen gegeben hinnehmen, und in der 
 Sphäre unseres Willens erzeugt die das Ideal, das die Persönlichkeit in der so 
 gegebenen Welt verwirklichen soll.  Nun wurde diese in das Unendliche 
 strebende Kraft seit Schellings Schrift vom Ich zum Absoluten erhoben.  Die 
 Entzweiung, die in diesem All-Einen vor sich geht, samt dem schmerzlichen 
 Bewußtsein von ihr, und die Versöhnung, welche die Gegensätze aufhebt und 
 doch bewahrt—das war Hegels Formel, in der ein neues pantheistisches 
 Lebensgefühl zum Ausdruck gelangte.  Inmitten der Gegensätze, in denen das 
 Göttliche allein seine Realität haben kann, besitzt und behauptet es seine Einheit.  
 Der Tiefsinn des Christentums liegt in dem Bewußtsein dieses Göttlichen, des 
 Leides der Trennung in ihm und der Seligkeit der Versöhnung.  Das ist nun auch 
 das Grundgefühl Hegels, das immerfort schlagende Herz in seiner Philosophie.313 
  
I have included Dilthey's formulation of this period, because it captures quite precisely 
the spirit of Rosenzweig's interpretation.  Here we have the transition from a philosophy 
based on "the force of personality" to one striving for reconciliation in the "absolute."  
However, in his biographical narrative, Rosenzweig presents Hegel as an historical 
personality, thereby showing the limits of absolute Idealism.  Through the form of his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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narrative alone, he implies that Hegel never quite escapes the confines of individuality he 
attempted to overcome.  But more important for the chapter at hand, is Dilthey's 
emphasis on "Entzweiung" (separation) during this period and how Hegel struggled to 
overcome this separation between his self and the world through the lens of Christianity.  
Rosenzweig is clearly following and expanding upon Dilthey's lead.  However, what is 
missing from Dilthey's summary is Hegel's emerging notion of fate.  This emphasis can 
be said to be the original contribution of Rosenzweig's Frankfurt section in general and 
his reading of "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate" in particular.   
 In Rosenzweig's understanding, Hegel's Frankfurt period can be characterized as 
moving from the fate of personal life, through the thought of reconciliation in love, and 
finally towards the notion of fate as history itself.  Rosenzweig follows these movements, 
as I show below, in order to understand the role of fate in Hegel's conception of the state.  
In order to do so, he first focuses on Hegel's text "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate."  
Although Hegel again takes up the Christian faith as he had earlier in "The Positivity of 
the Christian Religion," there the subject matter was the doctrine of the church, whereas 
here it is the life of Jesus himself.314  As Erich Auerbach wisely points out in "The Idea of 
Man in Literature," the introductory essay to his book on Dante, it is precisely the story 
of Jesus Christ that reveals "the intensity of personal life."315  Keeping in mind Hegel's 
early exposure to theology, it should come as no surprise that in exploring the "riddles of 
personal life," Hegel was drawn to the personal struggle found in the life of Jesus. 
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 Rosenzweig divides Hegel’s “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” into two 
phases of development. Whereas the first phase deals with the relation of Jesus to the 
‘spirit of Judaism’ and would later serve as an introduction to the final piece, the second 
phase deals with a more developed, and transformed, notion of the “fate” of Jesus and a 
new appropriation of the history of Christianity316—this second phase would result in the 
main text of the completed work.  With these two phases also come two different 
understandings of "fate" for Hegel. 
 Using what we have called a language of tragedy, Rosenzweig argues that Hegel's 
first concept of fate stems from his notion of “the highest subjectivity,” which developed 
out of his personal relationship to Hölderlin as evidenced in the letter of 1797.  When 
Hegel first applied this concept to the life of Jesus,317 Jesus was still posited over and 
against the world: “he cannot unify himself with the objects about him.”318  This is still 
the idea of "the highest subjectivity" Rosenzweig saw portrayed in Hegel’s letter: “This 
condition is namely perceived as suffering, but as a suffering for which there is no 
remedy, no fight, nor can there be, precisely because man wants suffering; he tries to 
keep himself pure of the world, to preserve his foreignness over and against it.”319  For 
Hegel's view of Jesus, this meant that he understood him as entirely isolated from the 
world, but for Hegel personally, this literally meant fleeing—like Hyperion—“into the 
arms of nature.”  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
316 This second phase was written in light of the newly published second edition of Kant’s moral theory.  
 
317 In the essay "Life of Jesus." 
 
318 "mit den Objekten um ihn kann er sich nicht vereinigen." HS 106. 
 
319 "Als Leiden nämlich wird dieser Zustand empfunden, aber als ein Leiden, gegen das es kein Mittel, 
keinen Kampf gibt noch geben darf, eben weil der Mensch das Leiden will; er sucht sich von der Welt rein 
zu erhalten, seine Fremdheit gegen sie zu bewahren." HS 106.!
 115 
 In a short fragment “On Love,” Hegel attempted to solve what he understood as 
the fundamental dualism arising from this separation—between "internal" and "external" 
life—through a metaphysical reconciliation in love.  But, as Rosenzweig notes, this 
reconciliation still took place “within the windowless four walls of the self.”320  This 
conception of fate, which posits the individual in his inner isolation as an “indivisible 
unity” (unteilbare Einheit) or as the “unity of life” (Einheit des Lebens),321 was still far 
from the "turning-point" in Hegel's development.  For at this juncture—still in regard to 
“the relation of the individual to the state”322—“[m]an is still the measure of the state.”323  
Thus, as Peter Gordon points out in his excellent chapter on this subject—cleverly titled 
"Hegel's Fate"—with regard to Hegel’s emerging and new metaphysical understanding of 
fate, “the new unity of subject and world would then allow for the appearance of a new 
kind of state no longer confined to 'the measure of man'.”324   
 For Rosenzweig, this new conception of the state emerges towards the end of 
Hegel's Frankfurt period from a new concept of fate.  Within the second phase of writing 
"The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," fate no longer remains isolated to the individual, 
but through the personal fate of Abraham expands to the Jewish people in their isolation 
from the world: “the spirit of Abraham is the unity, the soul, which rules over the fates of 
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all his descendants.”325  Rosenzweig concludes from this shift in Hegel’s position that the 
“concept of fate now grew into an historical life.”326  From this new conception of fate as 
a historically and not primarily individually based category, Hegel then moves to the 
“personal-ethical” (persönlich-ethisch)327 consequences of this transformation.  
In the early stages of Hegel’s conception of fate, it was still understood as “a 
human act” (menschlicher Tat).328  As was expressed in the letter of 1797, Hegel at first 
believed that the fate of the individual and the fate of the world were separate, only to be 
reconciled though love.  But now this division is overcome through a new notion of fate.  
Hegel now claims for the first time that fate can occur for man “also in suffering”: “fate 
comes about either through your own act or that of another.”329  For Rosenzweig this 
implies that even for the self of the letter of 1797, the self that “counteracts a union with 
the world”, “even in such suffering the “highest subjectivity” cannot escape the force of 
the world.”330  Hegel can now agree with Hölderlin's Hyperion that only children and the 
gods are "fateless."331  This new conception of human fate applies to Jesus Christ as well.  
Whereas before the fate of Jesus was bound up with his personal inability to be unified 
with the world, now this inability itself, this “suffering” which he did not chose for 
himself, is the cause of his fate. 
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 What Rosenzweig draws from these connections is profoundly significant for 
Hegel’s development.  Indeed, this new conception of fate is the "turning-point" he 
prepared his readers for at the beginning of the Frankfurt section.  Rosenzweig comes 
across the necessary proof of Hegel's new view of the state in an unassuming series of 
lines from a draft of “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate”: 
 
The existence of Jesus was thus separation from the world and a fleeing from it 
into heaven [...] in part an activity of the divine and in this way a fight with fate, 
in part in the spreading of the empire of God [...] in part immediate reaction 
against individual parts of fate, as they affect him in the moment; except against 
the part of fate that immediately appeared as state and also came to consciousness 
in Jesus, against which he held himself passive.332 
 
 
When Pontius Pilate, the head of the Roman state, sentenced Jesus to death by 
crucifixion, he did not resist.  This was the part of Jesus' fate against which he did not 
fight.  Rosenzweig interprets these lines as the culmination of Hegel’s new concept of 
fate: “[t]he state as a part of fate!”333  This development of fate from an isolated 
individual to an individual as part of a political and historical process, made way for a 
new conception of the state: “the whole of life as it confronted the individual, something 
unavoidable, from which he cannot escape.”334  “This is the moment”, writes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Rosenzweig, “where every view of the state that would place the individual before the 
whole has become an absurdity.”335  Regarding the question of the relation of the 
individual to the state, which in Bern favored the rights of the individual, the scales have 
now decisively tipped in favor of the state.   
 In concluding his interpretation of Hegel's new conception of fate, which, much 
like Hölderlin's Hyperion, now took on the qualities of "die Todesgöttin, die 
Namenlose,"336 Rosenzweig reveals his critical stance towards Hegel and his view that 
Hegel's philosophy ultimately favors the state over the individual: 
 
It is unthinkable that what “fate” is in this awful sense could still be contract.  
There the state has grown above and beyond all dependency on individuals.  And 
just like this the thinker will now find more and something different in the state 
than the citizens of human rights and will no longer submit himself to hold to the 
rules of justice as the highest measure.337 
 
 
This new conception of fate, which places the state over the individual, points towards 
the end of the “winding paths” (verschlungene Pfaden)338 of Hegel's personal life, where 
‘"life and idea [are] still entangled."339  As we have been following the biographical and 
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335 "Das ist der Augenblick, wo jede Staatsansicht, die den einzelnen vor dem Ganzen sähe, ein Unding 
geworden ist." HS 120. 
 
336 Hyperion 119. 
 
337 "Undenkbar, daß, was "Schicksal" in diesem ungeheuren Sinne ist, noch Vertrag sein könnte.  Der Staat 
ist da über alle Abhängigkeit von Einzelmenschen hinausgewachsen.  Und ebenso wird jetzt der Denker im 
Staat mehr und anderes finden als den Bürgern der Menschenrechte, und wird sich nicht mehre 
unterwinden, Grechtigkeit als höchsten Maßstab an seine Ordnungen zu halten." HS 120. 
 
338 HS 120. 
 
339 "Leben und Idee noch ineinandergeknäuelt." Rosenzweig, Briefe 28.9.11 
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philosophical division between life and thought, this is a most decisive moment in 
Rosenzweig's narration.  For at the end of these "winding paths," the "whole" has finally 
won out over the "part."340  This critical formulation, which emphasizes the division 
between life and thought, whole and part, and their possible reconciliation in absolute 
unity, foreshadows Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel in the Star and presents readers with a 
first glimpse of the historical personality, who would come to dominate the political 
thinking of the nineteenth century.  From the "hidden sorrows and passions" of personal 
life, the character of the great, historical Hegel now slowly begins to emerge.   
 While Rosenzweig does not prove that Hölderlin’s Hyperion was in Hegel’s heart 
and mind when he developed his notions of fate—or, for that matter, whether a scholar 
can explain the most pressing issues of development from personal letters—Rosenzweig's 
presentation of Hegel's Frankfurt period shows his own assumption, namely that by 
exploring the riddles of personal life one can locate the most pivotal points in an 
individual's philosophical and biographical development.  For Hegel personally, this 
point was the turn from personal life to the life of the state—the turn from the feeling of 
tragic isolation towards "fate as history itself." 
 
 
 
  
Hegel's Turn towards History as Fate 
 
The new relation between the individual and the state that Rosenzweig extracted 
from the drafts of "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate" was portrayed as the turning-
point in Hegel's development.  But towards what did he turn?  In the following section, I 
show how through Hegel's new conception of fate, not only did the state win the upper !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
340 "Im Kampf zwischen Teil und Ganzem [...] hat jetzt [...] das Ganze endgültig gesiegt." HS 122.!
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hand against the individual, but it was above all Hegel's understanding of history that was 
dramatically transformed.  This transformation in his conception of history soon became 
Hegel's new "belief" (Glaube).341  
Hegel's years in Bern, where he first wrote about the contemporary political 
events of his age, resulted in the first signs of that separation between life and thought 
which would come to dominate his Frankfurt period.  Now armed with a new conception 
of fate, Hegel once again looked outward to the political events unfolding around him.  
From 1797 to 1799, a group of representatives from the German empire met with French 
delegates at what became known as the Rastatter Kongress.  The purpose of the congress 
was to settle a land dispute with France, but this settlement was interrupted by the War of 
the Second Coalition and never concluded.  For Hegel, this was occasion enough to turn 
from the riddles of personal life and philosophy of religion to an object of inquiry he 
could almost reach out and touch: “the German empire and its constitution.”342   
The results of these reflections are known today as Hegel's Reichsschrift.  This 
critical piece of writing on the German constitution would occupy Hegel well into his life 
in Jena, where he moved after Frankfurt.  To give a sense for the nature of these 
reflections, Rosenzweig notes a central theme in Hegel's thinking—one of Hegel's 
“favorite thoughts”—which would return again and again: “a revolution comes about !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
341 HS 129. One should take pause at the use of the word "belief" here, given the importance of this term for 
Rosenzweig's later thought as a philosopher of religion.  In the context of our discussion, however, while 
writing Hegel and the State, questions around the words "belief" and "history" would occupy Rosenzweig 
in a series of letters to his cousin Hans Ehrenberg (see for example, 26.9.20).  During these discussions, 
where he writes that "[f]ür Hegel war die Geschichte göttlich," Rosenzweig is critical of those equating 
history with a divine purpose: "wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre."  This phrasing has unfortunately led to 
some misunderstanding of Rosenzweig's thought and an uncritical overemphasis on the a-historical nature 
of his thinking.  Without further examination of this problem here, one can at least take from this 
discussion the critical tone with which one should read the word "belief" in the context of Hegel's 
development. 
 
342 "Das deutsche Reich und seine Verfassung." HS 120.!
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when the spirit has left a constitution.”343  Although the idea of "revolution" now returned 
to Hegel's thinking, one must carefully distinguish it from the revolutionary "ideas of 
1789."  There, the notions of the dignity of man and justice stood to protect the individual 
against the state.  Here, the individual and the state have switched roles and Hegel stands 
to protect “the right of the state over the individual.”344  This is a direct result of the shift 
in his political thinking outlined above. 
 According to Hegel's observations, the German state now stood “isolated in the 
world from the spirit of the age.”345  Hegel claimed his countrymen were living under 
“the legend of German freedom”, where “the individual stood for himself, unbent by a 
universal” and "suffered nothing from the whole.”346  Whereas in the early years in 
Frankfurt, this "whole" was the "unity of personal life," towards the end of the Frankfurt 
period it is the "universal" of the state.  Hegel's emerging belief in history leads him to 
exclaim of this state: "The entire fate of more than a thousand years is contained within 
it."347  History itself has now become "the power of the universal over the particular, of 
state over man."348  These are the formulations that set the tone for Rosenzweig's first 
assessment of Hegel's Reichsschrift.  And in turning to this political pamphlet, it is once 
again Hölderlin who serves as Rosenzweig’s guide.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
343 "Einen seiner Lieblingsgedanken"; "eine Revolution entsteht, wenn der Geist aus einer Verfassung 
gewichen ist." HS 121. 
 
344 "das Recht des Staats über den einzelnen." HS 123. 
 
345 "isoliert vom Geiste der Zeit in der Welt." HS 121. 
 
346 "die Sage von der deutschen Freiheit"; "der einzelne ungebeugt von einem Allgemeinen für sich stand." 
HS 121. 
 
347 "Das ganze Schicksal mehr als eines Jahrtausends ist in ihm enthalten." HS 121. 
 
348 "diese Macht des Allgemeinen über das Einzelne, des Staats über den Menschen." HS 122.!
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Like the actual political reality he was observing, the subject of Hegel's political 
critique is the individual who no longer feels at home in the forms of the world about 
him.  Hegel presents us with two opposing forces: on the one hand “the dull impulse of 
the stirred-up masses and individuals towards change" and on the other "the longing for 
"life" of minds meandering in the light of the idea."349  Rosenzweig translates these 
opposing forces into the contrasting characters of Hyperion and Alabanda's friends in the 
beginning of Hölderlin's novel: Alabanda's friends—with whom Alabanda at first 
associates, but then rejects—are represented as the "stirred-up masses" struggling to 
escape from their imprisonment within reality; Hyperion is represented as hoping to 
actualize that idea that is already within him.350  In response to those Hyperion-like 
individuals, Hegel writes that they “cannot live alone.”351  This is the moment when “the 
highest subjectivity” of the letter of 1797 is completely overcome.  Earlier, it was indeed 
negated but no other way was posited, resulting in a separation with the world 
characterized by perpetual suffering.  Now however, the move is made "towards 
joyfulness, towards a complete reconciliation of man with the world:"352  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
349 "dem dumpfen Drang der aufgewühlten Massen und einzelnen nach Veränderung und der Sehnsucht der 
im Lichte der Idee wandelnden Geister nach 'Leben'." HS 124.  
 
350 See HS 124. 
 
351 "Sie können nicht 'allein' leben!" HS 125. 
 
352 "der Schritt zur Freudigkeit, zur völligen Versöhnung des Menschen mit der Welt." HS 125. 
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man had here finally stopped to want to counter-act his union with the world, he 
 no longer wants to “be alone”, he wants to find that which is presented in him, his 
 own nature “worked into an idea also outside of himself, as something living.353  
 
 
What Hegel had described earlier as the highest ideal of personal life, namely to 
“counter-act a union with the world”, he now describes as “ever-enduring death” 
(immerwährender Tod).354  But, like the fate of Jesus, those of “Hyperion-nature” still 
"want their suffering" and are forced to confront this death.  In contrast, those individuals 
with minds like Alabanda's friends have “namely no 'will' to suffer."355  These people 
“act, and know the consequences of their actions.”356  They are “like the blind heroic 
revolutionary.”357  Certainly, this is not the path those of "Hyperion-nature" would like to 
take towards action.  Yet what should they do, Rosenzweig asks with Hegel, those who 
live within the idea, and like Hyperion are filled with "Tatenlust,"358 but likewise see the 
futility in becoming blind revolutionaries?  Here a paradox arises, for it seems they have 
no choice but to give themselves over to action, to the blind revolutionary impulses they 
see around them.  Rosenzweig summarizes this paradox as follows: “the enthusiasm of 
one bound is a horrible moment, for he possesses the consciousness of his personality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
353 "der Mensch hat hier endlich aufgehört, seinen Bund mit der Welt hintertreiben zu wollen, er will nicht 
mehr "allein sein," er will das in sich Dargestellte, seine eigene "zur Idee hervorgearbeitete" Natur außer 
sich, als ein Lebendiges finden." HS 125. 
 
354 HS 126. 
 
355 "ohne den Willen nämlich zum 'Leiden'." HS 126-27. 
 
356 "sie handeln, und wissen die Folgen ihres Handelns." HS 127. 
 
357 "wie dem blind heldenhaften Revolutionär." HS 127 
 
358 Hyperion 116.!
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only in the limits of his fate, and so he would demolish his highest life along with it if he 
rebelled against these limits.”359   
 The above quote refers exactly to what happens to Hyperion when he joins 
Alabanda in Greece’s revolutionary war.  After receiving a letter from his friend 
describing the urgency of the situation, he must choose between his desire to act in the 
world and his highest ideal, his love for Diotima.  In the end, Hyperion decides to leave 
the life of the idea and follows his fate into action, giving himself up to the force of the 
state.  Although Diotima dies before Hyperion can return, the two lovers are reconciled in 
the divine unity of nature after Diotima's death—"auch wir, auch wir sind nicht 
geschieden."360 Hegel at first takes up the solution of his friend: “fate must turn in on 
itself.”361  That is, rather than the actions of the individual reconciling individual and 
world, it is nature as fate itself that represents the unity of life.  Yet whereas Hölderlin 
understands this inward-turning fate as the work of divine nature, Hegel sees another 
force at work.  As Rosenzweig writes: “Fate is no longer reconciled by the I, no longer 
through love, but rather in itself and through itself fate becomes—history.”362   
 While Rosenzweig does not provide a comparison between these varying views, 
he provides a needed dimension with his interpretation.  As Dilthey has pointed out, one 
characteristic feature of the form of the Bildungsroman is that it expresses the 
"Individualismus einer Kultur [...] die auf die Interessensphäre des Privatlebens !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
359 "ein furchtbarer Moment ist die Begeisterung eines Gebundenen, denn der besitzt ja das Bewußtsein 
seiner Persönlichkeit nur in den Schranken des Schicksals, und so würde er sein höchstes Leben 
mitzertrümmern, wenn er sich gegen diese Schranken auflehnt." HS 128. 
 
360 Hyperion 178. 
 
361 "das Schicksal muß sich in sich selber wandeln" HS 128. 
 
362 "Das Schicksal wird also nicht mehr vom Ich aus, nicht mehr durch die Liebe versöhnt, sondern in sich 
und durch sich selbst: das Schicksal wird zur—Geschichte." HS 128.!
 125 
eingeschränkt ist."363  In Hyperion, although Hölderlin looks to nature in order to 
reconcile himself with the world, this occurs within the sphere of private life—"innig im 
Innersten".364  On the other hand, in Frankfurt Hegel moves from the solitary confines of 
personal life to find reconciliation in the grand historical march of the world as 
exemplified in the state.  As Dilthey contends quite strongly of Hölderlin: "Nicht um auf 
seine Nation zu wirken, sehnt er sich, ein großes Kunstwerk hervorzubringen, sondern 
um seine nach Vollendung dürstende Seele zu sättigen."365  On the surface, one could 
contend that an interest in political matters would ultimately separate Hegel from his 
friend Hölderlin.366  However, it must equally be admitted that when Hegel finally turns 
from personal life towards history, he is still functioning under that reconciliatory 
principle of "das All-Eine"367 that Dilthey sees reflected in the "individualism" of the 
Romantic age.  Thus, it is ultimately the same drive that guides Hölderlin and Hegel's 
thought—the unity of all life—and in this manner a remnant of individualism remains 
within Hegel's new conception of the state.  Rather than placing the fate of the private 
individual at the center of all life, the state itself now becomes the new manifestation of 
individual personality.  Fate is no longer a private affair, but, as history itself, an urgent 
matter for the nations of the world.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
363 Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung. 249 
 
364 Hyperion 178. 
 
365 Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung. 258. For most writers of this time, claims Dilthey, the interests 
of the state stood "als fremde Gewalt gegenüber" (See 258).  
 
366 When a discussion of the state does arise in Hyperion, it is largely confined to the context of personal 
life. See for example Hyperion 35. 
 
367 Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung. 257.!
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 Hegel's new answer to the "riddles of personal life," that fate is history itself, is 
the decisive result of the "turning-point" of Hegel's Frankfurt period—it is Hegel's new 
"belief" in history.  The significance of this new belief cannot be underestimated in 
Hegel's political thought.  Rosenzweig thus summarizes the great importance history now 
assumes for Hegel: 
 
History acquires for Hegel in this moment the moral (sittliche), indeed nothing 
short of religious meaning, which it retained for him his entire life; it is the great 
basin, in which man is washed clean of all guilt, it is the stream into which the 
individual flows with both duty and bliss.  The walls of fate, in which the spiritual 
man was himself hopelessly trapped, fall on their own.  This Hegel’s new and for 
him ultimate solution!368  
 
 
Hegel's new belief is that fate is history itself.  The "guilt" of separation is reconciled in 
the "stream" of historical thought.  This transformation of Hegel’s concept of fate from a 
"personal" fate clothed in the language of tragedy to the "universal" fate of world history 
is a key moment in Rosenzweig's subsequent understanding Hegel's philosophy of state, a 
moment he will draw upon again and again in his interpretation.  
 Hegel's development during his Frankfurt period can thus be characterized as 
moving from the fate of personal life through the thought of reconciliation in love and 
finally towards history itself as fate bound to the state.  Throughout this biographical and 
philosophical transition, as Rosenzweig already stated at the beginning of the section, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!368!"Die!Geschichte!gewinnt!in!diesem!Augenblick!für!Hegel!die!sittliche,!ja!geradezu!religiöse!
Bedeutung,!die!sie!ihm!zeitlebens!behalten!hat;!sie!ist!das!große!Becken,!in!welchem!der!Mensch!von!
aller!Schuld!reingewaschen!wird,!sie!ist!der!Strom,!in!den!zu!münden!dem!einzelnen!Pflicht!und!Seligkeit!
zugleich!ist.!!Die!Mauern!des!Schicksals,!in!denen!sich!der!geistige!Mensch!hoffnungslos!gefangen!sah,!
stürzen!von!selbst!ein.!!Diese!Hegels!neue!und!ihm!endgültige!Lösung."!HS!128.!
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"[t]he idea of the unity of all life gained force."369  Within Rosenzweig's biographical 
narrative, the last years of Hegel's Frankfurt period are especially important, as they mark 
the final struggle with personal life before the beginnings of Hegel’s “system.”  Indeed, 
in these final days in Frankfurt Rosenzweig’s sees the "stream" of Hegel’s personal 
development concentrated into the "stream" of his historical thought.  When Hegel first 
joined Hölderlin in Frankfurt, this new phase of their friendship perhaps felt similar to the 
first meeting between Hyperion and Alabanda: "Wir begegneten einander, wie zwei 
Bäche [...] vereint in Einen majestätischen Strom, die Wanderung ins weite Meer 
beginnen."370  However, Hegel and Hölderlin's personal lives would soon drift part.  
While Hölderlin's stream led him deeper into the solitary confinement of an internal 
unity, Hegel's stream of life would soon be infused with a fresh stream of thought, 
making its way towards the great basin of history without his friend by his side.  This 
change is reflected in the first draft of Hegel's Reichsschrift, towards which Rosenzweig 
once again turns. 
 In the introduction to the first draft of the Reichsschrift, Hegel admits that he is 
witnessing an epoch in Germany in which the individual no longer feels satisfied with the 
old way of life.  In terms of his view of the state, this translates for Hegel into the idea 
that “the Kaiser’s power" is no longer the true “universal” of the state, but rather “isolates 
itself, has made itself into a particular” and so is “now present only as a thought, no 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!369!"Die!Idee!der!Einheit!alles!Lebens!gewann!Gewalt."!HS!97.!!370!Hyperion!29.!!
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longer as a reality.”371  Now almost free from the binds of personal life, Hegel’s 
emerging task—or as I hinted in Chapter II, Hegel's future task—is to find a new unity 
between the realms of idea and world—a unity independent of Hölderlin's Romantic 
views.  This is the first sign of what later would become the unity of "actuality" and 
"reason" in his thought:  
 
 a movement enters into “fate”, the rigid metal begins to flow and to knowingly 
 follow this flow is fulfillment for the longing of the  people, thirsty for life, who 
 are [residing in] the empire of the idea, the goal of their actions.372    
 
 
From the stream of personal life, Hegel's thought now enters as a "stream of thought" into 
that "great basin" of history.  What Hegel’s friend Schelling had worked out in a 
scientific manner in his System of Transcendental Idealism, that is, “a new philosophical 
valuation of history,” Hegel had come upon only through “personal perils and doubts.”373  
For the three friends from Tübingen—to now include Schelling—the "riddles of personal 
life" were worked out in different measures: Hölderlin channeled his energy into 
Hyperion and began to live the life of a poet; Schelling was recognized openly as a 
philosopher and systematically expressed his personal struggles.  For Hegel on the other 
hand, who was still six years away from publishing The Phenomenology of Spirit, there 
was no poetic output or systematic conclusion, but pages and pages of manuscript drafts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
371 "daß etwa die kaiserliche Macht nicht mehr das wahre 'Allgemeine' des Staats ist, sondern 'sich isoliert, 
zum Besonderen gemacht hat' und so 'nur noch als Gedanke, nicht als Wirklichkeit mehr vorhanden' ist." 
HS 129. 
 
372 "im 'Schicksal' geht eine Bewegung vor, das starre Metall kommt in Fluß, und diesem Fluß erkennend zu 
folgen, ist dem aus dem Reich der Idee nach Leben dürstenden Menschen Erfüllung seiner Sehnsucht, Ziel 
seiner Tat." HS 129. 
 
373 "die neue philosophische Wertung der Geschichte"; "aus ganz persönlichen Fährnissen und Zweifeln." 
HS 129.!
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and fragments.   Thus, ever searching for clues on Hegel's emerging view of the state, 
Rosenzweig would find the full force of this period of Hegel's development and the final 
remnants of Hegel's personal life confined within a single line.374  In a draft of Hegel’s 
“System Fragment of 1800,” Rosenzweig presents the crowning ideal of Hegel's youth as 
the desire for “unity with the age.”375  
 
 
The Unity of Personal Life 
 The trajectory of Rosenzweig's chapter leads from division towards unity.  
Rosenzweig attempted to show how Hegel's biography and his philosophical 
development match up during this period, providing a new direction for Hegel's thought.  
As Hegel himself would write to Schelling in November, 1800, his new task was now to 
"return to an engagement with the life of the people.”376 In stark contrast to the letter of 
1797, where Hegel called for the “separation” (Entzweiung) of the individual from the 
world into the self, he now writes in an epigraph shortly after arriving in Jena: “break the 
peace with yourself.”377  “The compass of the soul”, concludes Rosenzweig,  
 
has turned its point in the opposite direction, the “highest subjectivity” of the past 
 has given way to the striving towards highest objectivity; the star towards which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
374 This is an example of the style of citation that Stéphane Mosès believes links the “gestures” of 
Rosenzweig’s Hegel book to the thought and style of Walter Benjamin. 
 
375 "Vereinigung mit der Zeit." HS 130. 
376 "Rückkehr zum Eingreifen in das Leben der Menschen zu finden." HS 131. 
 
377 "Brich den Frieden mit dir." HS 131. 
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 the needle now points is “the age”; “to be the best part of [it],” to unite oneself 
 with it is the new magic word.378   
 
 
Upon closer inspection, Rosenzweig's interpretation reveals a strong link to his own 
historical situation.  As Rosenzweig argues above, Hegel's new task was to unify himself 
with the age.  Thus, he would leave the 18th century behind—a century when great 
personalities, such as Montesquieu and Rousseau, began to shape the course of history—
and embrace the "highest objectivity" of the dawning 19th century.  
 This opposition between "highest subjectivity" and "highest objectivity" is the 
same tension that reappears in Hans Ehrenberg's pamphlet "Die Geschichte des Menschen 
unserer Zeit"379 at the beginning of the 20th century.  Rosenzweig had read his cousin's 
publication in 1911, the same year he was finishing up the Frankfurt chapter.380  
Ehrenberg, a student of Wilhelm Windelband, was one of the first intellectuals to take the 
Hegel renaissance in Germany seriously.  And although Ehrenberg, like Rosenzweig, is 
ultimately critical of Hegel, he adopts many Hegelian motifs in his thinking.  This can be 
said of Rosenzweig as well.  Most notably, both Ehrenberg and Rosenzweig would 
inherit the reconciliatory role Hegel assigned to history.  Ehrenberg, for example, sees 
history as the critical tool necessary for overcoming that inherited opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity: "so wird diese Entzweiung durch die Macht der Geschichte 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
378 "Der Kompaß de Seele hat seine Spitze nach der entgegengesetzten Richtung gekehrt, die "höchste 
Subjektivität" von einst ist dem Streben nach höchster Sachlichkeit gewichen; der Stern, nach dem die 
Nadel jetzt weist, ist die "Zeit"; sie "aufs beste zu sein," sich mit ihr zu vereinigen, ist das neue 
Zauberwort." HS 131. 
 
379 Hans Ehrenberg, "Die Geschichte des Menschen unserer Zeit." A-Ω Verlag (1911). Unpaginated. I have 
added my own pagination beginning with the epigraph as page 1 and proceeding consecutively.  
 
380 See a reference to this in a letter to Ehrenberg. Rosenzweig, Briefe, 6.12.13. 
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sich schließen."381  Not only does Ehrenberg understand history as that "power" able to 
unite oppositions, but he describes this unification using a term Rosenzweig would adopt 
in his Hegel book: "Nur in der höchsten Sachlichkeit unseres Strebens und Vollführens 
besitzen wir heute die Waffe und das Werkzeug unserer Schaffenslust."382  Yet whereas 
Hegel assigns a metaphysical and almost religious importance to history, the cousins do 
not take it that far.  At the beginning of the 20th century, both cousins were searching for 
a way from "Objektivität zur Subjektivität"383—this ultimately translated into the path 
from history towards religion.  Thus, whereas Hegel, as a product of "1800", was shown 
to move from subjectivity towards objectivity, Rosenzweig, as a product of "1900," 
begins with the "highest objectivity" ultimately inherited from the 19th century and—in 
the form of historical analysis—looked to move towards a new unity of life and thought.  
It is difficult to determine how influential Ehrenberg's interpretation was for 
Rosenzweig's philosophical narrative of Hegel's Frankfurt period.  But at the very least, 
giving pause at this connection emphasizes the overlap between Rosenzweig's Hegel 
interpretation and his own biography.  It shows how his own riddles of his personal life 
were reflected into the form and content of his work on Hegel. 
 Only a few words remain to conclude my commentary on the Frankfurt section.  
As Rosenzweig's argument shows, Hegel’s development during this period leads towards 
his desire for “unity with the age.”  This formulation is so central to Rosenzweig’s 
interpretation that this same line will appear at the very end of the book.384  Hegel's !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
381 Ehrenberg, Geschichte. 37. 
 
382 Ehrenberg, Geschichte. 45. 
 
383 Rosenzweig, Briefe 21.12.09. 
 
384 See HS 521.!
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subsequent failure to unify himself with his age ultimately reveals why Rosenzweig 
chose to add an undercurrent of tragic language to this period of development.  
Furthermore, it is clear on the grounds of Rosenzweig’s own admission that as the “main 
chapter” of his dissertation, the Frankfurt section deserves special attention.  This justifies 
my lingering on the complexities of Rosenzweig's arguments, for the Frankfurt section 
provides some of the most decisive contours to the entire book.   
 The inner logic of this section not only foreshadows Rosenzweig's interpretation 
of Hegel's life and thought, but the concluding words also reflect back upon the 
“Preliminary Remarks” and close the circle Rosenzweig opened with his description of 
the “Janus-face” of the 18th century.  To quote Rosenzweig at length: 
 
How Hegel sketches his personal necessity into the picture of the entire age, how 
he uncovered there a striving of mutual reconciliation between those hungry for 
life coming from the realm of the light of reason and those longing for spiritual 
consciousness from a dull imprisonment in the real, - to finally find in the 
“unification with the age” the most personal answer for the most personal 
necessity: this may remind us of the attempt at a description of the relationship 
between man and state in the German eighteenth century that proceeded our story.  
There we tried to present the Janus-face of the conception of the state of the 
century, the divergence of reason-oriented and material-bound efforts of its 
thinkers around the state; we suggested that the leading together of the separate 
ways of viewing was the act of the great thinkers of the state of the German 
nineteenth century.  If we remind ourselves of that, then it may certainly seem as 
if Hegel’s questions and answers here, lifted out of the frame of the individual 
life, gained, above and beyond this, a general historical significance.385 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
385 "Wie Hegel zuletzt seine persönliche Not in das Bild des ganzen Zeitalters hineingezeichnet hatte, wie er 
da ein Streben gegenseitiger Annäherung aufdeckte zwischen den aus dem Lichtreich der Vernunft nach 
Leben Hungernden und denen, die aus dumpfer Gefangenschaft im Wirklichen nach geistiger Bewußtheit 
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These closing words reveal an interpretive continuity between the "Preliminary Remarks" 
and the "Frankfurt" section.  One could even propose that this closed circle of personal 
life stemmed from the original conception of Rosenzweig’s dissertation.386  At the end of 
this development, Rosenzweig presents Hegel for the first time as the historical 
philosopher of the 19th century who was to play his part in attempting to unite the realm 
of "reason" represented by Rousseau with the world of "actuality" described by 
Montesquieu—this is also a first hint towards Hegel’s famous statement in The 
Philosophy of Right, “what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.”  What is 
now ultimately at stake for Hegel is the unity of life and thought.   
 With his "actual personal development [...] complete,"387 Hegel's thought slowly 
begins to lift itself “out of the frame of individual life” and to take on its own “historical 
significance”.  This flowing of personal life into the "great basin" of history through a 
new conception of fate is now the “firm stance” of Hegel’s personality.388  It is not so !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
langen, um schließlich in der "Vereinigung mit der Zeit" für jene eigenste Not die eigenste Lösung zu 
finden: das mag uns gemahnen an den Versuch einer Schilderung des Verhältnisses von Mensch und Staat 
im deutschen achtzehnten Jahrhundert, der unsrer Erzählung voranging.  Wir hatten da das Doppelantlitz 
der Staatsauffassung des Jahrhunderts abzubilden gesucht, das Auseinandergehen der vernunftgerichteten 
und der stoffgebundenen Bemühungen seiner Denker um den Staat; wir hatten angedeutet, wie das 
Ineinanderführen der getrennten Betrachtungsweisen die Tat der großen Staatsforscher des deutschen 
neunzehn Jahrhunderts gewesen sei.  Erinnern wir uns dessen, so mag es wohl erscheinen, als ob Hegels 
Fragestellung und -lösung hier, herausgehoben aus dem Rahmen des einzelnen Lebens, darüber hinaus 
allgemeingeschichtliche Bedeutung gewönne." HS 132. 
 
386 The final version of Hegel and the State was supposed to be Rosenzweig’s Habilitationsschrift, which 
he never submitted.  All that is known is that he did submit “a part of” this work to Meinecke for his 
dissertation.  As was common in those days, there was perhaps no printed, formal version of Rosenzweig’s 
dissertation, thus explaining the lack of sources on this account.  What I propose is that the ideas developed 
in the “Frankfurt” chapter are both the goal and result of his original idea for the dissertation.   
 
387 "eigentliche persönliche Entwickelung ist vollendet." HS 138. 
 
388 "feste Haltung der Persönlichkeit" HS 131. !
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much that Rosenzweig lifts Hegel from the stream of personal life, but we now first 
encounter a kind of hardening or "Erstarrung" in his character.   We could speak with 
Rosenzweig in The Star of Redemption, where he references Goethe's Faust in order to 
show that is by way of a "hardening" of character that an individual ultimately becomes a 
"self."389  Unfortunately for Hegel, this "hardening" would result in the equation of his 
personality, in Rosenzweig's time and still today, with the unforgiving form and language 
of his system.  Although Hölderlin was subject to a much harsher fate during his lifetime, 
Rosenzweig and his contemporaries would remember him more kindly: along with 
Goethe, as the literary soul of the German nation.  In stark contrast, after his Frankfurt 
period Hegel begins to take on the "rigid, monumental form"390 of world-historical 
significance.  
 In the following chapters, which lead from the first developments of Hegel’s 
“system,” through The Phenomenology of Spirit, and finally towards the “Epochs of the 
World”, we will see how Hegel’s youth is behind him.   Regarding “the relation of the 
individual to the state,” Hegel has reached his verdict: “the state is history.” As the unity 
of life translates into this new philosophical knowledge, a deep surging current takes 
form for Hegel.  When Rosenzweig first began his book, Hegel's "stream of thought" 
(Strom der Ideen)391 in Jena was still a dark, unknown force in his development.  
Drawing extensively from the manuscripts of this period, Rosenzweig shows how Hegel's 
experience of personal life soon leads to the knowledge that “the state is power.”392 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
389 Star 78. 
 
390 "starren Riesenbild des historischen Hegel" HS 17. 
 
391 HS 138. 
 
392 "der Staat ist Macht." HS 139.!
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CHAPTER IV 
BIOGRAPHICAL INTERLUDE:  
THE "27th" YEAR OF LIFE 
  
 Within scholarship on Rosenzweig, it is not uncommon to allude to the events of 
his life when exploring his philosophical thought.  In many cases his biography directly 
influences his thought, and vice versa.  This is reflected above all in Rosenzweig's 
prolific corpus of letters.  His letters both reveal the turns and detours of his personal life 
and often chronicle the development of his philosophical thought.  This has led to a broad 
understanding of Rosenzweig as a philosopher for whom life and thought cannot be 
separated.   
 In the United States in particular, this conjoining of Rosenzweig's life and thought 
has an important history.  In 1953, before the first English translation of The Star of 
Redemption,393 Nahum N. Glatzer published his landmark introduction: Franz 
Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought.394  In this book, Glatzer was the first to compile a 
biographical presentation of Rosenzweig's life in an ordered presentation using 
Rosenzweig's own letters, organized into subsections with sparse commentary.  The 
result of Glatzer's work was both an introduction to the context of Rosenzweig's thought 
and a glimpse into the "stations" of his life: "A Student of Medicine, History, 
Philosophy"; "Between Church and Synagogue"; "The Jewish Thinker in the Trenches"; 
"The Sage of Frankfort"; "Paralysis. Fight Against Death"; "The Last Years".  This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
393 See Star of Redemption trans. William Hallo, 1971. 
 
394 Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig. New York: Schocken Books, 1953.!
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biographical presentation is complemented in the second half of the book by a selection 
from his writings.  Thus, for English readers at least, one first encountered the thought of 
Rosenzweig through a biographical account of his life. 
 This subordination of thought to life was a renewed issue when in Kassel in 1986, 
at the first International Rosenzweig Congress, Harold Stahmer revealed a collection of 
over 1,500 love letters written to Margarit Rosenstock-Huessy, or Gritli, who was the 
wife of Rosenzweig's cousin, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.  In these letters, Rosenzweig 
intimately detailed many aspects of his thinking, including his ongoing process of writing 
The Star of Redemption.  These newly revealed letters further underscored the already 
existing scholarship, which argues that the life and thought of Rosenzweig are 
inseparable.395 
 But of all the biographical intrigues of Rosenzweig's development, one event still 
stands above the rest.  In 1913, together with his cousins Rudolf Ehrenberg and Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy, it is believed Rosenzweig spent the night in Leipzig discussing the 
role of Christianity in modernity, centered on the question of socialism in the novel The 
Miracles of Antichrist by Selma Lagerlöf.396  This discussion led Rosenzweig to become 
convinced by his cousins that he should convert from Judaism to Christianity.  But if he 
was to convert, so he claimed, he wanted to convert as a Jew.  "Some scholars claim," 
writes the philosopher and Jewish historian Norbert Samuelson, "that Rosenzweig 
attended a Yom Kippur service in Berlin on October 11, 1913, and there had a religious 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
395 See here Die "Gritli" Briefe. Ed. Rühke and Mayer; also Franz Rosenzweig’s “The New Thinking”. Ed. 
Udoff and Galli.  
 
396 See also HS 471.  
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experience that convinced him that he must become Jewish and not Christian."397  
According to this line of interpretation, this led to Rosenzweig's now famous reply to his 
cousins: "Ich bleibe also Jude"—"I will thus remain a Jew."  In the narrative of 
Rosenzweig's life this is regarded as his own personal "turning-point," as Frankfurt was 
for Hegel.  For at this critical juncture, so it is often told, Rosenzweig first fully embraced 
a vision of his Jewish self,398 which in writing The Star of Redemption and then moving 
to Frankfurt in order to found the "Freie Jüdische Lehrhaus," he was never to leave 
behind.  The development of his personal life was complete; he was almost 27 years old. 
 In the above treatment of Hegel's Frankfurt period, I showed how Rosenzweig 
understood this period as Hegel's "turning-point" from personal life to a "belief" in 
history.  In this critical year—and in the city of Frankfurt, nonetheless—Hegel was 27 
years old.  But this common "turning-point" around the 27th year of life is no mere 
chance observation on my part, but a fact Rosenzweig points out in the context of Hegel's 
own development.  Thus, in the concluding passages of this biographical interlude, I 
would like to explore this biographical connection between Rosenzweig and Hegel within 
the context of my argument and thereby further underscore the indispensability of Hegel 
and the State not only as a stepping stone for Rosenzweig's development, but as 
containing the essential moments that would remain with him throughout his life and 
thought, especially in The Star of Redemption. 
 I argued above that with the end of the Frankfurt period, not only does 
Rosenzweig see the completion of Hegel's personal development, but this also closes the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
397 Samuelson, 298. !
398 In the language of The Star of Redemption, one could say it was at this juncture that he overcame his 
"daemon" and embraced his "inner conversion."  See Star 213 and my discussion of the demonic in Chapter 
VII. 
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circle of personal development opened in the "Preliminary Remarks" with the discussion 
of the division between "concept" and "experience."  Reading the conclusion of the 
“Frankfurt” section as the closed circle of Hegel’s personal development is further 
supported by the introduction to the next section, “Jena (until 1803).”  Here, Rosenzweig 
breaks his more or less chronological treatment of Hegel’s development and talks about 
Hegel’s later writings explicitly for the first time.  The ground for this break in 
chronology is an explicit emphasis on the “passage from youth to adulthood,”399 which 
was already anticipated in the Frankfurt chapter.  In talking about this transition to 
adulthood, Rosenzweig references the theme of a “philosophy of age” (Philosophie der 
Lebensalter) from Hegel’s later lectures,400 by way of which Hegel locates a certain 
“empty subjectivity” or “hypochondria” around the 27th year of life.401  In a letter from 
1810 Hegel then goes on to call this “fight” (Kampf) with hypochondria a “turning-point 
in life” (Wendungspunkt im Leben).402  In Rosenzweig's reading, this is further proof that 
the Frankfurt period, and more specifically the letter from 1797 and the proximity of 
Hölderlin at the age of 27, was the definitive turning-point in Hegel’s own life.  What 
comes after this turn is a new phase in Hegel's development.  Indeed, “his personal 
development is complete": 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
399 "Übergang aus dem Jünglings- ins Mannesalter." HS 137. 
 
400 The footnote from the Suhrkamp edition (Hegel und der Staat, 2010) referencing these lectures reads: 
Hegel GW 15, 231f.; HW II, 537f; das ursprüngliche "in" ist dann in ein "um" verwandelt! 
 
401 "leere[] Subjektivität"; "Hypochondrie"; HS 137. The appearance of the word “hypochondria” here 
certainly draws to mind the circumstances surrounding Rosenzweig’s own paralyzing illness, especially in 
connection with his “little book” Understanding the Sick and the Healthy.    
 
402 HS 137. 
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 Lifted out from the forge of experience, the thought is now hammered into 
 shape on the anvil of philosophical thinking.  From now on there are no more 
 reefs of internal experience through which the stream of ideas has to make its 
 way; the obstacles that will still distract and divide him in the coming time are 
 the difficulties of the matter itself.403   
 
In this passage, Rosenzweig makes a subtle reference to the last verse of "Hyperions 
Schicksalslied,"404 thereby drawing Hölderlin and Hegel even closer together, only to 
show that Hegel has now left the "reefs" (Klippen) of personal life—including his 
youthful friendship with Hölderlin—behind.  Hegel, in a not so subtle reference, is now 
free to pursue "die Sache selbst." This famous line from Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit—which would later inspire a new rallying cry in Husserl's phenomenology—
signals a shift in Rosenzweig's text from biographical thinking towards a philosophy of 
history.  In terms of a"geistige Biographie," we now see how the philosopher's 
personality shapes into a "stream of thoughts" (Strom der Ideen) as they make their 
course through the events of world history.  If Hegel's method in the Phenomenology is 
one of looking at "the result together with the process through which it came about,"405 
then we must understand Rosenweig's method as he combines the content of his 
narrative—the given historical "result"—with the forms of biography and history—the 
constructed "process".  Rosenzweig's biographical method shows itself, in Hegel's 27th 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
403 "Aus der Glühhitze des Erlebens herausgehoben wird der Gedanke jetzt auf dem Amboß des 
philosophischen Denkens zurechtgehämmert. Es sind fortan keine Klippen inneren Erlebens, durch die sich 
der Strom der Ideen Bahn machen muß; die Hemmnisse, die ihn in der nächsten Folgezeit noch ablenken 
und teilen sind die Schwierigkeiten der Sache selbst." HS 138. !
404 See the last verse of the song, which Hyperion composed "in glücklicher unverständiger Jugend." The 
specific reference reads: "Wie Wasser von Klippe / Zu Klippe geworfen." Hyperion 160. 
 
405 Hegel, Phenomenology 2.  
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year, to be a philosophy of history.  Thus, one key to the question of biography and 
history is how Rosenzweig transitions from "the stream of personal" to the "the stream of 
ideas."  For what more is "die Sache selbst"—freed from the "reefs of internal 
experience"—than a life that has become consumed in its thought?  
 The 27th year of life was decisive for Rosenzweig as well.  In the same letter to 
Gertrud Oppenheim, where Rosenzweig first describes his intentions in the Frankfurt 
chapter, he gives his cousin a glimpse into his own personal writing experience: “Ich 
habe es nicht aus subjektiver Erfahrung schreiben können, denn ich glaube noch nicht so 
weit zu sein; wenn es gut ist, so ist es 'Antizipation' in dem Sinne wie in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit davon die Rede ist.”406  Rosenzweig wrote this in 1911, when he was 24 years 
old.  The sense of "Antizipation" drawn from Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit puts into 
focus what was at stake for Rosenzweig in writing Hegel and the State:  
 
Unsere Wünsche sind Vorgefühle der Fähigkeiten, die in uns liegen, Vorboten  
desjenigen, was wir zu leisten im Stande sein werden.  Was wir können und 
möchten, stellt sich unserer Einbildungskraft außer uns und in der Zukunft dar; 
wir fühlen eine Sehnsucht nach dem, was wir schon im Stillen besitzen.  So 
verwandelt ein leidenschaftliches Vorausergreifen das wahrhaft Mögliche in ein 
erträumtes Wirkliche.407 
 
 
Only two years after Rosenzweig used "Antizipation" in this sense, he underwent his own 
personal "turning-point": "I will thus remain a Jew."  In this year, like Hegel in 1797, 
Rosenzweig would turn 27.  In writing Hegel and the State, not only did Rosenzweig !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
406 See Rosenzweig, Briefe, 28.9.11 
 
407 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit. München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 
1985. 418. 
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anticipate his own connection to Hegel's particular "stream of personal life," but the 
experience of writing this book had a profound impact on his own "stream of thought."  
The concept of "anticipation" would soon take a new significance for him in The Star of 
Redemption.   In that work it was no longer Goethe's sense understood in the context of 
personal development, but was brought to a new philosophical and now messianic level 
regarding our conception of time and the future: "For the future it is, in short, decisive 
that it can and must be anticipated."408  While writing Hegel and the State this thought 
was already implicit in his thinking, as the letter to Gertrud Oppenheim makes clear, but 
not yet an explicit part of his lived-experience. 
 Thus while writing his book on Hegel, Rosenzweig had not yet reached the full 
potential he would openly show in The Star of Redemption.  To speak with Ulrich 
Bieberich, Rosenzweig was still caught up in the "Spannung des Fertigwerdens"409—the 
tension between "subjective" potential and "objective" completion—a tension, one could 
argue, he would overcome through writing The Star of Redemption.  I argue here that 
Rosenzweig already anticipated this potential and anticipated his own future "turning-
point" while approaching the age of 27 while writing Hegel and the State. It was not unti 
his own "inner conversion" and decision "to remain a Jew," that Rosenzweig made the 
transition he describes for Hegel from personal life to the stream of thought.  Or again, as 
Bieberich writes: "die Übereinstimmung von Weltanschauung und Biographie."410 
   In reading Hegel and the State we are granted in the first place an original and 
still compelling, relevant account of Hegel's development.  But if we read this book with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
408 Star 234. 
 
409 Bieberich, 16. 
 
410 Bieberich, 21.!
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a critical eye—that is, with an anticipatory glance towards the future—then not only is 
this the first and most important "harbinger" (Vorbote) of Rosenzweig's own messianic 
thinking, but we begin to make out the contours of what Rosenzweig longed for and 
fulfilled in The Star of Redemption and see that he had already quietly possessed these 
visions in Hegel and the State.  It is the purpose of my project here to provide the 
substance for this claim and to show how in "anticipating" his own future—ultimately 
leading to the discussion of tragedy, religion and the state in The Star of Redemption—
this future was already beginning to take shape in the form, content and language of 
Hegel and the State itself.  As we now follow Hegel from the stream of personal life into 
the stream of thoughts, we will encounter a Rosenzweig who is still "under the spell" of 
his teacher Meinecke411—that is, still anticipating that "turning-point" in the 27th year of 
his own personal life.  Nevertheless, it is Rosenzweig's emerging personality and his 
voice as an historian that is compelling here.  And it is with compelling force that the 
beginnings of Hegel's system are now introduced: from the state as "fate" we now turn to 
the state as "power." 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
411 See here Bienstock, "Rosenzweig's Hegel." 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE STREAM OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 
 
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 As noted above, the break between the Frankfurt section and the following two 
sections of the book—"Jena (until 1803)" and "Jena (since 1804)"—marks Hegel's 
“passage from youth to adulthood.”412  With this transition from the "stream of personal 
life" into the "stream of thoughts" Rosenzweig also introduces the beginnings of Hegel's 
mature system of thought.  But while it may seem, especially in the following Jena 
sections, that Rosenzweig assembles his narrative as a progressive development towards 
Hegel's system as expressed in the Wissenschaft der Logik and Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften, the discussion of these books find little space in his 
telling.  Using the method of historicism, Rosenzweig's book breaks this system apart in 
order to relativize Hegel as an historical personality. Rosenzweig's thesis is that by 
focusing on the development of Hegel's conception of the state in particular, we can see 
how he remained bound to the thinking of the age, ultimately failing to reach the 
metaphysical heights Dilthey credits him with.  Following in Haym's footsteps, 
Rosenzweig wishes to place Hegel back into history, with the ultimate goal of his 
narrative leading towards Hegel's view of the state in The Philosophy of Right. Thus, 
although language of Hegel's "system" makes its way into Rosenzweig's interpretation, 
we should keep in mind that Rosenzweig remains committed to presenting Hegel's !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
412 HS 137. 
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thought as bound to the historical and political life of an individual—Hegel himself.  In 
this sense, it is not the systematic beginnings of Hegel's thought that is of lasting interest 
to Rosenzweig, but how in Jena Hegel irrevocably links his view of the state to the notion 
of "power." 
 When Myriam Bienenstock takes up Hegel and the State in her brief essay 
"Rosenzweig's Hegel," she points to the importance of this book not only for 
Rosenzweig's own thought—especially in The Star of Redemption—but also outlines 
some of the book's shortcomings.  First, she implicitly agrees with Rosenzweig's own 
assessment that Hegel and the State was the work of "a mere student" when she writes 
that the book was written "under the spell of Meinecke." 413  In her reading, however, this 
does not belittle the importance of the book—indeed she agrees with Otto Pöggeler that it 
is the work of a "pioneer"—but merely points to the necessity of contextualizing the book 
in relation to Rosenzweig's teacher, thereby highlighting what she considers its 
shortcomings: "It is still fully dominated by Meinecke's concepts and ideas and therefore 
cannot do justice to Hegel's own conception."414  For Bienenstock, a noted Hegel scholar 
herself, by remaining "under the spell of Meinecke," who would ultimately agree with 
Ranke that Hegel's state reduced all people to "shadows and specters,"415 Rosenzweig's 
narrative of Hegel's political philosophy leads to an inadequate account.  While I will 
touch on the particulars of Bienenstock's critique below and elsewhere—for example 
while addressing the role of Meinecke's "power-state" (Machtstaat) and later her claim 
that Rosenzweig fails to properly address Hegel's own conceptions of Geist and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
413 Bienenstock, "Rosenzweig's Hegel", 178.  
 
414 Ibid. 178. 
 
415 Meinecke, 241.!
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religion—one of the most important claims of her essay provides a telling interpretation 
of Rosenzweig's development: "It is precisely because Rosenzweig rejected Hegelianism 
without having ever really come to terms with it that Hegelian motifs kept reappearing in 
his later writings."416  Bienenstock's claim, however, which she unfortunately does not 
elaborate on, overlooks our own approach to the book: namely that by turning to the 
form, content and language of Hegel and the State, we see precisely how deeply 
Rosenzweig's own stance as an historian emerges from his engagement with Hegel's life 
and thought.  From this perspective, the "Hegelian motifs" in Rosenzweig's thought are 
not the remainder of an inadequate account, but the conscious continuation of 
Rosenzweig's own "stream of thoughts" leading up to The Star of Redemption. 
 In reading Rosenzweig's account of Hegel's Jena period, one must not only bear in 
mind the influence of his teacher Meinecke upon both the content and language of his 
reading, but also, as stated above, the fact that nowhere does he claim to treat Hegel's 
philosophy systematically.  In focusing rather on the concept of the state, Rosenzweig's 
narrative bears fruit for his later thought as well.  When he does come to speak explicitly 
of the state in the third part of The Star of Redemption, in comparison to Hegel and the 
State, he does so with brevity, but with force.417  We do not find there a drawn out 
discussion of political philosophy, but rather a poetical condensation of the many years 
he labored on Hegel's view of the state.  Above all, it is a state imbued with the features 
of power and force: "The state can at no moment lay down the sword."418  Power not only 
in the sense of violence—as the metaphor implies—but moreover, imbued with the force !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
416 Bienenstock, 177. 
 
417 See Star, 328-35. 
 
418 Star 334.!
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to shape history.  In the context of The Star of Redemption, the discussion of history 
revolves around the Christian and Jewish conceptions of time and eternity.  The Jewish 
people—as the "eternal" and "chosen" people—exist outside of the stream of history: 
"God withdrew the Jew from this life by arching the bridge of his law high above the 
current of time which henceforth and to all eternity rushes powerlessly along under its 
arches."419  The Christian people, on the other hand, "take up the contest with the 
current."420  And within this current, it is the force of the state that is decisive: "it is the 
state which first introduces standstills, stations, epochs into the ceaseless sweep of this 
life."421  When in Hegel and the State Rosenzweig turns from the stream of Hegel's 
personal life to the stream of Hegel's thought as it plays out in time—we could also call 
this the stream of history—he does not yet draw out this distinction between Christian 
and Jewish time.  Working from what he himself would denote as a Christian conception 
of time, Rosenzweig enters into the "stream" of Hegel's thought as it now plays out upon 
history in Jena.   
 
 
Hegel's Jena Period: Part I 
 Introducing the two sections on Hegel's Jena period—"Jena (until 1803)" and 
"Jena (since 1804)"—Rosenzweig had brought "the development of the Hegelian idea of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
419 Star 339. 
 
420 Ibid. 339. 
 
421 Star 334. !
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the state to a point where its individual details became clearly recognizable.”422  In 
tracing the development of Hegel's view of the state in Jena up until 1803, Rosenzweig 
looked primarily at three texts: the Reichsschrift—or “pamphlet,” as Rosenzweig calls 
it—with its concept of the state first begun in Frankfurt, which was intended to be neither 
a philosophical ideal nor systematic; the manuscript of 1802 or the “System of 
Ethicality”; and finally the “Natural Right” essay.  Regarding the years after 1804, 
Rosenzweig gives an account of what today is known as the Jenaer Realphilosophie,423 in 
which "the scientific foundation of the structure of the state" reaches a point "which from 
now on it will not leave."424 (HS 230).  What is at stake for Rosenzweig in these sections 
is to outline the early phases of the inner workings of Hegel's mature view of the state.  
Rosenzweig was the first researcher to work out Hegel's view of the state from the still 
unpublished manuscripts of the Jena period.  In a letter to his cousin Hans Ehrenberg, he 
writes:  
 
 like Goethe's Wagner [I] am infatuated with the noble parchment [...] This  
 feeling of being an eyewitness, a direct observer of Hegel's various   
 attempts to formulate his ideas, is sublime.  Besides I have the pleasant   
 sensation of being at the ultimate source and not, as when one depends on   
 books, of forging ahead with the uncomfortable feeling always that one   
 look at the manuscript might bring my house of cards tumbling down.425 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
422 "das Werden der Hegelschen Staatidee bis zu einem Punkt begleitet, wo zum erstenmal ihre Einzelzüge 
deutlich erkennbar wurden." HS 221. 
 
423 See Hegel: Frühe Politische Systeme, ed. Gerhard Göhler. 
 
424 "die wissenschaftliche Grundlage seines Aufbaus des Staats"; "die er von nun an nicht mehr verlassen 
wird." HS 229-230. 
 
425 Glatzer, Rosenzweig. 20-21. (November 11, 1910).!
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However, even for readers of books and not manuscripts, Hegel's Jena period still holds 
some of the same fascination that captured Rosenzweig, alluding to Goethe's Faust, like 
the young assistant Wagner: "Wie anders tragen uns die Geistesfreunden / Von Buch zu 
Buch, von Blatt zu Blatt [...] entrollst du gar ein würdig Pergamen, / So steigt der ganze 
Himmel zu dir nieder."426  This sentiment is echoed in an introduction to Hegel's early 
political writings by Gerhard Göhler, who includes large portions from Rosenzweig's 
Hegel and the State in his commentary: "Vorarbeiten eines fertig ausgearbeiteten, damit 
aber auch endgültig abgeschlossenen Denkgebäudes haben den besonderen Reiz, daß sie 
gewissermaßen einen Blick in die Werkstatt dessen tun lassen, was schließlich in 
ausgefeilter Architektonik präsentiert wird."427  In what follows below, I contend that we 
are not presented with an account of Hegel's system, but rather a collection of emerging 
elements from Hegel's thinking which crystalize into Rosenzweig's understanding of 
Hegel's "power-state."  Indeed, as I show below, during this "epoch of transition" 
(Epoche des Übergangs),428 which is crowned by Rosenzweig's reading of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's "stream of thought" in Jena concentrates into the 
notions of "history" (Geschichte) and "power" (Macht), setting the trajectory for his 
subsequent development and showing the contours of Rosenzweig's own future as an 
author beyond the "sublime" sentiment of Goethe's Wagner. 
   
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
426 Goethe, Faust I, 1104-09. 
 
427 Göhler, 8. 
 
428 HS 232.!
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The State as Power  
 In analyzing this notion of "power" in Hegel and the State Rosenzweig's 
relationship to his teacher Meinecke is key.  Bienenstock's claim that Rosenzweig was 
"under the spell of Meinecke," is acknowledged on several occasion in letters by 
Rosenzweig himself, but also in the dedications to Hegel and the State.  Not only does 
Rosenzweig proceed in a similar manner—following his teacher's method of a "history of 
ideas" by focusing on great historical individualities, in this case Hegel and his 
contemporaries—but already in the foreword one sees that he is following the lines of his 
teacher's interpretation of Hegel's political thought.  There, Rosenzweig distinguishes 
Dilthey's book on Hegel from Meinecke's thought, writing that for Dilthey,  
 
 the political in Hegel was more of a piece than a founding force in his
 development. And characteristically, he expressed it, where he expressed it, less 
 in the initial stages he hints at of a new sense of state power—stages which would 
 soon be taken up by Meinecke—than in the early soundings of a wish for a 
 cultured nation, a wish which had just recently awoken in the past decades.429 
 
 
This thought expresses on the one hand Rosenzweig's belief that Hegel's political 
philosophy is the "founding force" of his development—and this helps explain 
Bienenstock's concern that Rosenzweig does not deal with the entirety of Hegel's 
philosophy, he doesn't—and also that Rosenzweig will interpret Hegel's development, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
429 "Das Politische in Hegel war ihm mehr ein Teil als eine Grundkraft seiner Entwickelung. Und 
bezeichnenderweise faßte er es, wo er es faßte, weniger in den darin angelegten und von Meinecke bald 
hervorgearbeiteten Ansätzen eines neuen machstaatlichen Sinns als vielmehr in den Vorklängen 
kulturnationaler Wünsche, die eben in den jüngst vergangenen Jahrzehnten wachgeworden waren." HS 17. 
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following Meinecke, in terms of the state as power.  This first becomes apparent during 
Hegel's Jena period. 
 Hegel's time in Jena is defined by a turn from the internal world of personal life 
that found expression in his early theological writings, to an engagement with the 
political realities of Germany and its history.  Hegel’s first independent political writings 
were dominated, still under the spell of Kant, by the thought of the “dignity of man” 
(Würde des Menschen).430  After the turn from the tragedy of personal life to history in 
Frankfurt, Hegel’s thought moved from a thinking based on the interests of the individual 
to one based on the state: “in 'the state as fate' the ground was laid for a new conception, 
which did not take its start from the individual, but rather from the state itself.”431  This 
new state-based thinking—itself a “world-historical” (weltgeschichtlich) thinking 
inherited from Gibbon and Schiller432—led Hegel to “definitively” shift his thinking on 
the state and consequently also take a direct interest in the current German state: “the will 
towards the 'unification with the times,' which was based on rational governance of 
history, led to the reflective grasp of the actual state of the present.”433   
 Hegel had already begun to engage the present German state while in Frankfurt 
with his Reichsschrift essay, which was in part inspired by the events of the Second 
Congress of Rastatt in 1797 (Rastatter Kongress).  The writing of that political 
"pamphlet" was interrupted by the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1802)—also 
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430 HS 138. 
 
431 "im 'Staat als Schicksal' war der Grund gelegt für eine neue Anschauung, die nicht vom 
Einzelmenschen, sondern vom Staat selbst ausging." HS 138. 
 
432 HS 138. 
 
433 "der auf den Glauben an das vernünftige Walten der Geschichte gegründete Wille zur 'Vereinigung mit 
der Zeit' trieb zu denkendem Erfassen des wirklichen Staats der Gegenwart." HS 138.!
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known as the First Napoleonic War—where an alliance of Russian, Austrian and English 
armies fought against revolutionary France.  However, with a victory in Italy in 1802, 
Napoleon Bonaparte put an end to the war and the hopes of the alliance.  In the wake of 
these events Hegel then realized that “the long prophesized end of the thousand-year 
Roman Empire of the German Nation was now really coming.”434  Rosenzweig does not 
fail to emphasize the grim political reality now surrounding Hegel.  Indeed, Rosenzweig 
will later write that Hegel's mood in Jena was filled with such "apocalyptic consciousness 
for the present, the likes of which Nietzsche had hardly possessed."435  This rare 
comparison with Nietzsche is not, as it may seem, important in the context of the notions 
of "power" and "personal life," but for Rosenzweig is employed to point out the future-
oriented thinking of both thinkers and their desire to philosophically overcome the 
conditions of the present.  For Rosenzweig, it was with these apocalyptic thoughts of the 
present age in mind that Hegel finally rid his thought on the state of the last remnants of 
personal experience: “From the experience of the state as fate there comes the 
recognition: the state is power.”436   
The showplace for this idea begins with the famous first lines of Hegel's 
Reichsschrift, which is now in its final version: “Germany is no longer a state”.  A group 
of people can only be called a state, Rosenzweig explains in Hegel's words, “when they 
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434 "daß das so lang schon prophezeite Ende des tausendjährigen römischen Reiches deutscher Nation jetzt 
wirklich komme." HS 139. 
 
435 "apokalyptischen Gegenwartsbewußtsein erfüllt gewesen, wie es gleich stark kaum noch Nietzsche 
besessen hat." HS 248. 
 
436 "Aus dem Erlebnis des Staats als Schicksal wird die Erkenntnis: der Staat ist Macht." HS 139. 
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have unified in general in common defense of their property.”437  Hegel will call the 
organization of such defense “state power” (Staatsmacht).  In the various drafts of the 
Reichsschrift Hegel was still tarrying with “the difficulty of the relationship of the 
individual to this state-purpose and to this state,”438 but by the final version Rosenzweig 
recognizes that “the state is power and initially only power.”439  Thus, Rosenzweig sees 
hidden here the “naked formulation of the concept of the power-state,” namely “the 
power of the state to preserve itself against other states," or in Hegel's words, the “power 
of war and what goes together with this."440   
In a section coming much later in Hegel and the State, "Metaphysics of the State," 
it is this notion of a "power-state" revolving around defense and war that still makes up 
the core of Hegel's state for Rosenzweig.441  This reading of Hegel is one of the major 
influences inherited from Meinecke.  In his chapter on Hegel in Cosmopolitanism and the 
Nation-state, Meinecke is critical of Hegel precisely on the grounds that the state be 
defined in terms of war.  Well entrenched himself in the tradition of historicism, where 
the state is often understood as an individual "personality," Meinecke draws heavily on 
the section at the end of The Philosophy of Right where Hegel follows the idea that each 
individual state is "a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others."442  This idea !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
437 "Eine Menschenmenge kann nur dann ein Staat genannt werden, wenn sie sich zur gemeinschaftlichen 
Verteidigung ihres Eigentums über haupt verbunden hat." HS 143. 
 
438 "ringt er in unserem Entwurf noch mit der Schwierigkeit des Verhältnisses des einzelnen zu diesem 
Staatszweck und zu diesem Staat." HS 143. 
 
439 "daß der Staat Macht und zunächst nur Macht sei." HS 143. 
 
440 "nackten Fassung des Machtbegriffs"; "der Macht des Staats, sich selbst gegen andere Staaten zu 
erhalten"; "Kriegsmacht und was damit zusammenhängt." HS 143-44. !
441 See HS 438-442. 
 
442 Hegel, PR 366. 
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that states are "individualities" with rights of their own is then carried out in the final 
section of The Philosophy of Right in terms of world history and world-historical nations.  
Here nations are at the whim of "world spirit, around whose throne they stand as the 
agents of its actualization and as witnesses and ornaments of its splendor."443  For 
Meinecke, however, this power of the "world spirit" to determine the fate of nations leads 
to an unfortunate ending of Hegel's great thought: "Hegels Anschauung führte konsequent 
dahin, alle Individualitäten der Geschichte ihres Eigenrechtes zu berauben, sie zu bloßen 
bewußtlosen Werkzeugen und Funktionären des Weltgeistes zu machen."444  For 
Meinecke, the state, as the "formal realization" of the world spirit in history, is thus 
nothing more than a state of power and force.  However, according to both Bienenstock 
and Otto Pöggeler, Meinecke in this manner imbues Hegel with a Machiavellian sense 
that his thinking ultimately did not contain.445  Rosenzweig also distances himself from 
aligning Hegel and Machiavelli, as I show later on below. 
Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel is much more subtle and thorough than 
Meinecke's.  Rather than aligning Hegel's view of the state absolutely with that of a 
"power-state," he shows how although it contains the elements of "power", they were first 
exaggerated by political thinkers in the later half of the 19th century, following Hegel's 
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443 Hegel, PR §352.   
 
444 Meinecke 241. 
 
445 see here Bienenstock 178; Pöggeler, 120; also Pöggeler's reference to Meinecke's Machiavellism: The 
Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History, where Meinecke spells out his critique of 
Hegel's "power-state." Also, Ritter: "Morality and Ethical Life", 169, note 16: Meinecke suspected "the 
concept of ethical being" as "being the instrument of a philosophical "Machiavellianism," which Hegel uses 
to assert political power and force as something higher than moral selfhood to allow them to triumph over 
the impotence of the individual." !
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death.446  However, the principles of war and defense and how these play out upon the 
stage of world history still remain central in Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's view 
of the state, especially in its final installment in The Philosophy of Right.  Thus, in 
turning again to Hegel's Jena period, one must pay close attention to both the influence of 
Meinecke as well as the particular subtleties of Rosenzweig's interpretaion of "power."  
In Hegel's view of the state in Jena, it was not the inner unity of the state that took 
precedence, for example “customs, way of life, languages, etc.,”447 as was the case in the 
Greek Polis of antiquity—or as the examples of the Austrian, Russian, English 
monarchies showed at that time—but the notion of "defense" against other states.  
“Before us” writes Rosenzweig, “stands the state of the eighteenth century with its fresh 
will of power, with its indifference towards the task of a state unity [...] its 
underestimation of national drives and its lack of understanding for spiritual powers 
which unfold in national life.”448  At this juncture in his development, Rosenzweig sees 
Hegel's conception of the state akin to the “absolutism” (Absolutismus)449 so prevalent in 
the 18th century.  Indeed, Rosenzweig represents Hegel's Jena as "an epoch of transition 
from the deepest decline, the Roman Imperium and absolute monarchy, to a more 
beautiful future."450  But on the way to this future, Hegel constructs a state made up of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
446 See HS 456-70. 
 
447 "Sitten, Lebensart, Sprachen usw." HS 144. 
 
448 "Vor uns steht der Staat des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts mit seinem frischen Machtwillen, mit seiner 
Gleichgültigkeit gegen die Aufgabe einer bis zu Ende durchgeführten Staatseinheit, seiner Unterschätzung 
der nationalen Triebe und seinem Mangel an Verständnis für die geistigen Mächte, die sich im nationalen 
Leben entfalten." HS 144. 
 
449 HS 147. 
 
450 "eine Epoche des Übergangs aus dem tiefsten Verfall, dem römischen Imperium und der absoluten 
Monarchie, zu einer schöneren Zukunft." HS 232. 
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those elements he wishes to overcome.  And Rosenzweig can only see one thing written 
over the entrance of the doorway to the idea of the state from Jena: “Power, power and 
once again power” (Macht, Macht und abermals Macht).451  In reproducing the essence 
of the state of the 18th century Hegel has in a sense reached his goal of “unification with 
the times.”  However, with the dying out of the old and the coming of the new—as 
epitomized by the fall of German Empire—Rosenzweig reminds his readers that the 
times are not “unified” themselves: “Ununited as within the times themselves, the old and 
the demand for the new lay beside each other.”452  Thus, Hegel, just now emerging into 
philosophical maturity, acts as a “faithful mirror of this unresolved situation.”453  
Rosenzweig's description here not only again points to Hegel's future task in the 19th 
century of uniting reason with actuality—the trajectory he set out in the first section of 
the book—but also to the lasting importance the notion of "power" will have on Hegel's 
subsequent view of the state. 
 
 
The Freedom of the Individual 
Rosenzweig draws the description of Hegel’s state as “power” in contrast to the 
urgency of the “protection of the rights of man”454 Hegel experienced in his youth.  The 
"ideas of 1789," while still present in Hegel's thinking, have been largely supplanted by 
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451 HS 144. !
452 "Unvereint wie im Innern der Zeit selbst liegt das Alte und die Forderung des Neuen nebeneinander." 
HS 145. 
 
453 "als ein getreuer Spiegel dieses ungeklärten Zustands." HS 145. !
454 "den Schutz der Menschenrechte." HS 145. 
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the emerging notion of the "power-state."  However, in following “the relation of the 
individual to the state” during Hegel's Jena period, Rosenzweig still finds in this new 
conception of the state an undeniable emphasis on the “freedom” of the individual.  It is 
important to explore the beginnings of the relationship between the power of the state and 
the freedom of the individual, for as Hegel himself will later claim in The Philosophy of 
Right, it is in the state itself that "freedom enters into its highest right."455  It was first in 
his essay "On the Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling" (Über die 
Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems) that the seeds of Hegel's ultimate 
conception of the freedom of the individual can be found.  
In that essay, which for Rosenzweig has only limited importance for Hegel's view 
of the state, Hegel comes to the conclusion that “[t]he highest community is the highest 
freedom.”456  According to Rosenzweig, this will become the future motto of Hegel’s 
philosophy of state.  “Here” writes Rosenzweig, “the thought is captured in its seed, 
which in the future will attempt to ethicize the state which was fate, which became 
power.”457  Fate, as Hegel's Frankfurt period showed, could not be overcome from the 
outside, thus it turned inward and became history.  Now fate as history and thus history 
itself has become the “essence of freedom” (Wesen der Freiheit).458  Schelling, who in 
1800 developed his own concept of freedom as “absolute,” is overtaken here by Hegel: 
“where Schelling had only seen a relation between man and history, Hegel inserts in the 
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455 Hegel PR §258.   
 
456 "Die höchste Gemeinschaft ist die höchste Freiheit." HS 150. 
 
457 "Hier ist im Keim verschlossen der Gedanke, durch welchen Hegel fortan den Staat, der Schicksal 
gewesen, Macht geworden war, zu versittlichen sucht." HS 150. 
 
458 HS 151. 
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middle the state.”459  Thus, Hegel sees the freedom of the individual as actualized in his 
“relation to the state” (Verhältnis zum Staat).460  
Within this relationship of individual to state, there now enters a new concept 
during the Jena period: the concept of a “state-free zone” (staatsfreier Bezirk).461  In 
introducing this concept, Rosenzweig immediately draws the comparison with Hegel’s 
contemporary, the young Wilhelm von Humboldt.  For this historical personality, the 
freedom of the individual was of the highest priority.  Meinecke himself describes 
Humboldt as a "starke, freiheitsdurstige Individuum"462 and it was also these traits that 
separate the Hegel of Jena from the young Humboldt.  In conceiving of a "state-free 
zone," that is, a division of society where the freedom of the individual could manifest 
itself unhindered by the state, Hegel seems to overlook the “more ethical" (mehr 
ethische)463 side of freedom captured by Humboldt.   Although Hegel's own emphasis 
here may remind readers of his years in Bern and the call there for "justice," the freedom 
of the individual is now “only the limitation of, no longer the purpose of the state.”464  
While for Hegel the power of the state has gained precedence in his thinking, for 
Humboldt, as Meinecke points out, "[n]icht möglichst stark, sondern möglichst schwach 
soll der Staat sein."465  In comparison, Hegel loses the "spiritual glimmer" (des geistigen !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
459 "wo Schelling nur ein Verhältnis zwischen Mensch und Geschichte gesehen hatte, da schiebt Hegel 
mittenhinein den Staat." HS 151. 
 
460 HS 151. !
461 HS 146. 
 
462 Meinecke, 49 
 
463 HS 147. 
 
464 "jetzt nur noch Einschränkung, nicht mehr Zweck des Staats." HS 148. 
 
465 Meinecke, 43.
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Schimmers)466 that accompanies Humboldt's idea of freedom; his advantage, however, is 
that he does not view the state as a "necessary evil," but observes it rather with "great, 
calm recognition."467  No longer is Hegel consumed by the search for the "highest 
subjectivity" as he was in Frankfurt, wrapped up in the tragedy of the self, now "the 
pressure of the world no longer weighs upon his chest; he has learned selfless 
observation."468  This turn in Jena, as Rosenzweig remarked earlier, to the "highest 
objectivity," now moves Hegel even further from the ideals of his youth and for the first 
time, the freedom of the individual begins to find its permanent seat in the state.  
However, since "Germany is no longer a state", in order for this freedom to manifest 
itself—as it will in Hegel's concept of "Sittlichkeit" and Hegel's doctrine of the 
"Stände"—Hegel combines the notion of "power" with an emerging sense for the 
importance of individuality and the great historical individual.  Leading many to later 
associate him with Machiavelli, as Rosenzweig's teacher will, Hegel will claim that in 
order for there to be a new German state, and thus the realization of the freedom of the 
individual, the "the force of a conqueror"469 is required.   
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
466 HS 146. 
 
467 "nicht etwas als notwendiges Übel, betrachtet ihn vielmehr mit einer großen, ruhigen Anerkennung." HS 
146. !
468 "So wälzt sich der Druck der Welt ihm nicht mehr auf seine Brust; er hat selbstlos schauen gelernt." HS 
161. 
 
469 "Die Gewalt eines Eroberers." HS 157.!
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Theseus, Machiavelli and the Great Historical Personality 
 As noted above, Hegel wrote his Reichsschrift in response to the real political 
events surrounding him.  Thus, throughout the essay there is a constant tension between 
his "considerations" (Überlegungen) and real political action.  This corresponds on the 
one hand to the contrast between "concept" and "experience" in the eighteenth century.  
To recall, in introducing this "Janus-face," Rosenzweig claimed it would be the future 
task of the nineteenth century, and especially Hegel, to unite these two notions.  
However, this tension between theoretical considerations and actual experience also calls 
to mind Machiavelli and his piece of political prose, The Prince.  Indeed, so present is 
this comparison between Hegel and Machiavelli, that it led Hegel's first biographer Karl 
Rosenkranz to claim that "Hegel wanted [...] to become the Machiavelli of Germany."470  
In what follows, I show how Rosenzweig supports this claim and thereby aligns himself 
with his teacher Meinecke, yet at the same time does not fully accept such a plain 
oversimplification.  While Hegel himself draws on Machiavelli in his Reichsschrift, as I 
show below, for Rosenzweig, this pairing of two great political minds stands 
contextualized within Hegel's development and does not rule over his thought in 
principle.  In breaking from his teacher and also other biographers, Rosenzweig's 
interpretation of Hegel with regard to Machiavelli thus shows his original spirit as a 
"pioneer"471—first as an historian and later a philosopher in his own right. 
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470 Rosenkranz, 236. 
 
471 This is the claim made by Bienenstock discussed above. However, neither she nor Pöggeler, whom she 
quotes, detail their claims regarding Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel and Machiavelli. The following section 
aims at a continuation of their conversation. !
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 The end of Hegel's Reichsschrift is dedicated to the possibility of uniting 
Germany under one state.  Underscoring the emphasis in his thinking in Jena on the 
"power" of the state, Hegel writes: "Wenn alle Teile dadurch gewännen, daß Deutschland 
zu einem Staat würde, so ist eine solche Begebenheit nie die Frucht der Überlegung 
gewesen, sondern der Gewalt."472  In order for Germany to once again become a state, he 
continues, and this time united under one banner, the mass of its people "müßte durch die 
Gewalt eines Eroberers in Eine Masse versammelt, sie müßten gezwungen werden, sich 
zu Deutschland gehörig zu betrachten."473  Not only through force is Germany to become 
a state, but through the force of a conqueror.  Here again, the concept of individuality in 
Hegel's thinking is decisive.  For, as later his insistence on a constitutional monarchy in 
The Philosophy of Right will show, it is not enough for Hegel that the state mechanism 
alone with all its laws be set firmly in place, but at the top of this state there must stand 
an individual, a conquering personality.   
 In the concluding paragraphs of the Reichsschrift, Hegel draws a comparison for 
this personality to Theseus, the mythical conqueror who united Athens.  That Hegel 
draws an example from classical antiquity is no surprise, given the fascination of his age 
with Greek culture and thought.  The case of Theseus, who not only united Athens 
through force, but also carried out political reforms, fits the terms of Hegel's future-
oriented thought quite precisely.  But this comparison also provides a link to the thought 
of Machiavelli.  Earlier in the Reichsschrift, when Hegel discusses the theory of the state 
in other European countries, he writes of The Prince that it remains "ein großes Zeugnis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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473 Hegel, Politische Schriften. 138. 
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[...] daß das Schicksal eines Volks, das seinem politischen Untergange zueilt, durch 
Genie gerettet werden könne."474  When writing his political pamphlet, Hegel realized he 
was witnessing the downfall of the German empire.  In Machiavelli, Hegel did not 
witness the "abscheuliche Mittel"475 (Politische Schriften, 115) a prince requires to come 
to power, but rather a more noble goal of the great political thinker: "Italien sollte ein 
Staat sein."476  Thus, not only is it clear that Hegel held Machiavelli's thought in high 
regard, but Hegel's historical circumstance draws the temptation to equate, as Karl 
Rosenzkranz did, Machiavelli's "genius" with Hegel's own political thinking.  Did Hegel 
wish to be the German Machiavelli?  Rosenzweig himself presents them side-by-side 
when he writes that the voices of both thinkers "faded away without effect"477 and like 
Machiavelli and Italy, that "first a new generation, who saw the fulfillment with their 
own eyes, could honor [Hegel] as the prophet of the national unified state."478  This 
similarity to Machiavelli is further supported if we briefly examine the placement of the 
mythical Theseus within The Prince itself. 
 The name "Theseus" first appears in section six of The Prince: "About New 
Princedoms Acquired With One's Own Arms And Energy."  This sections deals with 
rulers "who have become princes by their own powers."479  "When we look into their 
actions and their lives," writes Machiavelli, "we will find that fortune provided nothing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
474 Hegel, Politische Schriften. 117. 
 
475 Hegel, Politische Schriften. 115. 
 
476 Hegel, Politische Schriften. 115. 
 
477 "ohne Wirkung verhallt." HS 158. 
 
478 "hätte erst ein nachwachsendes Geschlecht, das die Erfüllung mit Augen sah, als den Propheten des 
nationalen Einheitsstaats ehren können." HS 158. 
 
479 Prince, 16.   
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for them but an opportunity."480  Theseus would have found no success "if he had not 
found the Athenians in confusion."481  In comparison, the occasion for Hegel's 
Reichsschrift is precisely the political turmoil in Germany.  In order to seize upon this 
opportunity, for Machiavelli and Hegel alike, "things must be arranged so that when [the 
people] no longer believe they can be compelled to believe by force."482  In calling for 
"the force of a conqueror" (Gewalt eines Eroberers) Hegel is invoking "Theseus" in the 
same manner as Machiavelli.  In doing so, Hegel is also heeding the advice of 
Machiavelli from the same section: "a prudent man should always follow the footsteps of 
the great and imitate those who have been supreme."483  Machiavelli, like Hegel after 
him, also invokes Theseus towards the end of his political essay, showing that greatness 
can arise from turmoil.  But do these similarities prove that Hegel was intending to be a 
German Machiavelli himself?  
 Although Rosenzweig offers no direct answer to this question, his presentation 
points to the contrary.  Most importantly, whereas Machiavelli's The Prince was directed 
towards nobles and rulers, Hegel's political pamphlet had a different audience: "Hegel 
directed his writing towards private citizens, not towards the leading men, not towards 
‘Theseus’ himself, in this regard much different than his Florentine model."484  Thus, for 
Rosenzweig the comparison can only go so far.  While Hegel saw in Machiavelli a model 
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484 "An Privatleute also, nicht an die leitenden Männer, nicht an den 'Theseus' selber, richtet Hegel seine 
Schrift, darin sehr unterschieden von dem florentinischen Vorbild." HS 162. 
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for "die erhabene Gewalt großer Menschen,"485 for Hegel this leads beyond Machiavelli, 
in Rosenzweig's words, to "an unlimited trust in the course of history" or again in 
"history itself and the great historical personality."486  Even if Hegel saw similarities 
between himself and the great Italian political thinker, these common bonds were soon 
broken by the development of Hegel's own thinking within its own historical context. 
 Again looking beyond Hegel's time in Jena and anticipating his mature 
philosophy of state, Rosenzweig sees in the strong invocation of "Theseus" the concept of 
the historical personality arising in Hegel's thinking.  In order for Germany to become a 
"unified state" (Einheitsstaat), Hegel has now found a "new solution" (neue Lösung): 
"The great man, whom the many, rather than agreeing themselves on the state contract, 
instead obey against their will, because he has their unconscious will, the will that they 
will once have, on his side.”487  It was Dilthey, writes Rosenzweig, who first ventured to 
give a name to this “great man” that Hegel speaks of in the guise of "Theseus."  Dilthey 
argued that it could be no other than Napoleon Bonaparte himself.  This choice may seem 
natural given the importance Napoleon was soon to have for Hegel's thought (as I show 
in Chapter VI).  But Rosenzweig objects and draws his argument from an earlier section 
in the Reichsschrift.  There, when discussing the political future of Germany, Hegel 
explicitly sides with Austria in his choice among the four dominant political systems for 
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486 "ein unbegrenztes Vertrauen auf den Gang der Geschichte"; "der Geschichte selber und der großen 
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the sake of its “representational body” (repräsentierenden Körper).488  If, as he implies, 
Hegel hopes that "Germany is in the future united under Austrian rule,”489 he would have 
never supported the “great man” (große Mann) Napoleon, who was shortly before at war 
with this same political power.490  Indeed, Rosenzweig sees only one man Hegel could 
have had in mind: the Archduke Charles of Austria (Erzherzog Karl).  This line of 
thought leading from the inspiration of Machiavelli's The Prince to the historical 
Archduke Karl is a great sign for Rosenzweig that with a “firm hand” Hegel has now 
pushed the state “into the gears of history.”491       
Hegel's thought has now arrived at an “unlimited trust in the course of history, in 
its power to let something new emerge from its ground.”492  It is not the genius of Hegel 
himself that had the power to make this change, but rather “history itself and the great 
historical personality.”493  In Rosenzweig's view, however, with the emergence of 
"history" (Geschichte) for Hegel the thoughts of a power state and of freedom were too 
easily grouped together in the first years in Jena.  There was more work to be done than 
merely finding a "conqueror" (Eroberer) in order for the freedom of the individual to be 
preserved.  This limitation proved that Hegel had “set his foot on the threshold of the 
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political nineteenth century, without going over this threshold.”494  There were still some 
things missing from Hegel’s conception of the state, above all, the “ethical meaning of 
the union of state and individual” was at most only hinted at.495  This "union of state and 
individual," which was to find its ultimate conception in The Philosophy of Right under 
the banner of "Sittlichkeit," begins to take form in Jena with Hegel's emerging theory of 
the "estates" (Stände).  The “ideal of the state” (Staatsideal) recorded in the Reichsschrift 
was soon “clouded over” (umschleiert)496 by a new historical reality.  Namely, an 
“absolute state based on the foundation of a society of estates,”497 or in other words, 
Prussia.  It is the reality of this state, writes Rosenzweig, “not the Polis, neither the 
historical nor the platonic [...] which shines through the dark and heavy thought-pictures 
of the “System of Ethicality.””498                        
 
 
The Individual in Society: "Sittlichkeit" and Hegel's Theory of the "Stände" 
  
 “The System of Ethicality”, written in the winter of 1802/1803, is recognized as 
Hegel's first systematic account of the concept of "Sittlichkeit" as it is to appear in his 
mature system.  Within the system, this manuscript represents what later would be termed 
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“objective spirit” (objektiven Geist).499  It is here that the “individual parts” (Einzelzüge) 
of Hegel’s mature idea of the state become “clearly recognizable” (deutlich Erkennbar) 
for the first time.500  As we witnessed the progression and ultimate closure of Hegel’s 
personal development in Frankfurt, the move away from personal life towards history 
with the concept of the "power-state" (Machtstaat), we are now dealing with the 
beginnings of Hegel's system and the transition of his thinking to its ultimate significance 
for world history in general and 19th century political thought in particular.   
 “Sittlichkeit,” translated into English as either “ethicality” or “ethical life,” is 
divided in The Philosophy of Right into family, civil society and the state.  In his essay 
"Morality and Ethical Life: Hegel's Controversy with Kantian Ethics," Joachim Ritter 
argues that Hegel's mature concept of "Sittlichkeit" is developed as a critique of the 
Kantian division of legality and morality.501  This division leads to the separation of the 
individual into an inner life of "virtue" and an outer reality of "law."  For Hegel, however, 
this separation creates a dualistic position where the freedom of the individual attained in 
inner life is never realized in reality and remains a mere "ought" without consequence.  
According to Ritter's finely argued essay, however, Hegel aims to incorporate the inner 
life of the individual into the outer life of the state: "Ethical life [Sittlichkeit] is the 
institutional reality of human selfhood."502  Following Ritter, then, with the emergence of 
"Sittlichkeit," Hegel is first attempting to incorporate the freedom of the individual into 
the power of the state.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
499 HS 163. 
 
500 HS 221. !
501 Ritter, "Morality and Ethical Life." 171. 
 
502 Ritter, "Morality and Ethical Life." 172.!
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 This point underscores the overall tendency of Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State 
as well: namely, following Hegel's development towards the possibility of uniting the 
rational and the actual.  In Hegel's early years, this possibility was expressed as the 
attempt to overcome the personal tragedy of inner and outer life.  The manner in which 
Rosenzweig argues for this development will be preserved in his own theory of the tragic 
hero in The Star of Redemption under the notion of "metaethics."  Following Hegel's 
move towards the "power-state" and the forces of history in Jena, Rosenzweig's own 
thinking was imbued with the difficulties of preserving the freedom of the individual 
within the institutions of society.   
 In "The System of Ethicality" Hegel's thought begins to take on the shape of the 
“totality” of the relations between individuals and the state that it will retain in his mature 
system and The Philosophy of Right.  Still drawing on Montesquieu, as Rosenzweig will 
argue, the concept of "ethicality" is Hegel's answer to the former’s “espirit général,”503 
imbued however with the recent development in his own thought.  For “just like in the 
critique of the Reichsverfassung this state is built up upon war.”504  And although “war” 
is again at the center of Rosenzweig’s reading of Hegel's state, to this notion of conflict 
there is added the concept of the "family."  It is on the basis of “family and war” (Familie 
und Krieg) that Hegel's “idea of absolute ethicality” (Idee der absoluten Sittlichkeit) is 
realized in the “people” (Volk).505  In order to capture the “form and sense” (Form und 
Sinn) of this idea of “people”, Hegel draws upon a “division of estates” 
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(Ständegliederung) within the state.506  This can be seen as the first instance of his mature 
notion of "civil society," which in The Philosophy of Right is separated off from the state 
entirely.507 
 In "The System of Ethicality" Hegel divides the estates of the “people” into 
“noble” (Adel) “bourgeois” (Bürger) and “peasant” (Bauern).508  Each of these estates 
has its own virtue and also its own relation to freedom.  The first of these, the "noble" 
estate, is the “absolute estate” (absoluten Stand), in Rosenzweig’s words: "not the 
entirety of all virtues, but rather the sublime elevation above all particular virtues.”509  
This “sublime elevation” over all “particularity” finds its expression in the form of 
“bravery” (Tapferkeit).510  In other words, “this nobility is the noble of war.”511  The 
second estate is one of “relative ethicality” (relativen Sittlichkeit) and as the estate of the 
“bourgeois” its virtues appear under the form of “righteousness” (Rechtschaffenheit).512  
The third estate it that of “raw ethicality” (rohe Sittlichkeit) and the virtues of the 
“peasant” appear under the form of “trust” (Zutrauen).513  Each of these three estates is a 
“totality” (Totalität) and contains the others within it, and thus they stand in connection 
to the whole not merely as a “part” (Teil), but are connected to the whole “in all its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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richness” (in all seinem Reichtum): “only the manner and meaning, not the content of this 
connection is different for each estate.”514  Although there is a distinct hierarchy at work 
here, all three estates are necessary and their interaction makes up the levels of “society” 
(Gesellschaft) in Hegel’s idea of the state.515  The significance of this new ideal of the 
state for Hegel's development is great: Hegel has now “left the circle of thoughts of the 
eighteenth century completely behind him.”516  
 Central to understanding Hegel's "Stände" is not only their interaction in the 
"totality" of the state—for example, how the “noble” and “peasant” estate are connected 
through war as the officers on the one hand and the soldiers on the other, whereas the 
“bourgeois” class works and pays taxes, but does not fight in wars—but the question of 
“freedom” within Hegel’s new conception of the state as "power-state."  In line with the 
“individuality” of each class, Hegel writes that each has its own “coloring” (Färbung)517 
of freedom: the “noble estate” is free from all "fear of earthly things” (Angst des 
Irdischen); the “peasant estate” is granted the same “tenuous concept of freedom” (zarte 
Freiheitsbegriff) that all other classes are granted; and finally the estate of the 
“bourgeois,” with its right to property, is granted the freedom of “empirical existence” 
(empirischen Existenz).518  From these notions of freedom, Hegel proposes an “organic 
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'totality' of the whole" (organische 'Totalität' des Ganzen).519  To show that Hegel still 
has the ethical life of Greek antiquity in mind and has not yet reached his mature 
standpoint, Rosenzweig characterizes this new state as the “state of beauty of the system” 
(der Schönstaat des Systems).520  
In comparing this new “System of Ethicality” to the Reichsschrift dealt with 
above, Rosenzweig provides his readers with a rare glimpse into the overall objective of 
his book as it relates to Hegel's influence upon the latter half of the nineteenth century 
and subsequently the life and work of Bismarck, the founder of the first united German 
state.  His statement here provides a clue to the very thesis of his book:  
 
Between the demands of the pamphlet [the Reichsschrift] and the work of 
 Bismarck there exists at first glance a surprising and yet almost coincidental 
 agreement, from the picture of the state of the system ["The System of Ethicality] 
 there runs an underground line of development through the Paulskirche to the 18th  
of January, 1871.521   
 
In making this connection from Hegel's thought to the "Paulskirche," the now infamous 
meeting in 1848 in Frankfurt of the first freely elected parliament in Germany, and finally 
the founding of the unified German state in 1871, Rosenzweig is making the argument, 
here clearly influenced by Meinecke, that through the examination of Hegel's thought the 
historian may also gain insight into the development of the German nation.  He thus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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521 "Zwischen den Forderungen der Flugschrift und dem Werk Bismarcks besteht eine beim ersten 
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implies that the elements of Hegel's political thinking—namely, his theory of 
"Sittlichkeit"—are those same elements that went into the history and founding of the 
German state.   
In the Reichsschrift it was the simplicity of the “thought of power” 
(Machtgedankens)522 that Rosenzweig saw as analogues, albeit almost by “coincidence,” 
to the work of Bismarck.  Here in the “System of Ethicality” Rosenzweig sees much 
more than a coincidence.  For not only does the “System” show the beginnings of Hegel’s 
lasting political philosophy through its notion of "Sittlichkeit," but although in content it 
is explaining “conditions which are dying off” (absterbende Zustände),523 Rosenzweig 
sees here in the “light” (Licht) that hit what was sinking, the “vitalizing powers of a rising 
political spirit, which working out into the future would prepare and accompany the work 
of Bismarck.”524  Thus, with the rising significance of his notion of "Sittlichkeit" and the 
subsequent division of the "people" into classes and the state into an "organic totality," 
Hegel's new ideal of the state now “shines beyond the narrow reality of German life”525 
and points to a future history.  The questions of individual and state then take a new turn 
towards this future-oriented thought in Hegel's “great essay” (großen Aufsatz) “On the 
Scientific Manner of Treating Natural Right.”526  Here again, new questions of the 
individual in society emerge.   
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 Hegel’s essay “On the Scientific Manner of Treating Natural Right” is split into 
three parts: the first deals with “empirical” right and the second with Kant's and Fichte’s 
philosophy of right.  But it is the third part, Hegel’s own thoughts on the subject, which 
occupy Rosenzweig most intensely.  Also within this essay is the first appearance in 
Hegel’s writings of the “equation of what is actual and what is rational” (Gleichung von 
Wirklich und Vernünftig).527  This moment is fleeting in Hegel's essay, but if we 
remember how Rosenzweig splits “what is rational” from “what is actual” in the epigraph 
to his “Preliminary Remarks” and thus sets this question as a central concern within 
Hegel and the State, it is worth noting nonetheless.  The equation of the rational and 
actual appears in Hegel's words as the possibility that a “great and pure intuition [...] in 
the pure architectonics of its presentation [...] express the truly ethical.”528  This is the 
bridge between the subjective will on the one hand, and the objective reality of life on the 
other, or as expressed above, Hegel's notion of "Sittlichkeit."  It is no coincidence that this 
language appears in proximity to Kant's thought, for as Ritter will later argue, it is on the 
basis of Kant's ethical philosophy that Hegel's theory of right is founded.529  The source 
of this argument can be found in Hegel's essay on natural right.    
 After Hegel distances himself from Hobbes’ political thought and his idea of the 
“chaos of a natural condition” (Chaos eines Naturzustands), which Hegel rejects, wishing 
rather to preserve nature in the “idea of ethical nature” (die Idee der sittlichen Natur), 
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Hegel rejects the idea that freedom can be preserved through force.530  Rather than 
separating “legality” (Legalität) and “morality” (Moralität) as both Kant and Fichte do, 
and thus leaving the ethical moment in the hands of the individual alone, Hegel sees 
“ethical freedom” as “beyond the possibility of such decisions.”531  Ritter will later argue, 
however that it is on the basis of this separation of "legality" and "morality" that Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right is founded.532  However, this is a separation, as I stated above, that 
ultimately leads to a dualism of self and society.  In its full maturity, Hegel's theory of 
"Sittlichkeit" claims to preserve both the freedom of the individual and incorporates this 
individual into the institutions of society.  The roots of this central relationship between 
the individual and society, and now the gradual exclusion of the state from this 
relationship, are again bound up with Hegel's theory of the "Stände."          
 The "Stände" of the “Natural Right” essay are the same as those of the “System”, 
writes Rosenzweig.533  However, in line with Hegel’s increasing dependence upon the 
category of history to help articulate his political thoughts, Rosenzweig emphasizes here 
the historical picture of Hegel’s thought.  Ever since 1796, writes Rosenzweig, Hegel 
“placed the great break in world-history at the transition from the free-state to the Roman 
empire.”534  What resulted out of this break was that “private law became the ruling 
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power of life.”535  Hegel's task, rather than longing for a restoration of antiquity—again 
Ritter: Hegel "always opposed politically and intellectually every attempt of restoration 
to return to antiquity"536—is to look face-to-face at the necessity of history and 
“consciously take up this system [of private law]…and provide for it its own estate, as its 
empire.”537  Thus the estate of the “bourgeois” is brought into new relations with both the 
“Nobel” and “peasant” estates, and becomes the center-point for Hegel’s renewed 
question of the freedom of the individual.  This “world-historical foundation” 
(weltgeschichtliche Unterbau), as Rosenzweig calls it, and the role of the “bourgeois” 
within it now become the focus of Hegel’s thoughts, again clearly pointing towards the 
future importance of "civil society" (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) within his theory of 
"Sittlichkeit."538   
 Within the context of the “Natural Right” essay, however, the questions of the 
state have shifted from the relation of the individual and the state as such—which was the 
central relation of Hegel's early development—to the question of “the relation of political 
and economic man, state and property.”539  By turning to a central focus throughout the 
entirety of Hegel and the State, both in terms of its content and form—“the intellectual 
history of the individually great man”540—Rosenzweig addresses this new relation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between state and property in terms already familiar to us.  Drawing on the language of 
tragedy in Frankfurt and anticipating Hegel's encounter with Napoleon in Jena, 
Rosenzweig again shapes his narrative around the dramatic content of Hegel's writing.  
And just as in Frankfurt, here too we see a clear instance of Rosenzweig's biographical 
interpretation taking shape. 
 
 
From Tragedy to Comedy 
 Karl Marx, whom towards the end of Hegel and the State Rosenzweig calls the 
"fanatical herald of the future of man"541—showing thereby both a critical distance and 
respect for the "founder of social democracy"542—wrote in the first lines of his political 
pamphlet "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte": "Hegel remarks somewhere 
that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. 
He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."543  Marx' quaint phrase, 
in which he alludes to a discussion of history from Hegel's Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Geschichte,544 has made its way firmly into contemporary thought.545  It 
is important to note, however, that Rosenzweig picked up on this same dramatic 
repetition in Hegel's thought, and gave it a context lacking in Marx within Hegel's 
Natural Right essay from 1802, almost twenty years before his lectures on history.  In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
541 "dieser fanatische Verkünder menschheitlicher Zukunft." HS 470. 
 
542 "des Stifters der Sozialdemokratie." HS 467. 
 
543 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte." London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1984.  
 
544 See Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Part III, Section II. 
  
545 See for example, Slavoj Zizek's book First as Tragedy, then as Farce (2009).!
 176 
what follows, I will again touch upon the tragedy of Hegel's personal life experienced in 
Frankfurt and show how in developing Hegel's theory of the state in dramatic terms, 
Rosenzweig argues that what was once "tragedy" in Hegel's thinking, that is, the fate of 
the individual, has now become "comedy." 
 Hegel did not begin to develop a complete theory of the drama until his lectures 
on aesthetics, first delivered in Heidelberg in 1818.  However, long before these lectures, 
Hegel often leaned on drama and its language in order to draw lasting distinctions in his 
thought.  This was the case, for example, with Hegel's now famous treatment of 
Sophocles' Antigone in The Phenomenology of Spirit.  It was in commenting on this 
drama that Hegel most clearly made the separation between the ethical life of the 
family—represented by Antigone—and the ethical life of the state—as embodied by 
Creon.  This contrast, and in turn collision of opposing forces, is carried well into The 
Philosophy of Right and shows how the form of tragedy gained a significance far beyond 
the aesthetic sphere for Hegel.  This comes as no surprise if we take his mature theory of 
the drama into account: "Das Drama muß [...] als die höchste Stufe der Poesie und der 
Kunst überhaupt angesehen werden."546  As the "highest art," drama does not remain 
closed off from the world of actuality, it is not a passing amusement for the masses, but 
rather quite profoundly reveals itself "in der Weltgeschichte."547  It is this pairing of 
drama and world history that is of interest to us here.  For not only does Hegel learn to 
see the events of world history unfolding dramatically before him—as his future 
encounter with Napoleon most clearly shows—but Rosenzweig himself, in pairing the 
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internal conflicts of Hegel's individuality with the external events of his life and thought, 
plays his historian's role as the dramatic poet of Hegel's life.  
 Rosenzweig first introduced dramatic language into his biography in his treatment 
of Hegel's Frankfurt period.  There, under the notion of "the highest subjectivity" and in 
the proximity to his friend Hölderlin, Hegel struggled to portray the fate of the life of 
Jesus in philosophical terms.  This led first to a tragic notion of personal life, in which the 
individual's fate was composed of the complete separation from the world.  According to 
Rosenzweig, this was Hegel's own position in Frankfurt.  However, in the picture of the 
life of Jesus, this isolation from the "powers" of the world would soon become a new fate 
for the individual: "Jesus' fate grew precisely from these powers from which he fled."548  
In doing so, his "fatelessness" (Schicksalslosigkeit) was his highest fate and personal 
tragedy.  Finally, in the context of the development of Hegel's conception of the state, 
this led to Rosenzweig's conclusion:“[t]he state as a part of fate!”549  This movement 
from the tragedy of personal life through the state led to Hegel's own formulation: "fate 
as history itself."  In this moment history took on the tragic undertone once reserved for 
the individual, that is, history was now endowed with the "fate" of personal life.  Now in 
Jena, as I have shown, Hegel's thoughts shifted to the "fate" of this history and the 
political world around him. "It becomes noticeable," writes Rosenzweig, "how closely the 
emergence of the new historical world and view of the state in Germany was connected 
with the drama of the sinking empire."550  It is from the viewpoint of this "drama" that 
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Rosenzweig again turns his attention to Hegel's language of tragedy.  However, to this 
"tragedy" now comes the notion of "comedy," and both of these revolve around Hegel's 
understanding of the concept of "property" (Eigentum) in Jena.  One may thus ask, how 
does Hegel comes to associate dramatic language with the concept of "property"?  
 In introducing this term, the full range of the concept of "property" for Hegel's 
thought should be noted from the outset.  Indeed, Hegel's Philosophy of Right is founded 
upon a wide-ranging notion of what it means to 'take possession' of something.551  
Accordingly, Hegel defines "property" in The Philosophy of Right as "the absolute right 
of appropriation which human beings have over all things (Sachen)."552  However, in the 
first introduction to the Reichsschrift from 1799, Hegel still saw the concept of property 
as “something without relation” (ein Beziehungsloses).553  It was this “disconnectedness 
of private property” that Hegel saw as the “root of German suffering.”554  Rather than a 
simple "orderly dominance over his property,"555 Hegel now sees the relation of the 
individual to “property” in the same light as the state: “both are fate for us, from both we 
cannot and are not allowed to think ourselves as separated.”556  Hegel already presents 
this pairing of state and property under "the idea of fate" (die Idee des Schicksals)557 in 
the third introduction to the Reichsschrift: “A group of people [...] can then only be called !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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a state, if they have united themselves to a common defense of their property in 
general.”558  With this statement property “receives its entrance into the conceptual 
determination of the state itself.”559  State and property are intertwined as concepts and it 
is no longer merely the duty of the state to protect the private property of the individual. 
The state developed in the Natural Right essay is still understood by Rosenzweig 
as a “power-state” (Machtstaat) and as a “war-state” (Kriegsstaat).560  Given this view of 
the state, the question of the relation of the individual to this very inhuman-like picture is 
constant in both Rosenzweig and Hegel’s ideas.  In the Natural Right essay Hegel 
attempts to “reconcile” (aussöhnen) what before appeared to Rosenzweig as the 
“indifference” (Gleichgültigkeit) of the state towards the individual with the “great 
thought of the ‘identity’ of state and man.”561  Again it is the “division of estates” 
(Ständegliederung) in general that is central to this thought.  And here it is the relation of 
the state to the "economic individual" (wirtschaftende Einzelmensch)—a new formulation 
of the "bourgeois"—that comes into question.562    
The thought of "tragedy" again makes an appearance with the relation of the 
"economic man" and "property" to the state.  For Hegel, "the division of estates is 
'nothing other than the performance of tragedy in ethical life that the absolute eternally 
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plays with itself'."563  Such a sweeping dramatic claim is quite common for Hegel, as we 
already noted in his treatment of Sophocles' Antigone to help describe a modern political 
relation.  In the above context, Hegel draws on Aeschylus' tragic trilogy Oresteia, which 
concludes in the Eumenides with the trial of Orestes for the murder of his mother, in 
order to show how the concept of "property" is caught up in tragic relations.  Eumenides 
revolves around Apollo's command that Orestes avenge the murder of his father at his 
mother's hands, thereby throwing mankind into “act and guilt” and allowing the furies 
(Eumeniden) to rule with the “force” of “rigid law.”564  Athena, the ruler of Athens and 
thus the godhead of the state, was thus given to mankind to reconcile the "rigid law" of 
the furies with the law of the state.  Although she and her court proclaim Orestes 
innocent, she appeases the furies by giving them an altar of their own within the city of 
Athens: "The way / is free for you to be a landholder here, / enjoying honor justly and 
forever."565  In this manner “ethicality” (Sittlichkeit), understood here as the state itself, 
sacrificed a part of its “inorganic nature” to the "furies," who previously lived outside the 
law of the state, thereby placing a piece of its property—the altar— over and against 
itself as “fate.”566  With the trial of Orestes in mind, Hegel can write that this fate is “now 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
563 "Die ständische Gliederung ist 'nichts anders als die Aufführung der Tragödie im Sittlichen, welche das 
Absolute ewig mit sich selber spielt." HS 194. 
 
564 "Tat und Schuld"; "Gewalt"; "starren Rechts". HS 194. !
565 Aeschylus, Eumenides 1036. 
 
566 "So opfert die Sittlichkeit einen Teil ihrer selbst auf, indem sie ihre unorganische Natur, 'damit sie sich 
nicht mit ihr verwickele, als ein Schicksal von sich abtrennt und sich gegenüberstellt'." HS 194. 
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no longer that of man, but that of the state”567—indeed, "property has become the fate of 
the state.”568  
What Rosenzweig sees happening here is a reversion to the concept of fate of 
1798/99 in Frankfurt, but now it is the state and no longer man himself who has 
something “objective” over and against itself.  This new idea of fate as it relates to state 
and property is termed by Rosenzweig as “one definitive side of the Hegelian thought of 
freedom.”569  For in holding the sphere of private right (Privatrecht) over and against 
itself as fate, the state now maintains a “state-free zone” (staatsfreien Bezirk) where the 
freedom of the individual is possible.570  Thus, it is with “private right” or what Hegel 
defines as the sphere of “property,” where “freedom” plays itself out in Hegel’s thinking.  
This process is what Hegel terms the "tragedy in ethical life" (Tragödie im Sittlichen).571                 
 We have reached a point where the “relation of the individual to the state” is 
maturing towards its definitive form in Hegel’s thinking.  The above relation has 
increasingly played out within the question of “freedom” and its possibility in what 
Rosenzweig sees as a “power-state” (Machtstaat).  This finally leads Rosenzweig back to 
talk of the “great men” of history, a thought which points the way from tragedy to 
comedy.  It again occupies Hegel here and will form one of the essential aspects of his 
mature political philosophy in the form of the monarch.  In the “Natural Right” essay, 
however, the “great statesman” constitutes the fourth kind of individual and thereby a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
567 "Schicksal nun nicht mehr des Menschen, sondern des Staats." HS 195. 
 
568 "Das Eigentum ist zum Schicksal des Staats geworden." HS 194. 
 
569 "eine Seite des Hegelschen Freiheitsgedankens." HS 195. 
 
570 HS 195. 
 
571 HS 194.!
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fourth kind of freedom.  Rosenzweig briefly outlines the first three individuals and their 
relation to “freedom” as follows: 
  
There was the freedom of the economic “bourgeois” foreign to the state, the 
carriers of the “morality” of Kant and Fichte; the freedom of the fighting class 
from all those earthly shackles of possession and righteousness, which make up 
the content of freedom for the “bourgeois”; the freedom of the individual to drink 
from the breast of universal ethicality.572 
 
To these three forms now comes “the freedom of the great statesman” (die Freiheit des 
großen Staatsmannes).573  But this individual, honored by Hegel only because it is 
“wrapped up in fate,” does not have its “principle of right” (Rechtsgrund) in itself, “but 
rather solely in the overarching whole, in the state and its history.”574   
 Hegel’s emphasis on the “great statesman” is fascinating for Rosenzweig in many 
ways.  The concept of the individual is also the starting point for Rosenzweig’s Star of 
Redemption and Rosenzweig’s concept of “metaethics” (Metaethik) is colored with the 
same “heroic solitariness” (heldischer Einsamkeit)575 that appears in the great men of the 
Natural Right essay.  But this tendency towards the “historical personality” (historische 
Persönlichkeit) is also what ruled over the nineteenth century—“Ranke’s century”576—in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
572 "Es waren die staatsfremde Freiheit des wirtschaftende 'bourgeois,' des Trägers der 'Moralität' Kants 
und Fichtes; die Freiheit des Kriegerstandes von allen jenen irdischen Fesseln des Besitzes und der 
Rechtschaffenheit, die dem 'bourgeois' den Inhalt der Freiheit ausmachen; die Freiheit des einzelnen, an 
der Brust der allgemeinen Sittlichkeit zu trinken." HS 200. 
 
573 HS 200. 
 
574 "in das Schicksal hineingeflochten"; "sondern einzig im übergreifenden Ganzen, im Staat und seiner 
Geschichte." HS 201. !
575 HS 201. 
 
576 "Jahrhundert Rankes" HS 201. 
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two distinct ways:577 first, it was groups of individuals who in themselves were morally 
outstanding “parts” (Glieder) of a “group” (Menge); and second the great man who 
uniquely related to these same groups as an historical personality.578  Hegel, however, 
introduces a third type of individual who embodies the "feeling of personal particularity" 
(Gefühl der persönlichen Eigentümlichkeit), which was of waning interest to the coming 
century.579  The way this happens, writes Rosenzweig, is “infinitely telling” (unendlich 
bezeichnend).580  For with the introduction of this character and also the rounding out of 
the concept of “property” as embodied in an individual, Rosenzweig sees the transition 
from Hegel's struggles with personal life in Frankfurt to his mature stance as complete.  
Part of this transition, and the one of interest to us here, is the transition of the concept of 
fate from “tragedy” to that of “comedy”:  
 
 If the philosopher represented the relation of the state to the freedom of civic trade 
 and the independence of the subjects as the tragedy in the ethical, then the relation 
 of the state to the men resting in their personal particularity, lifted above and 
 beyond the state in the highest, internal sense [is represented] as—'comedy.'581   
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
577 This is probably a reference by Rosenzweig to the “bitter controversy” between Ranke and Heinrich Leo 
on the subject of historical personalities, especially Machiavelli.  See here Iggers, The German Conception 
of History. 66-69. 
 
578 HS 201. 
 
579 HS 201. 
 
580 HS 201. !
581 "Versinnbildlichte das Verhältnis des Staats zur bürgerlich gewerblichen Freiheit und Selbstständigkeit 
der Untertanen sich dem Philosophen als die Tragödie im Sittlichen, so das Verhältnis des Staats zu dem in 
seiner persönlichen Eigentümlichkeit ruhenden, im höchsten, innerlichen Sinn über den Staat hinaus 
gehobene Menschen als—'Komödie'." HS 201. 
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 Already in the Natural Right essay, before his great lectures on aesthetics, Hegel 
discusses ethical life in terms of tragedy and comedy.  With regard to tragedy, as we 
described above using the final scene from Aeschylus' drama, Hegel writes that "ethical 
nature segregates its inorganic nature [...] as a fate, and places it outside itself."  Comedy, 
on the other hand, "will generally come down on the side of absence of fate."582  In 
modern comedy, which is Hegel's focus here, man takes himself seriously, but the 
spectator “takes him comically” (nimmt ihn komisch).583  He holds his “small 
coincidental own being in bitter seriousness for absolute” and thus falls into that type of 
order, which corresponds to this, “the world of private right.”584  In this sense, with 
Rosenzweig playing the role of the historian as “witness” and “spectator” to Hegel’s 
development, this comic individual is “a picture of life of these times.”585  A picture in 
which individuals are endowed with nothing more than an “invalidity” (Nichtigkeit)586 
with regard to their own fate.  It is this “invalidity” of individuality that leads Rosenzweig 
to make one last connection to the Reichsschrift, which puts the “infinitely telling” and 
significant aspect of this comic individual into clear relief for Hegel’s political thought:  
 
It was like this in the Reichsverfassungschrift that Hegel described the powers that 
move the human race—politics, religion, necessity, virtue, force, reason, 
cunning—each of which carries itself as an absolutely free and independent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
582 Hegel, Natural Law, 105.   
 
583 HS 203. 
 
584 "er selber hingegen hält sein kleines zufälliges Eigenwesen in bitterem Ernst für absolut, und fällt so 
ganz von selbst derjenigen Ordnung in die Hände, in der das Zufällige unbedingte Geltung beansprucht, 
der Welt des privaten Rechts." HS 203. 
 
585 "ein Bild des Lebens dieser Zeit." HS 203. 
 
586 HS 203. 
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power, 'unaware that they are all tools in the hands of higher powers, of primal 
fate and all-conquering time, which laugh at such freedom and independence.'587 
 
 
This “laugh,” continues Rosenzweig, is the same sound that now echoes through the 
comedy of “the world of private right.”  We thus have before us the picture of the 
“comedy of the ethical” (Komödie des Sittlichen).588  
 In terms of Hegel’s development, which reached its personal peak in Frankfurt 
and is now slowly giving way to Hegel’s own system, this conception of “the comedy of 
the ethical” shows for Rosenzweig the distance Hegel has come since the days of his own 
“most personal tragedy” (persönlichste Tragik).  What for Hegel four years ago was 
“tragedy” and was represented in the life of Jesus, “the self-entrapment in the I,” “the fear 
for one’s own,”589 has now become “comedy” for him.  The concept of “fatelessness,” 
which he once saw with Hölderlin as the “entire weakness of the times” and also as the 
peak of the problem of “tragedy,”590 in Rosenzweig’s words this notion of “fatelessness” 
has now become “the title of the comedy of the ethical.”591  Thus, with this “revaluation” 
(Umwertung) of the constellation of fate—and this proto-Nietzschean term is not 
surprising if we remember the "apocalyptic" sense which filled Hegel at this time—Hegel 
has now come to view what he once saw as "tragic"—the "highest subjectivity" and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
587 "So hatte Hegel in der Reichsschrift die Mächte, welche das menschliche Geschlecht bewegen—Politik, 
Religion, Not, Tugend, Gewalt, Vernunft, List—geschildert, die sich jede als absolut freie und 
selbstständige Macht betragen, 'bewußtlos, daß sie alle Werkzeuge in der Hand höherer Mächte, des 
uranfänglichen Schicksals und der alles besiegende Zeit, sind, die jener Freiheit und Selbstständigkeit 
lachen." HS 203. 
 
588 HS 204. 
 
589 HS 203. 
 
590 HS 204. 
 
591 "Überschrift der Komödie des Sittlichen." HS 204. 
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separation from the world—as the "comedy" of ethical life.  The individual, who was 
once at the center of Hegel's state, now gives way to the powers of history resulting in a 
"crazy grandiose view of the invalidity of the individual."592  Hegel now stands at the 
door of the new century, in both “acknowledgment and dismissal” (Anerkennung und 
Verwerfung),593 and with this new relation of the individual to the state we play spectator 
with Rosenzweig to the dramatic turns of his development. 
 
 
Hegel's Jena Period: Part II 
 Rosenzweig's treatment of the conclusion of Hegel's Jena period, "Jena (since 
1804)," will again address the essay on Natural Right in light of a new version and then 
continues on to explicate what would later become known as the Jenaer 
Realphilosophie—Hegel's first complete systematic account of "Geist" or spirit.  The 
Jena period, which saw the life of the individual give way to the power of the state, 
finally culminates for Hegel in his now famous Phenomenology of Spirit.  In 
Rosenzweig's narrative, the conclusion of Hegel's Jena period is the continuation and 
systematic solidification of the relationship between the individual and the state.  Up to 
this period in Hegel’s development—in 1804—Rosenzweig recognized two ideals of the 
state standing in tension with one another.  He categorizes these two ideals as that of the 
“individual” (Einzelmensch) and the “whole of the state” (Staatganzes), or more 
particularly, as an “ethics of personality” (Persönlichkeitsethik) represented by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
592 "Eine verrucht großartige Anschauung von der Nichtigkeit der Individualität." HS 203. 
 
593 HS 204. !
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problem of a “state-free zone” and an “ethics of community” (Gemeinschaftsethik) 
encompassed by the idea of “life in the state.”594  This tension between "personality" and 
"community" in Hegel's thinking correspond to our chosen terms "individual" and "state."  
As we have seen, Hegel's philosophy of "personality" emerged in tandem with the 
tragedy of his own personal life in Frankfurt.  Mediated by a new conception of "fate," 
Hegel's political thinking was shown to correspond with his biography, moving steadily 
away from a focus on the individual towards an interest in the powers of the state and 
history.  This double-treatment of Hegel's thought along with his life outlines a basic 
trend in Rosenzweig's Hegel book.  With the turn in Jena to "die Sache selbst,"595 we are 
now greeted by the rise of the philosophy of history in Hegel's thinking.  As he himself 
enters into the political events surrounding him, so too does his thought adapt from the 
riddles of personal life to the fate of the individual in history.    
 The relationship between the individual and the state takes a new turn in the next 
version of the Natural Right essay with Hegel’s first attempt to develop a “middle realm 
between the state and man before-the-state."596  In the Philosophy of Right this "middle 
realm" will be termed “civil society”597 (bürgerliche Gesellschaft).598  What is most 
distinct for Rosenzweig in the development of this central concept is the change to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
594 HS 221. 
 
595 corresponding in this way to what Rosenzweig had called the "Sachlichkeit" of the nineteenth-century in 
his Baroque notes, here in dialogue with his cousin Hans Ehrenberg who uses this same term to describe 
the challenge facing the early twentieth-century "Geschichte der Menschen unserer Zeit." See Rosenzweig 
Jahrbuch, "Paulus und die Politik" (Verlag Karl Alber). !
596 "das Zwischenreich zwischen Staat und vorstaatlichem Mensch." HS 224. 
 
597 This is of course a reference to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
 
598 HS 224. 
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doctrine of the estates (Ständelehre) discussed above under Hegel's growing interest for a 
philosophy of history.  This shift in the importance of the philosophy of history in Hegel's 
thought is not only important for understanding Hegel's theory of "Sittlichkeit," but 
central to the entirety of the Jenaer Realphilosophie.  
 Hegel's philosophy of history in Jena once again takes flight from the Greek ideal.  
In observing the historical world around him, Hegel believed that along the “historical 
path from the Polis to the modern state” the “unity” of the Greeks was destroyed.599  This 
created a “higher diremption” (Entzweiung) where the “universal” (Allgemeine) was “free 
from the knowledge of all” (frei von dem Wissen aller).600  Although in this manner the 
modern individual lost his “external freedom” (äußere Freiheit) he nevertheless 
maintains the internal freedom, “the freedom of thought” (die Freiheit des Gedankens).601  
The now separated “universal,” on the other hand, stands juxtaposed to the individual in 
history as “hereditary monarchy” (Erbmonarchie).602  In this manner, Hegel is already 
attempting to do what he carries out in The Philosophy of Right, namely to reconcile the 
particular "will" of the individual, with the general "will" of the monarchical state.  
Although the idea of monarchy as the “true guarantee of personal freedom”603 was 
already present in the "pamphlet" of 1802, here in these final days in Jena monarchy 
itself, and in this manner a telling philosophy of history, is now taken up “without 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
599 "Der geschichtliche Gang Gang von der Polis zum modernen Staat hat die schöne 'genialische' Einheit 
des griechischen Menschen zertrümmert." HS 234. 
 
600 HS 234. 
 
601 HS 234. 
 
602 HS 234. !
603 "die wahre Bürgschaft der persönlichen Freiheit." HS 232. 
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digression or restriction into the ideal of the state.”604  Hegel's view of monarchy in Jena 
leads Rosenzweig to find the “spiritual element of Hegel’s doctrine of state as power”:605 
 
'physical strength' does not explain the success of great men of power, he has 
“something in his outline, which the others would like to call their master; they 
obey him against their will; against their will his will is their will; their immediate 
will is his will, but their conscious will is other; the great man has the former on 
his side, and they must, even if they do not want to.  This is the preordained of 
great men, to know the absolute will, to speak it; everyone collects themselves 
under his banner; he is their God.606 
  
Opposed to this idea of the monarch, which individuals must obey "even if they do not 
want to," is the pole of “freedom of thought.”607  From this tension between the authority 
of the monarch and the freedom of the individual Hegel, in the spirit of Kant's "What is 
Englightenment?," outlines the necessity of “public opinion” (öffentliche Meinung).  But 
in contrast to Kant, who in his essay wrote "räsonniert, aber gehorcht"608 thereby leaving 
the gap between public opinion and the state unaccounted for, Hegel adopts it into his 
idea of the state.  This new “organ” of the state also changed Hegel's division of estates; 
we now encounter the estate of “officialdom” (Beamtentum) for the first time in his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
604 "ohne Umschweif und Vorbehalt ins Staatsideal aufgenommen." HS 232. 
 
605 "Das geistige Element in Hegels Lehre vom Staat als Macht." HS 230. 
 
606 "'nicht physische Stärke' erklärt den Erfolg des großen Machtmenschen, sondern er hat 'etwas in seinen 
Zügen, das die andern ihren Herrn nennen mögen; die gehorchen ihm wider Willen; wider ihren Willen ist 
sein Wille ihr Willen; ihr unmittelbar Willen ist sein Willen, aber ihr bewußster Willen ist anders; der 
große Mensch hat jenen auf seiner Seite, und sie müssen, ob sie schon nicht wollen. Dies ist das Voraus des 
großen Menschen, den absoluten Willen zu wissen, auszusprechen; es sammeln sich alle um sein Panier; er 
ist ihr Gott." HS 230-31. 
 
607 "mit der ungewöhnlich starken Betonung der persönlichen Gedankenfreiheit." HS 237.  
 
608 See HS 27. 
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thought.  Thus, based on Hegel's understanding of history in Jena, from the “System of 
1802” with its aristocratic and estate-based picture of the state (aristokratisch-ständische 
Staatsbild) there now develops a picture based on this new monarchical-bureaucratic 
ideal.609  
 Rosenzweig points out that this is a change “in the sense of the changing times”610 
and that Hegel’s system has now become “externally more many-sided, less 
monumental.”611  In coming up with the estate (Stand) of “officialdom” as the “estate of 
the universal” (Stand der Allgemeinheit) Hegel was using the “social reality of the times” 
(soziale Wirklichkeit der Zeit) as his model.612  What is new to his system is the 
emergence here of a “moral-psychological systematic” (moralpsychologische Systematik) 
wherein the “dispositions” (Gesinnungen) of the estates are analyzed.613  This leads 
Hegel to classify the “officialdom” for example, with the “disposition” of “machine 
work” (Maschinenarbeit).614  This shift from the “impersonal ethicality” (unpersönlichen 
Sittlichkeit) to "true 'moral disposition'” (wahrer 'moralischer Gesinnung') is worth 
noting, because it represents for Rosenzweig that Hegel was beginning to push the 
division of estates (Ständegliederung) “entirely out of the state into society.”615  This 
move, which is a prelude to the final form of Hegel’s division of estates in the Philosophy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
609 HS 234. 
 
610 "eine Wandlung im Sinne der sich wandelnden Zeit." HS 234. 
 
611 "äußerlich vielseitiger, weniger monumental." HS 235. 
 
612 HS 235. Rosenzweig is commenting here on the middle section of the division “Konstitution” in the 
Jenaer Realphilosophie. 
 
613 HS 236. 
 
614 HS 236. !
615 "aus dem Staat ganz heraus in die Gesellschaft." HS 237. 
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of Right is in Rosenzweig's words, essential “for understanding the political content of his 
next great work [The Phenomenology of Spirit] and above all for Hegel’s placement to 
Napoleon.”616  For as Rosenzweig claims in explicating these changes to Hegel's thought, 
with the introduction of the “officialdom” the previously so important “Noble” estate is 
replaced and “the air of the Napoleonic age is noticeable here.”617       
 In general, Rosenzweig’s role as historian in his dramatic narrative rarely allows 
the reader to guess his position with regard to the subject matter.  I have argued that along 
with the content, one must look at the form and language of the book, and in this manner 
draw clues as to Rosenzweig's own philosophical position.  With this in mind, the last 
five pages—the final and third section—of the largest Jena manuscript, “Art, Religion, 
Philosophy,” is fascinating.   One can discern in Rosenzweig's words and the following 
discussion an uncommon interest in these pages.  In introducing them Rosenzweig writes: 
“and so, in order to answer the previously postponed question, how the philosopher 
thought about the relation of the state to the ultimate things at that time, finally valuable 
material comes into our hands.”618  This interest in the “ultimate things”, that is, in “art, 
religion and philosophy,” has the tone of the philosopher we will come to know in The 
Star of Redemption.  Indeed, all three of these themes will be woven into Rosenzweig's 
later thought.  However in treating Hegel's Jena period, it is the question of "religion" that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
616 "den politischen Gehalt des nächsten großen Werkes und vor allem um Hegels Stellung zu Napoleon zu 
verstehen." HS 237. 
 
617 "die Luft des napoleonischen Zeitlaters wird hier [...] spürbar." HS 238. Left to the side here was 
Rosenzweig’s discussion of the “officialdom” as “learned” (Gelehrte) and how, on the one hand, this 
allows this estate the “freedom” to know the “universal,” but also provides another link to Napoleon and 
the Italian Republic, where “official” and “learned” were incorporated into the concept of a “dotti.” !!!
618 "und so kommt uns hier endlich vollwertiges Material in die Hände zur Beantwortung der bisher 
aufgeschobene Frage, wie sich der Philosoph damals das Verhältnis des Staats zu den letzten Dingen 
gedacht hat." HS 239. 
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becomes especially important.  In leading up to a discussion of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, which concludes the entire first volume of the book, subtle changes in 
Rosenzweig's language and choice of content can now be discerned.  For example, as the 
following pages show, we see how Rosenzweig shares a lasting interest with Hegel in the 
world-historical question of the emergence of Christianity from its pagan roots.  Thus, in 
following Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's religious thought as expressed in a 
budding philosophy of history in Jena, we are also able to gather important clues that 
point beyond Hegel and the State itself into Rosenzweig's own future as a religious 
thinker.  
 
 
Religion and Philosophy of History in Jena 
 The final section of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, "World History," culminates in 
questions regarding the relation of the spiritual and secular realm,619 thereby linking 
political and religious philosophy at the highest level of Hegel's thought.  For 
Rosenzweig himself, the question of religion—and especially of the relation between 
paganism and the Jewish and Christian faiths—would become the central problem for the 
majority of his mature life.  There is certainly a connection to be made between Hegel 
and Rosenzweig with regard to religion, but what form does this connection take?  One 
can gain perspective on this topic by again drawing upon Bienenstock's article 
"Rosenzweig's Hegel," where she remarks that in Hegel and the State Rosenzweig 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
619 "In the hard struggle between these two realms [...] the spiritual realm brings the existence of its heaven 
down to earth in this world, to the ordinary secularity of actuality and representational thought." Hegel, PR 
380.!
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"neglects the religious dimension of Hegel's thought."620  After making such a striking 
claim, Bienenstock concludes her essay with the following thoughts and questions:  
 
 It is true, I think, that the way in which, in The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig 
 tries to relate faith and knowledge, the attempts he made at  understanding the 
 different religious traditions in conceptual terms and at developing an 
 interpretation of history on their basis, are hardly conceivable without Hegel's 
 influence.  But they are far from being Hegelian.  Indeed, one may perhaps see in 
 them an outcome of the way in which, in his first book, Rosenzweig related to 
 religion: Is it mere coincidence if the very religious dimension, still repressed in 
 Hegel und der Staat, reappears later in a Hegelian clothing?  Can one not suppose 
 that, had Rosenzweig adequately evaluated Hegel's attitude toward religion in his 
 first work, he himself would  have elaborated, in the Star of Redemption, a very 
 different attitude toward Hegel's idealism and perhaps, thereby, toward religion 
 itself?621   
 
It is a harsh reading of Hegel and the State that results, as Bienenstock seems to suggest, 
in the judgment that the treatment of Hegel's religious thought there is inadequate.  For 
again and again, Rosenzweig points to and discusses the role of religion in Hegel's 
political thought.  Perhaps Bienenstock is correct in claiming that his treatment is "non-
Hegelian" and "repressed"622 and indeed, Rosenzweig does not integrate Hegel's 
"Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion" into his narrative.  However, I would like to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
620 Bienenstock, 181. 
 
621 Bienenstock, 182. !
622 Bienenstock, 181. 
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argue that the question of religion, while not as central as that of individuality, is one of 
the guiding thoughts of Hegel and the State.    
 Throughout Hegel's development, Rosenzweig draws upon the question of 
religion as it appears in Hegel's writings to help show the limits of Hegel's political 
thought.  Additionally, the questions raised around religion in Hegel and the State, as 
Bienenstock points out, indirectly lead to Rosenzweig's own mature thinking.  As I will 
show below, when Rosenzweig addresses religion in Hegel and the State, he does so in 
combination with a discussion of Hegel's philosophy of history.  As he will later claim in 
discussing the "metaphysics" of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: "The particular history of 
religion has the same division as general world history, because—world history has the 
same division as the history of religion."623  This interdependence of religion and 
philosophy of history also provides the method for the introduction to Part II of The Star 
of Redemption, "On the Possibility of Experiencing Miracles."  There, Rosenzweig uses 
an historical analysis—one would almost like to say "historicist" method—to construct 
an argument for the necessity of a middle ground between the "extreme subjectivity" of 
philosophy and the "infinite objectivity" of theology.624  While Rosenzweig's treatment of 
religion in Hegel and the State falls short of the creative conclusions he will come to 
draw in The Star of Redemption–there, forging that very "bridge" (Brücke) between 
philosophy and theology with his own work—the preconditions for this content and 
historical method are already at hand in Hegel and the State—for the first time most 
clearly in the description of Hegel's Jena period.  Thus, Hegel's conjoining of religion and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
623 "Die spezielle Religionsgeschichte hat die gleiche Gliederung wie die allgemeine Weltgeschichte, weil—
die Weltgeschichte die gleiche Gliederung hat wie die Religionsgeschichte." HS 451. 
 
624 See Star 106.!
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history offers a glimpse not only into the future of Hegel's own thought, but into the very 
problematic that earned Rosenzweig the title "philosopher of religion."625 
 It was in Jena, as stated above, that a “new force” in Hegel’s thought emerged.  
Along with his ongoing systematic attempt to “to unite the ideal with the 'age',”626 
Hegel's thinking during this period began to revolve around a "picture of the present 
based on a philosophy of history.”627  Again drawing on the deep fascination for Greek 
culture sweeping through Germany at that time, Hegel believed himself to witness in the 
Christian epoch of world history before him a “downfall” (Niedergang) from the Greek 
Polis.628  What for Rosenzweig was a "highly surprising" (höchst überraschend)629 
observation, led Hegel to connect Christianity and Greek culture in this manner: no 
longer does Hegel find the "predecessor" (Vorfrucht) of Christianity in Judaism—as he 
had in his youth—but rather in the “imagination” (Phantasie) of Greek sculpture.630  
According to Hegel, in making statues of their gods, the Greeks were the first to separate 
the “ethical from the natural” (Sittlichen vom Natürlichen).631  This was essentially the 
same “becoming human of God” (Menschwerdung Gottes) that would arise and become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
625 See here Franz Rosenzweig: Religionsphilosoph aus Kassel.  For the Rosenzweig's views on religion 
before the Star, see Judaism Despite Christianity (ed. Rosenstock-Huessy).  
 
626 "das Ideal mit der 'Zeit' zu vereinigen." HS 243. 
 
627 "das geschichtsphilosophische Bild der Gegenwart." HS 241. 
 
628 HS 242. This "downfall" of Christianity is the subject of “a few pages” recorded by Karl Rosenkranz 
(see Rosenkranz 133-141). 
 
629 HS 245. 
 
630 HS 245. For the connection here of art and religion to Rosenzweig's Star, see the chapter on Hegel und 
der Staat in Else Freund's Die Existenzphilosophie Franz Rosenzweigs. !
631 HS 245. 
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“absolute” in Christianity with the death of Christ.632  Thus, it was on the basis of a new 
valuation of history—infused with a budding interest in philosophy of art—that Hegel's 
philosophy of religion merged with the historical world. 
 In Jena, Hegel divides the world-historical path of religion into three stages.  First 
there was the “religion of nature” (Naturreligion) of Paganism—the Greek culture 
described above—which reaches its peak in a “beautiful mythology” (schönen 
Mythologie).633  After the Romans hunted off these people and took away the home of 
their religion within “living nature” (lebendigen Natur), an “infinite pain” (unendlichen 
Schmerz) was created which gave rise to a second religion.  Christianity thus grew out of 
the “infinite pain” of the “de-deification of nature” (Entgötterung der Natur) and there 
grew within this new religion the belief that man nevertheless “carried the assurance of 
being one with the absolute within him.”634  The history of Christianity, which reached its 
peak in the Catholicism of the Middle Ages—as the “beautiful religion”—was moved by 
the two powers of “the feeling of separation and the belief in reconciliation.”635  It was 
then within Protestantism, with its “poetry of consecration” (Poesie der Weihe), that “the 
essence of Christianity, as the religion of separation and pain” is first unveiled.636  
Beyond the history of paganism and Christianity "the third religion, the religion of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
632 HS 245. 
 
633 HS 246. 
 
634 "ein Mensch die Zuversicht des Einsseins mit dem Absolute in sich trug." HS 246. 
 
635 "das Gefühl der Trennung und der Glaube an die Versöhnung." HS 246. 
 
636 "das Wesen des Christentums, als der Religion der Trennung und des Schmerzes." HS 247. !
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future, announces itself.”637  The moment when this new religion will come coincides, in 
Rosenzweig's reading, with the time “when the ideal of the state of the system has 
become reality.”638   For Hegel, this is the beginning of the “third age of the world” 
(dritte Weltalter) and in order to unite politics and religion, state and church, it is 
“philosophy” which rises to the task and “stands at its doorstep.”639  For this “future-
oriented” (zukunftsgerichtet) Hegel, now armed with the tools of the philosopher, there 
arose the idea of the “unity of the state with the 'divine'” (die Einheit von Staat und 
'Göttlichem'),640 whereby religion and state “were to internally grow together in the 
coming age of the world and thereby become 'absolute'.”641  This is the theme of the 
section “Art, Religion, Philosophy” within the Jenaer Realphilosophie.   
 Here, in the final moments before the appearance of the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
we are faced with a juxtaposition of “state and church, and in connection with this a 
change in the place of the state in the system.”642  For from the outset “the connection to 
the state, to the “people”, is now visibly no longer the only noticeable goal of the 
observation.”643  This is the first step towards “independence” (Selbstständigkeit) of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
637 "die dritte Religion, die Religion der Zukunft, sich ankündigt." HS 247. Rosenzweig cooly notes on the 
next line “that no bridge leads from the soon beginning flight of the romantics into the lap of the old church 
to these ideas of the Privatdozent in Jena”; "Von der bald beginnenden Flucht der Romantiker in den Schoß 
der alten Kirche führt keine Brücke zu diesen Ideen des jungen Jenenser Privatdozenten."  
  
638 "wenn das Staatsideal des Systems Wirklichkeit geworden sein wird." HS 247. 
 
639 "die Philosophie steht an seiner Pforte." HS 247. 
 
640 HS 248. 
 
641 "im kommenden Weltalter innerlich zusammenwachsen und damit 'absolut' werden sollten." HS 248. 
 
642 "Nebeneinanderstehens von Staat und Kirche und ein im Zusammenhang damit beginnender Wandel der 
Stellung des Staats im System." HS 249. 
 
643 "daß die Beziehung zum Staate, zum 'Volk,' jetzt sichtlich nicht mehr das einzige Merkziel der 
Betrachtung bildet." HS 249.!
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various “areas” (Gebiete)—art, religion, philosophy—which will later be classified as 
“absolute spirit” in Hegel’s mature system.  However, what is above all of concern for 
Rosenzweig is the “independence of religion” (Selbständigkeit der Religion).644  The 
starting-point of Hegel's investigation into religious life here—and an idea soon to be the 
starting-point for Rosenzweig's own philosophy of religion in The Star of Redemption—
is no longer the individual solely as a “political being,” but the “believing individual 
soul” (gläubigen Einzelseele): "What the state posseses only in government, the 
unconditional moral self-determination, the sublimity over every limited ethicality of the 
estates, the individual man as such posseses that in religion.”645  Rosenzweig 
characterizes this move towards the isolation of religion within the "believing individual 
soul" by Hegel as the “absolutizing of Christianity” (Verabsolutierung des Christentums) 
at the hands of Protestantism.646  In this movement Hegel has “made his honest, from 
now on unbroken peace with the present,” but only as “philosopher of religion.”647  
Above all, however, and here we come to the conclusion of this section, this new idea of 
the relation of the individual to political life impacted Hegel’s treatment of the relation of 
the state to the church. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
644 HS 250. 
 
645 "Was im Staat nur die Regierung als solche besitzt, die unbedingte moralische Selbstbestimmung, die 
Erhabenheit über jede beschränkte Standessittlichkeit, das besitzt der Einzelmensch als solcher in der 
Religion." HS 250. 
 
646 HS 250. 
 
647 "jedenfalls hat der Religionsphilosoph damals schon seinen ehrlichen, fürderhin nicht mehr 
gebrochenen Frieden mit der Gegenwart geschlossen. Aber nur der Religionsphilosoph." HS 250. 
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 Hegel begins his observation on this subject here with a statement echoing Kant: 
“man lives in two worlds” (der Mensch lebt in zwei Welten).648  But in distinction to 
Kant, these “two worlds” are in the end “of the same essence” (Weseneinheit): in Hegel's 
thinking, “[religion] is [the state], lifted into thought”—“man has his 'reality' in the state, 
his 'essence' in the church.”649  “However” writes Rosenzweig, summarizing Hegel, “the 
eternal, which he wants to obtain in the church in his conscious turning-away from the 
state, it has 'its being,' its earthly reality, in the state, in the 'spirit of the people'."650  In 
this sense the state is “right” (hat Recht) because it holds the “essence of reality” 
(Wirklichkeitswesen), but the church is also “right,” because the man of the church is 
“willing to die for their thoughts.”651  Thus, although these “two worlds” are opposed to 
each other, he now entertains the possibility of their “reconciliation” (Versöhnung), no 
longer as something in the future, but as a “possibility of the present” and from now on 
something which will exert “a determinative power on Hegel’s views.”652  In Hegel’s 
view of this reconciliation, however, the church cannot wish to bring the “kingdom of 
heaven” (Himmelreich) down to earth—this view will change with the Phenomenology—
for “this reality of heaven on earth is supposed to be the state.”653  It is thus the “great 
work” (große Werk) of the church "to bring about the reconciliation of the state and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
648 HS 251. 
 
649 "sie ist er, erhoben in den Gedanken"; "Im Staat hat der Mensch 'seine Wirklichkeit,' in der Kirche 'sein 
Wesen'." HS 251. 
 
650 "Aber das Ewige, das er durch seine bewußte Abkehr von Staat in der Kirche erwerben will, hat doch 
'sein Dasein,' seine irdische Wirklichkeit, im Staat, im 'Volksgeist'." HS 251. 
 
651 "für seinen Gedanken zu sterben bereit ist." HS 252. Also see here Napoleon’s church politics on the 
same page. 
 
652 "nicht mehr als ein Zukunftsgesicht, sondern als eine Gegenwartsmöglichkeit [...] der von da ab eine 
bestimmende Macht auf Hegels Anschauungen ausgeübt hat." HS 252. 
 
653 "weil diese Wirklichkeit des Himmelreichs auf Erden der Staat sein soll." HS 252.!
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kingdom of heaven 'in thought'."654  We have again reached a decisive point in the 
development of Hegel’s thought: “Hegel’s state has become Christian.”655  This, 
however, in an “internal sense” (innerlichem Sinne): "man no longer fulfills his duty to 
the state in the limited ethical disposition of the estates, but rather through a kind of 'self-
thinking' —'through religion'."656  At this point “religion [...] has in fact stepped out of the 
state.”657  With this new idea of religion Hegel believed to have worked out the “self-
release of the spirit from the 'life of a people,' thus from the state.”658  And it was from 
this vantage point, the perspective of "philosophy" now lifted beyond the state, that Hegel 
could now take up “developing the picture of world history and deciphering the nebulous 
countenance of the present.”659  This was the task of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, “a 
work of its own species” (ein Werk eigener Gattung).660  In the year of its completion—
1806—as Hegel saw Napoleon march triumphantly into Jena, "he knew, that the fate of 
this man, the rise and fall, was already recorded in his manuscript."661  With these words, 
anticipating the epoch of Napoleon to come—and the tragic fate of this great historical 
individual—Rosenzweig turns to a work of philosophy that would leave a great 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
654 "die Versöhnung von Staat und Himmelreich 'im Denken' hervorzubringen." HS 252. 
 
655 "Hegels Staat ist christlich geworden." HS 252. 
 
656 "der Mensch erfüllt nun seine staatliche Pflicht nicht mehr in beschränkter sittlicher Standesgesinnung, 
sondern aus einer Art 'Selbstdenken' heraus—'aus Religion'." HS 252. 
 
657 "tatsächlich über den Staat hinaus." HS 252. 
 
658 "Selbstbefreiung des Geistes vom 'Leben eines Volkes,' vom Staat also." HS 253. 
 
659 "das Bild der Weltgeschichte zu entwickeln und das verworrene Antlitz der Gegenwart zu enträtseln." 
HS 253. 
 
660 HS 253. 
 
661 "daß das Schicksal dieses Mannes, Aufstieg und Niedergang, in seinem Manuskript verzeichnet stand." 
HS 253.!
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impression upon him as a young historian.  And although Hegel's Phenomenology is only 
briefly touched upon, in terms of biographical form, Rosenzweig shows the great 
importance he bestows upon the work with its deliberate placement as the bridge between 
the "Stations of Life" and the "Epochs of the World."  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: 
 
ROSENZWEIG ON HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 At first glance—and from the perspective of the 21st-century—there seems 
nothing extraordinary about Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology.  It 
occupies only a few brief pages and is anything but exhaustive.  The Phenomenology is 
indeed shown to be decisive within the development of Hegel's ideas of the individual 
and the state, but nowhere does it take on the almost mythic proportions attributed to it 
after Rosenzweig's death.  Since the publication in 1947 of Kojève's Lectures on the 
Phenomenology of Spirit,662 not only has Hegel's thought been widely interpreted as the 
direct predecessor to Marx's revolutionary philosophy—gaining in this way prestige for 
influencing some of the most important events of the 20th century—but the 
Phenomenology itself has come to be seen as Hegel's "signature," his magnum opus, or at 
the very least, to again use Rosenzweig's words: as "a work of its own species."  
Although this is not the place for a detailed analysis, in the context of Rosenzweig 
scholarship, this idiosyncratic nature of the Phenomenology has led some, most notably 
Heinz-Jürgen Görtz,663 to see an affinity here between Hegel's Phenomenology and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
662 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (1947). 
 
663 Görtz, Heinz-Jürgen. Tod und Erfahrung: Rosenzweigs "erfahrende Philosophie" und Hegels 
"Wissenschaft der Erfahrung" (1984). In his book Wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre, Ulrich Bieberich 
takes issue with Görtz' ultimate position and claims that it was not the Star as a whole that was influenced 
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Rosenzweig's own "signature," The Star of Redemption.  With his detailed work, Görtz' 
was the first to attempt to build "the bridge from Rosenzweig to Hegel."664  That is, by 
looking back from the elements of The Star of Redemption and only then towards 
associations with Hegel's Phenomenology, Görtz argues that "the "new thinking" of the 
Star" is to be understood "as a dialectically renewing thought of the thinking of the 
Phenomenology."665  In the present work, however, I am looking the other direction—
from Rosenzweig's past to his future—and, beginning from Hegel and the State itself, 
attempting to build the bridge from Hegel to Rosenzweig; that is, to set the foundation for 
an understanding of the early Rosenzweig through an immanent reading of Hegel and the 
State, thereby shedding new light upon his later work.   
 First, by providing an analysis of Rosenzweig’s reading of Hegel's 
Phenomenology, I believe one can further reveal the importance of "form" in 
Rosenzweig's biography, that is, where he places the Phenomenology within Hegel's 
development and why.  Second, through a commentary on Rosenzweig's very brief 
selection from the work—he again focuses on Hegel's philosophy of history—and the 
language with which he casts his interpretation, we can come to a better understanding of 
the goals and limits of Hegel and the State as a whole.  Finally, a close analysis of 
Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology allows us to recognize some striking 
similarities regarding the origins of The Star of Redemption itself.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
by Hegel's Phenomenology, but rather the three introductions to each part: "The three introductions show 
how the individual is not dissolved into the All of philosophical knowledge." 87. 
 
664 Görtz, 39. A phrase he uses while commenting on the groundbreaking dissertation of Else Freund. 
 
665 Görtz, 20.!
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Stages of World History   
 In Rosenzweig's view, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, "a difficult, but very 
beautiful work,"666 falls outside of the phases of the development of his system.667  It was 
conceived, according to Rosenzweig, “as a kind of introduction to the system.”668  
Rosenzweig's treatment of the work as the placeholder between “Stations of Life” and 
“Epochs of the World” is thus telling.  Although the relation of the individual to the state 
is still drawn into focus, the transition in Hegel's thinking towards a more dominant 
philosophy of history now takes center stage.  In biographical terms, the Phenomenology 
represents Hegel's transition from the "riddles of personal life" to the ultimate questions 
of world history.   
 Rosenzweig first offers a summary of the work as the “collecting place” 
(Sammelplatz) of the various “configurations” (Gestalten) of “inner life” (im inneren 
Leben), which then culminate in the idea of “absolute knowledge” (absolute Wissen) as 
philosophy itself.669  He cautiously sidesteps Hegel's "dark and heavy remarks" (dunklen 
und schweren Ausführungen)670 regarding the "inner life" of the individual and avoids 
any fixation on the dialectical method at work.671  Rather, he limits his scope and stays 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
666 Rosenzweig, Briefe, 11.10.08. 
 
667 See HS 253. 
 
668 "als eine Art Einleitung zum System." HS 253. 
 
669 HS 253-54. 
 
670 HS 258. 
 
671 Rosenweig's approach to Hegel here and in the work as a whole—his ability to interpret Hegel without 
falling into the complexities of Hegel's own language—has gained him the posthumous support of a 
sympathetic reviewer: "The author manages to do justice to the historico-political conditioning of Hegel's 
metaphysics of the state without allowing himself to fall into the simplistic "sociology of knowledge" 
practiced with so much zeal by more modern, especially Marxist, authors.  The book is written in the 
characteristically beautiful German prose of Rosenzweig, untouched by the sorry obscurities of so many 
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true to the trajectory of his own project, taking up a discussion of the section entitled 
"Spirit" (Geist): “here, and nowhere before, the Phenomenology becomes for a stretch a 
philosophy of history.”672  This is relevant for Hegel's understanding of the state, for 
within this philosophy of history Hegel addresses “actual realities” (eigentliche 
Wirklichkeiten) by means of the “configuration of a world” (Gestalten einer Welt).673  
And “in knowing the names of these spirits,” writes Rosenzweig, “—the ethical world, 
the world torn into this life and beyond and the moral world view—we immediately 
recognize that Hegel's new philosophy of history will again stand under the influence of 
his earliest consciousness of time, supported by Schiller's aesthetic letters.”674  For Hegel 
“does not begin with the Orient" as he will in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 
but rather with the "'ethical world' of the Greek polis."675   
 What is now new for Hegel is "the treatment of the individual."676  The 
“individual” in the context of the Phenomenology is no longer the “individual” who 
stands in opposition to the Polis, “but man as a member of a family.”677  This new 
placement of the individual in relation to the state leads to Hegel’s now famous treatment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"learned" interpreters of Hegel's system." (M.J.V. Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March, 1969) (p. 
578).  
 
672 "In diesem Anschnitt also, nirgends vorher, wird die Phänomenologie eine Strecke weit zur 
Geschichtsphilosophie." HS 255. 
 
673 HS 255. 
 
674 "Indem wir die Namen dieser Geister genannt bekommen—'die sittliche Welt, die in das Diesseits und 
Jenseits zerrissene Welt und die moralische Weltanschauung'—erkennen wir sogleich, daß auch diese 
Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels wieder unter dem Bann seines frühesten, an Schillers ästhetischen Briefen 
aufgerankten Zeitbewußtseins stehen wird." HS 255. 
 
675 "nicht in der Welt des Orients"; "in der 'sittlichen Welt' der griechischen Polis." HS 255. 
 
676 "die Behandlung des Individuums." HS 255. 
 
677 "sondern der Mensch als Glied der Familie." HS 255. !
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of Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone, with its divine and human laws.  Already in 
Rosenzweig’s time the reading of this Greek tragedy could hardly be separated from 
Hegel's own interpretation.678  The individual understood as a member of a family, and 
now not merely in opposition to the state, also clearly points to Hegel's mature view of 
the family in The Philosophy of Right: a community, which brings forth individuals for 
the sake of civil society.    
 However, the above ideas merely introduce Rosenzweig’s main concern here, 
namely, Hegel's understanding of the three stages of world history inspired by the 6th 
letter of Schiller's Letters: “Enough, the beautiful world of ethicality had to go under, 
because it was beautiful, because, one would like to say, it led a plant-like natural 
existence.”679  This “beautiful world of ethicality,” represented by the Greek people and 
religion, is the first stage of world history here.  In Schiller’s words, "instead of rising to 
a higher animal life, it sank down into a base and vile mechanic."680  This second stage of 
world history is represented by the world of the Roman Imperium "with its civil law (mit 
seinem bürgerlichen Recht).681  With this stage, which also witnesses the emergence of 
what Hegel characterizes as a type of proto-monarch,682 “a break has entered into the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
678 See HS 255. 
 
679 "Genug, die schöne Welt der Sittlichkeit mußte untergehen, weil sie schön war, weil sie ein, man möchte 
sagen, pflanzenhaft natürliches Dasein führte." HS 255-56. 
 
680 Schiller, 6th letter, 173. 
 
681 HS 256. 
 
682  The name “Heliogabal” occurs here, the same Emperor the German poet Stefan Georg would write 
about (in his powm “Algabal”) around the same time Rosenzweig was composing his book.  Rosenzweig 
argues here that Hegel could not place monarchy within the Roman Imperium anymore, for it was now 
recognized as the form of “the present and future” (Gegenwart und Zukunft) (See HS 256).  
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world.”683  Again Schiller: "state and church, custom and law were now torn from each 
other [...] instead of developing humankind in its nature, it becomes a mere expression of 
its work, its science."684  Although with the emergence of “civil law” (bürgerliches 
Recht) the individual as such enters into the world—"the collective personality of the 
Polis had to fall in order for the individual person to come into being"685—this individual 
has now lost its “ethical home” (sittliche Heimat) in the world and is “internally empty” 
(innerlich leer).686  This leads then to the name of the second stage of world history: “The 
Self-Alienated Spirit: Bildung.”687 
 This second stage of world history is split into “a de-deified empire of reality and 
a reality-less world of faith, in the beyond.”688  We thus again encounter here Hegel's 
"two worlds."  The first of these worlds, “on the side of life” (Diesseits), leads through 
“Bildung” (education), which was missing from both the “world of ethicality”, Greece, 
and the “condition of law” (Rechtzustand), Rome: from the former, which did not 
recognize the individual as such, and from the latter, in which the individual was 
recognized, but merely as the “empty person in terms of law.”689  In the concluding act of 
the second age of the world, which then led to the events of the French Revolution, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
683 "So ist ein Bruch in die Welt gekommen." HS 256. 
 
684 Schiller, 6th letter, 173. 
 
685 "die lebendige Gesamtpersönlichkeit der Polis hatte untergehen müssen, damit die Einzelperson werden 
konnte." HS 256. 
 
686 HS 256. 
 
687 "der sich entfremdete Geist: Bildung" HS 256. 
 
688 "ein entgöttertes Reich der Wirklichkeit und in eine wirklichkeitslose jenseitige Welt des Glaubens." HS 
257. 
 
689 "als die leere Person im Rechtssinn." HS 257. !
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“Bildung” is the stage of the new opposition of both the “state-power” (Staatsmacht) and 
“wealth” (Reichtum).  These are the same in Hegel's thinking, writes Rosenzweig, as 
“state” (Staat) and “property” (Eigentum) and later “state” (Staat) and “society” 
(Gesellschaft).690  They were not recognized by either of the two previous ages of the 
world.  These two elements of “state-power” and “wealth” then lead up to the “absolute 
monarchy of France” (absolute Monarchie Frankreichs)691 and its eventual demise. 
 With this discussion of the "two worlds," Hegel's philosophy of history is moving 
its way towards the world-historical significance of the French Revolution.  The other 
"world" opposing “Bildung”, that represented by “belief” (Glaube), reaches its peak and 
thus also its demise with the concept of “pure insight” (reine Einsicht).   This concept 
emerged out of the rationalism of the 18th century with the notion of “universal 
usefulness” (allgemeine Nützlichkeit).692  It was in “usefulness” that both the “godless 
real-world of Bildung” and “reality-less pure thinking and belief” were to be 
reconciled.693  Here, writes Hegel, “both worlds are reconciled, and heaven is planted 
down upon earth.”694  And with this “bright trumpet cry” (hellen Trompetenstoß) we have 
once again returned with Hegel's new philosophy of history to the old “magnificent 
sunrise” (herrlichen Sonnenaufgangs)695 of 1789 and the perhaps most enduring section 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
690 HS 257. 
 
691 HS 258. 
 
692 HS 259. !
693 "der gottlosen Wirklichkeitswelt der Bildung und des wirklichkeitslosen reinen Denkens und Glaubens." 
HS 259. 
 
694 "Beide Welten [...] sind versöhnt, und der Himmel auf die Erde herunter verpflanzt." HS 259. 
 
695 HS 259. !
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of the Phenomenology: “Absolute Freedom and the Terror” (Die absolute Freiheit und 
der Schrecken). 
 
 
"The Magnificent Sunrise": Towards the Self-Legislation of the I 
 The section "Absolute Freedom and the Terror" is composed of a critique of 
Rousseau’s concept of the "general" or "universal will,” understood as “the will of all 
individuals as such.”696  Rosenzweig's reading of this section is consistent with the 
content of the first volume of Hegel and the State, and this is most apparent when he 
again focuses on Hegel's view of the "estates."  The political consequence of Rousseau's 
"universal will" is that within society it can only do “whole work” (ganze Arbeit), that is, 
in its "’absolute freedom’ all estates, which are the spiritual essences into which the 
whole separates itself, are extinguished.”697  However for Hegel, the ultimate result of the 
revolution was not the abolishment of all “estates,” but rather that these estates remained 
and were filled with a new “spirit” (Geist).698  Although the “world-historical spirit” has 
reached a new “reconciliation” with itself, the attempted abolishment of all estates led to 
nothing less than the “terror” which erupted in France during the revolution—the reign of 
Robespierre.  For Hegel, the “universal will” could “make nothing positive, because it 
always had to be something determinate.”699  This central critique of Rousseau’s concept 
of “universal will” is explained by the fact that this will is supposed to represent the will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
696 "Willen aller Einzelner als solcher." HS 259. 
 
697 "sind 'all Stände, welche die geistigen Wesen sind, worein sich das Ganze gliedert, getilgt." HS 259. 
 
698 See HS 262-63. 
 
699 "nichts Positives schaffen, weil das immer etwas bestimmtes Einzelnes sein müßte." HS 259. !
 210 
of “all individuals,” but as soon as it attempted to act in the world as the will of all, as 
was the case with the revolution in France, the will of the individual was immediately 
negated.  This then led to Hegel's damning conclusion, absent with Rousseau, that the 
“universal will” (allgemeine Wille) is “not only the summary of the individual will, but 
rather at the same time its destruction.”700  The result of this "destruction" has come to be 
known as the “Reign of Terror.”701  However, regarding the state, the revolution also 
resulted—quite contrary to its aims—in the reorganization of the “spiritual masses” (der 
geistigen Massen) into the “estates” of old.702  Thus, for Hegel, the state with its still 
essential organizing principle of the “divisions of estates” (Ständegliederung) was 
anything but destroyed.  Rather a "new monarchy” (neue Monarchie)703—Napoleon's 
reign—was set in place. 
 For Rosenzweig, the conclusion of Hegel's treatment of the French Revolution is 
the “decisive point of this entire philosophy of history: here it first grasps its present.”704  
For what resulted from this “entire uproar” (ganze Tumult) was something new in the 
world: “the self-referencing consciousness purely tied to itself.”705  What replaced 
Rousseau's "universal will" was the Kantian “free self-legislation of the I” (die freie 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
700 "daß er nämlich nicht bloß Zusammenfassung der Einzelwillen ist, sondern zugleich ihre Vernichtung." 
HS 260. 
 
701 The internal paradox of the revolution and the madness that resulted in the "Reign of Terror" is perhaps 
best captured in literary terms by George Büchner in his drama Dantons Tod.    
 
702 HS 260. 
 
703 HS 260. 
 
704 "Hier erst stehen wir am entscheidenden Punkt dieser ganzen Geschichtsphilosophie: hier erst ergreift 
sie ihre Gegenwart." HS 260. 
 
705 "das rein an sich Selbst gebundene, auf sich selbst verwiesene Bewußtsein." HS 261. 
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Selbstgesetzlichkeit des Ichs).706  From the ethical world of antiquity, through the Roman 
world of law with its split into the two worlds of “Bildung” and "belief," the world-
historical spirit has now finally arrived—on the threshold of the “third empire” (des 
dritten Reichs)707—at the “corner-stone” (Grundstein)708 of critical philosophy, in Kant's 
own words: "The concept of each rational being as a being that must regard itself as 
giving universal law through all the maxims of its will."709  Within Kant's thinking, this 
"self-legislation of the I" is identified with what he calls the "intelligible character" of 
mankind: the aspect of man not bound by the natural necessity of the world and 
"determinable only through the laws that he gives himself by reason."710  This 
"intelligible character" is distinct from our "empirical character," which Kant defines as 
"the determinations of a thing which stands under the conditions of time."711  Kant 
established this dual character of the self—the "phenomenal" (sensible) and "noumenal" 
(intelligible)—in order to preserve the freedom of the individual in face of the necessity 
of the natural laws of the world.  The universal will is no longer something outside of the 
individual, which in its most extreme case—for Hegel, the "Reign of Terror"—
completely negates that very same individual, but is now understood as the moral law 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
706 HS 261. 
 
707 Rosenzweig's use of this term predates the implication attached to this notion since the rise of National 
Socialism in Germany after 1933. 
 
708 HS 261. 
 
709 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. 51. 
 
710 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. 5:98. 
 
711 Ibid. 5:98. 
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within the individual himself.712 In light of Kant's philosophy, the individual has cast 
aside the universal will as the highest of all knowledge, and now, in Hegel's own words, 
"knows that will to be itself, and knows itself to be essential being."713   
 But what can be said of the state?  In France, Rousseau's “universal will” 
“destroyed itself, and there out of the cauldron of the revolution the old state and the old 
life emerged again renewed and rejuvenated.”714  The consequence of the revolution for 
Hegel was that “Kantian-Fichtian philosophy and early Romanticism" (Kantisch-
Fichtischen Philosophie, der jungen Romantik) armed with the notion of the "free self-
legislation of the I," now took over the world-historical spirit from France: "its ground is 
Germany" (sein Boden ist Deutschland).715  This is the grand conclusion of Hegel's 
philosophy of history in the Phenomenology.  The world-historical spirit now passed 
from the "Reign of Terror" into “the absolute religion of Christianity, which is one with 
absolute philosophy.”716 
 Rosenzweig understands the above philosophy of history—which ultimately leads 
away from the political realm into religion and philosophy—as nothing less than the 
greatest distance Hegel takes from the “nationalization of ethicality” (Verstaatlichung des 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
712 Kant bridges the gap between the individual and the universal with a regulatory function of the will as "a 
law of duty" (5:82): "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law." 
 
713 Hegel, Phenomenology. 363. 
714 "hat sich [...] selbst zerstört, und aus dem Revolutionskessel ist dort der alte Staat und das alte Leben 
erfrischt und verjüngt wieder hervorgetaucht." HS 261. 
 
715 HS 261. 
 
716 "seine Vollendung die absolute Religion des Christentums, welche eins ist mit der absoluten 
Philosophie." HS 261. 
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Sittlichen).717  But this by no means implies that Hegel “now suddenly imagined this third 
world-historical epoch without a state as purely individualistic, as something solely 
fulfilled by religious and philosophical powers.”718  For Hegel, the state after the 
revolution still contains a “universal will embodied in the person of the monarch, which 
internally holds or reestablished the prerevolutionary society's division of estates.”719  As 
Rosenzweig points out, anticipating his upcoming pairing of Hegel and Napoleon, “Hegel 
believed himself to see in Napoleon’s monarchy a restoration of the old division of 
society (Gesellschaftsgliederung) coming into being.”720  What then follows for 
Rosenzweig from the Phenomenology, is that “the state of the future, the third epoch of 
the world, would at least according to its body be the same as the state of the second, 
prerevolutionary epoch, and only the spirit, which animates this body, would be 
another.”721  In Rosenzweig's reading, the importance of this new state for the “whole of 
life” (Gesamtleben) has indeed become “very narrow” (eine ganz geringe).722  In the 
passing of the “spirit of history” over to Germany in the form of a “moral spirit”—again, 
epitomized in Kant's "free self-legislation of the I"—the “ultimate” task is now that of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
717 HS 262. 
 
718 "Das ist nicht so zu verstehen, als ob sich Hegel die dritte weltgeschichtliche Epoche nun plötzlich ohne 
Staat als eine rein individualistische, einzig von religiösen und philosophischen Kräften erfüllte vorgestellt 
hätte." HS 262. !
719 "ihren allgemeinen Willen in der Person des Monarchen verkörpernd die vorrevolutionäre ständische 
Gliederung der Gesellschaft in seinem INnern erhält oder wiederherstellt." HS 262. 
 
720 The historical event that led Hegel to believe this, according to Rosenzweig's reading, was Napoleon’s 
Italian constitution (HS 262). 
 
721 HS 262-63. 
 
722 HS 263. 
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“absolute religion, absolute science.”723  This “absolute religion”, as the “melting-
together” of the “natural religion” of the morning-land and the “religion of art” 
(Kunstreligion) of the Hellenic people (Hellenen) is “already prepared—one only has to 
reach out his hand to it.”724  And “absolute knowledge” is “speculative philosophy” itself, 
claims Hegel in a lecture to his colleagues, “the beginning of philosophizing, which you 
are to carry on.”725  This is Hegel's view of the "magnificent sunrise" of 1789 from the 
vantage point of 1806.    
 
 
Excursus: A View Towards the Star 
 Before moving on to the concluding words of "Stations of Life," I would like to 
make a brief excursus into Rosenzweig's own intellectual biography.  My approach to 
Hegel and the State thus far has been grounded in the attempt to give an immanent 
reading of the text in order to show how this text remains influential in Rosenzweig's 
later thought.  By avoiding the method of subjugating the language and form of Hegel 
and the State to the philosophical and theological language of The Star of Redemption, 
my aim has been to provide a more complete picture of Rosenzweig's early work on 
Hegel—one lacking in contemporary scholarship—in order to be able to better situate 
this work in comparison to Rosenzweig's accomplishments as a whole.  By focusing first 
on the biographical form of Hegel and the State an interpretive pathway is opened, which 
leads not only to the autobiographical dimensions of Rosenzweig's thought, but to a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
723 HS 263. 
 
724 HS 263. 
 
725 HS 263. 
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closer appreciation of "personality" (Persönlichkeit) in general within this thought.  By 
extension, Rosenzweig's critique of the relation of the individual to the state in Hegel's 
thinking is mirrored in his own appraisal of "individuality" in The Star of Redemption, 
most notably in his notion of "metaethics."  Finally, with the emergence in Hegel's 
thinking of a philosophy of history, we witness the lasting impression this had on the 
young Rosenzweig and how similar questions of history will continue to occupy 
Rosenzweig, especially with regard to religion. 
 With Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology we have not only come to 
the halfway point of the book—the halfway point of Hegel's life—but now Rosenzweig's 
own position as a philosopher begins to take more recognizable shape.  Rosenzweig's 
intellectual biography, however, as my project as a whole aims to show, does not begin 
with The Star of Redemption, but with Hegel and the State itself.   To recognize these 
beginnings means not only understanding the content of the book, as we have been 
pursuing, but its fate within Rosenzweig's biography as well.  And here a noteworthy 
connection between Hegel's life and Rosenzweig's own can be made.  Hegel finished 
writing his Phenomenology in 1806, presumably quite shortly before Napoleon himself—
"this world soul" (diese Weltseele)726—rode through Jena, thus announcing to Hegel the 
collapse of the Holy Roman Empire.  In a lecture to his colleagues from 1806, quoted by 
Rosenzweig, Hegel writes: "The entire mass of ideas and concepts up until now, the 
fetters of the world, are dissolved and fall in upon themselves like a dream."727  Within 
his philosophy of history, Hegel is describing here the collapse of the second stage of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
726 HS 274. 
 
727 "Die ganze Masse der bisherigen Vorstellungen, Begriffe, die Bande der Welt, sind aufgelöst und fallen 
wie ein Traumbild in sich zusammen." HS 263. 
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world history.  Over one hundred years later, in 1920, after witnessing defeat in the first 
World War and the collapse of the German empire, Rosenzweig looks back to the 
beginning of the new age around 1800, where for Hölderlin and his friend Hegel "the 
mountains of the German lands" were to become "mountains of the muses."728  "This 
dream," writes Rosenzweig,  
 
 already remained unfulfilled on the way from the fall of the old Empire to  the 
 founding of the new—from Hegel until Bismarck.  As this book was begun it 
 could have nevertheless remained a true dream, one of those that remain living 
 precisely as a dream, in order to one day become that which dreams may become: 
 history-creating power.  Today, with the appearance of the book [...] that dream 
 appears to irretrievably dissolve in the foam of the waves, which flow over all of 
 life.  When the structure of a world crashes in, the thoughts that thought it, the 
 dreams interwoven in it are also buried under its collapse.729 
 
 
The similarity of Rosenzweig and Hegel is not only reflected in these similar historical 
upheavals—the fall of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the fall of the German 
Empire in 1918—but around this time both thinkers produced what would become known 
as their philosophical "signatures"—The Phenomenology of Spirit and The Star of 
Redemption.  But was all of Hegel and the State really buried under the rubble of the 
German Empire?  One could also ask, were all of Hegel's early writings on religion and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
728 "und die Berge des deutschen / Landes Berge der Musen sind." HS 531, quoted from Hölderlin's "An die 
Deutschen." !
729 "Dieser Traum blieb schon auf dem Weg vom Untergang des alten zur Gründung des neuen Reichs—
von Hegel zu Bismarck—unerfüllt. Als dies Buch beginnen wurde, konnte er gleichwohl ein Wahrtraum 
scheinen, einer von jenen, die gerade als Träume lebendig bleiben, um einst noch zu werden, was Träume 
werden können: Geschichte schaffende Macht. Heute, da das Buch herauskommt [...] scheint jener Traum 
unwiederbringlich sich aufzulösen in den Schaum der Wellen, die alles Leben überfluten." HS 532. 
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politics buried under the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire?  Just as Rosenzweig looks 
into Hegel's past in order to help better understand his mature thought, I am looking into 
Rosenzweig's past with the aim of restoring what was once thought lost.  And indeed, it is 
precisely in Rosenzweig's reading of the Phenomenology as leading to the Kantian "self-
legislation of the I" that the remains of Rosenzweig qua historian make their way into the 
edifice of Rosenzweig qua philosopher. 
 In a letter to Hans Ehrenberg from 1908, Rosenzweig writes that he has been 
occupied reading Hegel's Phenomenology: "a difficult, but very beautiful work." He then 
goes on to report, that "beginning tomorrow I will penitently begin again with "Practical 
Reason,"730 meaning of course Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.  What this letter 
shows is not only that Rosenzweig was interested in Hegel's Phenomenology already at 
the beginning of his studies, but that while he was reading Hegel's work he was reading 
Kant as well.  This pairing of Kant and Hegel is then readily apparent in his reading of 
the Phenomenology within Hegel and the State, as shown above.  But from the letter to 
Hans Ehrenberg we also get the sense of a more personal interest in these thinkers, one 
that falls outside of Rosenzweig's official duties as a student and remains with him as an 
original thinker.  Indeed, what for Hegel was the "corner-stone" of the "Third Empire"—
Kant's "self-legislation of the I"—is for Rosenzweig nothing other than what he will call 
the "free personality" (freie Persönlichkeit)731 in the "Urzelle" to his Star of Redemption.   
 In the Urzelle, which functions as a philosophical skeleton showing for the first 
time what would later become the inner workings of The Star of Redemption, Kant is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
730 Rosenzweig, Briefe 11.10.08. 
 
731 See "'Germ Cell' of the Star" (Urzelle) in Franz Rosenzweig's "New Thinking." 52. 
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lauded as "personally the greatest of all philosophers" for discovering that "freedom is the 
'miracle in the world of appearance'."732  This "freedom" is the same "self-legislation of 
the I" within Rosenzweig's reading of the Phenomenology.  There, Rosenzweig already 
shows a similar reverence for Kant when introducing this new notion of the self.  He 
writes that we may now "finally use the Kantian words for the Kantian subject matter."733  
This "finally" implies a very high regard for Kant himself in introducing the Kantian 
"corner-stone" of the new age: "the denial of the empirical character for the sake of the 
intelligible."734  In The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant uses the term "personality" to 
further define his notion of this "intelligible character": 
 
 "personality, that is freedom and independence from the mechanism of the 
 whole of nature, regarded nevertheless as also a capacity of a being subject to 
 special laws–namely pure practical laws given by his own reason, so that a 
 person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality  insofar 
 as he also belongs to the intelligible world; for it is then not to be wondered at that 
 a human being, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in 
 reference to his second and highest vocation only with reverence, and its laws 
 with the highest respect."735 
 
 
It is from this Kantian sense of "personality" that Rosenzweig will find inspiration in the 
Urzelle for his own idea of "free personality."  This "free personality" along with Kant's 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
732 Rosenzweig, Urzelle. 52. 
 
733 "um einmal für die kantische Sache auch die kantischen Worte zu gebrauchen." HS 261. 
 
734 "die Verleugnung des empirischen Charakters um des intelligibelen willen." HS 261. !
735 Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason. 5:87. 
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notion of the self as "belonging to both worlds" will inspire Rosenzweig's formulation of 
"metaethics," albeit with significant changes, in The Star of Redemption as capturing the 
true nature of man, in contrast to "metalogic," which captures that other world of nature.  
Thus, already in Hegel and the State Rosenzweig's sets up a trajectory that leads from his 
reading of the Phenomenology through the Urzelle to The Star of Redemption.  
 In The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig's praise for Kant continues when first 
introducing his concept of "metaethics."  In this context he writes: "Kant, alone among all 
thinkers of the past, showed the way which we are now to follow."736  Thus, rather than 
being completely buried in the rubble of the past, Rosenzweig's work in Hegel and the 
State lays the foundation upon which he will erect one of the three main pillars of his 
thought—the "metaethical" self.  The origins of this concept are to be found not only 
within the general emphasis on biography, individuality and personality in Hegel and the 
State, but already in Rosenzweig's particular reading of Hegel's Phenomenology.   
 
 
Hegel, the Philosophical World Ruler 
 As was argued above, Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology reveals 
one of the key elements of Rosenzweig's own thought in The Star of Redemption.  
However, whereas within Hegel and the State itself this reading is limited to an overview 
and a brief account of Hegel's philosophy of history, the Phenomenology holds a decisive 
place for Rosenzweig within the form of the book as a whole.  It is the work that caps off 
the entirety of the first volume.  With the completion of the Phenomenology, Hegel now !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
736 Rosenzweig, Star. 21. !
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stands "eye to eye" with the age, his "self-consciousness" has "swelled so high" that he is 
prepared "to be" the age itself.737  What in the Frankfurt period was the tragic division 
from the world, seems to have been overcome; his task in Jena to unite his thought with 
the age seems to have been accomplished.  But can things really remain so good for 
Hegel?  Given the tone of his text throughout, one could argue that Rosenzweig is setting 
up his readers for the tragic fall of his hero Hegel in the following volume, "Epochs of 
the World."  And even a glance ahead to the first section of that volume, "Napoleon" will 
guarantee that there is more tragedy in store.  But once again we encounter Rosenzweig's 
dramatic language and its meaning is at first not entirely clear: Hegel "has crossed the 
Dantean middle of our lives."738   
 With the introduction of Dante into the picture, who is best known for his Divine 
Comedy, this tragic view of Hegel's life is further complicated.  Hegel himself writes of 
Dante's Divine Comedy—the first book of which begins with words echoed by 
Rosenzweig, "Midway upon the journey of our life"—that unlike tragedy, "it is without 
fate and without a genuine struggle, because absolute confidence and assurance of the 
reality of the Absolute exists in it without opposition."739  Has Hegel, who in the 
Phenomenology places philosophy on the "throne" of "absolute knowledge," now 
transformed for Rosenzweig from the tragic figure of the Frankfurt years to a dramatic 
figure of comedy?  Is "absolute knowledge" in the Phenomenology, which in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
737 "So hochgeschwellt ist jetzt das Selbstbewußtsein des Denkers. Er steht Auge in Auge mit der Zeit. Mehr 
noch: er redet mit ihr und sie spricht zu ihm. Er ist wirklich bereit und fähig geworden, in sie einzugehen: 
sie 'zu sein'." HS 264. 
 
738 "Er hat die Dantesche Mitte unsres Lebenswegs überschritten." HS 264. 
 
739 Hegel, Natural Law. 105. 
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Rosenzweig's words 'watches the procession of history from its throne,'740 the same as 
this comedic "reality of the Absolute [...] without opposition"?   
 Although one could question if Rosenzweig sees Hegel's life as a tragedy, 
comedy, or both, I believe the reference to Dante here is more rhetorical and less 
philosophical.  As Erich Auerbach writes describing Dante's own giovinezza, it is "the 
summit of our life."741  And his description of the peak of Dante's personal life could 
apply to Rosenzweig's Hegel as well: "his vitality and inner sense of measure had so 
matured that, almost simultaneously it would seem, he turned to public life and 
philosophical doctrines, combining the two and beginning to shape them to his cast of 
mind."742  With the Phenomenology, so we can at least conclude from Rosenzweig's 
placement of the text within his narrative, Hegel has reached the zenith of his stations of 
life.  What lies before him is no longer to be found solely in the "stream" of his life or 
thought: "The stations of life change for him into the epochs of the world.  The stream of 
thought broke the barriers of its shore and watered the thirsting fields of the age.743  
Whereas in “Stations of Life” the reader was often caught up in the sometimes 
bewildering internal development or “stream” of Hegel’s personal life and thought, this 
“stream”—which flowed from personal tragedy, through the reconciliation of the 
individual and the world in the thought of the power-state and finally into a powerful 
philosophy of history—has now too broken free of Hegel's stations of life.  In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
740 "sie nimmt Platz auf dem Thron, der ihr bereitet ist, und läßt den Zug, der sich jetzt in Bewegung setzt, 
an ihrem Sitze vorbeiziehen." HS 253. 
 
741 Auerbach, 69. !
742 Auerbach, 69. 
 
743 "Die Stationen des Lebens wandeln sich ihm in Epochen der Welt. Der Strom des Denkens brach die 
Schranken seiner Ufer und tränkt die dürstenden Äcker der Zeit." HS 264. 
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Rosenzweig's reading of the Phenomenology, he now characterizes Hegel as "a 
philosophical world ruler" who "allows the essences of the heavens and earth to pass 
before his eyes in long, well-ordered processions."744  Hegel's personal life and thought, 
filled with elements of both tragedy and comedy, have given way to the forces of world 
history and the epochs of the world: "Leaving the stream of a life-course behind, we 
become caught up in an infinite ocean."745  Through the tragedy of youth and the defiance 
of early manhood, Hegel himself has now become a world historical personality. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
744 "die Wesen des Himmels und der Erde als philosophischer Weltherrscher an seinem Auge in langem, 
wohlgeordnetem Zuge vorüberwallen läßt." HS 253. !
745 Dilthey, Formation. 252. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
"IN THE STYLE OF TRAGEDY" 
 
 
 
"Man ist eben kein regulierter Strom; 
 sondern ein vielarmiger." 
 
     Rosenzweig to Martin Buber, 1927 
 
 
 
"Es ist das Schicksal großer Zeiten, großer Bewegungen,  
daß sie in ihrer eigenen Leidenschaft befangen sein müssen. 
 So wachsen sie über ihr Maß hinaus, um überhaupt nur  
in Erscheinung treten zu können.  
Es ist der tragische Akzent alles Großen." 
 
      Hans Ehrenberg, Disputation III: Hegel 
 
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks on "Epochs of the World"  
 
 As in the first volume, biographical form is still one of the central organizing 
principles in the second volume of Rosenzweig's work.  Yet whereas in "Stations of Life" 
one could only separate Rosenzweig's philosophy of history from Hegel's own with 
difficulty, in the "Epochs of the World" Rosenzweig himself emerges as a philosopher of 
history.  In "Stations of Life" the reader and author were bound to the particularity of the 
"stream" of Hegel's development; with the "Epochs of the World" this stream now flows 
into the broad sea of history and Rosenzweig must accordingly chart his own course 
through the waves of time.  Hegel is now no longer treated only as an individual 
struggling with the particulars of personal life, but more pronouncedly as a world-
historical figure in conflict with the forces of history.  In this manner, the relation of the 
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individual to the state, while still central to Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel, has been 
transformed into the broader relation of the individual to history.  For Hegel, the state 
will ultimately play the central mediating role between the individual and history.  
However, the second half of his life shows Hegel breaking free from the shadows of the 
age—already begun with The Phenomenology of Spirit—into the full daylight of world 
history.  In this manner Hegel is himself subject to the same laws of history he so 
expertly discerns.  In following this stream into the broad expanse of time, Rosenzweig 
now treats Hegel more distinctly as a particular individual set in relation to a higher 
universal—the "Epochs of the World."     
 Within Rosenzweig's own personal development the relation and biographical 
trajectory he sets up for Hegel can be seen as reverse.  With the publication of Hegel and 
the State in 1920 Rosenzweig was qualified for life as a professor within Germany, a 
well-established position within the state.  Just as Hegel's thought became closely 
intertwined with the Prussian state, so Rosenzweig could have made a career as a state-
philosopher, like his teacher Meinecke.  But at this juncture, Rosenzweig chose to delve 
deeper into the "riddles" of his own personal life, his German Jewish identity.  Rather 
than bringing him closer to German political life, Rosenzweig's retreat—or perhaps 
return—into Jewish religious life took him even further from the state.  If Hegel's 
biographical trajectory can be understood as one leading from the ideals of the French 
Revolution and the vehement defense of the individual, leading through a philosophy of 
history and finally reaching a fully developed political philosophy, Rosenzweig's path is 
the reverse.  He begins with a broad political critique of his epoch, only to end up within 
his own stream of personal life.  This equates Rosenzweig much more closely with the 
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picture of Hegel we are given during his Frankfurt years, when Hegel lived and thought 
in proximity to Hölderlin.  Accordingly, after showing how his development through the 
political Restoration in Germany following Napoleon's defeat leads to Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right and his role as the "state philosopher" of Prussia, Rosenzweig ends his 
biographical drama—ends the entirety of Hegel and the State—by again aligning Hegel 
with Hölderlin.  Thus, it proves productive to keep in mind that even after traversing the 
broad expanse of the "Epochs of the World," Rosenzweig will ultimately claim that we 
are faced with the same Hegel he "discovered" in Frankfurt.  It is in terms of this 
discovery—still drawing indirectly on a language of tragedy—that Rosenzweig will 
judge Hegel's contribution to both world-history and more narrowly, to the history of the 
German nation-state.  As we join Rosenzweig in confronting two titans of Hegel's age—
Napoleon the conqueror and Goethe the poet—we must acknowledge Rosenzweig's own 
role as an interpretive historian.  This will show above all that Rosenzweig's account of 
Hegel's early development in Frankfurt, tinged with the color of personal experience, 
continues to permeate his interpretation of Hegel's biography.  It is this personal 
investment in his narrative—again as reflected in the form and language of the text—that 
remains our central concern.  In what manner does the "Epochs of the World" reveal 
Rosenzweig's own struggle to come to terms with his German past? 
 
 
Goethe and Napoleon: On the Demonic 
Goethe and Napoleon most famously met in Erfurt, in October of 1808.  All 
accounts of this meeting dwell upon Napoleon's assessment of Goethe's Die Leiden des 
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jungen Werthers, a book they supposedly discussed at that time and with which Napoleon 
took issue—but I will not go into these debates here.746  Rather, I would like to allude to 
the line of interpretation taken by Hans Blumenberg in his book Work on Myth, in order 
show how Goethe's confrontation with Napoleon takes on a specifically "demonic" 
dimension.747   By introducing the "demonic" here, and by this I would agree with 
Blumenberg in classifying it as a force that "breaks in, as something foreign, from 
outside,"748 which then in turn unceasingly affects the fate of the individual, I will forgo 
an outright analysis in favor of hinting at the implications of this term for Rosenzweig's 
narrative.  One may ask at the outset, in the drama that unfolds for Hegel during his 
“Napoleonic period,”749 why does Rosenzweig begin with an excerpt from one of 
Goethe's letters—in which he overtly alludes to the "daemons" (Dämonen)750—and thus 
places Goethe in the most prominent position at the beginning of the second volume of 
Hegel and the State? 
Goethe wrote the letter in question to his friend Friedrich Schiller in 1802—
before he had ever met Napoleon.  The excerpt at hand pertains to the German 
assessment of the French Revolution in the years leading up to Napoleon’s invasion of 
Germany.  In this passage, Goethe alludes to the French Revolution as a “natural 
necessity” (Naturnotwendigkeit): “One sees in this monstrous empirical evidence nothing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
746 For a newer account of these debates see: Seiler, Bernd W. "Goethe, Napoleon, und der 'junge 
Werther'." Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 3/2009. 396.  
 
747 Blumenberg, Work on Myth. See 465-522. !
748 Ibid. 490. 
 
749 "napoleonischen Periode." HS 296. 
 
750 HS 273. 
 
 227 
other than nature, and nothing of what we philosophers would so gladly like to call 
freedom.”751  In beginning this section with such an open "gesture" towards Goethe and 
placing the question of "freedom" at the center of discussion, Rosenzweig is emphasizing 
two central points of concern.  On the one hand, the question of freedom comes out of the 
already developed relationship between the individual and the state in volume one.  This 
development reached its peak with Hegel's concept of a "state-free zone" (staatsfreier 
Bezirk) within the state itself, thereby providing the seed for Hegel's view of religion and 
the state in The Philosophy of Right.  But perhaps more importantly for our account, the 
authoritative placement of Goethe's letter shows that the concept of the 'world historical 
individual'—and here Hegel is implied no less than Goethe and Napoleon—is once again 
brought to the fore.  More specifically, it is through a series of intellectual relationships—
Goethe and Napoleon, Napoleon and Hegel and finally Hegel and Rosenzweig—that this 
specific biographical focus is reflected into the autobiographical dimensions of 
Rosenzweig's work.  Thus, one may ask, what is the significance of the specific pairing 
Goethe and Napoleon at the outset of volume two?  
In his book Work on Myth, Hans Blumenberg expertly situates Goethe's 
relationship to Napoleon Bonaparte in terms of the "demonic" influence of the Corsican.  
Forgoing an outright definition, Blumenberg alternatively characterizes the "demonic" as 
a force—and here Goethe's own assessment of the French Revolution should come to 
mind—which holds "power over the elements, in others words, over nature;"752 and, as 
stated above, as something—or more pointedly someone—that "breaks in, as something !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
751 "Man sieht in dieser ungeheuren Empirie nichts als Natur und nichts von dem, was wir Philosophen so 
gern Freiheit nennen möchten." HS 273. !
752 Blumenberg, 480. 
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foreign, from outside."753  Already in 1906, presaging Blumenberg's position, 
Rosenzweig would write in his diary: "I don't think that the daemon is congenital with us; 
rather it comes to visit us one day and stays for good."  He continues with the following 
entry: "What I call daemon is destiny become man, character incarnate."754  As 
Blumenberg states, Goethe's confrontation with Napoleon would take a similar form, 
namely in working out Napoleon's famous statement that "politics is destiny."755  For 
Napoleon, as we shall see below, the pairing of "politics" and "destiny" would ultimately 
result in a tragic fall, and thus show how the fate of individual life gives way to the fate 
of history—in Goethe's understanding, a modern Prometheus. Yet as Blumenberg's 
claims, when Goethe and Napoleon met in Erfurt, it was Goethe's own demiurgic drives 
that rose to the surface: "Goethe himself is always the point of reference—either openly 
or covertly—when he speaks of Napoleon."756  Thus, we should understand Goethe's 
demonic encounter with Napoleon as a reflection of his own struggle in coming to terms 
with his world-historical significance.  Napoleon's "politics as destiny" transforms for 
Goethe into the renewed search for "aesthetic self-mastery."757   
Before he had met Napoleon in person, Goethe wonders aloud in his letter to 
Schiller “if Bonaparte’s personality will then further delight us with this glorious and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
753 Ibid. 490. 
 
754 Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought. 12. 
 
755 Blumenberg, 486-87. 
 
756 Blumenberg, 483. 
 
757 Blumenberg, 499. !
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reigning appearance.”758  This “appearance” is the “freedom” that Goethe, as 
Rosenzweig's leading voice of the epoch, found lacking in the “natural necessity” of the 
French Revolution.  However, much later in life, as Rosenzweig relates, Goethe reveals 
his underlying fascination with Napoleon in striking terms: “Napoleon no longer 
appeared to the old man as the carrier of historical life, but rather, detached from his 
particular work, as a symbol of that which man is capable of; there he names him along 
with the others, which the daemons provided in order to tempt us: with Shakespeare, 
Rafael, Mozart.”759  That Rosenzweig includes himself with those tempted by these great 
historical figures, that he subtly inserts the pronoun "us," begs the question: with what 
demonic force is Rosenzweig struggling while writing Hegel and the State? 
Hegel's confrontation with Napoleon would remain more closely tied to the 
historical events of the present.  With the section at hand, starkly entitled "Napoleon," 
Rosenzweig broadly summarizes the years 1806-1818 in Hegel's life.  It was now during 
this Napoleonic period, "and only now—that we find with the systematizer Hegel the 
morally free individual."760  Following from this, the "mark" (Kennzeichen) of Hegel's 
Napoleonic period was thus, unique to Hegel's development, the "superordination of the 
spiritual over the state, that degradation of the state to a mere caretaker of a spiritual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
758 "ob uns Bonapartes Persönlichkeit noch ferner mit dieser herrlichen und herrschenden Erscheinung 
erfreuen wird." HS 273. 
 759!"nicht!mehr!als!Träger!geschichtlichen!Lebens!erschien!Napoleon!dem!Greise,!sondern,!losgelöst!von!
seinem!besonderen!Werk,!ein!Zeichen!dessen!was!der!Mensch!vermag;!da!nennt!er!ihn!wohl!zusammen 
mit den andern, welche die Dämonen hingestellt haben, uns zu verlocken: mit Shakespeare, Rafael, 
Mozart." HS 273. 
 
760 "und nur jetzt—bei dem Systematiker Hegel den moralisch freien Einzelmensch." HS 288. 
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life."761  This is the most concise and oft repeated summary that Rosenzweig makes of 
Hegel's philosophy of state during this period.  What explanation does Rosenzweig offer 
for the revaluation of "spiritual life" over the state?  For Hegel it was the "tragic figure" 
of Napoleon who came to represent the freedom of the individual—including his tragic 
fall—and thus the limits of spiritual life itself.  Indeed, Hegel's conception of history does 
not remain unchanged in wake of Napoleon's drama.  We now see the last sparks of the 
“revolutionary-radical beginnings of the student and tutor”762 and the first hints of the 
“sullen” (grämlich)763 old man.  However, at the beginning of this period, "Napoleon's 
sun stands at a zenith above Hegel's system."764  Both Hegel and Goethe were under the 
spell of Napoleon's free personality.  Yet before we turn to Hegel's Napoleon, and the 
picture of tragedy offered there, let us linger with Rosenzweig's Goethe.  For it is under 
the arch of this other great personality that Rosenzweig encloses his own picture of 
Hegel.   
The biographical significance of Goethe for Rosenzweig’s own life is still largely 
underrepresented.  One great exception is Ulrich Bieberich, who in his book Wenn die 
Geschichte göttlich wäre: Rosenzweigs Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel argues that it is 
precisely with the figure of Goethe that any understanding of Rosenzweigs biographical 
development must begin.765  Not only does Bieberich point out that the young 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
761 "Überordnung des Geistigen über den Staat, jene Herabsetzung des Staats zum bloßen Pfleger eines 
geistigen Lebens." HS 296. 
 
762 "revolutionär-radikalen Anfänge des Studenten und Hofmeisters." HS 296. 
 
763 HS 299. 
 
764 "Die Sonne Napoleons steht im Zenith über Hegels System." HS 288. !
765 Here as well as below, see Bieberich, Wenn die Geschichte göttlich wäre. 15-25. 
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Rosenzweig knew Goethe "from front to back" while still a schoolboy and that he was 
compared with "the young Goethe himself" but he is most convincing when he argues 
that it was in Goethe’s own life that Rosenzweig saw a model for personal fulfillment.766  
As previously noted, when Rosenzweig read the book Cosmopolitanism and Nation-State 
by his teacher Meinecke, he remarked that he would gladly give ten years of his life to 
write such a book.767  When Rosenzweig thus embarked on that quest with the writing of 
Hegel and the State, according to Bieberich his life entered into a sort “tension of 
finishing” (Spannung des Fertigwerdens).768  This is then interpreted to be equivalent 
with uniting the “subjective and the objective,” or in other words, as the agreement 
between “biography and worldview.”769  These same autobiographical problems centered 
on the life of Goethe make their way into Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's 
biographical development.  
 Of all German writers, with the exception of Hölderlin, Rosenzweig gives Goethe 
the most prominent place in his book on Hegel, but in an explicitly formal sense, that is, 
well-placed to help orient his reader in his interpretation.  Not only does Goethe serve as 
the introduction to the "Epochs of the World," but we encounter Goethe once again in the 
final section entitled "Concluding Remarks."  One cannot help seeing Goethe as the 
'bookends' of the entire second volume.  The importance of Goethe in Rosenzweig's 
conception of Germany's history is revealed when he writes in his "Concluding Remarks" 
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766 Bieberich, 16. See also, Hans Ehrenberg's chapter on his youthful friendship with Rosenzweig in 
Autobiographie. 
 
767 See here Chapter I. 
 
768 From the early notebooks; quoted by Bieberich, 16. 
 
769 Bieberich, 16-17. 
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that compared with Goethe, Hegel "can be framed more narrowly, at least with respect to 
his national-historical relevance—but not his world-historical relevance.”770  Goethe's 
historical arch of influence spans not only above Hegel's own life and the nineteenth 
century, but into Rosenzweig's century as well.  When Blumenberg writes that in 
confronting Napoleon Goethe was forced to come face to face with his own "renunciation 
of the light of day" and was thrust further into "an unrelenting hard life of demiurgic 
concentration,"771 this can be extended to Rosenzweig as well.  Continuing the concerns 
of Hegel and the State, Rosenzweig will write in The Star of Redemption that "[o]nce 
man is possessed by his daemon, he has received "direction" for his whole life."772  Not 
only would Rosenzweig's "direction" include overcoming what Blumenberg calls, 
referring to Goethe, the pitfalls of "aesthetic self-mastery"—similar in content to what 
Rosenzweig refers to as his "insatiable hunger for forms"—but Rosenzweig's overcoming 
could not side-step the demonic influence of both Goethe and Hegel upon his own 
development.  Yet Hegel, this 'force from without', and more specifically Hegel's 
collision with Napoleon, stand under the influence of the earliest biographical model for 
the young Rosenzweig, "the greatest German of that epoch," Goethe.  As we turn towards 
the question of tragedy, we must keep in mind Rosenzweig's own collision, however 
subtle, with the great historical figures in the "drama" he sees unfold at the turn of the 
19th century.  Only then can we understand what is at stake for Rosenzweig and his own 
subordination to the tragic laws of history he unfolds for Hegel. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
770 "Hegel darf, nach seiner nationalgeschichtlichen Bedeutung wenigstens—nicht nach seiner 
weltgeschichtlichen—in engerem Rahmen gefaßt werden." HS 526. 
 
771 Blumenberg, 504. 
 
772 Rosenzweig, Star. 213.!
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"The Hero of the Tragic Drama"  
 Rosenzweig gives the very last part of the "Napoleon" chapter, referring to 
Napoleon himself, the somewhat striking title “The Hero of the Tragic Drama" (Der Held 
des Trauerspiels).  The title of this sub-section is striking, for while it may be common to 
hear the words Napoleon and tragedy mentioned in the same breath, it is less common to 
read about Hegel’s own opinion of his “tragic” contemporary, and certainly telling that 
Rosenzweig categorizes Hegel's picture of Napoleon in aesthetic terms.  One is reminded 
here of Hayden White's treatment of Hegel in his book Metahistory, where he claims that 
in order to best understand Hegel's historiography, that is, his own understanding of 
history, one should look not at his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, but at his 
Lectures on Aesthetics.773  With the move towards Napoleon and aesthetic language 
Rosenzweig is also temporarily breaking his own narrative of Hegel's life and 
concentrating for the first time since his treatment of Hölderlin on an "individual" other 
than Hegel himself.  And yet given Hegel’s extensive analysis of tragic drama in his 
Lectures on Aesthetics, years after his confrontation with the figure of Napoleon, one 
must admit that Rosenzweig leaves his readers here wanting a clearer understanding of 
the sense in which Hegel characterizes Napoleon as a "tragic" figure.  Again much like 
Rosenzweig's questionable use of the word "tragic" to categorize Hölderlin's Hyperion 
and Hegel's "turning-point" during his Frankfurt years, it is not entirely clear here what 
either Hegel or Rosenzweig mean with the word "tragedy."  In order to help clarify this 
question it is justified to look briefly outside the lines of Hegel's chronological 
development.  Thus, still using Rosenzweig’s text as a guide and Hegel’s own thoughts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
773 White, 85. 
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on the difference between ancient and modern tragedy as outlined in his Lectures on 
Aesthetics, this section will bring to light what kind of tragic figure Napoleon was and 
why, even within Hegel’s terms, Rosenzweig's understanding of Napoleon's “tragic” 
character is in need of further explanation.  This brief excursus will deepen our own 
understanding of Hegel's personality and changing conception of history.  But moreover, 
again using a term from White's Metahistory, what follows will attempt to show how 
Rosenzweig's "emplotment," or the "kind of story"774 he tells, again points towards the 
important role of "tragedy" in Hegel's biography.   
 Bracketing for the moment the historical context within which Hegel encounters 
the "shadow" of Napoleon—a context that begins in the Phenomenology and is then 
carried out over the years when Hegel was a newspaper editor in Bamberg and a school 
director in Nürnberg, his own years of "mediocrity" (Mittelmässigkeit) as will become 
clear below—let us begin with an excerpt from the letter Hegel wrote to his friend 
Niethammer on April 29th, 1814, with which Rosenzweig’s chapter on Napoleon reaches 
its peak: 
  
 Great things are happening around us. It is like a monstrous play, to see an  
 enormous genius destroy himself. That is the τραγιχωτατογ    
 [tragikotaton]775 that there is; the entire mass of mediocrity with its   
 absolute leaden weight, presses continuously without rest or    
 reconciliation, until it has that which is higher on the same niveau or   
 beneath itself; the turning-point of the whole, the reason that this mass has  
 force and that it remains as chorus over and above, is that the great   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
774 White, 7. !
775 'most tragic thing.' 
 
 235 
 individuality has to grant this right himself, and in doing so destroys   
 himself.776 
 
 
Hegel is talking here of the fall of Napoleon's empire in the years 1813/14.  The first 
thing that catches Rosenzweig attention is Hegel’s description of Napoleon’s fall as 
entirely "dramatic" (dramatisch).777  As emphasized above with reference to Goethe, for 
Rosenzweig, it was not the "acting man" (handelnde Mensch) that Hegel and his 
contemporaries saw in Napoleon, but rather "the picture [...] not of the giant himself, but 
rather the shadow of this genius."778  This "picture" of Napoleon perhaps explains why 
Hegel could see the unfolding of history before his eyes as a dramatic event.779  And 
when reading the constellation in which Hegel viewed this dramatic event—"individual 
and mass, hero and chorus"780—one must agree with Rosenzweig that Hegel saw 
Napoleon’s fall in the moment of its unfolding "in the style of tragedy" (im Stil der 
Tragödie).781   
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776 "Es sind große Dinge um uns geschehen; es ist ein ungeheures Schauspiel, ein enormes Genie sich 
selbst zerstören zu sehen; das ist das tragikotaton, das es gibt; die ganze Masse des Mittelmäßigen mit 
seiner absoluten bleiernen Schwerkraft, drückt ohne Rast und Versöhnung, so lang bleiern fort, bis es das 
Höhere herunter, auf gleichem Niveau oder unter sich hat; der Wendepunkt des Ganzen, der Grund, daß 
diese Masse Gewalt hat und als Chor übrig und obenauf bleibt, ist, daß die große Individualität selbst das 
Recht dazu geben muß, und somit sich selbst zugrunde richtet." HS 298.  
 
777 HS 298. !
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particular form of representing that history.” Moretti, 55. 
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 But what is most astounding about the passage above is the role that Hegel 
assigns to the “Chor” in Napoleon’s fall.782  In his Lectures on Aesthetics, which he was 
to hold years later,783 the chorus plays an essential and distinguishing role between what 
Hegel outlines as ancient and modern tragedy.784  In the passage above we see Napoleon, 
the “Held,” placed in a certain relationship to the chorus, “die Masse.”  With Hegel’s 
mature theory of tragedy in mind, however, this relationship seems entirely odd.  Thus, 
before going further in this direction and into the consequences it will have for the tragic 
character of Napoleon himself, let us first look at Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics and the 
notion of the "chorus" as it is presented there. 
 The tragic moment for Hegel is always defined in terms of a “Kollision.”785  In 
ancient tragedy—that is, Greek tragedy—this collision occurs between two powers of the 
ethical order (Sittlichkeit), which are each entitled in themselves to “Berechtigung.”786  
Hegel understands these ethical powers, as he will often say throughout, as powers such 
as the state and family.787  The chorus in ancient tragedy, however, is neither one of these 
ethical powers nor a character as the cause of their collision.  It is rather there “als das 
substantielle, höhere, von falschen Konflikten abmahnende, den Ausgang bedenkende !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
782 In quoting the letter to Niethammer in his book Hegel, Terry Pinkard places an ellipsis where the word 
“Chor” stands in the original.  One would like to think that he was thereby avoiding the complication this 
raises for Hegel’s theory of tragedy.  
 
783 The first of these was in Heidelberg in 1818. 
 
784 Although it is not the place for it here, the concept of the "chorus" plays an important role in 
Rosenzweig's own understanding of redemption the second book of the Star of Redemption.  There, 
however, the chorus does not represent "history" as it will for Hegel in this section, but the coming together 
of separate voices in the song of redemption. !
785 Hegel, Ästhetik. 547. 
 
786 Hegel, Ästhetik. 549. 
 
787 Hegel, Ästhetik. 564. 
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Bewußtsein.” (562).788  The chorus stands above the tragic collision as the “Gleichmaß 
unbewegten Lebens” and “greift deshalb in die Handlung nicht tatsächlich ein.”789  It 
does not actually intervene in the action!790  Before moving on to this point, which will 
prove decisive for our discussion, there is one final image of the chorus that Hegel 
provides, which must be quoted in full: 
 
 Wie das Theater selbst seinen äußeren Boden, seine Szene und Umgebung  hat, so 
 ist der Chor, das Volk, gleichsam die geistige Szene, und man kann ihn dem 
 Tempel der Architektur vergleichen, welcher das Götterbild, das hier zum 
 handelnden Helden wird, umgibt.791  
 
 
What a picture Hegel provides us with.  The chorus as the temple that surrounds and 
protects the hero.  But what may go unnoticed in this passage is the apparent association 
of the chorus with “das Volk.”  This strikes a note of truth if we remember that according 
to Hegel Napoleon’s tragic chorus was composed of the people, the “Masse des 
Mittelmäßigen.”  In talking about the difference between ancient and modern tragedy 
Hegel writes that the chorus belongs “wesentlich zur dramatischen Handlung selbst [...] 
und ihr so notwendig ist, das der Verfall der Tragödie sich hauptsächlich auch an der 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
788 Hegel, Ästhetik. 562. One can think here on the chorus of sea-nymphs from Aeschylus’ Prometheus 
Bound, who warn Prometheus not to prolong his suffering and wonder aloud what his actions will bring.  
 
789 Hegel, Ästhetik. 562. 
 
790 In Prometheus Bound, the sea-nymphs even go as far as being swept under the sea of Zeus’ wrath along 
with Prometheus in the end. 
 
791 Hegel, Ästhetik. 563. !
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Verschlechterung der Chöre dartut.”792  In modern tragedy, which for Hegel was also 
“der Verfall der Tragödie,” it is no longer one justified power pitted against another.  The 
once essential role of the chorus is relegated to a “deterioration” (Verschlechterung) and 
the tragic hero is left alone with his “subjektive Innerlichkeit des Charakters.”793  But the 
chorus of Napoleon’s fall as presented by Hegel seems to escape these definitions.  For it 
is neither entirely deteriorated, as is witnessed by the “Gewalt” it possesses, nor does it 
refrain from intervening in the action.  If in using the chorus to locate the difference 
between ancient and modern tragedy we come upon these points, what does that say for 
Napoleon’s tragic character?  Was his tragic personality more aligned with the heroes of 
the ancient world or do his actions fit better with Hegel’s conception of the modern?       
 With this question in mind let us now return to our discussion.  Given the image 
of the temple of architecture above, one would certainly like to see Napoleon as the 
“Götterbild” which was surrounded by “das Volk” as his temple!  And this was perhaps 
indeed how Hegel saw Napoleon in 1806, before the battle of Jena: "the Kaiser, this 
world soul" (den Kaiser, diese Weltseele).794  But, following the same path as Goethe, 
this would change with Napoleon’s fall in 1814.  For although Napoleon was perhaps 
once unified with the ethical power of the state, fully supported by his chorus—the 
people of France and beyond—this very chorus, according to Hegel, now turned against 
the hero himself.  Thus, one is apt to say that Napoleon, according to Hegel’s notion of 
ancient tragedy, was not a tragic hero of old.  This is affirmed by Rosenzweig when he 
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writes of Hegel that he placed the "the emphasis of the events in the individual,"795  that 
is, "tragedy" is here associated with the "Innerlichkeit" of Napoleon's personality.  For it 
was not the 'mass of mediocrity' that brought Napoleon to his fall, but rather "the great 
individual himself" (die große Individualität selbst).  But why, then, one could ask, 
mention of a chorus at all?  Would not Hegel have been better off and in turn more 
consistent with his later view of tragedy if he would have simply ascribed Napoleon’s fall 
to the “äußere Zufall der Umstände,”796 thus affirming his point that modern tragedy lies 
“wesentlich in dem Charakter”797 and not in the ethical powers of the world?  
 The chorus as it appears in Hegel’s letter to Niethammer thus throws an odd light 
on Hegel’s assessment of Napoleon as a tragic figure and Rosenzweig's emphasis of the 
same.  Nowhere in his Lectures on Aesthetics do we find the chorus described in such a 
way.  Whereas the chorus in ancient tragedy does not intervene in the action, here we find 
an entirely different image.  The chorus is associated with a lead weight that pulls 
Napoleon’s genius down to its own level and even reigns over it.  One can only conclude, 
with Hegel, that it was necessarily Napoleon’s own internal flaw that brought about his 
fall.  Does this, then, mean that Napoleon himself could be described as a modern tragic 
hero?  Although the modern hero is not essentially unified with a certain justified ethical 
power, such as the state—here one can think of Creon in Sophocles’ Antigone—Hegel 
does write that “die substantiellen Zwecke, Vaterland, Familie, Krone und Reich usf. [...] 
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in keiner Weise entfernt zu halten [sind].”798  So, one could believe for the moment that 
even as an emperor intimately united with his empire Napoleon still fit the role of the 
modern tragic hero.  For, he was the cause of his own fall.  The "mass of mediocrity" 
(Masse des Mittelmäßigen) did not stand opposed to him justified in their stance, but 
were first given the "right" (Recht) to bring down the "genius" (Genius) by that very 
genius himself.  If this all holds and Napoleon is a modern tragic figure, than why does 
the chorus play such a decisive role for Hegel in his letter if in modern tragedy it is all but 
absent?  
A possible answer to these questions lies in Rosenzweig's own interpretation of 
Hegel's "Kollision" with Napoelon.  For Rosenzweig, Napoleon’s tragic fall is 
outweighed for Hegel by a much different drama, the drama of history itself.  According 
to Rosenzweig, Hegel comes to see the choir less as a dramatic feature of Napoleon’s 
own fate and more as "the power of history" (die Macht der Geschichte).799  Thus, the 
importance of this episode with Napoleon is already coming to light with regard to 
Hegel's development.  In the same letter to Niethammer quoted above Hegel writes, 
looking back on his Phenomenology of Spirit, “[d]ie ganze Umwälzung habe ich 
übrigens, wie ich mich rühmen will, vorausgesagt.”800  What he predicted was—
remembering the summary of this chapter at the end of  "Stations of Life"—the "triumph 
of spirit over power" (Triumph des Geistes über die Macht).801  This was Germany’s 
victory over France.  But although he had earlier predicted the turn of events, his beliefs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
798 Hegel, Ästhetik. 559. 
 
799 HS 299. !
800 Hegel, Briefe II. 28. 
 
801 HS 298. 
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had now changed.  Whereas in 1806 Hegel could still see Napoleon as the “Weltseele” 
and thus the “Kaiser” of the world, all that remained now was "the belief in the power of 
history" (der Glaube an die Macht der Geschichte).802  In the end, Napoleon’s tragic fate 
was overshadowed by the "the tragic law of history" (tragische Gesetz der Geschichte)803 
itself and Napoleon was left to suffer, forgotten below the lead weight of history, the 
"chorus" (Chor) in Hegel’s letter.  Hegel, try as he might, could not capture Napoleon’s 
tragic character in dramatic terms.  For, while sharing qualities of both, he was neither a 
tragic figure in the ancient or modern sense.  Already at the beginning of the "Napoleon" 
chapter, Rosenzweig—both alluding to and yet refraining from expounding upon the 
point—suggests that perhaps Hegel should have listened to the lyrical advice of his friend 
Hölderlin, when already in 1797 in his poem “Buonaparte” he warned of the dangers one 
faces when trying to capture an individual as great as Napoleon in poetic language: 
 
      
  Der Dichter laß ihn unberüht wie der Geist der Natur, 
   An solchem Stoffe wird zum Knaben der Meister 
   
  Er kann im Gedichte nicht leben und bleiben 
   Er lebt und bleibt in der Welt.” 
 
 
By trying to explain Napoleon’s tragic fate in dramatic terms—thereby replacing 
historical description with a lyrically infused prose—Hegel ignores his friend's warning 
and, despite his attempts to understand, plays servant to Napoleon's world-historical 
figure.  After Napoleon's fall, all that was left for Hegel was his "conviction in the right 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the chorus" (Überzeugung vom Recht des Chors).804  Yet years later, this chorus—“das 
Volk”—the "power of history" Hegel had come to believe in, would remember Napoleon 
not as "the tyrant" (der Tyrann),805 but—much like Prometheus—and in Goethe's 
understanding "Shakespeare, Rafael, Mozart," as that great daemonic hero who suffered 
alone for the good of all mankind. 
 
 
"The Tragic Law of History" 
 In the previous section, the attempt was made to work out Hegel’s position with 
regards to Napoleon as it is presented within the first section of the second volume of 
Hegel and the State.  However, we were left with the somewhat uncomfortable claim that 
although Hegel portrays Napoleon as partaking in a sort of tragedy in his letter of 1814 to 
Niethammer, the description of Napoleon as a tragic hero and especially the role of the 
chorus in this description were at odds with Hegel’s formal, aesthetic theory of tragedy.  
Rosenzweig concludes that Napoleon’s fate fell very broadly under the "the tragic law of 
history" (tragische Gesetz der Geschichte).806  But how can we understand this, again, 
very broad and unexamined phrase by Rosenzweig, especially given Hegel’s own 
growing commitment to the "power of history"?  Alongside Rosenzweig and Hegel’s 
work, Peter Szondi’s book Versuch über das Tragische is a helpful touchstone here.  In 
this section, which is an extension of the previous, it will be shown how the question of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
804 HS 306. 
 
805 HS 299. 
 
806 HS 298. 
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Napoleon’s fate within Hegel’s spiritual biography touches on the relationship between 
life and tragedy itself, and that for this reason it is important both for Hegel's 
development and Rosenzweig's own life and thought. 
 It is very telling for Hegel's development that Rosenzweig chose to begin the 
second volume of his biography with a chapter on Napoleon.  As we have already shown, 
"Stations of Life” examined how Hegel’s philosophy developed out of his personal life 
and struggles, predominately his years in Frankfurt.  The closing words of the first half 
are repeated here: "The stations of life change for him into the epochs of the world.  The 
stream of thought broke the barriers of its shore and watered the thirsting fields of the 
age."807  Paradoxically, Hegel is here both the carrier of this stream and yet also belongs 
to the "fields" (Äcker) newly soaked with his thinking.  This is clear from Rosenzweig’s 
portrayal of Hegel in the following Napoleon chapter.  From the outset, Rosenzweig 
characterizes Hegel along with his contemporaries as belonging to the "thirsting 
generation" (dürstenden Geschlecht).808  It was none other than the "picture" (Bild) of 
Napoleon, which was to fill the "void" (Lücke) of this generation’s thirst.809  The 
importance of Hegel’s double-character, which is implied by Rosenzweig within this 
transition from "personal life" to "epoch," will only become clear once we have laid some 
introductory groundwork. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
807 "Der Strom des Denkens brach die Schranken seiner Ufer und tränkt die dürstenden Äcker der Zeit." HS 
264. 
 
808 HS 273. 
 
809 HS 273. 
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When Napoleon rode into Jena in 1806, Hegel famously hailed him as the "world 
soul" (Weltseele).810  Looking back on that time, in the same letter of 1814 to 
Niethammer, Hegel prided himself in correctly predicting the fall and fate of Napoleon in 
the Phänomenologie des Geistes.  The lines he was referring to and the same lines which 
Rosenzweig claims as the ground upon which his Napoleon chapter was written,811 read 
as follows:  
 
Wie das Reich der wirklichen Welt in das Reich des Glaubens und der Einsicht 
übergeht, so geht die absolute Freiheit aus ihrer sich selbst zerstörenden 
Wirklichkeit in ein anderes Land des selbstbewussten Geistes über.812 
 
Here, this "übergehen" is understood by thinkers such as Szondi as a decisive moment 
within Hegel’s dialectical thinking and decisive for understanding his dialectic in general.  
Rosenzweig, however, noticeably ignoring the development of the dialectic as a theory of 
knowledge as such, situates his observations on this passage within the biographical and 
historical flow of his argument as they reflect upon Hegel's philosophical personality. 
 For Rosenzweig, Hegel had indeed predicted the turn of events: "'spirit' has 
migrated from this side (Diesseits) to the beyond (Jenseits), from the state to philosophy, 
from France to Germany."813  But what he did not and could not predict in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
810 HS 274. 
 
811 See HS 298. 
 
812 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes. 441. !
813 "der ‘Geist’ ist aus dem Diesseits ins Jenseits, aus dem Staat in die Philosophie, von Frankreich nach 
Deutschland übergesiedelt." HS 275. 
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Phänomenologie, "was his own disposition, with which he would process the events."814  
As was stated before, in the language of the Phänomenologie, Hegel had seen the 
movement of "spirit" (Geist) from France to Germany—before the actual fall of 
Napoleon and before his reflective glance in 1814—as the "necessity of a triumph of 
spirit over power."815  This “triumph” was indeed affirmed with the fall of Napoleon in 
1813, yet although Hegel had predicted the necessity of this event, he had by no means 
predicted the manner.  In his letter of 1814 to Niethammer, Hegel’s conception of tragedy 
was thrown into question through his description of the chorus as "mass of mediocrity."  
Rather than understanding the fall of Napoleon as the triumph of spirit, Hegel was forced 
to concede this triumph to the "right of the chorus" (Recht des Chors).816  And what will 
become decisive for Rosenzweig is that this chorus, far from being the inactive chorus of 
ancient tragedy, represented here "the power of history" (die Macht der Geschichte).817  
But how are we to understand this "power of history" at this decisive point in Hegel's 
biography and why does Rosenzweig continue to present Hegel's life in the ambiguous 
language of tragedy? 
 Without straying too far from Rosenzweig’s text, I wish here to lean on Szondi’s 
insightful attempt to illuminate Hegel’s theory of tragedy.  In Szondi’s book Versuch 
über das Tragische (1961) Hegel is only one among many German philosophers 
represented.  But it is Hegel’s philosophy and in particular his dialectical theory that play 
the decisive role for Szondi throughout.  This emphasis on Hegel's dialectic already sets !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
814 "war seine eigene Stimmung, mit der er die Ereignisse aufnehmen würde." HS 298. 
 
815 "Notwendigkeit eines Triumphes des Geistes über die Macht." HS 298. 
 
816 HS 306. 
 
817 HS 299.!
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him apart from Rosenzweig and thus provides us with an adequate counterpoint to 
Rosenzweig's view.  Within Szondi's first investigation—on Schelling—he foreshadows 
what he will later reveal as the thesis of his book: “die These von der dialektischen 
Struktur des Tragischen.”818  And although he reads in all philosophers the tendency to 
join tragedy with dialectical thinking, he writes that “bei Hegel [fallen] Tragik und 
Dialektik zusammen.”819  According to Szondi, here echoing Rosenzweig's emphasis in 
the "Frankfurt" chapter, Hegel first developed his theory of tragedy around the concept of 
fate.  Here is the passage that Szondi quotes from Hegel's "Natural Right" essay, which, 
according to Rosenzweig,"concludes the movement that began in Frankfurt":820 
 
 
Die Tragödie [ist] darin, daß die sittliche Natur ihre unorganische, damit sie sich 
nicht mit ihr verwickele, als ein Schicksal von sich abtrennt und sich gegenüber 
stellt, und, durch die Anerkennung desselben in dem Kampfe, mit dem göttlichen 
Wesen, als der Einheit von beidem, versöhnt.821             
 
 
As “Schicksal,” or fate, tragedy is simultaneously a “Selbstentzweiung” and a 
“Selbstversöhnung.”822  Because the subject as “sittliche Natur” splits itself, that is, is the 
agent of its own fate, it can then be “versöhnt” and described as an “Einheit.”  In this 
basic movement—overly simplified here for the sake of brevity—Szondi sees the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
818 Szondi, 61.   
 
819 Szondi, 22. 
 
820 "So ebbt die Bewegung, die in Frankfurt begonnen hatte, ab." HS 194. 
 
821 Szondi, 20. Quoted from Hegel, Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts. !
822 Szondi, 23. 
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beginnings of the famous Hegelian dialectic.823  Rosenzweig on the other hand, 
emphasizes how this movement connects to Hegel's political thinking, and accordingly 
sees the "inorganic" (unorganische) as the "property" (Eigentum) of the state, and how in 
this moment "property" has become the "fate" (Schicksal) of the state.824  For Szondi, 
whose glance is not restricted by the development of the concept of the state, Hegel's 
dialectic unfolds in its full glory from these early roots.  Later Szondi will describe this 
dialectic as both “Weltgesetz” and “Methode der Erkenntnis.”825  Given these two 
descriptions, then, and keeping Rosenzweig's own treatment in mind as we return to the 
"Napoleon" section, it is but a short leap to the concept of the "tragic law of history." 
 Associating tragedy with the concept of fate lines up well with the common 
description of the tragic hero, here using the example of Hegel’s Napoleon, "that the 
great individuality must himself grant the right to its own destruction."826  The 
discrepancy between the terms "reconciliation" (Versöhnung) and "destruction" 
(Vernichtung), however, becomes decisive for us in consideration of Hegel’s letter of 
1814.  When Hegel described Napoleon in 1806 as the "worldsoul," he could still say 
later—in 1814—that he saw in him "an enormous genius" (ein enormes Genie).827  But, 
as Rosenzweig decisively points out, what Hegel predicted in the Phänomenologie, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
823 See Szondi, 21. 
 
824 HS 194-95. 
 
825 Szondi, 27. 
 
826 "daß die große Individualität selbst das Recht zu ihrer eigenen Vernichtung geben muss." HS 298. 
 
827 HS 298. 
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although correct "in broad strokes" (in den größten Zügen),828 was not what Hegel had 
expected.  Rather than a “Versöhnung” of one moment of history with the next, Hegel 
witnessed something he did not foresee.  In Rosenzweig's words: 
  
 that Napoleon's destruction would not come about internally, through the spirit, 
 but rather, as it appeared to him, through the mass of mediocrity with its leaden
 weight, this now made him sullen and gave him, as he is trying to figure things 
 out, the feeling of having lived through a tragedy.829 
 
Napoleon's fate, and in turn the fate of history, does not stem here from an internal 
"unity" (Einheit), but rather a force from without—similar to what we introduced as the 
"demonic" above.  The spirit that Hegel had hoped to see emerge from Napoleon, the 
"world soul" (die Weltseele), emerged rather from what Hegel identified himself as the 
chorus, "the mass of mediocrity" (die Masse des Mittelmäßigen).  Thus it was not the 
triumph Hegel had hoped for, yet still a triumph indeed: "a victory of mediocrity over 
genius."830  To speak here of a "reconciliation" (Versöhnung) on behalf of Napoleon 
would be misplaced.  The "reconciliation" (Versöhnung)—the dialectical movement of 
the world spirit from France to Germany—had indeed taken place.  But for Napoleon 
himself, "destruction" (Vernichtung) is the finer word.  In Rosenzweig’s final flourish, he !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
828 HS 298. This point is summarized earlier by Rosenzweig: "Napoleon's greatness war that he preserved 
the state; but precisely in this moment the state ceased to be the middle-point of human history" (Dass er 
den Staat erhielt, was Napoleons Grösse; aber eben in diesem Augenblick hörte der Staat auf, Mittelpunkt 
der Menschengeschichte zu sein). HS 276.  One may ask here, for Hegel, or for human history as a whole? 
 
829 "daß die Vernichtung Napoleons eine Vernichtung nicht von innen heraus, nicht durch den Geist, 
sondern, wie ihm schien, durch die Masse des Mittelmäßigen mit seiner bleiernen Schwerkraft sein würde, 
das hatte er nimmermehr 1806 geweissagt, das macht ihn jetzt grämlich und das gibt ihm, als er sich mit 
den Dingen abzufinden sucht, das Gefühl, ein Trauerspiel erlebt zu haben." HS 299. From the context of 
Rosenzweig’s text, he seems to make no distinction between “Trauerspiel” and “Tragödie,” allowing these 
terms, as well as Hegel’s own use of “Schauspiel” to freely interchange.!!!!
830 "einen Sieg des Mittelmäßigen über das Genie." HS 299. 
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describes that this "tragedy" (Trauerspiel) had led Hegel to resign himself to believe only 
in "the power of history" (die Macht der Geschichte).831  Here, Napoleon sank into the 
choir and merged with the movement of history and thus Napoleon’s great individuality 
was sacrificed to the tragic law of history.  Where once the battle of Jena was for Hegel 
the decisive moment of history, the present, that is, 1814, "could now again shift into 
earthly daylight from the apocalyptic lighting of the first hours of a third empire."832  In 
consequence of this change in Hegel's perception of historical development, Rosenzweig 
concludes: "the great turning-point of world-history could no longer be found here."833  
As we will see in the Philosophy of Right, this "turning-point" (Wendepunkt) will be 
located much earlier, already with the advent of Christianity. 
 Before ending this section, I would like to return to the notion of Hegel’s double-
character.  What was only hinted at before has now been unfolded from Rosenzweig’s 
text.  The final lines of the first volume, which I would like to draw upon again, give us a 
concise glimpse of how biography and history come together in Rosenzweig's text within 
his picture of Hegel's personality: 
  
 so swelled up has the self-consciousness of the thinker now become. He stands 
 eye to eye with the age. Even more: he is speaking to it and it speaks to him. He is 
 has really become prepared and able to enter into it: 'to be' it.  He has passed the 
 Dantean middle of our lives. The stations of life change for him into the epochs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
831 HS 299. 
 
832 "konnte ihm nun aus der apokalyptischen Beleuchtung der Geburtsstunde eines dritten Reichs wieder 
ins irdische Tageslicht rücken." HS 299.  Rosenzweig's use of the phrase "dritte Reich" predates the term as 
introduced by the National Socialists. 
 
833 "der große Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte konnte hier nicht mehr liegen." HS 299.!
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 of the world.  The stream of thought broke the barriers of its shore and watered 
 the thirsting fields of the age.834 
    
 
Yet what perhaps reads like the identification of Hegel with history is already called into 
question in the first paragraphs of the next volume.  Hegel brings both the "stream of 
thought" (Strom des Denkens) and is, as quoted before, one of the "thirsting generation" 
(dürstende Geschlecht).  It is this disjunction that becomes the centerpiece of 
Rosenzweig’s chapter, foreshadowing the pulse of the entire second volume.  For much 
later in his book Rosenzweig will write of Hegel that "the unity with the age is torn" (die 
Vereinigung mit der Zeit ist zerissen);835 this bold and tragic statement already begins to 
germinate here.  Although Hegel had predicted the turn of events surrounding Napoleon, 
they came about much differently than he had thought and it consequently changed his 
entire view of history.  Napoleon, once the “Kaiser,” the hero, could later only be seen as 
the fallen, tragic genius—Hegel at once in tune and at odds with his own thought.  
Rosenzweig’s choice to begin the second book of his biography with this tale of tragedy 
was no mere chance.  As the stream of personal life breaks the narrow confines of Hegel's 
"Stations of Life," we now face the moving seas of the "Epochs of the World."  Hegel’s 
life is given over not to the command of reason alone, but rather to the "tragic law of 
history," an aesthetic law where "actuality" triumphs over "reason."  And in Rosenzweig's 
telling, it will be under this tragic law of history that Hegel himself, a "world-historical" 
figure like Napoleon before him, will perish from his world.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
834 "So hochgeschwellt ist jetzt das Selbstbewusstsein des Denkers.  Er steht Auge in Auge mit der Zeit.  
Mehr noch: er redet mit ihr und sie spricht zu ihm.  Er ist wirklich bereit und fähig worden, in sie 
einzugehen: sie ‘zu sein’.  Er hat die Dantesche Mitte unsres Lebenweges überschritten.  Die Stationen des 
Lebens wandeln sich ihm in Epochen der Welt.  Der Strom des Denkens brach die Schranken seiner Ufer 
und tränkt die dürstenden Acker der Zeit." HS 264. 
 
835 HS 521.!
 251 
CHAPTER VIII 
FROM RESTORATION TO PRUSSIA 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 In his essay "Hegel and the French Revolution" Joachim Ritter, who according to 
Axel Honneth is one of those directly responsible for inspiring the most recent edition of 
Hegel und the State,836 makes the important claim that within "the discussion of concrete 
political relations and events in his political essays [...] in his letters, and elsewhere, 
Hegel comes to grips again and again, sometimes ardently, with the political 
restoration."837  In Ritter's reading, Hegel's political works all in some way or another 
engage the concept of "restoration" in light of Hegel's ongoing consideration of the 
effects of the French Revolution.  Already in the Phenomenology, the highest point of 
this engagement for Ritter and Rosenzweig alike—the moment when political change 
stood at the doorstep of Germany—Hegel found it necessary "to come to grips with the 
Revolution's emancipatory self-determination in the immediate relation to this its positive 
world-historical content."838  While Hegel reserves talk of "positive world-historical 
content" for his more strictly political texts, as will be shown below, the section of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
836 See "Nachwort," HS 582. 
 
837 Ritter, 53. The essays listed by Ritter and omitted above are: "On the Recent Domestic Affairs of 
Wurtemberg, especially on the Inadequacy of the Municipal Constitution of 1798, The German 
Constitution of 1800/3, the critical discussion of the Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of 
Württemberg in the years 1815 and 1816, published in 1817 in the Heidelberger Jahrbüchern, and finally 
the essay On the English Reform Bill of 1830." It is his essay on Württemberg from the years 1815-1817 
that is the central focus of Rosenzweig's "Restoration" chapter, and also our focus here.  The essay on the 
English Reform Bill will prove critical for Rosenzweig and is touched upon later.    
 
838 Ritter, 52.!
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Phenomenology entitled "Terror" already showed that with the advancing "self-
determination" of Spirit "there is politically no longer any possibility of turning back 
from the Revolution and what it has achieved."839  Its achievement, according to Ritter, 
was that "[e]very present and future legal and political order must presuppose and 
proceed from the Revolution's universal principle of freedom."840 
 While Rosenzweig certainly agrees, as he states numerous times about the 
importance of the French Revolution for Hegel, in his section "Restoration," immediately 
following the "tragic drama" of Napoleon, contrary to Ritter he already sees the 
Revolution transformed in Hegel's thought into his "belief in history," his "conviction for 
the right of the chorus."841  Thus, where Ritter talks of the French Revolution and the 
"universal principle of freedom," Rosenzweig casts this period of Hegel's development in 
more world-historical language as the "fall of the empire" (Untergang des Reichs)842 and 
the rise of history as "the ruling force over the entire will of the individual."843  Thus for 
Rosenzweig, it was in the atmosphere of the Vienna Congress of 1814, where observers 
including Hegel could "hope for everything or also fear everything,"844 that Hegel's 
political thinking begins to slowly emerge from its hiatus in "spiritual life" during the 
Napoleonic period. It does not develop, as Ritter claims, into an ever-increasing 
understanding of "the principle of freedom," but to an "implementation of the thought of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
839 Ritter, 52.  
  
840 Ibid. 
 
841 HS 306. 
 
842 HS 314. 
 
843 "die herrschende Gewalt über allem Willen der einzelnen." HS 307. 
 
844 "daß man je nach Stimmung alles hoffen oder auch alles fürchten konnte." HS 306.!
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unity in the state."845  This emphasis upon the character and consequently unified 
"individuality" of the state and people as opposed to the freedom of the individual in 
Rosenzweig's reading also leads to the new formula for Hegel's political thought: "to the 
power also the will of the state."846 
 
 
"Hegel's Homecoming to the State" 
 Rosenzweig comes to the above formulation in his considerations of Hegel's first 
political piece in some years, Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of 
Württemberg, written during the years 1815 and 1816 and published in 1817 in the 
Heidelberger Jahrbüchern.  In terms of Rosenzweig's presentation, the examination of 
this piece represents a return to the chapter "Stuttgart" where Rosenzweig first situated 
Hegel in his home province of Württemberg.  But whereas in "Stuttgart" the reader was 
still wrapped up in the journals and notes of a school boy, and in this sense placed within 
the stream of Hegel's personal life, here during the German restoration we are looking 
with Hegel from without, "eye to eye" with history itself. 
 The main point of contention in Hegel's essay is the conflict between the "estates" 
(Stände) and the new constitution set up by the monarchy.  With the invasion of 
Napoleon in 1806 the power of the estates as a governing body was entirely removed and 
now, after Napoleon's fall, they wanted that power back.  Hegel, who once worked to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
845 "Durchführung des Einheitsgedankens im Staat."  HS 317. 
 
846 "zur Macht auch der Wille des Staats." HS 317. Later, Rosenzweig writes regarding the concept of the 
will in Hegel's thought: "that power of the will, that [Hegel] did not want to acknowledge over his thinking 
and over thinking in general" (jene Macht des Willens, die [Hegel] über seinem Denken und über dem 
Denken überhaupt nicht anerkennen mochte) HS 358.  This quote explains Rosenzweig's constant emphasis 
on Hegel's concept of the will and that the state as power essentially means the state as will, which in turn 
implies that the will of the individual is subsumed under the will of the state. !
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carve out more space for the estates in his political theory however, now sided with the 
monarchy.  For in his view, "[t]he empire has ceased to exist, the highest judge between 
prince and subject, government and estates is missing."847  This "highest judge" was the 
"higher judicial authority" (einem höheren Gericht)848 of the empire whose previous task 
it was to resolve disputes between the estates and the ruling powers.  But with the fall of 
the empire, Württemberg "is now forced to be a state, a sovereign state, which cannot 
internally rest upon contracts of two independent forces, but rather must be one internally 
as well as externally."849  What first reemerges here is the thought from Hegel's Frankfurt 
period of "the unity of all life," which is then taken as the "implementation of the thought 
of unity in the state."  This move to cast the state itself in terms of unity leads, as was 
stated above, to what Rosenzweig sees as the new formula for Hegel's political thought: 
"to the power also the will of the state." 
 In terms of the overall development of the relationship of the individual to the 
state—which, as Rosenzweig's tragic "emplotment" continues, reveals itself more and 
more to be the guiding thought of the narrative—it becomes clear at the end of this 
narrative that it is precisely this "will of the state," which first emerges here, that is given 
precedence over the "will" of the individual.  When the estates argued, based on 
"historical right" (geschichtliches Recht),850 that their power should be restored, Hegel 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
847 "Das Reich ist nicht mehr, es fehlt der oberste Richter zwischen Fürst und Untertan, Regierung und 
Ständen." HS 315. 
 
848 HS 315. 
 
849 "gezwungen, ein Staat zu sein, ein souveräner Staat, der nicht beruhen kann auf Verträgen zweier 
selbstständiger Gewalten in seinem Innern, sondern der nach innen eins sein muß so gut wie nach außen." 
HS 315. 
 
850 HS 321.!
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responded with the "last and deepest" (der letzte und tiefste)851 thought of this writing on 
Württemberg.  In Rosenzweig's words:  
 
 Württemberg first became a state through the fall of the empire; only now  
 does its history as the history of a state begin; now everything must become 
 new, and what is old does not have the right of history, as it may seem, on its side, 
 but against it. A people's history first begins when it becomes a state.852  
 
This thought combining the idea of "history" and "state", which Rosenzweig also notes 
was systematically worked out during this time into Hegel's Encyclopedia, must be 
understood within the context of what was described in the previous chapter as the "fall" 
of Napoleon as an historical individuality and the rise of "history" as the chorus.  For 
here, we are no longer talking of the "will" of the individual, but the "will" of history as 
the state itself.  Hegel's general view as a philosopher of the state is then summed up by 
Rosenzweig a few lines later: "a people without a state have no history."853 
 Thus, it is with these stark words that Hegel finds his way back to the state and 
into the age of restoration.  However, his writing on Württemberg, which was discussed 
above, once again failed to bridge the gap between "reason" and "actuality," and although 
Rosenzweig does work out the details of the piece, in the end "it was the unfortunate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
851 Ibid. 
 
852 "Württemberg ist erst durch den Fall des Reichs ein Staat geworden; erst jetzt hebt seine Geschichte als 
die Geschichte eines Staats an; da muß alles neu werden, und das Alte hat hier das Recht der Geschichte 
nicht wie es scheint für, sondern gegen sich." HS 322. 
 
853 "ein Volk ohne Staat hat keine Geschichte." HS 323. It seems obvious that Hegel's claim made a deep 
impact upon Rosenzweig, for as we witness in the third book of The Star of Redemption, it is precisely the 
significance of the Jewish people as a people without a state that allows them to retain the redemptive fire 
that is lost in the course of history. While Rosenzweig would not make the absolute claim that the Jewish 
people, because they have no state, have no history, he does understand the Jewish people—as opposed to 
the historical Christian religion—as the holders of the eternal messianic hope between humans and God.!
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thing that he now transferred his new or actually pre-Napoleonic ideal of the state upon a 
state, that was not a state."854  With the appearance here of the "will of the state" and the 
further coupling of "history" with the "state," we are again merely passing from one 
period to the next.  From the tragic fall of Napoleon Hegel's eyes now turn to Berlin and 
the state of Prussia.  Whereas Hegel's engagement with Wurtemberg was based on "the 
threefold coincidence of descent, the moment, contact with the small state," Hegel would 
now turn to an "actual" state with his thoughts of a "constitutional monarchy" 
(verfassungsmässigen Königtum).855  From the epoch of "Restoration" we now turn to 
"Prussia" as well as the questions of that great work, The Philosophy of Right.  But before 
encountering what happens when the state becomes "a thought of philosophy" (ein 
Gedanke der Philosophie)856 (HS 438) Rosenzweig's attention is once again fixed upon 
the "personality" of Hegel himself. 
 
 
On Hegel's "Personality" in Berlin  
 Rosenzweig's biography of Hegel is much more than a biography as such.857  And 
even classifying his book using a term coined by his teacher Meinecke, as a work in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
854 "Daß er sein neues oder eigentlich sein vornapoleonisches Staatsideal nun auf einen Staat, der kein 
Staat war, übertrug, war das Mißliche." HS 335. 
 
855 "der dreifache Zufall der Herkunft, des Augenblicks, des Umgangs auf den Kleinstaat." HS 335. 
 
856 HS 438. 
!
857 A comparison, for example, with Terry Pinkard's Hegel would show not only that Rosenzweig is much 
more narrow with his focus on the development of the state, but also philosophically superior with his 
"subtle argumentation" (subtile Argumentation; see here Axel Honneth's "Nachwort", HS 581, where he 
also claims "that there could hardly be a second book that could succeed at doing something comparable on 
the same niveau of language and with the same clarity" (es dürfte, so viel ist sicher, kaum ein zweites Buch 
geben, dem Vergleichbares auf demselben sprachlichen Niveau und mit derselben Übersichtlichkeit 
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"history of ideas" (Ideengeschichte) only partially captures the complexity here.  Axel 
Honneth, whose "Nachwort" to the newest German edition of Hegel and the State is 
perhaps the best existing essay on the book as whole, claims that "[w]ith all his talent at 
narrative presentation the systematically oriented philosopher still holds the upper hand 
over the historian of ideas."858  This statement strikes at the heart of the book, especially 
knowing what an influential thinker Rosenzweig was to become, and yet one cannot 
overlook the centrality Rosenzweig gives to Hegel's biography in his book, not only for 
the sake of telling a "life" itself, as is clear already from the foreword, but for interpreting 
the most important changes in Hegel's development, as the chapter on Frankfurt clearly 
showed.  And here in the longest and most involved section of the book, "Prussia," with 
Hegel's "stations of life" changing once again from Nürnberg, to Heidelberg and finally 
to the city where he would reach the end of his life, Berlin, Rosenzweig once again draws 
upon biographical elements to both situate his "hero" in his development, but moreover to 
help explain one of the most important philosophical questions surrounding Hegel, even 
today: Hegel's relation to the Prussian state and his status as the "official" philosopher of 
Prussia.859 
 "In the twenties", writes Rosenzweig, and he is speaking here of the 1820s in 
Berlin, "Hegel became one of the personalities without which life in Berlin could not be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
gelungen wäre) (HS 573). Pinkard makes no mention of Rosenzweig's interpretation and only lists Hegel 
and the State in his bibliography.   
 
858 "Bei allem Talent zur erzählerischen Darstellung behält bei Rosenzweig doch immer der systematisch 
orientierte Philosoph die Oberhand über den Ideenhistoriker." "Nachwort," HS 574. 
 
859 See here the chapters in "The Myth of Hegel as a Totalitarian Theorist or Prussian Apologist" in The 
Hegel Myths and Legends ed. by Jon Bartley Stewart (1996). !
 258 
thought."860  Not only was Hegel's appointment in 1818 by Prussia's minister of culture to 
the chair of philosophy previously held by Fichte decisive, but also Hegel's lectures on 
aesthetics and history, which still serve today as fitting introductions to his thought, 
helped Hegel grow beyond the university and gain recognition in Berlin.861  Indeed, with 
Hegel's death in 1831 it was declared that "the learned world of Berlin and even more so 
the unlearned, had lost their philosopher."862  This turn of phrase, borrowed from 
Adelheit Zunz, emphasizing that even the "unlearned [] had lost their philosopher," 
shows that while in Berlin, it was the aura of Hegel's "personality," and only then the 
content of his thought, that gave him such prestige and influence alike.  
 The term "personality" itself is at work on many different levels within the 
entirety of Hegel and the State.  First, "personality" is not only at the center of Hegel's 
early biographical development, but significantly overlaps with Rosenzweig's 
autobiography as well.  As was shown, Rosenzweig located the "turning-point" of Hegel's 
development—the point where the state became part of the "fate" of mankind—within 
Hegel's tarrying with his personal life around the age of 27 in Frankfurt.  The 27th year of 
Rosenzweig's own life was also seen as his own personal "turning-point": the now 
famous "Leipziger Nachtgespräche" after which Rosenzweig later decided against 
converting to Christianity and declared "I will thus remain a Jew" (Ich bleibe also Jude).  
This overlap of both Hegel and Rosenzweig's development in terms of "personality" was 
further supported by Rosenzweig's early claim in his journals: "Why does one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
860 "Hegel war in den zwanziger Jahren eine der Persönlichkeiten geworden, ohne die das Berliner Leben 
nicht gedacht werden konnte." HS 347. 
 
861 See here HS 347-8.   
 
862 "die Berliner gelehrte Welt, und fast noch mehr die ungelehrte, habe ihren Philosophen verloren." HS 
347.!
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philosophize?  For the same reason that one makes music or literature or art.  Here too, in 
the last analysis, all that matters is the discovery of one's own personality."863  This early 
emphasis on "personality" creates the autobiographical continuity which leads from 
Rosenzweig's youth, through his biography of Hegel and the very choice to write a 
biography, and into his more mature analysis of "personality" and "character" in the Star 
of Redemption, especially surrounding his concept of "metaethics."               
 Second, the writing of history itself, as Rosenzweig saw first hand from his 
teacher Meinecke and observed in Dilthey's writings, deals with the instantiation of this 
history in the lives of individuals.  As Bieberich writes of Rosenzweig's teacher: "Für 
Meinecke ist nun der Ausbau der sittlichen und geistigen Welt auch der Aufbau der 
eigenen Persönlichkeit."864  As Bieberich rightly notes, Rosenzweig is leaning heavily on 
Meinecke's insistence on the importance of "personality" throughout his entire biography.  
Indeed, even beyond Hegel's own personal development we encounter many other 
individuals: Hölderlin and Schelling, Goethe and Napoleon, and foreshadowing 
Rosenzweig's own analysis of Hegel's legacy, even the socialist Marx.  These "historical 
personalities" are the preconditions for historical thought in the first place, a claim not 
only Dilthey and Meinecke, but Hegel himself would agree with.865 
 Finally, the concept of "personality" finds its way to the peak of Hegel's 
philosophy of state.  In bridging the gap from the "will of the individual" to the "will of 
the state," for Hegel there needs to be a natural "carrier of the reign" (Träger der 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
863 Rosenzweig, Briefe, April 1, 1906. 
 
864 Bieberich, 21.   
 
865 See here Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History (quoted in Avineri, 230).!
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Herrschaft)866 and "in order that also here the personal will receives its due, personality 
as such receives a place in the world of institutions."867  This place is held by the "ruler" 
(Fürst) who for Hegel is "first and foremost personality" (vor allem Persönlichkeit).868  
For these reasons alone, one should not quickly overlook the appearance of Hegel's 
"personality" within Rosenzweig's narrative, and especially not in regard to the question 
of Hegel's relation to the Prussia state.  Indeed, Hegel's "personality" should again and 
again be brought to the fore, as Rosenzweig himself does, however subtly. 
 Upon moving to Berlin Hegel had published his Logic (1816) and the Outline to 
the System (1818) and with these works shifted into the "foremost rank of German 
philosophers."869  Echoing Hegel's own leanings towards a state of "power"—a state 
which Rosenzweig, again continuing what he began with Napoleon, would later classify 
as "the chorus-leader in a dance of worlds"870—Hegel entered Berlin "with the promise of 
philosophical rule."871  In his inaugural address, Hegel claimed he was to bring about the 
"science of the middle-point" (Wissenschaft des Mittelpunkts),872 meaning thereby that in 
the city which stood in the "middle," namely Berlin, Hegel would centralize all of 
philosophy for his age.  Rosenzweig, drawing upon another "historical personality" to 
give credence to Hegel's thoughts, quotes here a letter to Hegel from Goethe, who in his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
866 HS 415. 
 
867 "damit auch hier dem persönlichen Willen sein Recht werde, die Persönlichkeit als solche in der Welt 
der Institutionen eine Stelle bekommen." HS 413. 
 
868 HS 412. 
 
869 "in die vorderste Reihe der deutschen Philosophen." HS 346. 
 
870 "Chorführer in einem Reigen von Welten." HS 373.  
 
871 "mit dem Anspruch auf philosophische Herrschaft." HS 346. 
 
872 HS 346.!
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"Über Kunst und Altertum" had also recently used the notion of "middle-point."  In that 
letter Goethe openly gives Hegel his support in "spreading a doctrine, wherefrom a life 
can be theoretically and practically fostered."873  Thus, with the blessings of the Prussian 
minister of culture and "the greatest German of the epoch," Hegel took his seat at the top 
of German philosophical thought. 
 But it was not only what Hegel would bring to and achieve in Berlin that shaped 
his personality there, rather the historical events that surrounded his life.  In 1819, just 
one year before Hegel would publish his Philosophy of Right, Karl Ludwig Sand, a 
student and member of a nationalist student fraternity (Burschenschaft), would 
assassinate the conservative dramatist August von Kotzebue upon nationalist grounds.  
Sand would soon thereafter be executed for his crime and through this execution was 
seen by the student fraternities and some professors as a martyr for the nationalist cause.  
In particular, Sand would receive the public support of the professors De Wette and Jacob 
Fries, both of whom were thereafter released from their duties as professors.  Along with 
a sharp increase in suspicion of "demagogy" in the university—and this explains the title 
of Rosenzweig's section here: "Demagogues"—this brought "the fight for academic 
freedom all at once to a focal point of political oppositions."874  When Hegel, seemingly 
against his own beliefs,875 famously sided amongst company with the right of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
873 "eine Lehre sich verbreite, woraus theoretisch und praktisch ein Leben zu fördern sei." HS 346-47. 
 
874 "So wurde mit einem Male der Kampf um Freiheit der Lehre zu einem Brennpunkt der politischen 
Gegensätze." HS 350. 
 
875 According to Rosenzweig he had recently participated in celebration honoring Sand and De Wette (see 
here HS 350).!!
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government to lay off a professor, according to Rosenzweig it was "the beginning of his 
emphatic political opinion in general."876   
 In his book Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Shlomo Avineri also highlights 
these events in Hegel's life as decisive for his historical legacy.  But unlike Rosenzweig, 
Avineri, himself a Jewish thinker, paints a much more damning picture of the student 
fraternities.  He emphasizes that although Hegel did show some support for the 
fraternities877 they were overall "the most chauvinistic element in German society."878  
Rosenzweig leaves unmentioned that many student fraternities were anti-Semitic and had 
even burned books at one of their recent gatherings.879  Jacob Fries, whom in the Preface 
to The Philosophy of Right Hegel calls a "leader of this superficial brigade of so-called 
philosophers,"880 would be denounced by Hegel (even using a quote by Goethe's 
Mephistopheles to do so!) for what Avineri calls his "moral subjectivism."881  In 
rewriting his Preface to The Philosophy of Right—and we are finally approaching here 
with Rosenzweig the content of Hegel's Philosophy of Right itself—he was soon to make 
a decision that would influence not only his own life, but his legacy as well: he choose to 
openly polemicize in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right directly against Fries: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
876 "der Anfang seiner entschiedenen politischen Stellungnahme überhaupt." HS 350. 
 
877 See here Avineri, 130-31.  Avineri provides a brief list of examples where Hegel showed his support for 
the student fraternities in order to help clear up the false assertion that "Hegel appeared in the context of his 
time on the side of the police against freedom of expression." 
 
878 Avineri, 119.  
  
879 Avineri goes as far as aligning the student fraternities with the rise of Nazism in Germany more than a 
century later (122).  
 
880 Hegel, PR. 15. 
 
881 Avineri, 121.  !
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 And so [Hegel] came to that political move, which already during his   
 lifetime stuck with him more than any other and which drove him through   
 its consequences more closely and unconditionally than he himself had   
 even originally thought into the arms of the Prussian government.882     
 
This quite fatal move on the part of Hegel resulted in his being identified, by biographers 
as early as Haym, with the Prussian state and later, in quite contradictory fashion, even 
German nationalism.883  And yet Rosenzweig reminds his readers even before 
introducing these decisive events, "[o]ne should by no means forget how much more 
"Prussian" Prussia first became since 1848 and how precisely at that time the scarce 
outlines of the sharp and dry market still seemed dispersed in the serene air of humane 
Bildung, which drifted over from Weimar."884  Avineri adds to this the quite obvious, yet 
still overlooked fact that Hegel had already worked out much of what he wrote in The 
Philosophy of Right in Heidelberg, even before coming into direct contact with the 
Prussian state.885  Thus, although Hegel's "reign" as philosopher in Berlin seemed 
undisputed, the "personality" of this "man from Stuttgart who spoke more with himself 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
882 "So kam er zu jenem politischen Schritt, der ihm mehr als irgendein anderer schon zu Lebzeiten 
nachgehangen und der ihn in seinen Folgen enger und bedingungsloser, als er wohl selbst ursprünglich 
meinte, der preußischen Regierung in die Arme getrieben hat." HS 351. 
 
883 See here the excellent contextualization by Avineri which I have been drawing on in pieces, which also 
takes into account texts published after Rosenzweig's book: "The Owl of Minerva and the Critical Mind" 
(Avineri, 115-31). 
 
884 "Man darf ja überhaupt nicht vergessen, wieviel 'preußischer' Preußen erst seit 1848 geworden ist und 
wie gerade zu jener Zeit noch die knappen Umrisse des scharfen und trokkenen Märkertums aufgelöst 
erschienen in der heiteren Luft humaner Bildung, die aus Weimar herüberwehte." HS 348. How much 
Rosenzweig's book is indeed a relic of the "pre-World War years" is painfully apparent here, through no 
fault of his own.  After the unfortunate coupling of Buchenwald and Weimar one can now hardly speak of 
the "serene air" drifting over from Weimar to Berlin.  
 
885 Avineri, 116.!
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than with his audience"886 was already being taken up into the stream of history and 
"scattered" (sprengen)887 about.  In the same sense in which Hegel would later claim that 
the works of great individuals are separate from the individuals themselves,888 Hegel's 
philosophy was already being taken up into the stream of history: "The changing role of 
Prussia in the context of German nationalism created [...] a new image of Hegel's political 
thought."889  Hegel's mistake was not polemicizing against Fries alone, as Rosenzweig 
nicely points out, but again in Avineri's words "in his ultimately naïve belief that these 
forces of nationalism and subjective romanticism were merely a carry-over from the 
past."890  Indeed, as Rosenzweig will point out in connection with Bismarck and also his 
teacher Meinecke and even decades before the rise of National Socialism, the role of the 
"nation" in Germany would define its history more than that of the "state."891  Thus with 
this public emergence of Hegel's "personality" in Berlin, like Kant and Fichte before him, 
and similar to Napoleon as well, Hegel himself was becoming that which he knew all too 
well: a world-historical personality.  It was in the full awareness of his significance as an 
historical individual that Hegel presented the culmination of his political philosophy to 
the world. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
886 "mehr mit sich selber als zur Hörerschaft redenden Stuttgarter." HS 348. 
 
887 HS 456. 
 
888 See here Avineri, 230. 
 
889 Avineri, 122.   
 
890 Ibid. 
 
891 See Chapter XII.!
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CHAPTER IX 
 
HEGEL'S "METAPHYSICS OF THE STATE": 
 
INDIVIDUAL, HISTORY AND RELIGION 
 
 
Introductory Remarks: On Hegel's Double-Thought 
 After leading his readers through the sometimes bewildering personal 
development of Hegel's individuality and then pitting this individuality against the forces 
of the world around it—Napoleon, Restoration, Prussia—Rosenzweig finally comes to 
rest with a sustained analysis of the Philosophy of Right itself.  How does Rosenzweig, 
who in the first half of the book took his readers on an architectural journey through the 
various "buildings" of Hegel's state,892 now paint this final "picture"?  Or, to continue the 
metaphor, is this then too a "building"?  As Wayne Cristaudo points out in his recent 
study on Rosenzweig in a chapter on Hegel, the idea of a "building" in this context is 
"something where the ends are forced into union as they becomes servants to the 
whole."893 Rosenzweig has taken his readers through many "buldings" before: there was 
the building in Tübingen, with the actual inscription above its door: "Aedes Deo et Musis 
sacrae"894; there was the metaphorical building of Hegel's first ideal of the state with the 
inscription "Discite justiciam moniti"895 (HS 80); and finally the building of Hegel's !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
892 HS 143. 
 
893 Cristaudo, 307. 
 
894 HS 38; "House of God and Sacred Music." 
 
895 HS 80; "Learn Justice from this Warning." 
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"power-state" with its inscription "power, power and again power" (HS 144).896  If we are 
now indeed entering a new "building" of Hegel's thought, then the inscription for this 
doorway must certainly be: "what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational."  
 After the Second World War, Hegel's name came to be commonly associated with 
two things: his dialectical method and his statement from The Philosophy of Right that 
"what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational".  These are also the two points 
where the most misunderstanding surrounding Hegel arises.897  Rosenzweig distances 
himself from Hegel and clearly avoides Hegelian language focusing little if at all on the 
method of "dialectics".898  In some senses, Rosenzweig's Hegel seems to be quite foreign 
from the one made popular in the wake of Marx and later the Frankfurt School.  Unlike 
Szondi, for example, Rosenzweig does not see the gradual emergence of the dialectic in 
Hegel's development, but a life-long tarrying with "actuality" itself.  This struggle with 
"actuality" was mirrored in the various stages of Hegel's personal life in the first volume 
of Hegel and the State.  What first began as the separation of "concept" and "experience" 
towards the end of the 18th century—and the desire to unite these two—resulted for 
Hegel in the tragic separation of life and thought experienced in Frankfurt.  The 
reconciliation of this tragic moment was found in the idea of the "fate of the state," and 
by way of this new association of fate with the political life of a people Hegel came to 
adopt the idea of a "power-state."  Finally, seen through the lens of an increasingly 
important philosophy of history, this "power-state" gave way to the "power" of history 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
896 HS 144; "Macht, Macht und abermals Macht." 
 
897 See here The Hegel Myths and Legends. 
 
898 Only in the final sections do we see the word "dialectic" creeping up, but much more often Rosenzweig 
simply uses "method" or later "ambiguity" (Zweideutigkeit) to describe Hegel's philosophical procedure.!
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itself, as was made manifest in the Phenomenology.  This development, which 
Rosenzweig has shown to lead from the private stream of personal life to the public 
epochs of the world, culminates in Hegel's famous line from the Preface to the 
Philosophy of Right: "what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational."899     
 When Rosenzweig finally comes to speak of the famous line from the Philosophy 
of Right, he begins his analysis by claiming that it would be mistaken to think that Hegel 
is merely claiming thereby "the identification of nature and spirit" (Gleichsetzung von 
Natur und Geist).900  Instead, Rosenzweig offers a close and critical reading of what early 
on he claimed would become the "motto" (Leitspruch)901 of the nineteenth century.  As 
Hegel himself claims, the task of the Philosophy of Right "is nothing other than an 
attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity."902  Because 
philosophy is "exploration of the rational," it is, as Rosenzweig points out, for that very 
reason and "not despite this,"903 "the comprehension of the present and the actual."904  
Rosenzweig emphasizes here not only the logical connection between "reason" and what 
is "actual," but also, as will be explained shortly, the very direction of this relationship.  
That is, while both philosophy and the world are rational, the rationality of philosophy 
precedes the rationality of the world.  Rosenzweig explains the importance of this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
899 Hegel PR. 20. 
 
900 HS 352. 
 
901 HS 24. 
 
902 Hegel, PR. 21. 
 
903 "das Ergründen des Vernünftigen"; "nicht trotzdem." HS 354. 
 
904 Hegel, PR. 20.!
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relation by looking at the context of Hegel's famous line and, once again, by drawing on 
Hegel's understanding and privileging of historical understanding. 
 Rosenzweig's account of Hegel's "motto" begins with a close reading of Hegel's 
allusion to Plato and Plato's conception of the state as encountered within the context of 
The Philosophy of Right in the lines leading up to Hegel's famous statement.  In those 
lines Hegel states that Plato—who in his Republic famously called for a philosopher king 
to rule over the state—has stood with his state for an "empty ideal" in political thinking, 
but in truth it represents "nothing other than the nature of Greek ethics [Sittlichkeit]."905  
With Plato then, so Rosenzweig, we have "a purified likeness of the Polis," a "Polis" for 
which "slavery" (Sklaverei) was a precondition and thus in terms of freedom only a "few" 
(einige) and not "all" (aller) could be free.906  Hegel continues, that  
  
 Plato, aware that the ethics of his time were being penetrated by a deeper 
 principle which, within this context, could appear immediately only as an as 
 yet unsatisfied longing and hence only as a destructive force, was obliged, in 
 order to counteract it, to seek the help of that very longing itself.907  
 
Rosenzweig focuses on this "deeper principle" that "penetrated" Plato's state as the key to 
unlocking Hegel's "motto," stating that for Hegel this "principle" was "doubtlessly the 
autocracy of the rational I tied to Socrates and the Sophists."908  Plato's "unsatisfied 
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905 Hegel, PR. 20. 
 
906 "ein gereinigtes Abbild also der Polis"; HS 354. 
 
907 Hegel, PR. 20. 
908 "Das 'tiefere Prinzip,' das in die Sittlichkeit der Polis 'einbrach,' ist für Hegel zweifellos die an Sokrates 
und die Sophisten geknüpfte Selbstherrlichkeit des vernünftigen Ichs." HS 354. 
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longing" (unbefriedigte Sehnsucht) for precisely this "rational I" obliged him to seek the 
help of a philosopher king who would "protect the endangered Greek state from the 
upheaval of critical reason."909  In this sense for Hegel, Plato's state, in which he 
recognized that reason was the "measure and guide of reality,"910 contained a "substantial 
truth" and was thus not an empty "ideal".911  But Plato's mistake was in seeking this 
rational principle "outside"912 of the state itself, namely, as Hegel will write in the body 
of the Philosophy of Right, by excluding "private property" and "family" and doing away 
with the freedom to chose one's own class [Stand].913  By taking away these rights, the 
latter of which stands as one of the major sources of freedom in Hegel's state, 
Rosenzweig observes that Plato "nullifies [...] even the existing freedom of the few in the 
actual Greek state."914  Thus, in reaching outside of the Greek state to forms of ethical life 
not contained within Greek life itself in order to overcome the "destructive force" of 
reason, Plato—despite the insistence on a philosopher king—"thereby inflicted the 
gravest damage on the deeper drive behind [this force], namely free infinite 
personality."915  In order for this freedom to extend to "all" and not merely a "few" 
individuals, the truth had to come "from above" [aus der Höhe].916  
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909 "für den vom Aufruhr der kritisierenden Vernunft bedrohten griechischen Staat." HS 354. 
 
910 "daß die Vernunft Maß und Wegweiser der Wirklichkeit zu sein habe." HS 354. 
 
911 Hegel, PR. 223. 
 
912 Hegel, PR. 20. 
 
913 Hegel, PR. 223.   
 
914 "wo selbst die im wirklichen griechischen Staat vorhandene Freiheit der wenigen [...] vernichtet ist." HS 
354. 
 
915 Hegel PR. 20.   
 
916 Ibid. 
 270 
 With the next move in his interpretation, Rosenzweig puts to use all of the 
painstaking attention he paid to the development not only of Hegel's political, but his 
religious thought as well.  For what was needed and for Hegel did indeed come "from 
above"—"the truth that 'all' should be free"917—"had to be revealed in the world of 
Christianity, before a new world-historical people, the Germanic, could take it up and 
actualize it."918  Hegel himself writes that the principle of "subjective freedom [...] is 
historically later than the Greek world, and the philosophical reflection which can fathom 
these depths is likewise later than the substantial Idea of Greek philosophy."919  In 
interpreting this passage, using language which he would later develop abstractly in his 
Star and then more concretely in Understanding the Sick and the Healthy, Rosenzweig 
writes that Plato "did not find the means to cure the sick world," but what he and the 
Sophists alike recognized was "the sickness" (die Krankheit).920  Plato, however, stood 
alone in "calling the correct doctor to the bed."921  For according to Hegel, he was the 
first to discover "the pivot upon which the impending world revolution turned"922—in 
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917 "die Wahrheit, daß 'alle' frei sein sollten." HS 355. 
 
918 "sie mußte der Welt im Christentum offenbart werden, ehe sie von einem neuen weltgeschichtlichen 
Volk, dem germanischen, aufgenommen und verwirklicht werden konnte." HS 355. 
 
919 Hegel, PR. 223.   
 
920 "Was Plato also nicht fand, war das Mittel zur Heilung der kranken Welt." HS 355. The language of 
sickness and health is important to point out here, for in Hegel's "motto" Rosenzweig recognizes the central 
argument in Hegel's metaphysics.  In Understanding the Sick and the Healthy, which was supposed to serve 
as an introduction for the layman to the ideas explored in the Star, the entire argument is built around the 
metaphor of sickness.  Rosenzweig's own actual paralyzing sickness aside, the language of interpretation 
here at such a central point of argument for Rosenzweig points towards the centrality in his thinking as well 
as to the role of "reason" in understanding "actuality."  
 
921 "daß er den richtigen Arzt ans Krankenbett rief." HS 355. 
 
922 Hegel, PR. 20. 
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Rosenzweig's words, "the thought that reason is to configure reality."923  With this line of 
argument Rosenzweig reaches the first half of Hegel's "motto": "what is rational is 
actual."      
   Emil Fackenheim, notable for his work on both Hegel and Rosenzweig, saw in 
this section of Rosenzweig's work a clarification of Hegel's thinking rare in contemporary 
scholarship.924  Rosenzweig's main contributions to the understanding of Hegel's often 
misused "motto" are first, his emphasis on the two separate parts of the statement and his 
explication of their relation to each other and second, in showing how the thought arises 
out of Hegel's own philosophy of history and religion.  Rosenzweig points out that critics 
of Hegel, and according to Fackenheim this also carries past the publication of Hegel and 
the State in 1920, take the second half of the "motto" -—"and what is actual is rational"— 
as the "core" (Kern) of the thought and criticize Hegel on these grounds for naively 
equating reality with rationality.  However, in order to understand Hegel's thinking here, 
one must proceed in the proper direction: before the world was rational, reason came 
"from above" and subsequently made the world a rational place.  This occurred for Hegel 
precisely when Christianity entered into the ancient world "with the thought of heaven on 
earth," making the words "what is rational is actual" into "an ethical demand and into the 
measure of all human features."925  Thus, Hegel's thought on the rationality of the world 
is preceded by reason itself entering this world and therefore this two-part thought cannot 
be understood to have counted "in general and for eternity" (nicht überhaupt und seit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
923 "der Gedanke, daß die Vernunft die Wirklichkeit zu gestalten habe." HS 355. 
 
924 See here "On the Actuality of the Rational and the Rationality of the Actual" in The Hegel Myths and 
Legends (42-49). !
925 "seit es durch das Christentum im Gedanken des Gottesreichs auf Erden zur sittlichen Forderung und 
zum Maßstab aller menschlichen Einrichtungen wurde."  HS 355. 
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ewig).926  It rather arose, or better descended, with the first "act" (Tat) of Christianity: 
namely, with the embodiment of divinity in the figure of Christ.  Rosenzweig writes, 
quite brilliantly simplifying Hegel's thought and banishing any misunderstanding of 
tautology: "Only because the rational has become actual—the principle of the act—only 
therefore is now—the principle of knowing—the actual rational."927  Thus, the two parts 
of Hegel's "motto" can be understood as follows: the first, the actuality of reason, is 
associated with the "act," or the beginning, and only since its appearance with 
Christianity is reason destined to work itself out upon the world; the second part, the 
rationality of what is actual, is a result of reason having entered into the world and 
functions now as a "principle of knowing," that is, as the way "to investigate how reason 
has worked itself out in [actuality]."928  Rosenzweig designates Hegel's recognition of the 
actuality of reason as an "innermost revolutionary thought,"929 whereas the result that 
actuality is rational "shows, how the state of our age should be recognized."930  In 
summary he writes: "Only since Christianity entered the world did reason become the 
foundation of the spiritual world and this rationality the principle for knowing this 
world."931  This is the new "Wendepunkt" in Hegel's thought, which he had been 
searching for since the tragic fall of Napoleon. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
926 HS 355. 
 
927 "Nur weil das Vernünftige wirklich geworden ist—Grundsatz der Tat—,nur deshalb ist nun—Grundsatz 
des Erkennens—das Wirkliche vernünftig." HS 355. 
 
928 "zu untersuchen, wie die Vernunft sich in ihr [Wirklichkeit] ausgewirkt habe." HS 355. 
 
929 "innerst revolutionären Gedankens." HS 355. 
 
930 "zeigt, wie der Staat unsres Weltalters erkannt werden soll." HS 356. !
931 "Erst seit das Christentum in die Welt trat, ist die Vernunft der Grund der geistigen Welt und diese 
Vernünftigkeit Grundsatz für das Erkennen dieser Welt geworden." HS 356. 
 
 273 
 We first encountered Hegel's famous line from The Philosophy of Right —"Was 
vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig"—shortened as the 
epigraph to the "Preliminary Remarks" of Hegel and the State as two lines separated by 
ellipses.932  This separation had the twofold effect of both explicitly showing the gap 
between "reason" and "actuality" in Hegel's early development, leading up to the 
Frankfurt ideal of "a unity with the age" (Vereinigung mit der Zeit),933 which was then 
realized with the completion of the Phenomenology.934   Yet on the other hand the 
epigraph, with its explicit separation of the two forces Hegel's tried his entire life to bring 
together, foreshadows the pulse of the entire book.   
 
 
Images from the "Preface"—and a "Film"  
 In the previous section we entered into the newest "building" of Hegel's thought 
and presented Rosenzweig's explanation of the inscription—"what is rational is actual; 
and what is actual is rational"—above its doorway.  And yet, how do these words now 
play out within this building of thought itself?  What does this ideal of the state, which 
Rosenzweig has been anticipating throughout the entirety of Hegel and the State as the 
crowning achievement of Hegel's development, finally have to offer?  
 A critical tone, more or less veiled throughout, now begins to come to light with 
Rosenzweig's introductory comments on The Philosophy of Right.  This is most evident 
in his treatment of two images Hegel uses to describe the task of his political philosophy.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
932 See here HS 23.  
 
933 See HS 130. 
 
934 HS 264.!
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Both images—one of a rose in a cross, the other of the owl of Minerva—are used by 
Hegel to underscore the metaphysical intentions of his work.   
 With the first image Hegel recognizes "reason as the rose in the cross of the 
present."935  Rosenzweig's explains the meaning of this cryptic image: "in the harsh wood 
of earthly suffering, the beautiful bloom of divine life."936  For Rosenzweig however, this 
image, which now sits "at the top of his [Hegel's] work"937 represents the culmination of 
the trajectory Hegel began in Frankfurt.  There, he vowed to "be not better than the age 
[...] but to be the best of it."938  Here, with the Philosophy of Right, Hegel does not want 
to be "the cross of the present," but has rather set out to know "the rose in it."939  
Rosenzweig's critical response to this seemingly beautiful image is unmistakable: "To 
know! Nothing more."940  Veiled in this exclamation is what Wayne Cristaudo calls 
Rosenzweig's "exasperation"941 with Hegel—and with philosophy in general—which he 
would fully unfold in The Star.  Is merely "knowing" enough to unite the rational with 
the actual?   
 In last lines of the foreword to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel famously comments 
that philosophy, as a critique of the present world around it, always comes too late, after 
the "owl of Minerva" has already flown:  Rosenzweig leaves this poetical and striking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
935 Hegel, PR. 22. See here footnote 27 (PR 391) for additional notes on Hegel's understanding of this 
image. 
 
936 "in dem harten Holz des irdischen Leidens die schöne Blüte göttlichen Lebens." HS 357. 
 
937 "an die Spitze des Werks." HS 358. 
 
938 "besseres nicht als die Zeit [...] aber 'aufs beste.'" HS 358. 
 
939 "nicht das Kreuz der Gegenwart, sondern die Rose darin hat er sich vorgesetzt zu erkennen." HS 358. 
 
940 "Zu erkennen! Nichts weiter." HS 358. 
 
941 Cristaudo, 300.!
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statement more or less untouched, repeating it word for word in his text.942  For Hegel, 
this now famous image was meant to show that philosophy does not proclaim how the 
world "ought" to be, but rather "that it is only when actuality has reached maturity that 
the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped 
in its substance, in the shape of an intellectual realm."943  Thus, as with the image of the 
rose in the cross above, Hegel claims that rather than being prescriptive, his philosophy is 
descriptive: that is, in strikingly metaphysical terms, it proclaims it is philosophy's task to 
know what is.  Again in an unmistakable critical tone, Rosenzweig takes a clear position:  
 
 Our task will now then be to uncover to what extent Hegel really submits to this 
 sentiment and purpose in his execution and to what extent that power of the will, 
 which he does not wish to acknowledge as ruling his thinking and thinking in 
 general, nevertheless still overwhelms him.944    
  
The "power of the will" (Macht des Willens) which he claims is "overwhelming" Hegel, 
is both the "will" of the state that Rosenzweig has observed creeping into Hegel's 
thinking as a power over the individual, but also, and just as significantly for our 
observation, the power of Hegel's own will,945 his own individuality.  In this critical 
introduction to the Philosophy of Right, where Rosenzweig, most clearly for the first time 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
942 HS 358. 
 
943 Hegel, PR. 23.   
 
944 "Unsere Aufgabe aber wird nun zunächst sein, aufzudecken, wieweit Hegel in der Durchführung sich 
wirklich unter der Herrschaft dieser Stimmung und Absicht gehalten und wieweit etwa jene Macht des 
Willens, die er über seinem Denken und über dem Denken überhaupt nicht anerkennen mochte, ihn selber 
dennoch übermannt hat." HS 358. !
945 HS 356. 
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in the book, is openly questioning Hegel's claims, we can observe Rosenzweig's method 
of subtly mixing his biographical argument with his philosophical analysis of Hegel as 
an historical figure.  And again, it was especially the personality developed in the wake 
of the personal tragedy in Frankfurt that according to Rosenzweig still dominates Hegel's 
views.946  Is Rosenzweig preparing his readers for the tragic fall of Hegel, much like 
Hegel himself witnessed the fall of Napoleon?  It is with this question in mind that one 
should approach Rosenzweig's sustained analysis of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.   
 In a letter to his cousin Hans Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig calls the section "The 
Development of the Systematic" (Das Werden der Systematik) a "film" inside the larger 
narrative.947  This "film," a 'moving image' in contrast to the architectural language used 
until now and which frames and introduces Rosenzweig's analysis, shows to what extent 
Hegel's own "will," and not the objective "spirit" of history, is at work in the 
development of his system leading up to the Philosophy of Right.  It would exceed the 
limits of this project to follow all the various categories and moments within Hegel's text 
that the "film" introduces.  Accordingly, instead of following every historical and 
philosophical moment Rosenzweig articulates, I would instead like to isolate three 
categories, which I hope crystallize at least in part some of the major themes in both 
Hegel's thought and Rosenzweig's interpretation.    
 These categories are drawn from the section entitled "Metaphysics of the 
State."948  This section, where the question of the state as "a thought of philosophy" (ein 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
946 HS 358. 
 
947 Rosenzweig, Briefe, 16.6.14. !
948 "Metaphysik des Staats." HS 438-456.   
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Gedanke der Philosophie)949 is finally taken up, is unique within Hegel and the State.  
For the first time Rosenzweig noticeably switches from the role of an historian with 
philosophical intentions, as was best displayed in "Stations of Life" and also the first half 
of the second book, into the character of the philosopher himself.  Remembering 
Rosenzweig's famous letter to Meinecke here, where he makes the distinction between 
"student" and "philosopher,"950 this section on the metaphysics of the state can also be 
said to point beyond the text of Hegel and the State itself.  Already in the first section, 
"The Essence of the State," Rosenzweig aims to understand what is at stake "without 
making such an immediate use of Hegelian language."951  In what follows below, I would 
like to briefly look at the following themes, which summarize Hegel's picture of the state 
in the Philosophy of Right and, read with a critical eye, already foreshadow some of the 
elements that remained from Hegel and the State in Rosenzweig's thinking.  The themes 
to be discussed, which appear intertwined and certainly compliment each other, are: the 
individual, history and religion.    
 
 
The Individual: Or the "Essence of the State"  
 The concept of the "individual" provides the most common thread throughout the 
entirety of Hegel and the State.  Already in the foreword Rosenzweig presented a group 
of individuals—Hegel's biographers Rosenkranz, Haym and Dilthey—to show how 
historical knowledge is dependent on the individual's perspective upon his present age.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
949 HS 438. 
 
950 See Chapter I. 
 
951 "ohne allzu unmittelbaren Anschluß an das Hegelsche Wort." HS 439.!
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This insight applies—autobiographically—to Rosenzweig as the "fourth biographer" in 
this line, a role he was well aware of.  On a second level, as I showed in Chapter II, 
Rosenzweig followed the intricate development of the relation of the individual to the 
state from Hegel's youth onward and argued thereby for a gradual shift away from the 
rights of the individual towards the power of the state.  Finally, Rosenzweig applies the 
concept of the "individual" to Hegel himself as a biographical subject.  This is especially 
clear in the second volume of the book, where Rosenzweig presents Hegel's development 
in terms of the fate of a "world-historical" hero. To these historical and biographical 
usages of "individuality" Rosenzweig now adds the important distinction of the state as 
an individual itself.        
 Towards the end of the sub-section entitled the "Essence of the State", which 
appears in the section "Metaphysics of the State," Rosenzweig quite unexpectedly lays 
out the underlying thesis of his entire book in succinct terms:  namely, "that which we 
have followed from the beginning of [Hegel's] thinking: the origin of the idea of the 
power-state through the mediation of the concept of fate from the spirit of a most taut 
individualism."952  It is with this thesis in the backdrop that he offers his encapsulating 
assessment of The Philosophy of Right.  This assessment in volume two follows from the 
groundwork Rosenzweig laid in volume one.  As we already saw, the "power-state" 
emerged with the Reichsschrift within Hegel's development in combination with the 
concept of fate he gained in Frankfurt.  We are familiar with Rosenzweig's summary: 
"The experience of the state as fate becomes the knowledge: the state is power."953  What 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
952 "das, was wir von den Anfängen seines Denkens her verfolgten: der Urpsrung der Machtstaatsidee 
durch Vermittlung des Schicksalsbegriff aus dem Geiste eines gespanntesten Individualismus." HS 442.   
 
953 HS 139. 
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came out of this combination of personal fate and state-power was Hegel's new task: "to 
meld together the internal fullness of personality with the power-nature of the state."954  
And what began simply as "the relation of the individual to the state" and made its way 
through the Reichsschrift and into the beginnings of Hegel's system in Jena, has finally 
merged as the "most taut individualism" into the completed thought of the Philosophy of 
Right.  What is the nature of this "individualism" and what is the nature of Hegel's state? 
 The state as it appears in the Philosophy of Right must be understood as a 
philosophy of state, whose aim it was to help teach its readers to "grasp" (begreifen) the 
"ethical world" (Sittlichkeit),955 as discussed above.  Its lasting contribution, for 
Rosenzweig at the beginning of the 20th century as well as for readers today at the 
beginning of the 21st century, is to help orient thinking individuals in the basic relation of 
man to the political world.  In the section "Metaphysics of the State," whose title is all the 
more striking given the complete disinterest in Hegel's "metaphysics" as outlined in the 
Encyclopedia, Rosenzweig's guiding question is what happens when the state becomes "a 
thought of philosophy"?  
 "The peculiarity of the state," writes Rosenzweig, "is that it is indeed something 
ultimate for man, who in a certain sense cannot see beyond it, but that it is likewise 
'individuality' and thus really nothing ultimate at all."956  This double-nature of the state, 
it's being both ultimate and universal while remaining individual and particular, is what 
Rosenzweig unfolds in relation and opposition to individual man in his critique of The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
954 "innere Fülle der Persönlichkeit mit der Machtnatur des Staats zu verschmelzen." HS 167. 
 
955 See Hegel, PR. 22. !
956 "es ist die Eigentümlichkeit des Staats, daß er zwar dem Menschen gegenüber ein Letztes bedeutet, 
worüber dieser gewissermaßen nicht hinausgehen kann, daß er aber gleichwohl 'Individualität' und also 
doch wieder kein Letztes ist" HS 439. 
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Philosophy of Right.  In general, the culmination of Hegel's political philosophy is a play 
of particular to whole.  According to Rosenzweig's reading, this play, or dialectic, must 
result for Hegel in  "something ultimate" (ein Letztes).  That Hegel's political thinking 
aims at an "ultimate" underscores Rosenzweig's interpretation that we are dealing here 
with a metaphysics that assumes an "unconditional" end.  This end in itself, the 
unconditional relation of man to the state, is mediated by a series of "conditional" 
relations.  By following theses relations, Rosenzweig argues that in the end the state is 
indeed not something ultimate and unconditional, but subject to the laws of individuality 
itself.  
 The main body of The Philosophy of Right, which Rosenzweig summarizes in his 
own words as much as possible in order to create critical distance, is split into three 
distinct parts: "Right," "Morality" and "Ethicality." In part one—"Right"—the individual 
is defined in terms of his will and his acknowledgement that there are other individuals 
surrounding him with wills of their own.  The wills that make up this collection, aligned 
for Hegel with Roman civil law (Privatrecht), are conditioned by the other wills 
surrounding them and thereby together form a plurality, but not yet a community 
(Gemeinschaft).  In order to become part of a community as opposed to a mere plurality, 
the individual will must have a sense of right and wrong, or morality.  Accordingly, in 
part two, "Morality," in order to gain a moral law that is not arbitrarily based on the will 
of other people, the individual turns in on himself—the Kantian self-legislation of moral 
law as was already introduced in the Phenomenology.  But now, rather than being 
surrounded by actually existing wills, the individual is set in relation to an ideal 
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community.  Thus, morality is not an unconditional end in itself, but in need of an actual 
community existing outside of it: this is the realm of "Ethicality," part three.   
 This section sets up the relation between individual and society.  Here the 
individual moves from family life into civil society and is finally taken up into the state.  
The individual's relation to the state, however, is at first mediated by a particular 
community (Gemeinschaft).  The community an individual becomes part of is determined 
by the freedom to choose one's own occupation.957  Thus, here the freedom of 
individuality is combined with the necessity of belonging to a greater whole.  For both the 
individual and the community, the other establishes an ultimate end: first, there could be 
no community without individuals, but likewise, in order for the individual to emerge 
from its self-enclosed legislation, he or she must necessarily become part of a 
community.  Although this relation is final for the individual—"the individual no longer 
leaves it"958—it is not yet the ultimate relation.  
 The individual belongs to society as part of community.  But society itself has "no 
relation to something like an epitome of humanity."959  It is merely the "gathering place 
for all communities."960  Thus, since the individual determines its place in society through 
the "arbitrary"961 inclusion in an occupational community, rather than establishing a 
necessary and unconditional link between the individual and society, Hegel's concept of 
civil society is always based on a conditional relation.  This conditional dialectic of part !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
957 Hegel, PR. § 206. 
 
958 "aus dieser tritt nun der einzelne nicht mehr heraus." HS 440. 
 
959 "hat daher auch keinerlei Beziehung etwas zu einem Inbegriff der Menschheit." HS 440.   
 
960 "nur Sammelplatz für allerlei Gemeinschaften." HS 440. !
961 PR § 206; HS 441. 
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to whole, however, must come to an end for Hegel with the state.  Society as a whole 
belongs within the sphere of the state.  Without the state, there could be no society.  Thus, 
by extension, the individual, as part of a community within society, necessarily belongs 
to the state as well.  As Rosenzweig writes: "he is not allowed to separate between the 
'chance' of his particular placement and the 'necessity' of belonging to a state."962 (HS 
441).  This necessary relation of individual to state is the unconditional end Hegel's 
political thought aims towards. 
 But here Rosenzweig interjects in terms that foreshadow his "relational" thinking 
in The Star.963  "This unconditionality," he writes, "is the unconditionality of a 
relation."964  He continues: "Something truly unconditional has to be a single unity."965   
That Hegel's political philosophy does not result in a "single unity" for Rosenzweig is 
based on the problem that both the state and man must presuppose the other.  In order for 
the state to exist, he argues, philosophy must presuppose the real existence of man.966  
However, it can only prove this existence philosophically if it again presupposes that man 
is part of the state, for otherwise the presupposition would remain groundless.  The state, 
on the other hand, is the result of the thought-process and cannot be proved until the end: 
"the system can only be represented in one direction."967  Thus, the problem with these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
962 "er darf zwischen dem 'Zufall' seiner besonderen Stellung und der 'Notwendigkeit,' einem Staate 
überhaupt anzugehören, nicht scheiden." HS 441. 
 
963 See here Jules Simon, Rosenzweig's Relational Ethics. 
 
964 "diese Unbedingtheit ist die Unbedingtheit eines Verhältnises." HS 441. 
 
965 "Das wahrhafte Unbedingte muß ein Eines sein." HS 441. 
 
966 HS 441. !
967 "da ebendas System nur in einer Richtung dargestellt werden kann." HS 441. 
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presuppositions, which can only be noticed at the final stage of the book with the state, is 
that they never result in an "unconditional relation" as Rosenzweig claims is Hegel's goal, 
but merely a series of assumptions, which can never be proved.  The ultimate result of 
Hegel's political thought is thus not the necessary relation of man to the state, but the 
necessity that the state itself is always stuck in a relation.  Because Hegel's philosophy 
begins with the presupposition of a free individual will, it can never fully escape the 
"reality" of its task: namely, that it, too, is defined not by totality, as an unconditional 
relation would imply, but by individuality.  Thus, the state is not an end in itself, but will 
always remain, as individuality, a "state among states" (Staat unter Staaten).968    
 As Hegel believed already in Jena with his understanding of a power-state, one of 
the predominant factors that make up a state is the ability of its citizens to defend 
themselves.  This then presupposes that the totality of a state is defined in terms of its 
borders, indeed, its borders separating it from another state. With this central idea of 
Hegel's power-state in mind, it is not a far leap to the claim that the state is defined in 
terms of individuality as a "state among states."  This emphasis on behalf of Rosenzweig 
not only undermines Hegel's claim to the necessity and unconditional nature of the state, 
but also shows one of the defining features of the essence of Hegel's state: as an 
"individual" it is, despite Hegel's insistence, "unconcerned about the wills of 
individuals."969  Rather, the true essence of the state cannot be separated from its fate: 
that it is and will always remain historically determined.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
968 HS 442. !
969 "ein um diesen Willen der Individuen unbekümmertes 'Individuum.'" HS 442. 
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History: Or the "Fate of the State" 
 We have already seen how in the first half of the book the concept of "history" 
became the determinate character for Hegel's picture of the state.  It was during what 
Rosenzweig later calls Hegel's "romantic Epoch" (romantische Epoche),970 that is, his 
time in Frankfurt when he was closest to Hölderlin, that history rose to its prominent 
height in Hegel's thinking with the concept of "fate."  Drawing on Hölderlin's Hyperion, 
Rosenzweig emphasized how Hegel's new conception of the state as part of the historical 
fate of the individual, and the resulting configuration of the state as "power," undermines 
the very freedom of the individual himself.  The consequence of the coupling of history 
and the state led Rosenzweig to a conception of "fate" as "the whole of life as it 
confronted the individual, something unavoidable, which he cannot escape from."971  In 
Hegel's "Napoleonic period," this same thought was expressed with Rosenzweig's 
exposition of the "right of the chorus," or history as the formative force of the present.  
Through his experience of the "tragedy" of Napoleon's fall, Hegel's conception of fate 
shifted from the individual to history itself.  In now turning to the completed Philosophy 
of Right, this "whole of life," the "fate" of the individual as history itself, becomes the 
"actuality" of the state in the world as a "state among states."  Here too, as in "practical 
life," the state is conceived as "individuality."  But whereas the individual of practical life 
was confronted with "history" of which the state was a part, the fate of the state itself is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
970 HS 386. 
 
971 HS 119. !
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bound to Hegel's conception of  "world history."972  This is also the title of the last section 
of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.973 
 In engaging Hegel's conception of history as world history Rosenzweig once 
again takes up a single thought from Hegel's text in order to help illustrate its significance 
for the state: "world history is the world court."974  This line, taken from Schiller's poem 
"Resignation" (1786), is interpreted by Rosenzweig as a continuation and consequently 
"metaphysical" completion of the famous double-thought, or "motto," from Hegel's 
Preface.  Here too, the question is one of a relation, namely, between "substantial reason 
and subjective actuality,"975 or more generally phrased, between "nature" (Natur) and 
"spirit" (Geist).  In explicating Hegel's "double-thought" from the Preface, Rosenzweig, 
keeping in mind the image of the "owl of Minerva," concluded that this thought only 
leads one to "cognition" (Erkennen) of the world, but takes "the movement from living 
things."976  With Schiller's line this becomes all the more clear for Rosenzweig.  "If world 
history is the world court" he writes, "then as a result the present is judged in that it 
becomes past."977  In becoming past the present ceases to be actual.  Since for Hegel what 
is rational must necessarily be actual as well, when the present is judged and "becomes 
past," it thus "renders itself as abandoned by reason."978   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
972 HS 444. 
 
973 Hegel, PR. §341. 
 
974 "die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht." HS 444. 
 
975 "substanzieller Vernunft und subjektiver Wirklichkeit." HS 444. 
 
976 "den lebendigen Dingen die Bewegung nehmen will." HS 444. 
 
977  "Ist die Weltgeschichte das Weltgericht, so empfängt das Gegenwärtige sein Urteil dadurch, daß es 
Vergangenheit wird." HS 444. !
978 "erweist es sich als von der Vernunft verlassen." HS 444. 
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 How this process plays out whereby a people is first enveloped and then judged 
and abandoned by world history provides the "factor" (Grösse) that was explicitly 
missing from Hegel's "motto" in the foreword: "time" (Zeit).979  By inserting "time," and 
we are speaking here of historical time captured in a philosophy of history, as the 
relational link between "what is rational" and "what is actual," the central role of Hegel's 
philosophy of history is once again brought to the fore.  As was explained above, 
actuality only became rational for Hegel after the appearance of Christianity and the 
figure of Christ.  But this recognition itself was already imbedded in a philosophy of 
history or a way of looking at, or judging, the past.  When Christianity entered the world, 
all that came before it then became "past," that is, was abandoned by reason and ceased to 
be actual.  Thus, with the notion that history is the judge of the people and events of the 
world in mind, Rosenzweig can conclude that "only because world history is the world 
court [...] only therefore can what is actual be rational."980  Rosenzweig is hereby not only 
claiming the central importance of history for Hegel's thought.  Since time "only goes in 
one direction and does not run backwards,"981 through the emphasis on this concept 
Rosenzweig is bringing out the particular and irreversible appearance of a people within 
history as fate.  We have already encountered Hegel's personal fate, which led him in part 
to the thought of the fate of the individual in history; now this individuality has been 
subsumed into the "individuality" of the state.  And, as a "state among states" within the 
court of world history, this state is to be understood as a "willing" individual with a fate 
of its own.  However, this fate is not merely the "reasonless necessity of a blind fate," like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
979 HS 444. 
 
980 "Nur weil die Weltgeschichte das Weltgericht ist [...] nur deshalb ist das Wirkliche vernünftig." HS 445. 
 
981 "da die Zeit nur in einer Richtung und nicht rückwärts läuft." HS 444.!
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that of a practical individual, but the "exposition and actualization of the universal 
spirit."982  
 In laying out the relation of the state to history in terms of fate as a process, 
Rosenzweig reminds his readers that "the actual being [of the state] as a willing 
'individual' is the immediate appearance of the rational world order."983  While this 
"rational word order" remains "immediate" and thus recognizable to reason, the 
"appearance" of the peoples of the world in the configuration of a state changes with 
time.  The state is thus merely "a step in the process" of the "development" or "becoming 
conscious" of the "universal spirit" (allgemeiner Geist).984  Echoing Herder's own 
"natural" language of history, Hegel sees the "blossoming" of a people in the moment 
where what is essential to world history proceeds from them and their "fall" when they 
"persevere" in this moment and world history moves on without them.  Perhaps the best 
example for this is the central passage in Rosenzweig's treatment of Hegel's 
Phenomenology: the "blossoming" of freedom in the French Revolution and the "fall" of 
the free individual with the concluding "terror" of the Robespierre reign.   
 This process whereby reason as "universal spirit" first actualizes and then 
abandons a people, a process which can be said to guide the entirety of Hegel's Lectures 
on the Philosophy of History, also applies in the first place to the "destiny of the great 
man,"985 and for this there is no better example than Napoleon.  In working out the role of 
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982 "vernunftlose Notwendigkeit eines blinden Schicksals"; Auslegung und Verwirklichung des allgemeinen 
Geists." HS 445-46.    
 
983 "sein wirkliches Dasein als wollendes 'Individuum' sei die unmittelbare Erscheinung der vernünftigen 
Weltordnung." HS 444. 
 
984 See HS 446.!
985 "Des großen Mannes Geschick." HS 446. 
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the state within world history, Hegel himself writes that "at the forefront of all actions, 
including world-historical actions, are individuals as the subjectivities by which the 
substantial is actualized."986  In terms of the state within world history, these individuals 
are the "visible external side" (sichtbare Außenseite).987  If the people is a world historical 
people, as the French certainly were with the rise of Napoleon, then the individuals at the 
"forefront of all actions" also follow the "necessities of world history,"988 similar to the 
ebb and flow of the world historical people and their states.  Thus, the individuals 
himself, as a world historical "hero" (Heros),989 is also bound to what Rosenzweig earlier 
called the "tragic fate of history."990   
 When Rosenzweig deals with Hegel's conception of "the fate of the state," the 
close reader cannot ignore the prominent placement of the theme of "personality" within 
the discussion.  This is most clear with Rosenzweig's interjection when discussing the 
fate of the state: "Nevertheless, for the third time the reciprocal penetration of 
'subjectivity' and 'substantiality,' which rules over the entire doctrine of 'objective spirit,' 
consolidates itself into human personality."991  Thus, Rosenzweig emphasizes that even 
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986 Hegel , PR, 375. Rosenzweig notes here that this emphasis on the individual in history is also the secret 
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987 HS 445. 
 
988 "den Notwendigkeiten der Weltgeschichte." HS 446. 
 
989 HS 446.  
 
990 HS 298. 
 
991 "Immerhin, zum dritten Mal verdichtet sich die wechselseitige Durchdringung von 'Subjektivität' und 
'Substanzialität,' welche die ganze Lehre von 'objektiven Geist' beherrscht, zur menschlichen 
Persönlichkeit." On the three times: first the "bourgeois," then the "ruler" (Fürst) and now the "hero." HS 
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from the heights of world history and the fate of the state, we are again brought down into 
the world of the "individual" and "personality".  
 To summarize: for Hegel, the fate of the state is inevitably bound to the fate of 
history.  This history, however, is controlled by the actions of individuals.  And to repeat 
Hegel's phrase: "At the forefront of all actions, including world-historical actions, are 
individuals as the subjectivities by which the substantial is actualized."992  This claim by 
Hegel is made within the context of "World History" towards the very end of the 
Philosophy of Right.  But if we have again ended up with the fate of the individual 
beginning with the fate of the state, we must momentarily step away from Hegel and 
world history and closer to Rosenzweig's own philosophy of history.  For readers of the 
Star, it is already evident within the first few pages that this strikingly personal book, 
compared to Hegel and the State, begins with an account of history controlled by the 
fates of individuals.  Whereas for Hegel individuality is ultimately in service of the state, 
for Rosenzweig the state has receded into the background and the philosophers and their 
work take center stage.  This brief detour is necessary to remind readers that Hegel and 
the State, as much as it follows the political history leading up to the founding of the 
German nation state, is a book about an individual philosopher.  Thus, woven into 
Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy, and this is most apparent 
when contrasted with the fate of the state within history, is always the fate of the 
particular individual George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  Implicit in Rosenzweig's 
argument is that an essential part of this fate is Hegel's thinking on the state and relation 
to the political world around him.  But another, indeed substantial part of Hegel's fate, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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equally present in Rosenzweig's interpretation, and yet always falling into the shadows of 
his analysis of state power, is Hegel's relation to religion.  
  
 
Religion: Or "Beyond the State" 
 As we already saw in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, and just above with 
the discussion the "fate of the state," Hegel's changing relation to religion helps to 
determine the exact character of his state.  Of course, given Rosenzweig's own 
philosophical legacy as a philosopher of religion, this aspect cannot be overlooked in any 
reading of Hegel and the State.  But even so, Hegel's relation to religion is so central to 
his political philosophy and philosophy of history that it can be followed without break 
from his earliest days in Tübingen.  Peter Gordon is correct to point out that Rosenzweig, 
given his stature as a Jewish philosopher later in life, rather curiously omits any real 
discussion of Judaism in his interpretation of Hegel.993  But it would be a mistake to read 
Hegel and the State as if there were no relevant philosophy of religion to be found here.  
On the contrary, the emphasis upon Hegel's religious thought becomes ever stronger as 
the book proceeds, to the point that at times, one may believe to be reading the 
Rosenzweig of The Star. 
 In his book Hegel, Frederick Beiser begins his introduction with a reference to 
Rosenzweig, whom he calls "one of the greatest Hegel scholars."994  He states that 
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993 See Gordon, "Hegel's Fate." In Rosenzweig and Heidegger (2003). 
 
994 Beiser, 1.   
 
 291 
Rosenzweig "declared he lived in an age post Hegel mortum."995  That is, in an age which 
had outgrown the concerns of Hegel himself.  While it is a fitting introduction to his own 
concerns, namely the question as to why read Hegel today at all,996 in our context an 
equally provocative and famous quote from Rosenzweig is perhaps better suited.   In a 
letter to his cousin Hans Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig writes: "The fight against history in the 
19th-century sense [...] is for us the fight for religion in the sense of the 20th."997  For 
Rosenzweig, his own age cannot be considered post Hegel mortum in the sense that it 
excludes Hegel himself—and by extension the work Rosenzweig put into Hegel and the 
State—it is rather the philosophical inversion of Hegel's century of historical thought into 
a century of religious thought.  Within the 20th century Rosenzweig became known as a 
philosopher of religion at the expense of his historical thought.998  By revisiting 
Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's religious thought—albeit, as it is addressed within 
his political thinking—one can witness how the beginnings of Rosenzweig's own 
religious thought are rooted in his historical understanding and interpretation of Hegel.  
This is nowhere more evident than in the passages leading up to and encompassing the 
section "Beyond the State" (Jenseits des Staats).  
 We have already witnessed the important role religion played for Hegel in his 
early development.  What first began as an infatuation with the Christian response to 
Greek culture and how this was manifested into historical and political communities, then !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
995 Ibid. 
 
996 Beiser responds that "despite his damnable obscurity, [Hegel] is still an interesting interlocuter to 
contemporary philosophical discussion." Beiser, 3. 
 
997 Rosenzweig, Briefe, 9.26.1910. 
 
998 This is mostly due to the interpretation of his thought as a Jewish philosophy of history, which 
understands the Jewish people as existing beyond the confines of time, and thus outside of history, leading 
to the belief that Rosenzweig saw little value in world history at all. !
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culminated in the Phenomenology with religion, "as consciousness of absolute Being as 
such,"999 which Hegel places above the political state.  This view of religion as a realm 
beyond the state was carried over into Hegel's own biography during his Napoleonic 
period, when "spirit," which religion alone could access, maintained its place above the 
state.   It was not until Hegel's "Homecoming" to the state that religion regained its 
decisive place as the historical mediator of the political present.  The "Preface" to the 
Philosophy of Right, as I have shown above, leaves no doubt as to the central role of 
religion in Hegel's political thought.  
 The development of Hegel's thought culminates with religion "lifted out of the 
sphere of history."1000  As was certainly still the case with the Phenomenology—"[u]ntil 
1806 world history was itself the absolute"1001—Hegel's conception of history around the 
time of the Philosophy of Right no longer placed history as the highest order.  Rather, 
history—the "development towards 'freedom'"1002—now served Hegel as a mediator 
between "completed ethical organization" (vollendeten sittlichen Organisation) and "life 
within 'absolute spirit'" (des Lebens im 'absoluten Geist').1003  This lowering of history 
allowed Hegel to unfold a conception of religion that was independent from the state.  
However, Hegel's state is "not an external and soulless mechanism"1004 and at the very 
least through the concept of "political sentiment" (politischen Gesinnung) which is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
999 Hegel, Phenomenology. 410. 
 
1000 "über die Sphäre des Historischen hinausgehoben." HS 447. 
  
1001 "Bis 1806 war die Weltgeschichte das Absolute selber gewesen." HS 448. 
 
1002 "Entwickelung zur 'Freiheit'." HS 448. 
 
1003 HS 448. !
1004 "Der Staat ist ja eben kein äußere und seelenloser Mechanismus." HS 453. 
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nothing less than "patriotism" (Patriotismus),1005 the state and religion meet on similar 
ground.  But the conflict between the two arises when religion—"rightfully so" (mit 
Recht) adds Rosenzweig—claims to contain "the absolute truth" (die absolute 
Wahrheit).1006  But how can religion make this claim to truth when "it is only through 
being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical 
life"?1007  In other words, how does Hegel reconcile religion and the state?  Hegel's 
preliminary answer is that the state and religion are different manifestations "of the same 
spiritual content" (des gleichen geistigen Inhalts).1008  As Rosenzweig points out, for 
Hegel, the state "also has a doctrine."1009  However, ultimately, although Hegel may seem 
to reconcile the state with religion, Rosenzweig argues that the doctrine of the state wins 
out over the doctrine of the church.   
 Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel's philosophy of religion is again bound up with his 
critique of Hegel from the first pages of the Star as a thinker of totality.  As we already 
saw, Rosenzweig characterized the most pivotal shift in Hegel's Frankfurt period with the 
following words: "The idea of the unity of all life gained force."1010  Although we 
encounter Hegel now years later, what was begun in Frankfurt has again reached another 
peak.  Without explicitly stating it, Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel's presupposition of the 
"unity of all life" (Einheit alles Lebens) looms in the background of his presentation of 
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1010 "Die Idee der Einheit alles Lebens gewann Gewalt." HS 97.  !
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the reconciliation of religion and the state.   The crucial point in Hegel's later thought is 
the Protestant break from the Catholic Church.  In order for Hegel's state to retain the 
"universality" necessary for its authority over the individual, Hegel must accept and 
embrace the split in the church that resulted in Protestantism: "only so, over the 
particular churches, does the state maintain the universality of thought."1011  This 
understanding of religion as broken into different churches allows the state and religion 
to coexist: on the one hand, the individual can still live freely in an "ultimate empire" 
(letztes Reich)1012—that is, a realm of "loneliness," which Rosenzweig very tellingly 
designates as the "being-alone of the soul" (Beisichselbersein der Seele).1013  But in order 
that this realm does not rob the state of its authority, Hegel removes it from the clutches 
of the one Catholic Church—which by its very nature still made claims to totality—and 
placed into the religious world of Protestantism—the world of the one church broken into 
many.   
 With this move towards the reconciliation of the state with Protestant Christianity, 
writes Rosenzweig, "[a]ll the driving forces of the Hegelian thought on the state"1014 
come together: the self-sufficiency of the state; the unconditional relation of the 
individual to the state; and the spirit of world history, which, because it remains unseen, 
does not destroy the self-contained nature of the state.1015  Religion is allowed to exist, 
indeed it must exist in order for the individual to maintain its particular freedom and not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1011 "nur so, über den besonderen Kirchen, hat der Staat die Allgemeinheit des Gedankens." HS 455.   
 
1012 HS 447. 
 
1013 HS 447. 
 
1014 "Alle Triebkräfte des Hegelschen Staatsgedankens." HS 455-56. !
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be completely subsumed into the state, but one could say that this religion has become a 
personal or "individualistic" (individualistisch)1016 religion, which is ultimately 
powerless against the state.  If one pauses for a moment to consider the central position 
religion would soon take in Rosenzweig's own thought, one can certainly agree with 
Wayne Cristaudo when he writes that for Rosenzweig "Hegel's Protestantism was but a 
thin veneer for philosophy itself usurping the role of religion."1017  This perspective gains 
even more importance when it is noted that Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel's philosophy 
on religious grounds, however subtle, comes at the very end of his analysis of the 
Philosophy of Right.  Here the relation of the individual to the state, which we have 
followed from the beginning, reaches its culmination.  And once again, as we reach such 
a significant mark in the book, Rosenzweig draws his readers back to Hegel's days in 
Frankfurt. 
  "The cornerstones of the entire, Hegelian System," writes Rosenzweig in the 
concluding words of the "Metaphysics of the State," "the absoluteness of the individual 
and the absoluteness of the whole, mutually suport each other."1018  Beginning in Hegel's 
Frankfurt period, Rosenzweig argued that the individual no longer stood above or even 
equal to the whole beyond him, but that at that time Hegel began to understand the state 
as a part of the individual’s fate.  This elevation of the state above the individual soon 
resulted in the state itself taking on traits of individuality, eventually defining itself in 
terms of power.  We saw how through the tragic law of history, which Hegel witnessed 
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1018 "Die Eckpfeiler des ganzen, Hegelschen Systems, die Absolutheit des einzelnen und die Absolutheit des 
Ganzen, stützen sich gegenseitig." HS 456.!
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first hand with the fall of Napoleon, world history itself became the commanding force of 
the state, removing the individual even more from the freedom he once enjoyed in 
Hegel's earlier thought.  Now in Berlin, Hegel believes himself to have reconciled the 
freedom of the individual through a conception of religion, which allows for religion to 
exist beyond the state.  However, according to Rosenzweig's increasingly critical view, 
"the will towards the religious salvation of the individual soul beset with the world and 
fate demands the concept of the self-legislating and self-ethicizing state."1019  Thus, in 
Hegel's thinking the state replaces religion as the redemptive force in the world.  We saw 
the beginnings of this idea—which ultimately would transform into Hegel's notion of a 
"power-state"—in Frankfurt.  Thus, Rosenzweig can write that "what once happened in 
Frankfurt [...] what was once blood and life, has now become completed work."1020  For 
our purposes here we could say that with this final discussion of the role of religion in 
Hegel's political thought, the state is finally victorious over the individual.  It is with this 
ultimately critical view of Hegel's conception of individuality in mind that Rosenzweig 
writes these concluding words:  
   
 The process of a becoming closes into the ring of being. In the beginning   
 stood the growing pains of a human soul, at the end stands Hegel's    
 philosophy of the state.1021   
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1019 "der Wille zur religiösen Rettung der von der Welt und Schicksal bedrängten Einzelseele fordert den 
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These final words of the section "Metaphysics of the State" conclude the broad critique of 
the relation of the individual to the state begun in Frankfurt.  They also show the 
trajectory of Rosenzweig's own biographical interpretation of Hegel: from the "growing 
pains" of Hegel's youth, which put him side-by-side with Hölderlin and which more or 
less showed him to be a passionate protector of individuality, we end with Hegel the 
systematizer, whose own personality is replaced by his system in thought.  We can 
further observe in these words the kernel of Rosenzweig's critique of German Idealism 
for ultimately raising philosophy above the life of the individual.  In the context of 
Hegel's development, Rosenzweig implies here that from the struggles of a human soul 
we are left nothing but a "work."  Is this all an individual can hope for?  Are we nothing 
more than the work we put into the world?  And can this work ever escape the "tragic law 
of history"?  
 It is with these unasked but certainly implied questions that Rosenzweig turns 
from Hegel's biography as a completed work to his final years and the beginnings of his 
philosophical legacy.  This break in the narrative is located within the "Prussia" section, 
but is curiously presented without its own title.1022  However, the shift is clear.  Indeed, of 
all the passages in the book, this one most clearly lets Rosenzweig's own voice break 
through.  From the powers of history and their tragic law, we now move towards the call 
so familiar to readers of Rosenzweig: "Into life." 
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CHAPTER X 
PHILOSOPHICAL INTERLUDE: 
"INTO LIFE" 
 
 "Into life" (Ins Leben)—these are the now famous last words of The Star of 
Redemption.  In an early review of the book, Hans Ehrenberg writes that "[t]he only thing 
I regret about the book [...] is the unnecessary last word with which the author, who 
surely does not need to speak in this way, concludes, paying tribute to our times by 
suddenly joining in the call: 'from philosophy to life'."1023  The "unnecessary" ending 
Ehrenberg refers to, is a reference to the philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie) 
movement that was so prevalent in Europe in the early 20th century.  We have already 
touched upon this movement in relation to Dilthey, for whom "lived experience" was the 
necessary beginning to all philosophical and historical reflection. Rosenzweig certainly 
falls into this broad movement, as do many other thinkers of the time.  This is apparent in 
Hegel and the State, as was pointed out in Chapter II, from the frequent use of a "stream 
of life" to capture biographical meaning.  But, as Ehrenberg's comment implies in the 
context of the Star, limiting Rosenzweig to the classification as a philosopher of life 
undermines much of his originality.  For, as Ehrenberg goes on to conclude in his review, 
it is not the reflection upon life as a philosophical topic that differentiates Rosenzweig 
from his generation, but that he is one of the few chosen ones, who is "granted to gaze 
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upon the blossom [of life] in the moment of its fullest splendor."1024  He continues to 
claim that "[n]ew epochs and new series of works can take their point of departure only 
from such individuals."1025   
 If The Star of Redemption is understood as the beginning of a "new epoch," the 
same cannot be said of Hegel and the State.  Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of 
the book is its entanglement in its age and if anything, its fateful appearance at the end of 
an epoch.  Nevertheless, both works are indebted to the philosophy of life of the age.  
Despite Ehrenberg's misgivings that Rosenzweig openly linked The Star of Redemption 
to one of the popular movements of the day, the command to go from the confines of a 
book "Into life" has imbued Rosenzweig's legacy with a wide range of practical 
applications—ranging from psychoanalysis1026 to the interfaith discourse.1027  However, 
in contrast to the Star, the philosophy of life on display within Hegel and the State must 
be limited to what Otto Bollnow calls "historical philosophy of life" (geschichtliche 
Lebensphilosophie).1028  This division of the philosophy of life championed by Dilthey 
acts under the principle that "man only knows himself within history" (daß sich der 
Mensch nur in der Geschichte erkennt)1029 and is accordingly the assumption by which 
Hegel and the State proceeds.  
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   The most obvious manifestation of "historical philosophy of life" within Hegel 
and the State is its biographical form.  In line with this form of inquiry, which follows the 
"life" of an individual along the trajectory of birth to death, Rosenzweig's book would 
seem to deal with the "life" of Hegel.  However, underlying this trajectory is another 
notion of "life," which Rosenzweig implements without elaborating on conceptually.  
This is not the personal or even autobiographical notion of life found within The Star—
the call to move away from the book itself "Into life"—but life understood as "historical 
life."  Chapter I has already put forth the terms by which Rosenzweig's Hegel should be 
understood as an "historical Hegel."  Within the body of Hegel and the State, the notion 
of "historical life" is synonymous with the "stream of history," into which and out of 
which the personal lives of individuals flow.  This is markedly different from the notion 
of "life" in The Star, where "life" is something that falls outside of historical progress and 
comes to its highest realization in "God's truth."1030  In The Star, the words "to walk 
humbly with thy God" are "written over the gate [...] which leads out of the mysterious-
miraculous light of the divine sanctuary in which no man can remain alive."1031  Whereas 
"to live" in The Star means to enter into "eternity" of the present moment, the notion of 
"life" in Hegel and the State is still bound to the stream of history and time. 
 This is nowhere more apparent than in the break leading from Hegel's 
"Metaphysics of the State" to what I entitle below the beginnings of "Hegel's Historical 
Life."  Here, shortly after Rosenzweig has closed another circle leading from and 
returning to Frankfurt, he writes the following words, which leave no doubt that the 
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authors of The Star of Redemption and Hegel and the State are writing in the same spirit, 
however contrasted the perspectives remain: 
  
 Being falls into the history from which it emerged, and it dissolves it again into 
 becoming. As a whole, Hegel's Natural Right only worked in school, not in life.  
 Life first had to spring the unity of thought in order to newly reassemble the 
 scattered pieces.1032  
 
These lines, which show such similarity to the primacy of "life" in The Star, certainly 
seem to have been written during the second revision of the book in 1918 and not 
earlier.1033  If we juxtapose the last line quoted above with a central idea from Part One of 
The Star, leaving the quotes in the original German, the similarity is striking: 
  
 Hegel and the State: 
  "Das Leben mußte erst die Einheit des Gedankens sprengen, um die versprengten 
 Stücke neu einzubauen."1034    
  
 The Star of Redemption:  
 "Wir haben das All zerschlagen, jedes Stück ist nun ein All für sich [...] das 
 Zusammenwachsen des Stückwerks zum vollkommenen des  neuen All, wird erst 
 später kommen."1035  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It is quite obvious from this juxtaposition that in both books, Rosenzweig is critical of a 
simple unity of knowledge.  The concept of the "All" that is "zerschlagen" in The Star is 
the philosophical result of Hegel's "unity of thought" in Hegel and the State.  In Hegel 
and the State, however, Rosenzweig is still "under the spell of Meinecke" and thus under 
the spell of historical power.  In this early work "life" is still equated with history and it is 
history that has the power to both destroy and reassemble Hegel's unity of thought.  Thus, 
whereas we can speak of "life" in The Star when we come face to face with "God's truth," 
in Hegel and the State we must limit ourselves to life as it appears within the stream of 
history.  It is finally with this break in his narrative, which so reminds us of what is at 
stake in The Star but could be easily missed in Hegel and the State, that Rosenzweig 
moves from the "powers of history" as they influenced Hegel's thought as a world-
historical hero, to the beginnings of Hegel's own legacy and his fate as expressed in the 
language of "historical life." 
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CHAPTER XI 
HEGEL'S HISTORICAL LIFE 
 
 
Introductory Remarks  
 When Rosenzweig first began to conceptualize his dissertation project, he 
intended to engage with German cultural history, but in a different manner than the 
finished product shows.  Rosenzweig's earliest dissertation plans are recorded in a letter 
to his cousin Hans Ehrenberg from 1909.  There he remarks that he is interested in the 
"prehistory" of German "imperialism," leading from the beginning of the 19th century up 
until the founding of the new empire in 1871.  He expresses his research plans to Hans 
Ehrenberg as follows: 
  
 Ich werde im Winter 1870 anfangen und mich so allmählich rückwärts fressen, 
 also zuerst Wagner (der mir deshalb so interessant ist, weil hier der
 Zusammenhang der modernen Germanizisten mit dem Vormärz durch eine 
 Persönlichkeit hergestellt wird; dann die Partei der "Preußischen Jahrbücher," 
 die rückwärts auf die Partei der "Deutschen Zeitung" hinweisen. Und so 
 allmählich—mit der nötigen Oberflächlichkeit—rückwärts. Du kannst dir denken, 
 wie schön ich das 19. scl. dabei kennen lernen werden.1036 
 
In the finished product that lays before us, the period leading from the Vormärz—a 
designation for the period of German history generally spanning from Napoleon's fall in 
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1815 until the "revolution" in 1848—up until the founding of the empire in 1871 takes up 
only a small portion at the end of the book.  Indeed, striking in our connection is 
Rosenzweig's open desire in this letter to link the epochs of German history by means of 
a "personality."  In the same letter, Rosenzweig writes that all ways lead first through 
Wagner, but then eventually to Hegel.  It would be this second "personality," to the 
complete exclusion of the first, that would dominate Rosenzweig's dissertation.  And 
rather than showing the "prehistory" of German Imperialism, Hegel and the State 
functions more along the lines of a philosophical biography, leaving Hegel's influence 
upon his age mostly for the two concluding chapters.  This shift from a "superficial" and 
sweeping analysis of the German 19th century to the more narrow approach of 
philosophical biography, betray Rosenzweig's desire to work first within the conceptual 
frame of "individuality" and only then expand his thinking into world-historical terms.  
And although Rosenzweig will pay tribute to his original dissertation conception in the 
concluding chapter of Hegel and the State, as I will show below, it is again an 
"individual" who acts as the placeholder of history and also the figure who for 
Rosenzweig best exemplifies the beginning of Hegel's legacy: none other than the 
infamous Karl Marx himself.       
 
 
Marx: The Secular Prophet  
 The relationship between Rosenzweig and Marx is largely unexplored1037 because 
Rosenzweig himself hardly mentions him in his writings.  However, one glance towards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1037 For an exception see, Cristaudo, Religion, Redemption, and Revolution. Chapter 13: "Beyond the 
Prophets of Modernity: Rosenstock-Huessy and Rosenzweig on Nietzsche and Marx." 
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Germany at the beginning of the 20th century shows an age where "Marx" and 
"Marxism" seemed to be daily words in the political world—for good or for bad.  But 
Rosenzweig himself, unlike the thinkers of the Frankfurt school for example,1038 would 
not give in to the "materialist" leanings of his age.  For him, as he expressed it quite 
directly in Hegel and the State, Marx would remain the "fanatical herald of the human 
future."1039 
 With the appearance of Marx within the pages of Hegel and the State, we are once 
again reminded of one of Rosenzweig's unspoken methodical principles: the inclusion of 
an individual personality to help explain the progress of history.  Although Marx's 
appearance in the book is rather brief, he stands as the last personality discussed in the 
section "Prussia," and in this manner is given a privileged position within the formal 
make-up of the book.  In terms of content, there are two aspects by way of which 
Rosenzweig contrasts Hegel and Marx: one political and one religious. 
 Marx's contribution to Hegel's political thought leads us back to the discussion of 
the "estates" (Stände).  Rosenzweig credits Marx with discovering and championing an 
estate Hegel had missed: the "fourth estate" (Vierte Stand) or the class of the 
"proletariat."1040  So important was this class for Marx, that he no longer believed the 
state to be the place of "human destiny" (Geschick der Menschheit),1041 but the 
battleground of this class alone.  This led to a major shift in his appropriation of Hegel's 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1038 See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973.  
 
1039 "fanatische Verkünder menschheitlicher Zukunft." HS 470. 
 
1040 HS 468. 
 
1041 HS 468. 
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thought: "At the point that the state held for Hegel, Marx places society."1042  This shift 
from "state" to "society," which then allowed Marx alone to observe "the face of the 
proletariat climbing up from the darkness,"1043 placed upon the shoulders of "society" 
what Hegel had seen for the "state": "it, society, now appeared as the carrier of the world-
historical course towards the consciousness of freedom."1044  With "freedom" now to be 
found in "society" and not the state—to recall, for Hegel, society remains a moment 
lodged within the unfolding whole of the state—the individual was no longer bound to 
the limits of his relation to the state alone, but could find freedom anywhere there was a 
society—and this meant anywhere in the world.1045  Rosenzweig emphasizes that with the 
recognition of the proletarian "fourth estate" and the new reign of "society" above the 
state, Marx really had in mind an "actual world-spanning community" (eine wirklich 
weltumspannende Gemeinschaft).1046  With his idea of a "world-spanning community," 
wherein the individual was to find "the highest ethicality" (höchste Sittlichkeit), there was 
thus no need for the ethicality of any other "earthly community" (irdischen 
Gemeinschaft), including the church.1047  And here, and in only a few brief lines, we 
move from Rosenzweig's political to his religious critique of Marx.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1042 "An die Stelle, die bei Hegel der Staat einnahm, tritt bei Marx die Gesellschaft." HS 469. 
 
1043 "das Gesicht von dem aus Dunkel aufsteigenden Proletariat." HS 469. 
 
1044 "sie, die Gesellschaft, erschien nun als Trägerin des weltgeschichtlichen Ganges zum Bewußtsein der 
Freiheit." HS 469.   
 
1045 Cristaudo comments that Rosenzweig is critical of the notion of society here, because Marx "failed to 
grasp the power and meaning of the nation." (Cristaudo, 374).   
 
1046 HS 470. 
 
1047 Ibid.!
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 For Marx, the church did not have to be denied, "its superficiality was apparent 
(ihre Überflüssigkeit lag zutage).1048  Nothing on earth could stand above "society" and 
its claim to the freedom of the individual.  If "society" was the future gathering-place of 
"human destiny," then there was no need in the world for the church: 
 
 But of course, at the point where Marx left the matter, with the cosmopolitan 
 society, now, according to the profound comparison of the great Christian poet of 
 the North, the immitated picture, whose empire is only of this world, could be 
 brought home in the church to the true one, whose empire is not of this world.1049   
  
The "great Christian poet of the North" that Rosenzweig speaks of above is Selma 
Lagerlöf, the same writer whom Rosenzweig and his cousins were discussing on that 
fateful evening in 1913.1050  Rosenzweig is making a reference here to her book Die 
Wunder des Antichrist (The Miracles of Anti-Christ), where she deals with the relation of 
socialism to Christianity in the contrasting language of day and night, worldly and 
otherworldly.1051  The argument against Marx that Rosenzweig so subtly inserts, is that 
by placing "society" and the needs of the proletariat above all other earthly things, Marx, 
as Wayne Cristaudo correctly points out, "left matters as a mere imitation of the 
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1048 HS 471. 
 
1049 "Aber freilich, an der Stelle, wo Marx die Sache ließ, bei der weltbürgerlichen Gesellschaft, könnte 
nun, nach dem tiefsinnigen Gleichnis der großen christlichen Dichterin des Nordens, das nachgeamte Bild, 
dessen Reich nur von dieser Welt ist, in die Kirche zu dem echten, des Reich nicht von dieser Welt ist, 
heimgebracht werden." HS 471. 
 
1050 This is the famous "Abendgespräch" discussed in Chapter I, where Rosenzweig was convinced by his 
cousins, albeit only temporarily, to convert to Christianity.  
 
1051 Selma Lägerloff. Die Wunder des Antichrist. München: Nymphenburger, 1985 (1897).!
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Church."1052  By attempting to undermine the church by denying it a place in history, 
Marx's "cosmopolitan society" unwittingly proved Lagerlöf's point, namely that precisely 
because the church is "not from this world" does it maintain its role as the true place of 
human freedom.  This argument underscores Rosenzweig's view that Marx's ideal of 
society is linked more closely with an otherworldly realm and therefore surrenders to the 
idealist traps he wanted to avoid and not the material world he had hoped to redeem. 
 The significant, yet brief appearance of Marx in Hegel and the State—and this is 
the most pronounced treatment of Marx anywhere in Rosenzweig's works1053—is 
significant because it shows an important instance of Rosenzweig's philosophy of 
history—following Dilthey and Meinecke by interpreting the past through the lives of 
historical individuals—but also shows the continued undercurrent of religion in the book.  
In terms of Hegel's effect upon Rosenzweig's own age,1054 Marx represents the figure in 
whose thinking the unity of Hegel's system was preserved, but not in the form Hegel had 
given it, rather one chosen by Hegel's "historical life" instead.  Thus, despite his critique, 
Rosenzweig acknowledges that Marx was the first to really carry out the "the great 
thought of immanence" (großen Gedanken der Immanenz),1055 a phrase Rosenzweig 
attributes to Treitschke, but which could equally have come from his cousin Hans 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1052 Cristaudo, 374.   
 
1053 See here Cristaudo, 373. 
 
1054 As Ritter notes: "In more recent literature, it is true that the significance of civil society for Hegel's 
philosophy first begins to get fully disclosed in that literature's consideration of Marx in his relation to 
Hegel [...] In this connection, the treatment of the relationship of "lordship and bondage" in the 
Phenomenology [...] has attained nothing short of classic meaning for Marx and the Marxist school." 
Ritter's comment relates to my section on Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel's Phenomenology, where I argue 
that it is primarily through the Phenomenology that Hegel has been passed on to the 20th century. !
1055 HS 471. 
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Ehrenberg, who classifies Hegel's thought as "absolute[] Immanenzphilosophie."1056  
Additionally, and more important for our argument here, Rosenzweig writes that Marx 
was the only one in the Hegelian School to keep the most "original" aspect of Hegel's 
political thought: "the power of Hegelian quietism, of belief in fate,"1057 which 
Rosenzweig had followed from Frankfurt to Berlin.  Hegel's result, the "fate of the state," 
becomes the "fate" of "society" for Marx and leads him, "and only him," in terms 
undeniably Christian, to see "where and how and in what form the end of days gathered 
in the sky of history."1058  Running parallel to this portrait that Rosenzweig paints of the 
secular prophet and his visions for the future of mankind, is the "fate" of Hegel's life as it 
is taken up into historical knowledge: the end of the biographical life and the beginning 
of Hegel's "historical life" stand in tension as two sides of the same face.   
  
 
A Revolutionary Epoch 
 Although the beginnings of Hegel's legacy are most pronounced in the figure of 
Marx, before Rosenzweig lets the force of "historical life" completely take hold of the 
biographical life, he lingers again on Hegel as an historical individual, showing that his 
task as a biographer is not yet complete: "The one spirit of the thinker still held the 
empire together, he was still the master of the whole and ruled over it in proud 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1056 Ehrenberg, Parteiung. 55.   
 
1057 "die Kraft des Hegelschen 'Quietismus,' des Schicksalsglaubens." HS 470. 
 
1058 "wo und wie und in welcher Gestalt die Endzeit am Himmel der Geschichte heraufzog" HS 470.   !
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repose."1059  It is once again in terms of a unified personality, an individuality—"the one 
spirit of the thinker"—that Rosenzweig's narrative proceeds.  The quote above again 
reveals the tragic anticipation found so often throughout the book.  As we reach the end 
of Hegel's life, the necessary precondition within the logic of his double thought, "die 
Vernunftsimmanenz des Wirklichen,"1060 is called all the more into question.  With this 
emerging division between thought and reality Rosenzweig shows how Hegel's 
individual life is reflected in the very epoch he is trying to rationally grasp—how the acts 
and thoughts of his "station of life" are coming up against the "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) of 
the "epochs of the world."  There is one historical event in particular that stands out 
towards the very end of the epochs of Hegel's life.  With the last lines of the section on 
Prussia—"Then came the July Revolution"1061—Rosenzweig leaves his readers in 
suspense of this epoch making event, gradually building his historical narrative to its 
"dramatic" peak.  In the year 1830, one year before his death, the unified stream of 
Hegel's personal life begins to break apart, and he is thrust unrelentingly into the 
ultimately tragic expanse of "historical life." 
 It cannot be denied that beginning with the French Revolution in 1789, the epoch 
of Hegel's life and legacy was the result of many historical upheavals.  We have already 
seen how the French Revolution played a large role in shaping Hegel's early development 
and how Napoleon's invasion of Germany and the subsequent collapse of the Holy 
Roman Empire was a catalyst for Hegel's understanding of the tragic character of history.  
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1059 "Noch hielt der eine Geist des Denkers das Reich beisammen, noch beherrschte er das Ganze und 
thronte darüber in stolzer Ruhe." HS 471.   
 
1060 Ehrenberg, Parteiung. 56. 
 
1061 "Da kam die Julirevolutuion." HS 471.!
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But in 1830, just one year before Hegel's death, another revolution would again threaten 
the fragile stability of Hegel's epoch.   
 The "July Revolution" was a three-day uprising in Paris in the summer of 1830 
that saw the fall of the Bourbon Monarchy and the rise of what became known as the July 
Monarchy.  In his book Europe in 1830 Clive H. Church, who convincingly argues for 
reexamining the July Revolution within a broader European context, writes that these 
experiences of 1830 "amounted to the most significant attempt to reverse the Restoration 
and return to the kind of political life which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic upheavals 
had previously brought to the peoples of Europe."1062  For Hegel and his generation, who 
for the last fifteen years had seen "the devil of the revolution painted upon the wall,"1063 
the July Revolution was an ominous sign that signified the collapse of "the elaborate 
building of European freedom."1064  Hegel himself was deeply shaken: 
 
 After three and a half decades of war and upheaval, which he had experienced 
 since his youth, he was counting on quiet, external quiet at least, that would allow 
 the world-spirit, which, as he expressed it in 1816, was so busy with actuality, to 
 again turn inward and to internally collect itself. And now everything became 
 newly uncertain.1065  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1062 Clive H. Church. Europe in 1830. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983. 
 
1063 "den Teufel der Revolution so oft an die Wand gemalt." HS 489. 
 
1064 "[d]as kunstreiche Gebäude des europäischen Friedens." HS 489. 
 
1065 "Nach den dritthalb Jahrzehnten kriegerischer Umwälzung, die er seit seinen Jünglingsjahren miterlebt 
hatte, mochte er auf Ruhe gerechnet haben, äußere Ruhe wenigstens, die dem Weltgeist, der, wie er es 1816 
ausdrückte, in der Wirklichkeit so sehr beschäftigt gewesen, es verstatten würde, sich wieder nach innen zu 
kehren und sich in sich selber zu sammeln. Und nun wurde das alles aufs neue ungewiß." HS 490. !
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Rosenzweig's formulation of Hegel's sentiment above, shows not only that Hegel still 
very much believed in the truth of the "world spirit"—the rational spirit of history—but 
that he thought that this spirit was still in tune with the "actuality" of the historical 
present.  Or in other words, as we already heard in Rosenzweig's commentary on The 
Phenomenology, at this juncture Hegel was—albeit now more than ever in the spirit of 
his "quietism" or "belief in fate"—still of the mind that he was standing "eye to eye with 
the age."1066  But, just like after the fall of Napoleon, Hegel was now once again forced to 
witness a break between his thinking and the reality it was supposed to represent.  Hegel, 
as Rosenzweig reads it from his letters after 1830, lived the last of his days in "fear of 
revolution" (Revolutionsfurcht).1067 
 Thus the "July Revolution," which is also the title of the penultimate section of 
Hegel and the State, not only presented the threat, as the German historian Niebuhr 
wrote, of "a return to barbarism" (Rückfall in die Barbarei) within what Rosenzweig saw 
as an "anti-Goethean generation" (goethefeindliche Geschlecht),1068 but for Hegel the 
Catholic leanings of the French state threatened to end the "Protestant epoch" 
(protestantische Epoche)1069 he was living in, which began with the Napoleonic 
upheavals, and subsequently to make his ideal of the state impossible.  As Rosenzweig 
argued and I showed above, in 1820, in order for Hegel's concept of the state to reign 
absolute, it required a plurality of churches to rule over, not just one to stand in conflict 
with.  In the years before the July Revolution, writes Rosenzweig, "the 'Catholic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1066 "Auge in Auge mit der Zeit." HS 264.   
 
1067 HS 502. 
 
1068 HS 489. 
 
1069 HS 500. 
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principle' remained the unanswered question for [Hegel], the 'break' in France's 
constitutional future."1070  This led Hegel to further underscore the Protestant character of 
his political thinking and even modify his thinking, thereby transforming his ideal of the 
state to conform to the political reality of his day.       
 
 
 Hegel's Religious Thought—in Political Context 
 In "The Metaphysics of the State" we saw how Hegel attempted to reconcile 
religion and with the state by arguing for the necessity of Protestant Christianity and its 
break with the unity of the Catholic Church.  Within Protestantism, the state could have 
absolute authority while allowing the authority of the various churches to exist by its 
side—or even above it—but never threaten its worldly position.  However, this position 
was indeed being threatened by the rise of clericalism—the support of the interest of the 
Catholic clergy in political matters—throughout Europe.1071  And for Hegel, in March of 
1826 a "personal" experience brought "the problem of state and catholicism" to "the 
middle of his political interests."1072   
 As we saw already saw, Hegel was a public figure in Berlin, and with the 
publication of The Philosophy of Right in 1820 he had already made as many enemies as 
friends.  One can only imagine that for the following decade, the public expressions of 
Hegel's philosophy were scrutinized and even seen as dangerous.  This was indeed the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1070 "das 'katholische Prinzip' bleibt ihm die ungelöste Frage, der 'Bruch' in Frankreichs konstitutioneller 
Zukunft." HS 508. 
 
1071 See HS 496. 
 
1072 "persönliche"; "das Problem Staat und Katholizmus"; "die Mitte seines politischen Interessenkreises." 
HS 495. 
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case with a lecture on the philosophy of history he gave in March of 1826.  The subject 
was the place of Catholicism within history.  As early as Jena, Hegel relegated 
Catholicism within his philosophy of history to a particular stage of Christianity, which 
was essentially overcome with the emergence of Protestantism.  In his lecture in Berlin, 
this position apparently upset a local Catholic chaplain in the audience, who reported 
Hegel to the Minister of religion for "public slander of the Catholic religion."1073  Hegel 
defended himself by replying that while lecturing at an Protestant university and under a 
more or less Protestant government, he was justified to point out the "papal idolatry and 
superstition"1074 of the Catholic Church.  Although this incident was resolved without 
punitive consequence for Hegel, what he saw in France as "the political emancipation of 
the Catholics in the until now purely Protestant state"1075 was enough for him to revisit 
his picture of the state developed in The Philosophy of Right.  The occasion came in 1827 
with the publication of the second edition of his Enzyclopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften (Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences).1076 
 Rosenzweig's interest in the Encyclopedia is purely for its relation to the 
development of Hegel's picture of the state.  What begins as the general task of adding 
"amendments to the great work of philosophy and right," transforms itself with the 
discussion of state and religion less into the desire to expound upon this discussion in the 
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1073 "öffentlicher Verunglimpfung der katholischen Religion." HS 496. 
 
1074 "papistischen Götzendienst und Aberglauben." HS 496. 
 
1075 "die politische Emanzipation der Katholiken im bisher rein protestantischen Staat." HS 496. 
 
1076 The first edition was published in 1817. 
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great political work, "than in a certain sense to replace it."1077  In his treatment of the 
Preface to The Philosophy of Right, Rosenzweig argued that Hegel's motto to the book—
the famous line on "reason" and "actuality"—could only be understood by drawing on 
Hegel's philosophy of history.  Accordingly, although Plato recognized in his state ideal 
that reason was the "measure and guide of reality,"1078 it was not until the world-
historical event of the birth of Christianity that reason became "the foundation of the 
spiritual world."1079  In terms of his philosophy of history, this implied for Hegel that 
historically, religion followed the state.  But in 1827, this relation was reversed.  What 
was missing from Plato's state, the "free self-conscious will" (freien selbstbewußten 
Einzelwillen),1080 could not have been predicted by Plato.  For according to Hegel, it was 
first with Christianity that the concept of a "free self-conscious will" came into existence.  
Since for Hegel "freedom enters into its highest right"1081 in the state, and in this manner 
individual freedom is a prerequisite for the state in general, now in 1827, "the state must 
necessarily come later than religion."1082  This reversal of the role of religion and the 
state—placing religion before the state in his philosophy of history—runs not only 
counter to Hegel's philosophy of history in 1820, but ultimately introduces a new 
conception of the state, which according to Rosenzweig is designed precisely to resist the 
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1077 "Ergänzungen zu dem großen rechtsphilosophischen Werk"; "als in gewisser Beziehung zu ersetzen." 
HS 497.  !
1078 "Maß und Wegweiser der Wirklichkeit." HS 354. 
 
1079 "Grund der geistigen Welt." HS 356. 
 
1080 HS 498. 
 
1081 Hegel PR. §258. 
 
1082 "der Staat müsse notwendig später kommen als die Religion" HS 499.!
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Catholic forces gaining political ground in Hegel's age.  In Rosenzweig's words, Hegel's 
critique of Catholicism has now shifted to the center of his new state ideal: 
 
 Catholicism is also unable to carry this true state for the same reason that Plato 
 could not know the true state.  The construction of history that in 1820 was the 
 foundation of the basic thought of the entire philosophy of right, is now being 
 used for the single purpose of showing the incompatibility of Catholicism and the 
 state.1083 
    
 In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel's conception of the state depended on a 
juxtaposition of the state against a multiplicity of churches: "only so, above the particular 
churches, does the state have the universality of thought."1084  In 1827, Hegel took 
religion from its relegated place as "internal" (innerlich) and "lonely" (einsam) and 
placed it more prominently as a determining factor of the state: "no longer could belief 
remain in the recess of the internal und be closed off from the acts and order of life."1085  
On the contrary, Hegel now believed that "only upon the ground of religious freedom 
could the freedom of the state thrive."1086  And it was only in the religious freedom of 
Protestantism, not in Catholicism, "which separates the divine and the worldly,"1087 that 
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1083 "aus dem gleichen Grund, aus dem Platon nicht den wahrhaften Staat erkennen konnte, ist auch der 
Katholizismus unfähig, diesen wahrhaften Staat zu ertragen. Die 1820 dem Grundgedanken der ganzen 
Rechtsphilosophie untergebaute Geschichtskonstruktion wird jetzt schon zu dem einen Einzelzwecke 
errichtet, die Unverträglichkeit von Katholizismus und Staat zu erweisen." HS 499. 
 
1084 "nur so, über den besonderen Kirchen, hat der Staat die Allgemeinheit des Gedankens." HS 455. 
 
1085 "nimmer könne der Glaube im Winkel des Innern verbleiben und abgeschlossen werden von Tat und 
Ordnung des Lebens" HS 501. 
 
1086 "nur auf dem Boden der religiösen Freiheit die staatliche gedeihen könne." HS 501. 
 
1087 "die Heiliges und Weltliches trennt." HS 507. 
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Hegel thought "true political freedom" (wahre politische Freiheit)1088 was possible.  
Thus, while in 1820 Hegel's state was based on the juxtaposition of the one state to many 
churches, Hegel now based his ideal of the state "upon the one Protestant faith."1089  
 According to Rosenzweig, this change in thinking was not a mere detail within 
Hegel's philosophy of state, but rather showed that a force was at stake here that Hegel 
had been trying to reckon with for his entire life: "actuality" (Wirklichkeit)1090 itself.  
Beginning with the July Revolution in 1830, the very "actuality" that until now Hegel had 
learned to rationally grasp, was visibly falling out of his grip.  We are again confronted 
with Rosenzweig's unspoken thesis that Hegel's life—mirrored in his generation—was 
constantly in tension between "concept" and "experience."  Hegel would indeed try to 
incorporate the July Revolution into his lectures on the philosophy of history, arguing 
that the fall of the Bourbons in 1792 and again in 1830 only prove his point, first recalled 
by Marx and later by Rosenzweig, "that great decisions, in order to legitimate themselves 
as irrevocable for human consciousness, must occur twice."1091  This 'doubling' of 
history, which Marx had called the move from tragedy to comedy, also shows that in the 
reversal of state and religion in Hegel's philosophy of history Rosenzweig saw Hegel's 
move as a comedic— in Hegel's own words, taking his “small coincidental own being in 
bitter seriousness for absolute”1092—reconciliation of religion with the state.  However, 
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1088 HS 505. 
 
1089 "auf die eine protestantische Gläubigkeit." HS 501.   
1090 HS 502. 
 
1091 "daß große Entscheidungen, um sich dem menschlichen Bewußtsein als unumstößlich zu legitimieren, 
doppelt eintreten müssten." HS 507. 
 
1092 Hegel, Natural Law. 105. 
 
 318 
this penultimate section in "Epochs of the World" was designed by Rosenzweig to show 
what his book claimed already in the epigraph to the first section of the book:1093 namely, 
that despite his "world-historical" efforts, Hegel's fate remained irreconciled, as he could 
never fully accomplish the unity of rationality and reason he so desired.  This "fate" 
comes to its tragic climax in the last political work Hegel was to write: "On the English 
Reform Bill." 
 
 
The "Fate" of Hegel's "On the English Reform Bill" 
 Rosenzweig's presentation of Hegel's last political writing—"On the English 
Reform Bill"—is subtly cloaked in the language of tragedy.  In 1831, the year the essay 
was published and the same year of Hegel's death, Rosenzweig observes a new mood in 
Hegel's writings and letters: "A trace of Hamlet, otherwise foreign to him, is present in 
his demeanor."1094  How are we to understand this language of tragedy in the context of 
Hegel's biography?  Although the reference to Hamlet, which Rosenzweig does not 
elaborate on, should not be overemphasized, it does point towards the general emphasis 
on tragedy within Rosenzweig's book.  After briefly outlining the context of Hegel's last 
political writing, I argue in the following section that Rosenzweig's treatment of this 
essay reveals his view that Hegel's life is ultimately imbued with a tragic sense—a sense 
which is then reflected in Rosenzweig's own personal and political situation.  
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1094 "Ein hamletischer Zug, ihm sonst fremd, liegt über seinem Verhalten." HS 519. 
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  Hegel's essay was written in response to the proposal of a bill that would grant 
English landowners greater participation in electing future members of English 
Parliament.  While Hegel had always kept a watchful eye on English politics, his essay 
did not address England so much as the "political problem of liberalism in France and 
especially in Prussia."1095  Although Rosenzweig nicely situates Hegel's criticism of these 
new European liberal tendencies within a broader context of Hegel's writings, our interest 
lies in the manner in which Rosenzweig presents this piece and what that says about his 
overarching view of Hegel's life and thought.  It is again by focusing on the form of 
Rosenzweig’s writing that his deeper views on Hegel emerge.  As stated above, by 
comparing Hegel to Hamlet, Rosenzweig evokes images of the tragic, without going as 
far as explicitly saying that Hegel was a tragic figure himself.  However, his life–and 
especially the end of his life–are filled with tragic moments.  Indeed, there are two tragic 
moments to be discussed here.  First, the "fate" of the work itself, which was censored 
and not published in its entirety.  Second, how the fate of this work played out upon the 
fate of Hegel himself.  In conclusion I would like to show how these two "fates" also 
mirror Rosenzweig as the author of Hegel and the State.    
 For Rosenzweig, Hegel's "On the English Reform Bill" is significant for the 
manner in which it reflects Hegel's changing relation—and final stance—towards the 
world as such.  It has been Rosenzweig's interest throughout to show how Hegel's thought 
was either at odds with his environment—the days of turmoil in Frankfurt—or how 
Hegel tried to reconcile his thinking with the unfolding of historical reality around him—
Jena and Napoleon; Prussia.  But now, approaching the end of Hegel and the State and 
Hegel's biography alike, Rosenzweig's concluding argument on Hegel's life begins to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1095 "politische Problem des Liberalismus in Frankreich und besonders in Preußen." HS 513.!
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shine through: "For the first time there happens to him what in forty years had never 
occurred: he cannot respond to the mute question of actuality with the clear and specific 
answer of the spirit."1096  The significance of Hegel's last political essay for Rosenzweig 
is that it clearly shows the break between reason and reality that has been anticipated 
throughout the entirety of Hegel and the State.  What happened, asks Rosenzweig, to the 
"philosophical Alexander"1097 we had come to know?  Hegel no longer has a grasp on the 
reality facing him and cannot find an answer for the call of the world.  Rather than the 
great Alexander, we are presented with an image of Hamlet: Hegel, alone at the end of 
his days, is faced with the fear of an impending revolution, and like Hamlet, he can only 
resort to silence.1098  We already know from examining Rosenzweig's notion of 
"metaethics" in The Star, that silence is a prerequisite and indeed the defining 
characteristic for a tragic hero.  Accordingly, when Hegel's students ask him to say the 
"correct word" (rechte Wort)1099 in order to clarify the political situation unfolding 
around them, Hegel is no longer certain that a verbal response is adequate.  Rosenzweig 
formulates Hegel's position rhetorically: "Yet, will a not word that falls into this 
whirlpool only increase the calamity, which exists precisely because everyone only wants 
to hear themselves?"1100  
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1096 "Zum ersten Mal geschieht ihm, was ihm in vierzig Jahren nie geschah: er muß der Wirklichkeit auf 
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1098 See Hamlet, Act V.2, 341. 
 
1099 HS 520. 
 
1100 "Doch wird ein Wort, das in diesen Strudel fällt, das Unheil, das ja gerade darin besteht, daß jeder nur 
sich selber hören will, nicht noch mehren?" HS 520. 
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 The power of words to change the political and historical world is one of the 
underlying themes of Hegel and the State.  This is clearly reflected in the choice to use 
Hölderlin's verse from "An die Deutschen" as an epigraph, which I elaborate on in my 
final chapter. Thus, there is a clear parallel between the manner in which Rosenzweig's 
ends his narrative of Hegel's life and the questions Rosenzweig is asking himself almost 
one hundred years later about the unfolding of his own biography.  While the lives of 
these two philosophers are certainly very different, the historical life of Hegel as 
Rosenzweig represents it is written in terms that reveal Rosenzweig's own spiritual 
biography.  At the end of Hegel's life and the end of Hegel and the State, all that remains 
for both individuals is "hope" (Hoffnung).1101  This parallel between Hegel and 
Rosenzweig lends even more significance to the presentation of Hegel's last published 
work. 
 Hegel's essay was published as a series of newspaper articles.  It was ultimately 
critical of the English monarchy, praising instead the Prussian political model Hegel had 
before him.  However, since at that time Prussia was trying to walk amicably with its 
powerful neighbor, the final sections of Hegel's critique were censored and never 
published.   Rosenzweig notes that this failure of Hegel's political thought to reach the 
public it was addressing was a typical fate of Hegel's political writings: "Hegels stärkste 
Verherrlichung des preußischen Königtums fand in dem Regierungsblatte Preußens 
keinen Platz.  Es ist ein eigenes Geschick, das über Hegels politischen Flugschriften und 
Zeitungsaufsätzen waltete. (HS 518)."    
 One must take pause here and wonder about the notion that a work can have a 
"fate" of its own.  There is something very modern about this idea: the notion that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1101 See HS 521; HS 532.   
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work has become a "thing", something independent of its author.  One can only wonder 
aloud at the fate of Hegel and the State itself, which until recently has lived a life quite 
separate from its author.  But nonetheless, if these works do indeed belong to the authors 
who wrote them, if the author's "personality" is revealed through their "work," then the 
fate of their work reflects the fate of their personality.  Thus, I argue that the fate of Hegel 
and the State reveals the fate of Rosenzweig's relationship to Germany and his personal 
identification with and towards the German people.  In Hegel and the State we do not see 
the failed attempt of a young student to carry out a sustained philosophical reflection, but 
the battlefield upon which Rosenzweig worked out his relationship to his spiritual 
biography and thus the prerequisite for understanding in what manner he transformed 
himself from a German academic into a German-Jewish philosopher.  
 In the case of Hegel himself, the fate of "On the English Reform Bill"—that it 
was not published in its entirety and cut short of its purpose—is reflected in Hegel's own 
personal fate: that although with the publication of the Phenomenology Hegel rose to 
unite with his age, in the end his thinking remained disjointed from reality.  With the rise 
of liberalism in Europe, Hegel sees both the necessity of such a movement, but fears its 
consequences.  And although Hegel praised the French Revolution as long as he lived, he 
was now, especially after July 1830, filled with a "fear of revolution" (Revolutionsfurcht). 
This "fear of revolution" coupled with the rise of liberalism goes back to Hegel's 
Napoleon period, where he witnessed the "mass of mediocrity" (Masse des 
Mittelmäßigen) pull the genius of Napoleon into its clutches.  Now, faced with very real 
possibility of revolution, Hegel's once powerful thought seems helpless in the face of 
reality.  The fate of his essay "On the English Reform Bill" parallels the fate of his own 
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personal life: "All the difficulties of his internal position were expressed."1102  At the end 
of Rosenzweig's biography we do not find a defiant self—that quality of the tragic hero 
that Rosenzweig emphasizes in the Star—but rather, something less tragic and simply 
sad: "an old heart" (ein altes Herz).1103  In this sense Rosenzweig writes in the style of 
tragedy, but does not write a tragedy itself.  The seeds of Rosenzweig's theory of the 
tragic are scattered about Hegel and the State, but not until The Star do we see his tragic 
flower in full bloom. 
 
 
A Biographical Death 
 In a letter to Hans Ehrenberg, Rosenzweig makes a rare comment on biographical 
method: "Die biografische Methode scheint mir in der Biografie nur dadurch 
gerechtfertigt,  weil der Mensch geboren wird und stirbt, —also eine Darstellung, die ihn 
sozusagen zwischen zwei Nichtse ausspannt, dadurch wenigstens möglich  ist.1104 Dilthey 
already addressed the possibility of biography.  With Dilthey we came to the conclusion 
that biography must of necessity be constructed like a work of art.  That is, even though it 
can still lay claim to some objectivity, it remains the construction of the author.  In the 
quote above we see how the birth and death of the biographical subject make this 
construction at least possible.  Birth and death give the life in question limits and it is 
from within these limits that the contours of the life can be defined.  Even if a biography 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1102 "Die ganze Schwierigkeiten seiner inneren Stellung war in ihr zum Ausdruck gekommen." HS 518.   
 
1103 HS 519. !
1104 Rosenzweig, Briefe, 6.12.13.  
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fails to capture its subject with complete accuracy, in this very failure it can be said to be 
operating within the realm of objectivity.  The alternative to this biographical thinking is 
writing world history (Weltgeschichte).  This type of history writing, Rosenzweig goes on 
to comment in the same letter, "ist eben absoluter Anfang und absolutes Ende."1105  Thus, 
the biographical writing of history makes no claims to be absolute, but remains fixed 
within the particularity of its subject matter.  Moreover, it is a form of history writing that 
Rosenzweig can stay committed to, despite his misgivings about history in The Star.  
Thus, Rosenzweig's Hegel and the State makes a stronger claim as a work of biography 
than as a work of world history.  Indeed, following the guidelines of the letter above, 
Rosenzweig begins with Hegel's birth in Stuttgart, and ends his presentation with his 
death in Berlin: the two nothings of Hegel's birth and death enclose the fullness of his 
life.  With his birth in 1770, Hegel was destined to mature around the greatest 
personalities of the nineteenth century.  But what can be said of his death?   
 A biographical death is an ending and not a beginning.  It does not anticipate like 
birth, but concludes.  With Hegel's death Rosenzweig has reached the conclusion of his 
biography, but not quite the conclusion of his book.  The "Foreword," "Prefatory 
Remarks" and "Concluding Remarks" all fall outside the trajectory of birth to death, and 
thus teach us something about the world historical context of Rosenzweig's biography.  
With Hegel's biographical death, however, we come to the end of the life story.  And it is 
again how this story is told that reveals the unspoken thoughts that give shape to its 
character.  Hegel's death is partly tragic, partly sad, partly a reflection of his philosophical 
legacy and partly the inevitable human stamp on his often seemingly larger-than-life 
philosophy.  But more than any of these, Hegel's death completes the biographical circle !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1105 Ibid.!
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of Rosenzweig's book.  And, like Hegel expressed in the Preface to his Phenomenology, 
it is often only at the end that we can understand the beginning.  
 The trajectory of Hegel's life as told in Hegel and the State has reached its end.  
Rosenzweig so strongly emphasized Hegel's Frankfurt period because it was here that he 
was struggling with notions of fate, which would both determine his ultimate conception 
of the state, but also form his self-identity as a philosopher.  With the publication of the 
Phenomenology Hegel had risen from the turmoil of inner life—a turmoil Rosenzweig 
likens to personal tragedy—and greets the age "eye to eye."  While during Napoleon's 
reign Hegel's confidence is shaken, it is not broken.  It is during this time that "fate" is 
firmly wedded with history for Hegel.  It is only at the end of Hegel's life that his unity 
with the age is broken.  With the threat of revolution and his own death on the horizon, 
Hegel’s ability to grasp reality rationally is slipping: "the unity with the age is torn" (die 
Vereingung mit der Zeit ist zerrissen).1106  What comes now for Hegel is "the harbinger 
from Hades" (der Bote aus dem Hades).1107  He has reached the point "where the internal 
ground of life of man, won from the harsh storms of development and previously 
declared in all turns of fate, has slipped from under the feet."1108  Hegel's final thought is 
if there is still a place in this world "for participation in the passionless quite of solely 
thinking knowledge."1109  Hegel, the great thinker of his age, ends his life in tragic 
isolation from the reality he once thought to have mastered.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1106 HS 521. 
 
1107 Ibid.   
 
1108 "wo der in harten Entwicklungsstürmen erkämpfte und in allen Schicksalswendungen bisher behauptete 
innere Lebensboden dem Menschen unter den Füßen weggleitet." HS 521.   
 
1109 "für die Teilnahme an der leidenschaftslosen Stille der nur denkenden Erkenntnis." HS 521.  !
 326 
 This is the concluding thought of Rosenzweig's presentation of Hegel’s 
biography, but not yet the concluding thought of the book.  Hegel's fate was 
foreshadowed throughout the entire book through the use of tragic language.  Now, that 
tragedy, which is really more a profound sadness and isolation than tragedy in the classic 
or modern sense, has reached its end.  We soon see how the way Hegel's end is described 
is reflected in Rosenzweig's own failed "unification with the age."  In the final pages of 
Hegel and the State to come, we are slowly guided from Hegel's biography and 
development of his view of the state into the historical age that followed.  The end of 
Hegel and the State not only wraps up the historical life of Hegel, but gives us a glimpse 
into Rosenzweig's own historical life.  In the concluding gestures of the book, we see 
how Rosenzweig's tragic "emplotment" of Hegel's life is reflected in the tragedy of his 
own identity as a German intellectual.  Thus, Hegel's biographical death is a foil for the 
death of Rosenzweig's German self and provides the occasion for the birth of his 
German-Jewish soul—a claim I elaborate on below. 
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CHAPTER XII 
 
"A GLIMMER OF HOPE" 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The final section of Hegel and the State, "Concluding Remarks," is one of its 
most intriguing.  In this short conclusion to the entire book, Rosenzweig puts the final 
touches on his picture of Hegel's development and legacy, gives his readers a clearer 
picture of the thesis of the book as whole and lastly, connects the contents of the book to 
his own historical present. We can learn a great deal from these concluding gestures, not 
only about Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel, but about Rosenzweig himself as an author. 
 As touched on earlier, with the publication of the Gritli-Briefe, the 
correspondence of Rosenzweig's love affair with Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, many once 
unknown facts of his biography came to light for the first time.  Included in these letters 
is Rosenzweig's sparse, yet important commentary on the period of revision he undertook 
for the Hegel book in the years 1919 and 1920, shortly before its publication.  The 
significance of these comments, which contain Rosenzweig's reaction after revisiting 
Hegel and the State for the first time in many years, are amplified by another historical 
conincidence: while editing Hegel and the State, Rosenzweig was editing The Star of 
Redemption for publication as well, the book for which he is best remembered today.  As 
Stéphane Mosès phrased it, despite being edited for publication virtually simultaneously, 
there is "a true abyss" (ein wahrer Abgrund)"1110 between the two books.  Nevertheless, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1110 Mosès, "Rosenzweig und Hölderlin." 354. 
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within the Gritli-Briefe we are at least offered a glimpse onto both sides of this abyss, and 
perhaps something more. 
 The view towards Hegel and the State that stands out from these letters is 
Rosenzweig's changing attitude towards his book as the revision process goes on.  What 
began as boredom and doubt—"I have the feeling like I am reading someone else’s 
work"; "A book for old men"—slowly transforms into a renewed interest and self-
respect: 
 
 The Hegel book is in parts very nice.  After reading it again, the Frankfurt  chapter 
 even took hold of me a little.  How there, as a 24-year-old I told the life-crisis of a 
 26-year-old with all philological accuracy and yet with the prophetic feeling "et 
 de me fabula narratur," precisely with the holy respect of "you will have your 
 turn"—that gave the chapter a funny, at the same time festive and awkward tone, 
 like a first kiss between children.  And later on some things are written very 
 masterfully.  Thus it is now a bearable work for me.  Nevertheless, I could only 
 work on it for a few hours at a time, and then doubt tore me away again.1111 
 
 
A few weeks later he will add: "The Hegel book is really not a bad book, the Heidelberg 
Academy was entirely correct from their point of view."1112  The above quotes show that 
Rosenzweig's own damning claim in the forward that he "never would have begun it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1111 "Das Hegelbuch ist streckenweise sehr schön. Das Frankfurt–Kapitel hat mich beim Wiederlesen jetzt 
sogar ein bischen ergriffen. Wie ich da als 24 jähriger mit aller philologischen Akuratesse und doch mit 
dem profetischen Gefühl "et de me fabula narratur" die Lebenskrise eines 26 jährigen erzählt habe, eben 
mit dem heiligen Respekt "du kommst auch noch dran"—das hat dem Kapitel einen komisch zugleich 
feierlichen und verlegenen Ton gegeben, so wie ein erster Kuss in einer Kinderliebe. Und im späteren ist 
manches  sehr souverän hingeschrieben. So ists eine erträgliche Arbeit jetzt für mich [emphasis mine] 
Allerdings habe ich nur immer stundenweis dran arbeiten können, dann riss mich die Verzweiflung wieder 
auf." Rosenzweig, Gritli-Briefe, 29.11.1919. 
 
1112 "Der Hegel ist wirklich kein schlechtes Buch, die Heidelb. Akademie hat von ihrem Standpunkt aus 
ganz recht gehabt." Gritli-Briefe, 15.12.1919. 
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today" is not to be taken as a condemnation of the entire book.  The Heidelberg 
Academy, who funded its publication, made the claim that Hegel and the State would 
prove a lasting source for scholarship.  But there is something more here, and it is again 
in the Frankfurt chapter, the time of Hegel's life when he lived in proximity to Hölderlin, 
that Rosenzweig saw his own life-story reflected into the work—"et de me fabula 
narratur" (it is of me the story is told).  Even if Rosenzweig is fondly looking back upon 
himself as a man looks back at a boy, the author of The Star of Redemption was satisfied 
enough with his work to risk publishing his Hegel book alongside his great religious-
philosophical masterpiece.  In other words, he could still find himself in his work.   
 Another reference to Hegel and the State in the Gritli-Briefe shows that at least at 
one point, the perspectives of the boy and the man converge—and this happens nowhere 
else but in the final version of the "Concluding Remarks" we now have before us: 
  
 I actually have to rewrite the entire concluding chapter, not just because it was 
 written before 1914, but in this case really because it comes before 1913.  Here 
 Eugen is correct when he says that "before him" I could not even write at all.  It 
 was written in February 1913.  I was personally satisfied with it, read it aloud to 
 Eugen, who immediately rejected it,—"such murmering."  That occurred to me as 
 I now reread it and I felt terribly ashamed.  I will now perhaps leave it out 
 entirely.1113 
 
At present, it is uncertain what the original form of the concluding remarks was, and if it 
is still available to us.  However, we can be assured that the final version that lies before !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1113 "das ganze Schlusskapitel muss ich eigentlich neuschreiben, nicht bloss weil es vor 1914 ist, sondern in 
diesem Fall wirklich einmal weil es vor 1913 ist. Hier hat Eugen recht, wenn er meint, ich hatte "vor ihm" 
überhaupt nicht schreiben können. Es ist vom Februar 13. Ich war selbst sehr zufrieden damit, las es 
Eugen vor, der es gleich ablehnte, —"so säuselnd". Das fiel mir ein, als ich es jetzt wieder las und mich 
ensetztlich schämte. Ich lasse es nun vielleicht ganz weg." Rosenzweig, Gritli-Briefe, 21.12.1919. !
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us was severely edited or perhaps even written anew towards the end of 1919.  This is 
worth lingering on, because if it is indeed the case, then it significantly shortens the 
apparent abyss between Rosenzweig's two major works—and more tellingly, as I will 
argue later, the abyss between Roeszweig as German and Rosenzweig as Jewish.  
Accordingly, we may read the "Concluding Remarks" to Hegel and the State not only as 
the final gesture of the entire book, but as Rosenzweig's own assessment of his work after 
he had written The Star of Redemption.  Seen in this light, these passages take on a 
significance that cannot be claimed of many other passages in the book.  Before returning 
to Hölderlin, who is the surprising protagonist of these final pages, we should linger on 
the opening words of this section—they reveal a great deal about the historical and 
intellectual world of Rosenzweig himself and ultimately point towards the tragic impulse 
he gives to Hegel's biography.    
 
 
"From Hegel to Bismarck" 
 Rosenzweig prefaces his "Concluding Remarks" with the epigraph " . . . aus 
Gedanken die Tat . . . " (from thoughts the act).1114  This line from Hölderlin's poem "An 
die Deutschen" has served as a point of orientation for Rosenzweig throughout the entire 
book.  The tension between "thoughts" and the "act" serves as a parallel to the fissure 
between "reason" and "actuality" in Rosenzweig's critique of Hegel's political thought.  
Moreover, this break into opposing tensions displays how Hegel's influence upon 
German nationality of the nineteenth century is reflected into Hegel's biography in a 
tragic light.  It is this irreconcilability of a particular, individual life with a universal, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1114 HS 526. 
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national history—and the glimmer of hope for the reconciliation of the two—that fills the 
final pages of Rosenzweig's book.   
On the first pages of "The Epochs of the World," Rosenzweig already hinted that 
Goethe was the authoritative voice of Hegel's age.  Goethe's "demonic" presence 
resurfaces in the "Concluding Remarks" when Rosenzweig contrasts him the the life and 
influence of that other German personality, Hegel.  The following quote from the 
"Concluding Remarks" shows how Rosenzweig values Hegel's historical legacy only in 
contrast to Goethe:  
 
If we bring to mind that [Hegel’s] life spans the exact time in which Goethe’s  
Faust came to be—1770-1831—it would become evident how much more truly 
the life itself and its work should be fixed within the history of the 19th century 
than the life and work of the greatest German of that epoch [...] in truth, the arc of 
Hegel’s historical influence played out with much more shallowness and therefore 
more briefly than that of the poet two decades his elder [...] The fruitful expanses 
of [Goethe's] life were spread equally broad on both sides of the great epochal 
divide that counts for us as the classical moment of modern German intellectual 
history.1115 
 
Portrayed in the manner, Hegel was merely a "narrow" figure in Goethe’s "broad" 
epoch.1116  Although Hegel's philosophical contributions express "a leitmotif of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1115 "Vergegenwärtigen wir uns, wie dies Leben genau die Zeit umspannt, in der Goethes Faust wurde—
1770 bis 1831—, so wird deutlich, wie viel genauer es selber und sein Werk in die Geschichte des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts eingespannt sein mußte als etwa Leben und Werk des größten Deutschen der 
Epoche [...] in Wahrheit verläuft doch der Flugbogen der geschichtlichen Wirkung bei Hegel viel flacher 
und darum kürzer als bei dem zwei Jahrzehnte älteren Dichter [...] gleich breit liegen die fruchtbaren 
Gefilde seines Lebens zu beiden Seiten der großen Epochenscheide verteilt, die uns als der klassischen 
Augenblick der neueren deutschen Geistesgeschichte gilt." HS 526.  
 
1116 This quote thus already foreshadows Rosenzweig's quite broad inclusion of Goethe—and particularly 
Goethe's Faust as a metaphor for his method at the end of the introduction to Book I—within The Star of 
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German nineteenth century," in his "national-historical significance"1117 the whole of 
political doctrine never managed to make it out of the nineteenth century intact.  And 
although Hegel provided the "thoughts" that opened the path towards Bismarck's "act"—
the founding of the German nation in 1871—these thoughts remained so wrapped up in 
the idea of that state that they failed to becoming manifest in the German nation.  
Goethe's life, in contrast, reached deeply enough into the eighteenth century—"into the 
pre-revolutionary and pre-Kantian world"1118—that his influence could arc above the 
nineteenth century into the twentieth.  The final words of the "Concluding Remarks" give 
testament to Goethe's influence upon Rosenzweig as well. 
 The stated purpose of Rosenzweig's "Concluding Remarks" is to show "where the 
thoughts of the politician Hegel remained behind the acts of the century of Bismarck," 
and moreover to allow its readers to feel "how also in this his remaining-behind there was 
a necessity, precisely the necessity of his dwelling in the fountain-well of time."1119  In 
order to explore what he terms the "necessity" of Hegel becoming trapped within his own 
age, Rosenzweig's again follows the path already laid down by his teacher Meinecke.  
This path, "the path from Hegel to Bismarck"1120 was first laid out by Meinecke in his 
book Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat.  Rosenzweig does no more than touch upon its 
major moments.  However, within these few paragraphs, which were most likely written !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Redemption, whereas Hegel, at least explicitly, is assigned the narrow role of representing the philosophy 
of Idealism, which the "new thinking" aims to overcome. 
 
1117 "ein Leitgedanke des deutschen neunzehnten Jahrhunderts"; "nationgeschichtlichen Bedeutung." HS 
526-27. 
 
1118 "in der vorrevolutionären und vorkantischen Welt." HS 526. 
 
1119 "wo die Gedanken des Politikers Hegel hinter den Taten des Jahrhunderts Bismarcks zurückbleiben"; 
"wie auch in diesem seinem Zurückbleiben Notwendigkeit lag, eben die Notwendigkeit seines Hausens in 
den Brunnenkammer der Zeit." HS 527. 
 
1120 "der Weg von Hegel zu Bismarck." HS 527.!
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as late as 1920, Rosenzweig is able to look back upon the trajectory of his work with 
fresh eyes and thus offer his readers a brief but informative gloss on his reading of 
Hegel's political thought.     
 Rosenzweig focuses on the doctrines of three political thinkers who laid the 
intellectual foundations of Bismarck's German nation and how they diverged from 
Hegel's thinking.  These thinkers are Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann (1785-1860), 
Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-1861) and Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896).  For all 
three thinkers, what is new in contrast to Hegel is the inclusion of the concept of the 
"nation" in their political thought.  For Dahlmann, the state is "an all-powerful order 
above humans."1121  Thus the starting-point of Hegel's political theory, the freedom of the 
human will, is removed from its prominence and replaced with a state embodying a being 
of its own.  On the other hand, Stahl acknowledges the importance of the human will 
within the state, but on grounds of religious freedom keeps the two separate, which like 
Dahlmann allows the state to come forward as a power of its own.  In contrast, Treitschke 
follows Hegel's idea that "the state is power and belongs to the world of the will."1122  For 
him, however, the state properly understood is "a people unified by law."1123  According 
to Rosenzweig, what drove Treitschke, and "unconsciously" (unbewußt)1124 Dahlmann 
and Stahl as well, was that unlike Hegel, who understood the state as the totality of the 
actualization of the human will, for theses three thinkers there was something external to 
the state: they were driven "towards the founding of the state not merely upon its own !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1121 "übermächtige, übermenschliche Ordnung." HS 528. 
 
1122 "der Staat Macht ist und der Welt des Willens angehört." HS 528.   
 
1123 "das rechtlich geeinte Volk." HS 529.   
 
1124 HS 529.!
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will, but rather upon the nation standing external and before him."1125  Rosenzweig goes 
on to claim that this reveals the true reason Hegel was not adopted as the national 
philosopher of the state: "that derivation held onto by Hegel of the state from the 
will."1126  
 Rosenzweig's underlying critique of Hegel's political thought is based on what 
happens to the individual will when subsumed into the universal state: "Thus, the 
individual was only called forth so that he could enter into the state."1127  As we have 
already seen, although Hegel begins his intellectual voyage holding the freedom of the 
individual in highest regard—so much so that his students could still say that "the 
master's doctrine of the state flowed from the metal of freedom"1128—this highest place in 
his political thought was soon taken over by the state.  But the situation is no better with 
Treitschke, who replaces the individual will with the will of the nation: "both, the 
individual and the nation, are thus in a certain sense sacrificed to the state."1129  When 
Bismarck founded the first unified German state in 1871 he would follow the lead of 
Treitschke and found this state upon a national platform.  This led to a separation of the 
state from the nation, or what now became evident to Rosenzweig's generation after the 
First World War, "the speparation of state and culture."1130  As early as 1914, the German 
people no longer felt that the state embodied the national culture: "The harsh necessity of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1125 "zur Begründung des Staats nicht schlechthin auf seinen eigenen Willen, sondern auf die außer ihm und 
vor ihm bestehende Nation." HS 529. 
 
1126 "jene bei Hegel festgehaltene Herleitung des Staats aus dem Willen."HS 529. 
1127 "So wurde der Einzelmensch nur hervorgerufen, damit er in den Staat eingehe." HS 529.   
 
1128 "die Staatslehre des Meisters aus dem Metall der Freiheit gegossen sei." HS 529. 
 
1129 "beide, Einzelmensch und Nation, sind so in gewissem Sinne dem Staat zu opfern" HS 530.   
 
1130 "die Trennung von Staat und Kultur." HS 530.!
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external history hindered the state from growing with internal necessity from the life of 
the nation for the Germans; just as before, the individual could not find enough room in 
this state."1131   
 With the above argumentation, Rosenzweig sets up the opposition between the 
individual and the nation.  Hegel's generation, "gone mad with the I" (irre geworden am 
Ich"1132—equally influenced by Rousseau and the French Revolution—sought to preserve 
the freedom of the individual in the establishment of the state.  However, what 
Rosenzweig now sees here are "the traces not of a state, but of a nation."1133  Hegel never 
gave the nation a place in his thinking.  Nevertheless, with Bismarck's founding act in 
1871, the nation came to substitute the individual in the fulfillment of the state.  
Rosenzweig, hinting here at his devastating critique of the individualism of German 
Idealism within the first few pages of The Star, writes that perhaps because Hegel was a 
"lonely man" (einsamer Mensch) filled with "personal longing and searching" 
(persönlichen Sehnen und Suchen) that he overlooked the importance of the nation in 
favor of "the gratification of his will" (die Befriedigung seines Willens).1134  While the 
above words are certainly damning towards Hegel, Rosenzweig by no means praises 
Bismarck's state.  On the contrary, the ideal of a "national moral community" (nationalen 
Gesittungsgemeinschaft) which the generation of 1770 had cloaked in the form of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1131 "Die harte Notwendigkeit der äußeren Geschichte hatte es gehindert, daß der Staat dem Deutschen mit 
innerer Notwendigkeit aus dem Leben der Nation hervorwuchs; wieder wie einst fand der Mensch in 
diesem Staat nicht mehr recht Raum." HS 530. To challenge the idea of 'not having enough room,' of the 
state oppressing the free air of individuals, was one reason Rosenzweig wrote his book to begin with. See 
HS 18. 
 
1132 HS 530. 
 
1133 "die Züge nicht eines Staats, sondern einer Nation." HS 531. 
 
1134 HS 531.  !
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state, remained "only a hope even after Bismarck's act (auch nach Bismarcks Tat nur 
Hoffnung."1135  For Rosenzweig, neither the individual nor the nation were enough to 
resist the "harsh necessity of external history."  
  What does Rosenzweig offer us against this necessity of history?  Is there a way 
from "thoughts" (Gedanken) to the "act" (Tat)?  One of the most important underlying 
questions of Hegel and the State is the possibility of "hope" (Hoffnung) in the face of 
history.  In classifying the historical progression "from Hegel to Bismarck" as one from 
"thought" to "act," Rosenzweig is leaning heavily on the visions of Hölderlin's poem and 
the hope for a "national moral community" contained therein.  However, he must also 
acknowledge both the naivety of his own youth and the irreconcilability of the present 
with that past when he writes: "not 'as the bolt comes from the clouds' did this act spring 
forth from these thoughts; the path of history was longer and more gradual than the poet's 
longing had dreamed it."1136  Hölderlin's longing for a German nation mirrors the young 
Rosenzweig's own longing for a renewed political state.  However, as the quote above 
reveals, in 1919, Rosenzweig now sees in history a "long" and "gradual" path, one 
imbued with less of the "lonely" (einsame) fire of the poet's soul, which he could perhaps 
still associate with when he began writing his book on Hegel.  The necessity of the age 
has forced Rosenzweig to admit to the limits of Hegel's idea of the state as a political 
ideal.  Indeed, looking back on Hegel's life he can now see that these limits were set 
when in Frankfurt Hegel first developed his idea of the state as fate "in proximity to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1135 HS 531. 
 
1136 "nicht 'wie der Blitz aus dem Gewölke kommt,' ist jene [Tat] aus diesem [Gedanken] gesprungen; der 
Weg der Geschichte was länger und allmählicher, als die Sehnsucht des Dichters ihn träumte." HS 528.   
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Hölderlin."1137  Already then, the will of the individual far outweighed the will of the 
nation.  In the following pages, we can now again turn towards Rosenzweig's reading of 
Hegel's life and, with the book behind us, see how this tragic vision is reflected in 
Rosenzweig's own personal biography. 
 
 
"An die Deutschen": Rosenzweig's Hölderlin 
 Understanding how Rosenzweig makes use of Hölderlin's poem "An die 
Deutschen" is the final key to unlocking Hegel and the State.  In the following section I 
offer an analysis of several verses from the poem.  These verses appear within the context 
of the main epigraph to Hegel and the State and within the conclusion as well.  I argue 
that an analysis of Hölderlin's "An die Deutschen" is indispensible for coming to terms 
with both the content of the book—Rosenzweig's critical narrative of Hegel's life—and 
also Rosenzweig's own biographical relation to Hegel and the State when he published it 
in 1920.  In short, in what follows I show how Rosenzweig's motives for writing Hegel 
and the State as well as the reasons he would eventually move beyond the book are 
hidden within his formal use of Hölderlin's "An die Deutschen."  
 "An die Deutschen" was written in the year 1800.  The significance of this date 
was no coincidence for Rosenzweig.  Throughout his life, following in the footsteps of 
his elder Dilthey, Rosenzweig remained fixated upon this moment of German history.  
Rosenzweig's cousin Hans Ehrenberg, in a striking passage from his Autobiography, 
summarizes the height of spiritual life around the year 1800 and how it related to the 
emerging hopes for a renewed national life:   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1137 "in Hölderlins Nähe." HS 532.!
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 Politicians, poets and scholars tried in vain during the first decade of the 
 nineteenth century to provide Germany with an all-around healthy foundation for 
 her national life and to breathe into her the power to develop a new national 
 tradition.  Their failure to achieve this was a tragedy.1138  
 
Ehrenberg's words, although quite broadly stated, may serve as a paraphrase of 
Rosenzweig's thesis in Hegel and the State: how did the hopes for a new national life find 
their champion in Hegel and his contemporaries and more importantly, in what manner 
did these hopes fall short?  While Ehrenberg's use of the word "tragedy," written in exile 
in the year 1943, carries a much stronger implication than anywhere the word appears in 
Hegel and the State, juxtaposing this usage with Rosenzweig's text nevertheless 
underscores how in Hegel and the State the tragedy of German history is embedded 
within the life of one particular personality—Hegel.  And although today this German 
tragedy could take on many historical forms—ranging from the collapse of the Holy 
Roman Empire in the year 1806; the fall of German Imperialism in 1918 and of course, 
beyond Rosenzweig's own life time, the rise of National Socialism—regarding the year 
"1800," Rosenzweig had a more particular tragedy in mind.  As he would later write in a 
letter that would be termed the Urzelle or "germ cell" of The Star of Redemption, what 
captivated him above all in the year 1800 was "the philosopher as opposed to the 
philosophy."1139  This overtly existential tone shows that for Rosenzweig it was within 
the individual lives of the "[p]oliticians, poets and scholars" that the riddles of Germany's 
tragedy could to be unearthed.  As expressed in Hegel's biography, it was first during his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1138 Ehrenberg, Autobiography. 104. 
1139 Rosenzweig, "Urzelle." 370 (my emphasis).  !
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friendship with the poet Hölderlin in Frankfurt that the notions of history and fate, the 
unity and separation of life were thrown into collision.  The significance of Hölderlin's 
"An die Deutschen" is how it reveals the tragic undercurrent of German intellectual life in 
general and how even in a much different age Rosenzweig in particular could see his own 
German nationality reflected in the verses of this poem. 
 "An die Deutschen"1140 begins with a warning, "Spottet nimmer des Kindes" and 
continues with a humbling admission: "auch wir sind / Tatenarm und gedankenvoll."  
The "wir" (we) of this first verse includes the poet amongst what must be assumed as the 
German people, "Tatenarm und gedankenvoll."  This central tension of the entire poem 
applies equally to the spheres of practical politics as well as poetical reflection.  Indeed 
the failure to unite "Gedanke" (thought) and "Tat" (act) is the "tragedy" that Ehrenberg 
spoke of in his autobiography.  In Hölderlin's poem this assumed result is still in 
question: "Aber kommt, wie der Strahl aus dem Gewolke kommt / Aus Gedanken 
vielleicht, geistig und reif die Tat?"  What is at stake here, according to Stépfane Mosès 
in his essay "Rosenzweig und Hölderlin," is nothing less than the possibility of "an ideal 
community of the people, infused with the spirit of poetry."1141  This ideal, which echoes 
the vision of community contained in the Systemprogramm that Rosenzweig first 
discovered, corresponds to Rosenzweig's vision for his own age as a cosmopolitan 
German state, a Kulturstaat, at least when he first began his book on Hegel in the year 
1910.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1140 For all quotes from this poem, see Hölderlin, Gesammelte Werke. 
 
1141 "idealen, vom Geist der Poesie durchdrungenen Volksgemeinschaft." Mosès, "Rosenzweig und 
Hölderliin." 358. 
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 After establishing the frame of inquiry, the poem then shifts to the personal 
struggles of the poet himself: "Schon zu lange, zu lang irr ich, dem Laien gleich / In des 
bildenden Geists werdender Werkstatt hier."  The verses transform into a personal 
longing, a cry towards the creative spirit of the people: "Schöpferischer, o wann, Genius 
unsers Volk / Wann erscheinest du ganz, Seele des Vaterlands."  This longing for 
wholeness was the sentiment shared by Hölderlin and Hegel when they lived together in 
Frankfurt—there, in the language of Hölderlin's Hyperion, it was called "the unity of all 
life."  When Hölderlin resummons this longing and those he longed with—"mit denen ich 
/ Vormals trauerte"—it is once again by making comparison to the poets and artists not 
of Germany, but of Greece: 
 
 Wenn unsere Städte nun 
 Hell und offen und wach, reineren Feuers voll, 
 Und die Berge des deutschen 
 Landes Berge der Musen sind, 
 
 Wie die herrlichen einst, Pindus und Helikon 
 Und Parnassos, und rings unter des Vaterlands 
 Goldnem Himmel die freie, 
 Klare, geistige Freude glänzt. 
 
 
This vision of the "golden skies of the Fatherland" remains precisely that, a vision.  It 
would never be realized in its utopian ideal, not by Hölderlin himself nor for the 
generation to follow.  Rather, the final words of the poem anticipate the struggles of the 
German people to give a poetical reality to their vision: "Klanglos . . . ists in der Halle 
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längst / Armer Seher! bei dir, sehnend verlischt dein Aug / Und du schlummerst hinunter 
/ Ohne Namen und unbeweint."  The use of the pronoun "du" (you), after the poem has 
shifted through the "wir" and "ich," removes the impersonal generality of the collective 
people, but inserts an ambiguity as to exactly who this "you" is.  The "Armer Seher" at 
the end of the poem is at once the poet himself, but also all who still hold a vision of hope 
for the future of the German people.  With the publication of his book on Hegel, 
Rosenzweig could still feel called by this "you."  So much so, that he would choose to 
frame Hegel and the State with two verses from Hölderlin's "An die Deutschen." It is to 
these verses that I now turn.  
 The manner in which Rosenzweig integrates "An die Deutschen" into his text 
must be noted from the outset.  Far from giving a critical reading of the poem, 
Rosenzweig selects certain verses that appear as direct questions; questions Hölderlin 
posed to his age, and which Rosenzweig now poses to his own.  The first of these 
questions, taken from an older version of the second verse of the poem, was the original 
epigraph to Hegel and the State in 1909: 
 
 Aber kommt, wie der Strahl aus dem Gewölke kommt 
 Aus Gedanken vielleicht, geistig und reif die Tat? 
 Folgt der Schrift, wie des Haines 
 Dunklem Blatte, die goldene Frucht? 
 
The choice of this epigraph for Hegel and the State appears at first to be quite practical.  
The movement from "Gedanken" (thoughts) to "Tat" (act) that the poem questions, 
mirrors the movement of German history in the nineteenth century as the thoughts of 
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politicians, poets and scholars, which leads to the act of the founding of the German 
nation-state by Bismarck.  The fact that it is a question and not a statement shows the 
uncertainty Rosenzweig still sees in this progression.  Indeed, it is the break between 
"Gedanken" and "Tat," like the break between "Vernunft" and "Wirklichkeit" that adds to 
the tragic undertones of the entirety of Hegel and the State.  
 However, the epigraph is also a cunning choice, which reflects on Rosenzweig's 
own biography.  For in choosing this verse, Rosenzweig is also questioning the 
possibility of a written work, "der Schrift"—in this case Hegel and the State—to change 
the course of history.  With his poem, Hölderlin proposes a vision of German unity, 
which Rosenzweig could still dream of before the collapse of the Wilhelmian Empire in 
1918.  This dream that Hölderlin and Hegel longed for in their youth, was pronounced as 
a longing towards the "genius of our people."  However, looking back on his work in 
1919, after living through the First World War and writing The Star of Redemption, 
Rosenzweig must soberly judge the course of history and the original dream of his work: 
  
 On the way from the collapse of the old empire to the foundation of the new—
 from Hegel to Bismarck—this dream remained unfulfilled. When this book was 
 begun, it could have just as well seemed like a waking dream, one of those which 
 precisely as dream could remain living in order to once become what dreams 
 could become: history-creating power.1142 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1142 "Dieser Traum blieb schon auf dem Weg vom Untergang des alten zur Gründung des neuen Reichs—
von Hegel zu Bismarck—unerfüllt.  Als dies Buch begonnen wurde, konnte er gleichwohl ein Wahrtraum 
scheinen, einer von jenen, die gerade als Träume lebendig bleiben, um einst noch zu werden, was Träume 
werden können: Geschichte schaffende Macht." HS 532.  
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The dream Rosenzweig held to be possible when he first began his book on Hegel now 
seems to him "to dissolve irretrievably into the foam of the waves that engulf all of 
life."1143  As he stated in the addendum to the Foreword, his original task with Hegel and 
the State was to provide a critique of Hegel's political philosophy in order to help make 
room for a new sense of German nationality.  By presenting Hegel's political thought in 
the form of a biography, Rosenzweig aimed to give his readers a living glimpse into their 
own political history and in this way reanimate their engagement with German national 
history and the contemporary political community.  That Rosenzweig casts his project 
using Hölderlin's poetic question—"folgt der Schrift [...] die goldene Frucht?"—shows 
that he aimed to achieve this dream not through a call to political action, but through 
Bildung, or the shared culture of language and thought.        
 All that is left for Rosenzweig in 1919 is "a glimmer of hope" (ein Schimmer von 
Hoffnung),1144 and yet, as he writes making subtle reference to Goethe's Faust, "the 
prisoner in the dungeon is not prohibited from casting his glance upon it."1145  It is this 
"glimmer of hope" that Rosenzweig found in the second epigraph to his book and which 
now serves as the last lines of Hegel and the State: 
 
 Wohl ist enge begrenzt unsere Lebenszeit 
 Unserer Jahre Zahl sehen und zählen wir, 
 Doch die Jahre der Völker, 
 Sah ein sterbliches Auge sie?  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1143 "unwiederbringlich sich aufzulösen in den Schaum der Wellen, die alles Leben überfluten." HS 532.   !
1144 HS 532. 
 
1145 "doch dem Gefangenen im Kerker bleibt es unverwehrt, den Blick auf ihn zu werfen." HS 532. If 
Rosenzweig is indeed referencing Faust here, and I strongly believe he is, than the proper translation of 
"sein Blick", owing to the character Margarette, would have to be "her glance."!
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This second question, added as the second epigraph in 1919, was asked by the author of 
both Hegel and the State and The Star of Redemption.  Even though from a stylistic 
perspective there is an abyss between these two works, with this second epigraph 
Rosenzweig's work on history and his work of philosophy briefly come together.  The 
first lines of the verse, Wohl ist enge begrenzt unsere Lebenszeit / Unserer Jahre Zahl 
sehen und zählen wir, represent the work Rosenzweig did as an historian: the limits of a 
particular life are ordered by years and events.  It is a kind of quantifying of life, an 
organization of the past.  The second part of the verse on the other hand, Doch die Jahre 
der Völker / Sah ein sterbliches Auge sie? points towards the future and almost becomes 
a theological question.  Taken together, this verse answers the question posed by the first 
epigraph—albeit with another question.  Whether it is possible for written works to 
change the course of history, remains unanswered for Hölderlin and Rosenzweig alike.  
There is no knowing the limits of the history of a people.  And yet, one could imagine 
that Rosenzweig saw something else in these verses, something closer to his heart as the 
author of The Star of Redemption.  If a "mortal eye" cannot see the future and must cast 
his glance towards the past, what is this "glimmer of hope" Rosenzweig preserves?  Is it 
the "genius of the people" that Hölderlin longs for? Or perhaps the power of history to 
transform the present? Or in Rosenzweig's case, if we again recall his allusion to Faust, is 
it perhaps a longing for the redemptive power of God?  
 As I showed above, Rosenzweig had just finished writing The Star of Redemption 
while he was working on revision to Hegel and the State.  In this context, the phrase "the 
years of the people" (die Jahre der Völker) merits special attention.  For readers of The 
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Star of Redemption, it is well known that Rosenzweig identifies himself as Jewish in this 
work.  The entirety of Part III, which deals with the relation between Christianity and 
Judaism, is written using the pronoun "we" to denote Rosenzweig's belonging to the 
Jewish people (jüdisches Volk).  But this same "we" in the context of Hegel and the State 
refers to Rosenzweig's belonging to the German people.  Thus, with the addition of this 
second epigraph we have arrived at the crux of the German Jewish problem for 
Rosenzweig.  This verse shows that Rosenzweig is at heart both German and Jewish, a 
pairing he struggled with his entire life.  With the publication of Hegel and the State 
Rosenzweig bid farewell to his German past, only to embrace a Jewish future. 
 Rosenzweig chose to make the questions from Hölderlin's "An die Deutschen" 
emblematic for Hegel and the State because he conceived of his book as a gift "to the 
Germans."  However, like the title to the poem, it would be foolish to see only this one 
side.  Rosenzweig resurrects Hegel's biography in order to show how Hegel's political 
ideals diverted the vision of utopia he once shared with Hölderlin.  In this manner, Hegel 
and the State was also written as a warning—not merely to the neo-Kantians who 
mocked Hegel's name at the beginning of the twentieth century—but to the German 
people as a whole: "Spottet nimmer des Kindes [...] auch wir sind / Tatenarm und 
gedankenvoll."  Today, Rosenzweig, rightly remembered as one of the most important 
Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century, is recognized for a more considerable gift to the 
German people—the translation of the Hebrew Bible into German with Martin Buber.  
His own relation to his past as a German historian, however, is one of tragedy: a life lived 
in the solitude of discipline and hopeful longing, only to be broken by the external forces 
of history.  Thus, the verse following the second epigraph from Hölderlin's "An die 
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Deutschen," a verse Rosenzweig leaves unmentioned, provides a fitting picture for the 
undercurrent of tragedy we have been following throughout Hegel and the State: 
 
 Wenn die Seele dir auch über die eigene Zeit 
 Sich die sehnende schwingt, trauernd verweilst du 
 Dann am kalten Gestade 
 Bei den Deinen und kennst sie nie 
 
 
This picture would remain all the more tragic, had Rosenzweig not found his soul 
renewed in the Jewish faith.  However, part of Rosenzweig, even if a vision of his 
younger self, would always remain on the "kalte Gestade" he was forced to inhabit while 
writing Hegel's biography.  In Part I of The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig takes up this 
isolated world of the tragic individual, in order to show how this tragedy may be 
overcome through language, love and faith.  But as he writes there, "[w]ithout the storms 
of defiance in the self, the silence of the sea in the faithfulness of the soul would be 
impossible."1146  Thus, the tragic individual that Rosenzweig preserves within his 
narrative of Hegel and the State—to show through Hegel's life the impossibility of 
unifying the individual with the state—is captured in the same notion of individuality in 
The Star of Redemption.  The "glimmer of hope" Rosenzweig draws from Hölderlin—
Doch die Jahre der Völker, sah ein sterbliches Auge sie?—contains the same hope for 
redemption Rosenzweig would seek throughout his life.  And as the ones-to-come—the 
"Künftigen" from Hölderlin's poem—is it not our task to brave the forceful waves of 
history and preserve this glimmer for those future souls still unknown? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1146!Star!170.!
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